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  • Originally posted by S2 View Post
    Has this thread become a grab-bag for all things W.W. II? It would seem so. The essential intent remains determining whether Germany could have won W.W. II. That argument surely was settled by Kursk in 1943 at the latest. Germany's only real chance at an acceptable victory remains with Barbarossa. That, by the way, is a separate argument from Operation Typhoon. The German Army's operational and logistical plan was conceived to attain the seizure of Moscow by late August-early September. This was entirely possible. Doing so would not only remove the key transportation hub and political center of the Soviet Union but also permit a German opportunity to fight Soviet forces to their north and south on a reverse front.

    Nitpicking about proximity fuzes and tank production in 1944 has no impact whatsoever on this essential theme. Army Group Center at Smolensk was postured by late July/early August to seize Moscow. Neither Soviet forces to their north nor the Kiev region represented an operational/strategic threat to AGC's ambitions. Nor did the seizure of Leningrad or Kiev offer Germany a strategic prize capable of gaining victory.
    However, without Leningrad holding Moscow becomes a lot harder.

    So what stopped the Germans and why? It could be argued that Hitler's overweening focus on protecting Baltic ore shipments from Sweden was the impetus behind a Leningrad seizure. Equally, it can be argued that his desire to secure the lower Donbas region for economic reasons compelled his diversion of German armor forces south. If correct, either or both would suggest this preoccupation was the product of a siege mentality incapable of conceiving a strategic decapitation. In effect, Hitler was reconciled to a long war with the Soviet Union and conceded the strategic opportunity to attain incremental gain-and was only partially successful doing so.
    A couple of points, the pause of AGN before Leningrad pre-staged the defeat in front of Moscow. Had the panzer's kept driving and taken the city by storm in August then the later blood letting and material losses and then the siege could have been avoided. This would have placed the 3rd and 4th panzer armies in a much better state for the drive on Moscow

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    • "However, without Leningrad holding Moscow becomes a lot harder."

      For whom? The Soviets? If the Germans you are correct only so long as Leningrad (along with Kiev) becomes the operational distractor to strategic victory at Moscow.

      Consider Operation Typhoon. Despite added casualties and vehicle losses along with wear incurred by German forces diverted to Leningrad and, then, Kiev. Despite worsening weather, shorter flying days and an operational pause in front of Moscow permitting additional reinforcements along with the introduction of T-34 brigades by that fall, the Germans were at the doorstep in early December.

      None of those impediments existed in late July/early August following the German capture of Smolensk and the successful defense of Yelnya.

      Leningrad was irrelevant to Moscow's capture by AGC. Moscow, OTOH, was entirely relevant to the successful defense of Leningrad. The siege of Leningrad was BEST avoided for the Germans by capturing Moscow and severing the rail links north while forcing the Soviets to fight on a reversed front there.
      Last edited by S2; 23 Oct 11,, 05:33.
      "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
      "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

      Comment


      • Originally posted by S2 View Post
        "However, without Leningrad holding Moscow becomes a lot harder."

        For whom? The Soviets?
        No the Germans

        Consider Operation Typhoon. Despite added casualties and vehicle losses along with wear incurred by German forces diverted to Leningrad and, then, Kiev. Despite worsening weather, shorter flying days, an operational pause in front of Moscow permitting additional reinforcements along with the introduction of T-34 brigades by that fall, the Germans were at the doorstep in early December.
        And had Germany seized Lenningrad by storm in July or early August then the losses incurred by 3/4 PzAr would have added amss to Typhoon.

        None of those impediments existed in late July/early August following the German capture of Smolensk and the successful defense of Yelnya.

        Leningrad was irrelevant to Moscow's capture by AGC. Moscow, OTOH, was entirely relevant to the successful defense of Leningrad. The siege of Leningrad was BEST avoided for the Germans by capturing Moscow and severing the rail links north while forcing the Soviets to fight on a reversed front there.
        But Lenningrad is relevant to holding Moscow once taken. In effect the seige amounted to the same thing simply with much added wastage. However if the Germans had not gone after Leningrad- then the eventual Soviet counter offensive can strike in enfilade from the Northern Flank.

        Comment


        • "And had Germany seized Lenningrad by storm in July or early August then the losses incurred by 3/4 PzAr would have added amss to Typhoon."

          The Germans didn't seize Leningrad by a coup de main. That's an accomplished fact. Nor did they after reinforcement from AGC. Leningrad required an oblique approach from the east. Typhoon should never had occurred but for strategic dilettance both north and south by Hitler.

          "...However if the Germans had not gone after Leningrad- then the eventual Soviet counter offensive can strike in enfilade from the Northern Flank."

