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  • Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan

    Dutch Soldiers Stress Restraint in Afghanistan

    By C. J. CHIVERS
    Published: April 6, 2007

    QALA-E-SURKH, Afghanistan — The Dutch infantrymen stood on a ridge near the Baluchi Valley, an area in south-central Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban and tribes opposed to the central government.

    Whenever they push farther, the soldiers said, they swiftly come under fire from rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. “The whole valley is pretty much hostile,” said one, a machine gunner.

    But rather than advancing for reconnaissance or to attack, the Dutch soldiers pulled back to a safer village. “We’re not here to fight the Taliban,” said the Dutch commander, Col. Hans van Griensven, at a recent staff meeting. “We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”

    Thousands of fresh Western troops have flowed into Afghanistan since last year, seeking to counter the resurgent Taliban before an expected spring offensive. Many American units have been conducting sweeps and raids.

    But here in Uruzgan Province, where the Taliban operate openly, a Dutch-led task force has mostly shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the Taliban’s fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in. American military officials have expressed unease about the Dutch method, warning that if the Taliban are not kept under military pressure in Uruzgan, they will use the province as a haven and project their insurgency into neighboring provinces.

    The Dutch counter that construction projects and consistent political and social support will lure the population from the Taliban, allowing the central and provincial governments to expand their authority over the long term.

    Insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics have long been subjects of intensive tinkering and debate, as military and police forces from different nations, and even different units within nations, have chosen conflicting approaches.

    The Dutch-led force of about 2,000 soldiers has adopted what counterinsurgency theorists call the “oil spot” approach. Under this tactic, it concentrates efforts in less hostile areas, especially a basin around Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital, which overlaps an economic development zone designated by Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president.

    The central idea is that if foreign military forces show restraint and respect, and help the local government to govern, then these areas will expand, slowly but persistently, like an oil stain across a shirt. As they grow, the theory says, the Taliban’s standing will decline.

    To date, the Dutch, aided by American soldiers and contractors who train Afghan police officers and soldiers, have helped Afghan units to coordinate security and build police posts. Simultaneously, they have sent teams of specialists and Australian engineers to choose development projects and plan them with village leaders. They have built or repaired schools, mosques, police garrisons, courtrooms and a hospital inside the more secure areas. A bridge and a police training center are under construction or in design. They also have opened a trade school that teaches Afghan laborers basic job skills, including carpentry and generator repair.

    To encourage expansion of the government’s influence, the Dutch infantry conducts patrols around the secure zones, and reconstruction teams try to identify future projects and allies who can extend the ring of influence. “Inside the inner ring, we try to do a lot of long-lasting development projects,” said Lt. Col. Gert-Jan Kooij, the task force’s operations officer. “It’s not like it is 100 percent safe there. It never is. But it’s permissive at least. And by showing that we have projects in the permissive areas, we hope the people in other areas will see that it gets better when they work with their government.”

    Such counterinsurgency tactics are not new; they are only back in vogue, with a new generation of officers drawing lessons from past military operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Borneo, Vietnam and elsewhere.

    Similar tactics have reappeared in American units in Iraq, as both the Army and the Marine Corps have been rewriting doctrine along the same lines.

    But the Dutch have embraced the theory more fully than most, to the point that most Dutch units now take extraordinary steps to avoid military escalation and risks of damage to property or harm to civilians. (When armored vehicles damaged a grove of mulberry trees, a captain came by the next day to negotiate a compensation payment for the farmers.)

    When Dutch units patrol, they usually avoid known hostile zones, which include expansive patches of Uruzgan Province. When a Dutch unit is attacked, it typically withdraws from enemy range. In areas where the Taliban are less prevalent, soldiers do not wear helmets, which the Dutch say makes them more approachable.

    Dutch commanders say they also draw from their army’s experiences in southern Iraq from 2003 through 2005, where similar tactics were used. They say their units had better relations with Iraqis, and faced less fighting, than did American units. Civilian deaths and property damage caused by American tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, they said, have hardened villagers’ attitudes, which helps the insurgents with recruiting, intelligence and protection.

    Dutch officers also say the approach has yielded promising results here. Sometimes villagers have warned them of ambushes or roadside bombs, and in several villages the Dutch are rarely attacked. Since the task force began operations last August, it has not suffered a combat fatality. Colonel van Griensven also said the task force had developed underground contacts in Taliban-controlled regions.

