Nuclear Terrorism
By GRAHAM ALLISON
Published: September 5, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/05/bo...t-allison.html
WHY DO YOU use an axe when you can use a bulldozer?" That was Osama bin Laden's question in 1996 to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief planner of what grew into the most deadly attack on the American homeland in the nation's history. Mohammed is now in American custody, the highest-ranking Al Qaeda leader captured to date in the war on terrorism. He has told interrogators that the "axe" to which bin Laden referred was his proposal to charter a small plane, fill it with explosives, and crash it into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Bin Laden sent him back to the drawing board with a charge to devise a more dramatic, devastating blow against the "hated enemy."
In the months that followed, Mohammed proposed a number of "bulldozer" options for bin Laden's review. As he explained in an Al Jazeera interview in April 2002, just before he was seized, he and his colleagues "first thought of striking a couple of nuclear facilities." But with regret, he noted, "it was eventually decided to leave out the nuclear targets-for now." When the interviewer asked: "What do you mean 'for now'?" he replied sharply: "For now means for now."
AL QAEDA'S "MANHATTAN PROJECT"
In August 2001, during the final countdown to what Al Qaeda calls the "Holy Tuesday" attack, bin Laden received two key former officials from Pakistan's nuclear weapons program at his secret headquarters near Kabul. Over the course of three days of intense conversation, he and his second-in-command, the Egyptian surgeon and organizational mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri, quizzed Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed about chemical, biological, and, especially, nuclear weapons. Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and two other as yet unidentified top-level Al Qaeda operatives who participated in these conversations had clearly moved beyond the impending assault on the World Trade Center to visions of grander attacks to follow.
Mahmood and Majeed's meeting with the leaders of Al Qaeda came at the end of months of prior meetings with subordinates. Al Qaeda had sought out Mahmood, one of Pakistan's leading specialists in uranium enrichment, for his capabilities, his convictions, and his connections. Mahmood's career spanned thirty years at the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, and he had been a key figure at the Kahuta plant, which had produced the enriched uranium for Pakistan's first nuclear bomb test. Thereafter, he headed the Khosib reactor in the Punjab that produces weapons-grade plutonium. In 1999, however, he was forced to resign abruptly for describing Pakistan's nuclear capability as "the property of a whole Muslim community" and for publicly advocating that Pakistan provide enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium to arm other Muslim states. But even though the government of Pakistan vehemently denounced Mahmood's views, it had been surreptitiously following a similar policy, having offered or supplied uranium enrichment technology and know-how to Iraq, Libya, Iran, and even North Korea.
Mahmood is representative of a significant faction of Pakistani "nuclear hawks" who through the 1990s grew increasingly estranged from the country's more moderate leadership. Under the leadership of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the revered "father of the Islamic bomb," these scientists had thrust Pakistan into the ranks of the declared nuclear powers, and through their work they became some of the most respected members of Pakistani society. But for many of them, the mission was not only to overcome India's conventional superiority but to stand up for the Muslim world. As Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto revealed in his memoir (written from prison just before his execution in 1979), these scientists were ordered in January 1972 to "achieve a full nuclear capability" in order to demonstrate that "Islamic Civilization" was the full equal of "Christian, Jewish, and Hindu Civilizations."
Mahmood was-and is today-an Islamic extremist. In the late 1980s, Mahmood published an essay titled "Mechanics of Doomsday and Life after Death," in which he argued that natural catastrophes are inevitable in countries that succumb to moral decay. In contrast, he later praised the virtues of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which he called the vanguard of the "renaissance of Islam." His spiritual leader, the Lahore-based Islamic radical cleric Israr Ahmad, declared in the fall of 2001 that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was the beginning of "the final war between Islam and the infidels." Ahmad condemned the U.S. war on terrorism as a "materialistic jihad," in contrast to the Muslims' jihad, which he characterized as being for "the sole purpose to gain the pleasure of Allah and for the preservation of justice and equality." Ominously, Ahmad's student Mahmood predicted in an essay that, "by 2002, millions may die through mass destruction weapons, terrorist attacks, and suicide."
After his forced departure from Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission in 1999, Mahmood founded a "charitable agency" that he named Ummah Tamer-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Community) to support projects in Afghanistan. Majeed also retired in 1999 and joined Mahmood's organization. Under this cover, they traveled frequently to Afghanistan to develop projects, one of which called for mining uranium from rich deposits in that country. Other members of the board of Mahmood's foundation included a fellow nuclear scientist knowledgeable about weapons construction, two Pakistani Air Force generals, one Army general, and an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry.
