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  • Top scientists concerned over strategic programme post n-deal

    Top scientists concerned over strategic programme post n-deal

    http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus...0612092010.htm

    Mumbai, Dec 9. (PTI): Though Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has assured that India will maintain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent, the US bill for civil nuclear cooperation with New Delhi seems to be sending a clear signal to the contrary, say top scientists.

    The bill has a clear intention of indirectly making India a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty without signing them, former Atomic Energy Commission chairman P K Iyengar told PTI today.

    The bill enabling nuclear commerce with India was cleared on Thursday night by the conference committee of US Congress.

    "It is impossible to have a minimum credible deterrent without conducting nuclear tests. But the bill indicates that the cooperation will be terminated if this is done," he said.

    On August 17, the Prime Minister told the Parliament that India would make its own assessment of its nuclear weapons programme in this "uncertain and unpredictable world".

    Singh also made it clear that there was no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

    Though Singh has said India will not accept any condition that goes beyond the July 18, 2005 agreement between him and US President George Bush, accepting the deal in its current form is up to the government, Iyengar noted.

    "The bill is nothing but a substitute for a technology denial regime and more stringent than ever before," he maintained.

    Though Singh has promised stockpiling of nuclear fuel for a period of 40 years (the life of a reactor), the details in the bill go very much against this as the US will decide on the supply of nuclear fuel from members of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Iyengar pointed out.

    "They can find 1,001 reasons to scrap the deal at any time and punish India by denying fuel," he said.

    On the reprocessing of spent fuel too, the bill goes against India's interest, scientists said.

    Even after four decades, the US has the right not to allow India to reprocess spent fuel from the American supplied atomic power plant at Tarapur (units 1 and 2), Iyengar said.

    "The US does not reprocess its own spent fuel. But from the energy point of view, India needs to do that as its entire fast breeder reactor programme depends on reprocessed fuel," he observed.

    A section of scientists from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) said, India will have a very limited advantage in purchasing American reactors without any assured fuel supply.

    The bill can be seen as a "willful attempt to curb and contain India's nuclear research programme", they said after going through the 41-page document sent to them by the Deaprtment of Atomic Energy (DAE).

    DAE has invited senior nuclear scientists to discuss the bill with AEC Chairman Anil Kakodkar on December 15.

    On the termination of nuclear transfers, the bill said "Exports of any nuclear and nuclear-related material to India shall be terminated if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian person of techology or equipment".

    This provision holds the Government responsbile for the act of a single person, which is not acceptable, the scientists observed.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I think this is a very bad, bad deal for India. We are not allowed to conduct any further nuclear tests inspite of the fact that we have only a very primitive nuclear program-we do not have megaton bombs, nor do we have MIRV capability. We are not allowed to reprocess spent fuel inspite of the fact that our entire fast breeder program depends on this, and above all, this deal makes us a junior partner of the US and a half assed nuclear weapons state. We have had to put 14 nuclear rectors under eternal perpetual safeguards (and this applies even if the agreement is terminated according to the US legislation), even though the total number of reactors under safeguards of all the existing nuclear weapon states combined is only 11.

    I think the long term strategy of the US is to turn India into a Japan-toothless, and eternally dependent on the US on everything except for its economy. The Indian Prime Minister may eventually be reduced to a maharajah of the Princely state of India (governed by the US, of course).

  • #2
    You know what..i'd buy what the scientists are saying than what the 'poll'iticians do. I think we should test if need be. Even today. Since we are to stay with nuclear weapons IF there is ANYTHING to ensure that testing physically is important. We should TEST tomorrow. The nuke deal can be scrapped if the scientists say so. I would REALLY have liked that they were in the loop on this. Frankly i think it's not that good an idea myself. But i sort of am not able to put all the equations together. Maybe we start a discussion forum for the scientists to pool in their speculations and debate in ernest. But i'd trust any Indian scientists opinion over ANY politicians. And this where the deal worries me.

    Comment


    • #3
      Well US has made clear it has no rights and wont intervene on any reactors bought from diff nations.
      So while having the nuke deal our priority will be to have reactors from France/Russia.

      As told by kalam recently FBW is what we need for more than half a century of energy security we have more than 35% thorium reserves.

      So dont worry much i can assure you guys it'll work out both ways.
      And LEFT is a boon to us in disguish they'll never let out foreign policy being sold out.

      Comment


      • #4
        *FBR

        Also i'm sure if the scientists want to test it they will.
        Its all tied upto economy.

        The new bill has exempted MANY clause.
        someone please post those waivers which was critical at first form of the bill.

        Comment


        • #5
          LOL, its in India's hand, whether to buy anything from US or not. You can't loose what you can't buy or don't have.

          With or without Nuclear bill, if we test, US will impose sanctions, period. If we think testing is absolutely essential, then we have to pay the price, just like we did in 98. Stop looking at the Nuclear Bill as the end. It goes way beyond that.

          But i'd trust any Indian scientists opinion over ANY politicians
          I don't know with how many 'Scientists' of the level quoted in the article you have interacted before, its all not black and white..lots of grey there..

          Comment


          • #6
            If india were to perform a nuclear test in the future, it would be subject to sanctions and isolation regardless of whether this nuke deal goes through or not..

            Its just no longer acceptable for countries to perform nuclear tests.

            Comment


            • #7
              [QUOTE=joey;308122]
              Well US has made clear it has no rights and wont intervene on any reactors bought from diff nations.
              US won't, NSG can and will.


              As told by kalam recently FBW is what we need for more than half a century of energy security we have more than 35% thorium reserves.
              look up on Thorium cycle will you?