          You presume a Soviet Army in the north that had been successively driven back on its heels into a cantonment would have generated a strategic counter-offensive into AGC's northern flank after defeating 16th and 18th Armies in front of Leningrad. I see no such capability to do so. None. It was all the Soviets could do to man the barricades before Leningrad.

          Leningrad and Kiev were operational distractors to a German Army poised in early August to seize Moscow. Nothing of consequence stood before them then. That would change two months later.
          Last edited by S2; 24 Oct 11,, 06:50.
          "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
          "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

          Comment


          • Originally posted by S2 View Post
            [B].

            You presume a Soviet Army in the north that had been successively driven back on its heels into a cantonment would have generated an strategic counter-offensive into AGC's northern flank after defeeating 16th and 18th Armies in front of Leningrad. I see no such capability to do so. None. It was all the Soviets could do to man the barricades before Leningrad.

            Leningrad and Kiev were operational distractors to a German Army poised in early August to seize Moscow. Nothing of consequence stood before them then. That would change two months later.
            Assuming Hitler throws everything at Moscow and leaves the northern approaches unsupported as it were- a primarily infantry advance through the baltics then Leningrad is more than merely manning the barricades. The battle of Raseiniai might have had a far different outcome if the 4th wasn't there to stop the 3 and 12MC of the NWF.

            Skip forward a few months with Leningrad not under seige and suddenly AGC in possesion of Moscow is a salient where those T-34 brigades, Siberian units and the fresh/new divisions can attack from the north some distance back from the main weight of AGC's offensive might. Given the logistical problems Germany had that winter and Hitler's well known prefrence for relief over breakout Moscow might have become a Stalingrad and doomed Germany to defeat in 42 not 45.

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            • Zraver Reply

              "Assuming Hitler throws everything at Moscow and leaves the northern approaches unsupported as it were- a primarily infantry advance through the baltics then Leningrad is more than merely manning the barricades. The battle of Raseiniai might have had a far different outcome if the 4th wasn't there to stop the 3 and 12MC of the NWF."

              I don't recall suggesting the absence of 4th PzA from AGN's order of battle. AGC, without reinforcement but without reinforcing either the north and then the south, was more than adequate at the end of July to seize Moscow.

              OTOH, the Soviet Army was entirely incapable of launching a strategic counteroffensive through AGN into the northern flank of AGC. I'm unsure why you over-value the condition of the Red Army in late July, 1941, particularly those rapidly being pushed into a Leningrad cantonment? They were rather otherwise occupied with self-preservation to conduct any kind of meaningful operational counter-offensive that might unhinge AGC from their objective.
              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

              Comment


              • The loss of Moskow in sep/oct 1941 would not degrade soviet ability to regenerate armys ,which came from all over, nor would it hurt their abilty to equip them with armament ,espeaciy tankS which came from Kharkov and Stalingrad.
                It would place some logistical problems for the soviets however that is not the reason it was attacked durring thyphoon, the asumptions were that after the batle of kiev the bulk of enemy combat power was deployed in front of moskow and the soviets no longer had reserves.
                J'ai en marre.

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                • Originally posted by zraver View Post
                  the B-24's can't get above the 88mm's... The B-17's can and did with a light enough bomb load but the B-29 won't be ready until 1944. Plus the Germans jsut switch production to the 105 and 128mm flak guns which reach higher and have a bigger explosive charge.
                  yes they did, during the Hamburg raid Bomber command lost 7% of its force to the night fighters.
                  Those losses are less severe than the Soviets, another year of virtual stalemate in the East and the Soviets are the ones who run out of men.
                  1943 German production of Pz 38, III, IV, V, VI chassis was 12854, 1944 production was 18245. Granted some of those are flak panzers, recovery vehicles etc, but the majority are tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers.
                  So the us faces a weaker su during the cold war, it still does not not help germany shift any significant forces west.
                  2/3 of 1944 production and half of 1943 production are SPA or SPAT .
                  Last edited by 1979; 23 Oct 11,, 08:06.
                  J'ai en marre.

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                  • 1979 Reply

                    "The loss of Moskow in sep/oct 1941 would not degrade soviet ability to regenerate armys ,which came from all over..."

                    It would have certainly degraded their ability to assert control over their remaining dominions with political credibility. It is from whence those armies might come. Further, the loss of Moscow would have impeded their ability to move those armies efficiently.

                    "...nor would it hurt their abilty to equip them with armament ,espeaciy tankS which came from Kharkov and Stalingrad..."

                    Finally, nothing would have precluded the German army from moving into the Moscow-Gorki space before reversing the northern and southern fronts upon themselves. So much for Kharkov as a meaningful source of continuing armaments.

                    "...It would place some logistical problems for the soviets however that is not the reason it was attacked durring thyphoon, the asumptions were that after the batle of kiev the bulk of enemy combat power was deployed in front of moskow and the soviets no longer had reserves."