    “If you look at what we have done in eight months, I am optimistic,” he said. “We have a good start with the basics.”

    He added that he could deploy his units on sweeps, searches and raids, and chase the Taliban away. But each time after his infantry left an area, he said, the Taliban would simply move back in.

    Not everyone is convinced, and some participants openly worry that the formula is out of balance, undermined by too great a reluctance to use force. Large areas of Uruzgan remain Taliban havens. The local government, plagued by corruption, remains so weak that it does not yet have a significant program against soaring poppy production, which helps underwrite the insurgency. One Afghan interpreter who works with the Dutch said their approach was passive.

    “The Dutch, if the fight starts, they run inside their vehicles every time,” said the interpreter, who asked that his name be withheld because he risked losing his job. “They say, ‘We came for peace, not to fight.’ And I say, ‘If you don’t fight, you cannot have peace in Afghanistan.’ ”

    Uruzgan is also clearly not as safe as casualty statistics suggest. Neither the United Nations nor any foreign aid organizations work here, because they judge the province too dangerous. The insurgents often plant bombs and conduct ambushes, although so far the bombs have not been as powerful as those in Iraq, and Afghan marksmanship has often been poor. In late March a suicide bomber struck an armored vehicle, and this two-day patrol near the Baluchi Valley entrance was warned that two suicide car bombers were stalking them.

    The Dutch must move slowly on dirt roads, searching for mines. And a Dutch patrol base in Poentjak, near the Baluchi Valley, is a lonely fortress, often coming under rocket and mortar fire.

    One platoon commander, First Lt. Rick, who according to Dutch rules for junior soldiers could be identified only by his rank and first name, noted that anger at foreign troops persisted even in the secure areas. In Tarin Kowt, a city of about 100,000 people, the population in most neighborhoods tolerates Dutch patrols. But on the city’s western side, he said, people throw stones or stare icily, slowly running their fingers across their throats.

    For soldiers trained to fight, the soft approach is at times uncomfortable. A noncommissioned officer, Cpl. Niels, recalled the terrorist attacks in America in 2001. “We are soldiers,” he said. “We saw the planes coming in and we wanted to go to Afghanistan and fight. But other people don’t see if that way.”

    Pvt. Kai noted that Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribes had resisted outside influence for more than 1,000 years, and said it was unlikely the isolated population of Uruzgan would accept the central government in a time frame anything like what Dutch military planners hope for.

    In some respects, the soldiers said, the Dutch must seek support from two populations: one in Afghanistan, the other back home. The Netherlands is more averse to casualties than the United States, the soldiers said, which influences choices in the field.

    Still, of roughly two dozen soldiers and officers interviewed, none felt that avoiding casualties was the driving force behind their tactical choices. And Dutch officers point out that Dutch special forces are operating here, and fight the Taliban directly. In the past week, they said, those forces had at least four engagements, which included airstrikes or artillery support.

    Military officers further noted that successful counterinsurgency efforts typically required a decade or more — not months. Colonel van Griensven estimated that the task force’s approach would require at least 10 years. But the Dutch government has thus far committed to a two-year mission, ending in 2008, raising the question of whether their tactics will endure should the Dutch depart or reduce troop levels.

    Colonel van Griensven said he understood the arguments over where the balance should lie between fighting and seeking friends. “There is no right answer,” he said.

    “The only thing we believe is that using too much fighting is ounterproductive. Will we be successful? I cannot tell yet.”

    http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/wo..._r=2&ref=world
    Reconstruction and helping the Afghans to address their grassroot problems will go a long way to win the hearts and minds, but to retreat when fired upon by the Taliban would only embolden the terrorists.

    Further, it would be interesting what are the methods that are being applied to ensure that the area where such grassroot help is being given is sanitised while such assistance is being given and how are they managing to prevent the Taliban coming in thereafter to undo the assistance given.


    "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

    I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

    HAKUNA MATATA

  • #2
    An interesting approach to say the least......only time will tell if it's effective.
    Although it is not true that all conservatives are stupid people, it is true that most stupid people are conservative.
    - John Stuart Mill.