              So dont worry much i can assure you guys it'll work out both ways.
              Thank you

              Comment


              • #8
                re

                EXIT NOT POSSIBLE FROM NUKE DEAL

                http://www.telegraphindia.com/106121...ry_7151369.asp


                Roadblocks ahead

                When parliamentarians debate the India-US civilian nuclear cooperation deal, they would find that India is in a complete bind over the deal. There is little possibility of either backing out now that the US Congress has passed the Hyde Act or is going to do so later if the bilateral agreement for cooperation does not suit India’s interests. What seems improbable now will become impossible later.

                The Hyde Act is the enabling legislation that allows Washington and New Delhi to enter into a bilateral agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation. The Bush administration has gone out of its way to get the legislation through the lame duck session of the US Congress. For India to back out now would invite a backlash.

                However, saying no after getting into a bilateral agreement with the United States of America (known as the “123” Agreement after Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954) would be even more difficult. The Indian parliament cannot hold back the government, as there is no provision in India for the parliament to ratify international agreements.

                The manner in which US under- secretary of state, Nicholas Burns, was escorted around Delhi by top foreign service officials on the eve of the Hyde Act being passed, suggested that the government was fully on board, even if it was aware of the shortcomings of the act. New Delhi has also given the impression of a supportive public mood.

                The US, too, would have made a favourable assessment of public opinion in India from the fact that our strategic experts and diplomatic reporters have either been singing hosannas in the media or have kept silent about the deal.

                Two arguments have been given by the government at various times to defend the deal: One, that whatever the US does through the Hyde Act is its internal business and does not affect us; two, that India would be bound only by the bilateral 123 Agreement. This claim that the unacceptable (“extraneous and prescriptive”) provisions of the Hyde Act can somehow be mitigated through the 123 Agreement is misleading.

                Let us understand the subterfuge involved. The overarching law that governs US policy on nuclear issues is the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. From this law follows the Henry J. Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 or, in short, the Hyde Act. This legislation deals with exemptions for the India-US cooperation deal from certain requirements of the generic legislation — the Atomic Energy Act.

                The part of the Atomic Energy Act, which deals with international cooperation is listed under chapter 11, Section 123, and entitled “Co-operation with other nations”. The 123 Agreement between India and the US follows from the Hyde Act and it has to be negotiated under this particular section of the Atomic Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Act, the Hyde Act and the bilateral 123 Agreement are, therefore related hierarchically.

                Any agreement under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act would by definition be under US law. In negotiating such an agreement, the US administration cannot go against its internal law — neither the Hyde Act nor the parent legislation, the Atomic Energy Act. In any conflict between an international agreement and US law, the latter predominates. A case in point is the fuel supply agreement India had with the US for the Tarapur atomic power plant. After India tested in 1974, fuel supply to Tarapur was stopped as was reprocessing of the spent fuel because US domestic laws kicked in.

                To then say that if the Hyde Act does not meet India’s requirement, this can be corrected in the 123 Agreement is to fly in the face of the existing hierarchy of US laws.

                The Hyde Act has provisions, which clearly go against the understanding India and the US had. This was reflected in the joint statement of July 18, 2005 and the separation plan of civilian and military facilities of March 2, 2006.

                The act does not provide for full nuclear fuel cycle cooperation. There are no guarantees of life-time fuel supply in return for safeguards in perpetuity for civilian nuclear power plants. End-use verification procedures remain, as do the double-layer of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the fallback safeguards under US law. The intrusive annual reporting requirements also remain in the legislation. India is expected to unilaterally give a date to cease fissile material production even before the international Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is signed. The US retains its right to conduct nuclear tests, as it has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But India, which also refused to sign the CTBT, will be bound by a bilateral commitment not to conduct any more tests or face punishment, ending all co-operation. Indian foreign policy is expected to be “congruent to that of the United States” and the provisions about following Washington’s lead on Iran remain.

                To then claim that through sleight-of-words these issues can be dealt with in the 123 Agreement is to test public credulity. If the bilateral agreement uses acceptable language on end-use verification and further tests, the relevant US laws which direct the administration to cease nuclear cooperation when India conducts a nuclear test or fails end use certification will remain operational. The 123 Agreement, through clever use of language, may create a semblance of acceptability of Indian concerns but the enabling legislation, the Hyde Act, and the Atomic Energy Act will still apply to India.

                This, however, is not the only problem that New Delhi will face. The negotiations with the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group will not be easy. The IAEA has never dealt with a case like India’s — under the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has either dealt with nuclear weapons powers (those who tested before 1968) or the non-nuclear weapons powers. India is not a nuclear weapons power under the definition of NPT and yet possesses nuclear weapons. Therefore, the IAEA needs to evolve “India-specific safeguards” to put a special inspections and accounting regime in place.

                The US wants these safeguards to be as close as possible to those applicable to non-nuclear weapons powers. The Hyde Act clearly states that the Additional Protocol which India signs with the IAEA should be based on the Model Protocol 540 which applies to non-nuclear weapons states. The IAEA has, thus, been charged with creating an absolute firewall between India’s civilian and military programme which would require a stringent inspections regime. Since the IAEA does not have the requisite financial resources to implement such a regime, one should not be surprised if the US steps in to help in its implementation.

                The emphasis on consensus in the NSG advocated by the Hyde Act will ensure that the US administration does not bestow special favours on India while other members of the cartel also do not act in violation of America’s commercial interests.

                The negotiations are going to get progressively tougher. It is like climbing a mountain — the air is rarefied and then the weather worsens. Going up becomes difficult but coming down is not without risk.

                Comment

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