                    This comment is unclear to me. However, Soviet defense capabilities before Moscow were considerably greater at the start of Typhoon than in early-mid August. Despite the erosion of German combat power incurred by the diversion of AGC panzer forces north and, then, south; despite the shorter flying days and poor weather; despite the abysmal weather-related ground conditions, etc. those defense capabilities were barely sufficient to stop a German army poised to do exactly the same two months earlier in August.

                    It seems indisputable that the German army, which had seized Smolensk on July 16, 1941 was postured to also seize Moscow shortly. They had the strength to do so. The weather and road conditions were favorable. The opposing force dispositions before them were largely nonexistent. Their operational plans called for exactly such. Nothing precluded doing so save Hitler's dilatory intervention on behalf of operational objectives of secondary importance at the expense of the grand strategic prize.
                    Last edited by S2; 23 Oct 11,, 08:35.
                    "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                    "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                    Comment


                    • It a lot harder to build a rail than actualy just regauging an existing one, among the schorched earth tactics aplied during the german retreat from Bielorusia was employing a machine that destroyed the rail ties behind it.
                      It it not that hard to build one if the Soviets were not confident that the germans could be trown back.
                      Besides the distance between smolensk and gorki is about 900 km and the advance would not be on better roads than the ones to moskow. Not a problem
                      if you are moving armis acros a map like Stolfi does but a bit harder trough the mud.
                      There are at lest six new soviet armies in the soviet southern fronts that would not be needed without guderian turn south .
                      J'ai en marre.

                      Comment


                      • 1979 Reply

                        "It a lot harder to build a rail than actualy just regauging an existing one..."

                        Stolfi indicates the German Army CONSTRUCTED 14,000 miles of normal guage and repaired another 10,000 miles of track during Barbarossa alone.

                        "...among the schorched earth tactics aplied during the german retreat from Bielorusia was employing a machine that destroyed the rail ties behind it.
                        It it not that hard to build one if the Soviets were not confident that the germans could be trown back..."


                        Unless Germans have become Russian and 1944 has become 1941 I fail to see your point, especially in light of the evidence suggesting German acumen at constructing rail lines.

                        "...Besides the distance between smolensk and gorki is about 900 km and the advance would not be on better roads than the ones to moskow..."

                        As Moscow lies roughly between those two cities it seems your concern may only be valid for 400 kilometers. My distance calculator suggests the distance from Smolensk to Nishny Novgorod (Gorki) is 760 km and 360 km from Smolensk to Moscow.

                        "...Not a problem if you are moving armis acros a map like Stolfi does but a bit harder trough the mud..."

                        Thank God there's little of that in August as compared to November.

                        "...There are at lest six new soviet armies in the soviet southern fronts that would not be needed without guderian turn south."

                        It's not as though Soviet armies in the south face no opposition from the 11th and 17th Armies and 1st Pz Group. Moreover, it's not as though armies subsequently raised by the Soviets were even as well-manned, equipped and trained as those which had already proven so inept against German arms.

                        Soviet armies on the northern and southern flanks of AGC had stark choices in the summer and very early fall of 1941. They could defend (barely) to their front or attack AGC in the flank. Doing one would expose themselves to the other. There's no evidence offered that they could withstand attacks by 11, 17, 16, 18 Armies along with 1 and 4 Panzer Groups while also attacking the flanks of AGC. Moreover, there's no evidence offered suggesting they weren't decisively engaged in late July-early August when such would have been necessary. As such those armies would have found it near impossible to disengage, reconstitute and rearm while repositioning themselves between AGC and Moscow.

                        The question which needs to be asked is whether the Soviet Union could have remained a viable threat to the German Army if Moscow-Gorki had been taken in early-mid September and successful operations subsequently conducted on reverse fronts to eliminate Soviet forces along the Leningrad axis and on the southern periphery?
                        "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                        "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by USSWisconsin View Post
                          IMO, a delay in Overlord would hurt the Allies - the historical timing was good, if it had happened later, the chances of Germany figuring out what was going on would increase exponentially. Had they been well prepared for D-Day, losses could have been unacceptable - the invasion might even have been thrown back.
                          D-Day was at a time when the German leaders least expected it. Rommel was at Germany, attending his wife's birthday, and the weather was bad, reassuring the German leaders.
                          However, D-Day would most likely have been successful whenever it took place. The German military leadership expected the landing to be at Pas de Calais, to the point when even after the landing, Hitler refused to send troops to suppress the landing, believing the main landing to come at Calais and the Normandy landing to be a mere diversion

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                          • Originally posted by S2 View Post

                            I don't recall suggesting the absence of 4th PzA from AGN's order of battle. AGC, without reinforcement but without reinforcing either the north and then the south, was more than adequate at the end of July to seize Moscow.
                            But AGN was not able to take Leningrad without 3PG. The pause on the western Dvina river let the Soviets rushs troops to the city.