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    • #3
      Originally posted by crooks View Post
      An interesting approach to say the least......only time will tell if it's effective.
      How do they get home week ends?..............remember back in Europe during my tours, the Dutch army all went home week ends
      Last edited by T_igger_cs_30; 07 Apr 07,, 18:30.
      sigpicFEAR NAUGHT

      Should raw analytical data ever be passed to policy makers?

      Comment


      • #4
        Originally posted by T_igger_cs_30 View Post
        How do they get home week ends?..............remember back in Europe during my tours, the Dutch would army all went home week ends
        They're Dutch, I'm sure they find a way ;) .
        Although it is not true that all conservatives are stupid people, it is true that most stupid people are conservative.
        - John Stuart Mill.

        Comment


        • #5
          Is their approach wrong?


          Forget about weekends. Let's look at the business end!


          "Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

          I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

          HAKUNA MATATA

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Ray View Post
            Is their approach wrong?


            Forget about weekends. Let's look at the business end!
            Personally Sir, I cannot see it being succesful in the long term, IMO the enemy will find so many ways to exploit it..........“
            If you look at what we have done in eight months, I am optimistic he said. “We have a good start with the basics.”
            8 months , basics?..........not at all sure about this
            sigpicFEAR NAUGHT

            Should raw analytical data ever be passed to policy makers?

            Comment


            • #7
              [B]Further to my post #6

              But rather than advancing for reconnaissance or to attack, the Dutch soldiers pulled back to a safer village. “We’re not here to fight the Taliban,” said the Dutch commander, Col. Hans van Griensven, at a recent staff meeting. “We’re here to make the Taliban irrelevant.”
              How can you possibly make an enemy irrelevant by "pulling back" to a safe area everytime they show thier face?

              But here in Uruzgan Province, where the Taliban operate openly, a Dutch-led task force has mostly shunned combat. Its counterinsurgency tactics emphasize efforts to improve Afghan living conditions and self-governance, rather than hunting the Taliban’s fighters
              How can you empower the local Afghans to take control themselves, by retreating and leaving them alone everytime the Taleban fighters appear, how will they get the local people to shed thier fear of the Taleban?

              To date, the Dutch, aided by American soldiers and contractors who train Afghan police officers and soldiers, have helped Afghan units to coordinate security and build police posts. Simultaneously, they have sent teams of specialists and Australian engineers to choose development projects and plan them with village leaders. They have built or repaired schools, mosques, police garrisons, courtrooms and a hospital inside the more secure areas. A bridge and a police training center are under construction or in design. They also have opened a trade school that teaches Afghan laborers basic job skills, including carpentry and generator repair.
              And without destroying the Taleban resistance, again the Taleban will use these new structers and skills to thier own end.

              Such counterinsurgency tactics are not new; they are only back in vogue, with a new generation of officers drawing lessons from past military operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Borneo, Vietnam and elsewhere
              Without research hard to comment, any idea how succesfull these tactics were in these other conflicts, and at what stage of the conflicts were they carried out? Afghanistan is no where near under control yet.

              But the Dutch have embraced the theory more fully than most, to the point that most Dutch units now take extraordinary steps to avoid military escalation and risks of damage to property or harm to civilians. (When armored vehicles damaged a grove of mulberry trees, a captain came by the next day to negotiate a compensation payment for the farmers.)
              And how soon after negotiating the compensation, did the Taleban reappear and take the money?

              Dutch commanders say they also draw from their army’s experiences in southern Iraq from 2003 through 2005, where similar tactics were used. They say their units had better relations with Iraqis, and faced less fighting, than did American units. Civilian deaths and property damage caused by American tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, they said, have hardened villagers’ attitudes, which helps the insurgents with recruiting, intelligence and protection.

              Alas a sad fact of war, it helps to show that restucturing cannot be attemted untill the war is won IMO.

              He added that he could deploy his units on sweeps, searches and raids, and chase the Taliban away. But each time after his infantry left an area, he said, the Taliban would simply move back in.
              So they make it easier for them to do this.

              One Afghan interpreter who works with the Dutch said their approach was passive
              .

              Says it all.

              Uruzgan is also clearly not as safe as casualty statistics suggest. Neither the United Nations nor any foreign aid organizations work here, because they judge the province too dangerous
              .