                            OTOH, the Soviet Army was entirely incapable of launching a strategic counteroffensive through AGN into the northern flank of AGC. I'm unsure why you over-value the condition of the Red Army in late July, 1941, particularly those rapidly being pushed into a Leningrad cantonment? They were rather otherwise occupied with self-preservation to conduct any kind of meaningful operational counter-offensive that might unhinge AGC from their objective.
                            I'm not talking July, I'm talking December. Those fresh Soviet divisions are going to attack from somwhere.

                            Comment


                            • Zraver Reply

                              "But AGN was not able to take Leningrad without 3PG. The pause on the western Dvina river let the Soviets rushs troops to the city..."

                              You are half-correct. The operational pause enjoyed by 56th Pz Corps commander, Von Manstein, was at the cost his of Leningrad objective and his interim objective of Pskov. However, seizing Leningrad wasn't a function of 3PG additional reinforcing elements. It was a function of wasted time. Even with additional resources in early September the seizure was not effected. Von Leeb, Hoepner and Von Manstein share the blame for failing to ruthlessly exploit the Dvina bridgehead at Dvinsk.

                              Still, however, Leningrad was a strategically-irrelevant Barbarossa objective. Moscow might well stand without Leningrad. Leningrad does not stand without Moscow.

                              "...I'm not talking July, I'm talking December. Those fresh Soviet divisions are going to attack from somwhere..."

                              My entire premise is all about mid-August to mid-September. Combat operations as a function of Typhoon or the Soviet strategic counter-offensive in December are irrelevant to Germany's ability to seize Moscow in late August/early September 1941.

                              If done so and expanded into the Moscow-Nishny Novgorod (Gorki) space by late September then Yaroslavl doesn't exist as a railhead and subsequent Soviet reinforcements are assembling east of the Volga river and well east of Lake Ladoga for any possible winter counteroffensive. AGC infantry divisions are closing up and fortifying that operational space east of Moscow in the early fall while combat operations against the northern and southern peripheries are pursued on reversed fronts behind the protection of that barrier.

                              Further, the political picture changes dramatically for what remains of the Soviet government controlling such possible forces. How the war (and those possible Soviet reinforcements) are now employed is impossible to determine under these altered conditions.
                              "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                              "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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                              • Originally posted by S2 View Post

                                Still, however, Leningrad was a strategically-irrelevant Barbarossa objective. Moscow might well stand without Leningrad. Leningrad does not stand without Moscow.
                                Maybe, but AGC after taking Moscow is in a pickle.

                                My entire premise is all about mid-August to mid-September. Combat operations as a function of Typhoon or the Soviet strategic counter-offensive in December are irrelevant to Germany's ability to seize Moscow in late August/early September 1941.
                                No they are not.

                                If done so and expanded into the Moscow-Nishny Novgorod (Gorki) space by late September then Yaroslavl doesn't exist as a railhead and subsequent Soviet reinforcements are assembling east of the Volga river and well east of Lake Ladoga for any possible winter counteroffensive. AGC infantry divisions are closing up and fortifying that operational space east of Moscow in the early fall while combat operations against the northern and southern peripheries are pursued on reversed fronts behind the protection of that barrier.
                                Germany's ability to push east past Moscow is doubtful, by then the panzers would have completely outrun the supply lines and the wear on the truck fleet is mounting. Once in Moscow AGC has to push east, north and south to forestall any Soviet counter strike and the numbers just are not there to do that successfully. In the historical time line by the time of Operation Typhoon the invaders had suffered about 20% losses in men and 50% or more in tanks and planes and even higher in truck transport. The German reserve army was depleted and logistical failures meant the troops were short on everything, not just winter clothes. Nor is it an absolute that AGC can seize Moscow quickly. Being poised to make an advance on the city and actually taking it are different things. Moscow had a sizable garrison recently bolstered by the arrival of the 200,000 escapees from the Smolensk Pocket. While short on weapons these were trained troops. Moscow was also much bigger than any of the other cities so a protracted street battle is not out of the question- a problem for the panzers who need those rifle divisions slowly slogging east. The longer it takes to actually take Moscow, the more those rifle divisions are also needed on the shoulders.

                                Further, the political picture changes dramatically for what remains of the Soviet government controlling such possible forces. How the war (and those possible Soviet reinforcements) are now employed is impossible to determine under these altered conditions.
                                Impossible, but we can speculate. While we are in ageement that Moscow should have been the goal, and that it was doable, and that the Soviet Union was Moscow first all others second. How the Soviet government maintains control depends in part on how fast the Germans can take Moscow. The Soviet government was planning a move so they had a fall back plan.

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