              Again another sad comment

              The Dutch must move slowly on dirt roads, searching for mines. And a Dutch patrol base in Poentjak, near the Baluchi Valley, is a lonely fortress, often coming under rocket and mortar fire
              The Taleban are not going to change.

              One platoon commander, First Lt. Rick, who according to Dutch rules for junior soldiers could be identified only by his rank and first name, noted that anger at foreign troops persisted even in the secure areas. In Tarin Kowt, a city of about 100,000 people, the population in most neighborhoods tolerates Dutch patrols. But on the city’s western side, he said, people throw stones or stare icily, slowly running their fingers across their throats
              has to be a nightmare for the guys on the ground.

              For soldiers trained to fight, the soft approach is at times uncomfortable. A noncommissioned officer, Cpl. Niels, recalled the terrorist attacks in America in 2001. “We are soldiers,” he said. “We saw the planes coming in and we wanted to go to Afghanistan and fight. But other people don’t see if that way
              Sounds like the guys on the ground do not agree with the approach, maybe an unfair statement to make by myself from one quote, but I think I would feel the same way.

              Colonel van Griensven said he understood the arguments over where the balance should lie between fighting and seeking friends. “There is no right answer,” he said
              A true statement , which takes me back to how can you restructer when still fighting a war?[B]
              sigpicFEAR NAUGHT

              Should raw analytical data ever be passed to policy makers?

              Comment


              • #8
                Well all I can say is the Dutch High Command have probably spent more time in coffee shops than studying tactics. These lessons were learned in Vietnam the general population only went with force thus when the Taliban says you will do this or that it is done or youre dead,the dutch have no chance with heart or mind campaign when they do not show the general public that if they resist they will be supported with all the military might that the Dutch army can bring down.A sour note of dutch UN operations in Bosnia as they withdrew from Sverbrinica leaving thousands of muslims to their fate (death at the hands of the Serbs).Sad to see the Dutch Army has learned Nothing!

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                • #9
                  Originally posted by Woodsy the Lar View Post
                  Well all I can say is the Dutch High Command have probably spent more time in coffee shops!
                  and we all know about Dutch "coffee? Shops"

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by T_igger_cs_30 View Post
                    How do they get home week ends?..............remember back in Europe during my tours, the Dutch army all went home week ends
                    And we followed them to Amsterdam...Just to make sure they got there safely of course ps 1000 up!!

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                    • #11
                      Originally posted by Ray View Post
                      Forget about weekends. Let's look at the business end!
                      Sir,

                      You tell me. The Dutch are surrounded and the Taliban got the initiative.

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Sir,
                        I second OoE. I think this is taking COIN to the extreme. When your own interpreter states the following,

                        “The Dutch, if the fight starts, they run inside their vehicles every time,” said the interpreter, who asked that his name be withheld because he risked losing his job. “They say, ‘We came for peace, not to fight.’ And I say, ‘If you don’t fight, you cannot have peace in Afghanistan.’ ”
                        then you aren't getting the job done. Now, the article does talk about Dutch SF taking the fight to the enemy (but not enough to prevent these attacks on the regular Dutch forces), but if you don't try some operations to keep the enemy off balance, then they have the initiative just as OoE speaks of.
                        "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Neither force alone nor civil affairs operations alone work particularly well. There has to be the right mix and this seems to be a little off to one extreme to me.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by dave lukins View Post
                            And we followed them to Amsterdam...Just to make sure they got there safely of course ps 1000 up!!
                            Very well put and with a bit of honesty and sarcasm to bring the truth to the front.

                            How can any army be placed into a combat zone, to fight an enemy, and be told not to engage your enemy. This pulling back to save an area when your enemy comes into a disputed area

                            The Western Powers have surcome to Political Correctness, and politicians who have no military service or background.

                            The Dutch military and political command should be totally embarrass with this type of action.

                            You win by killing your enemy, not being his friend.

                            Road Runner!!

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                            • #15
                              Just how many different approaches there are in A-stan? Seems that every province has different NATO forces and everybody seems trying something . Dutch , Germans , British etc. etc. - how can all this be co-ordinated ?
                              Only good thing is perhaps that if all these policies are being given acid test, then maybe next time there will be clearer rules .
                              If i only was so smart yesterday as my wife is today

                              Minding your own biz is great virtue, but situation awareness saves lives - Dok

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