At the time of Mahmood and Majeed's visit to bin Laden in the summer of 2001, relations between the United States and Pakistan were still in a deep freeze, in response to Pakistan's test of a nuclear weapon in 1998. The United States had immediately imposed economic sanctions on the country, and President Bill Clinton denounced the Pakistani government for its decision, saying, "I cannot believe that we are about to start the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th century when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or personal fulfillment." In 1999, relations deteriorated further when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a coup d'état that ousted the democratically elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif.
When reports about the August 2001 meeting reached CIA headquarters at Langley after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, alarm bells sounded. Analysts at the Counterterrorism Center recognized the story line. In 1997, Pakistani nuclear scientists had made secret trips to North Korea, the result of which was that Pakistan would provide North Korea with technical assistance for its nuclear weapons program in exchange for North Korean assistance in Pakistan's development of long-range missiles. The CIA had additional information about a third Pakistani nuclear scientist, who had been negotiating with Libyan intelligence agents over the price for which he would sell nuclear bomb designs. CIA director George Tenet was so alarmed by the report of Mahmood's meeting with bin Laden that he flew directly to Islamabad to confront President Musharraf.
On October 23, Mahmood and Majeed were arrested by Pakistani authorities and questioned by joint Pakistani-CIA teams. Mahmood claimed that he had never met bin Laden, but repeatedly failed polygraph tests in which he was asked about his trips to Afghanistan. His memory improved, however, after his son Asim told authorities that bin Laden had asked his father about "how to make a nuclear bomb and things like that." According to Mahmood, bin Laden was particularly interested in nuclear weapons. Bin Laden's colleagues told the Pakistani scientists that Al Qaeda had succeeded in acquiring nuclear material for a bomb from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Mahmood explained to his hosts that the material in question could be used in a dirty bomb but could not produce a nuclear explosion. Al-Zawahiri and the others then sought Mahmood's help in recruiting other Pakistani nuclear experts who could provide uranium of the required purity, as well as assistance in constructing a nuclear weapon. Though Mahmood characterized the discussions as "academic," Pakistani officials indicated that Mahmood and Majeed "spoke extensively about weapons of mass destruction," and provided detailed responses to bin Laden's questions about the manufacture of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
After their arrest and interrogation, Mahmood and Majeed were found to have violated Pakistan's official secrets act. Their passports were lifted and they remain, in effect, under house arrest. Nonetheless, the Pakistani government refused to bring the two to trial for fear of what they might reveal about Pakistan's other secret nuclear activities. This was not an idle fear. In a prescient article published less than a month before he was kidnapped and executed while investigating the "shoe bomber" Richard Reid, Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Pakistani military authorities found it "inconceivable that a nuclear scientist would travel to Afghanistan without getting clearance from Pakistani officials," because Pakistan "maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists, using a special arm of the Army's general headquarters to monitor them even after retirement."
In the end, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Mahmood and Majeed had provided bin Laden with a blueprint for constructing nuclear weapons. Thereafter, sometimes in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and otherwise unilaterally, American operatives have sought to intercept further "vacations" in Afghanistan by Pakistani nuclear physicists and engineers. The CIA's summary of the matter, submitted to President Bush, concluded that while Mahmood and his charity claimed "to serve the hungry and needy of Afghanistan," in fact, it "provided information about nuclear weapons to Al Qaeda."
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PATIENCE, THOUGHTFULNESS, AND EXPERTISE
Andrew Marshall, director of net assessments at the Department of Defense and one of the wise men among national security insiders, has long warned that "if the U.S. ever faced a serious enemy, we would be in deep trouble." Al Qaeda qualifies as a formidable foe. With an annual budget of over $200 million during the 1990s, Al Qaeda brought more than sixty thousand international recruits to Afghanistan for training in terrorist attacks. It established cells, including sleeper cells, in approximately sixty countries. It created affiliate relationships with major terrorist groups around the world, from Chechnya to Indonesia, from Saudi Arabia to Germany, and within the United States itself. Indeed, an Al Qaeda sleeper cell in Singapore, among the most secure and watchful societies in the world, was narrowly prevented from launching an attack on the U.S. and Israeli embassies there, with ten times the amount of explosives used by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. As one Singaporean official observed, "If they could do it here, they could do it anywhere."
Even before 9/11, Al Qaeda's attacks demonstrated an organizational capacity to plan, coordinate, and implement operations well above the threshold of competence necessary to acquire and use a nuclear weapon. Veterans of the most successful U.S. covert actions agree with Tenet's bottom line: the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was "professionally conceived and executed-it showed patience, thoughtfulness, and expertise." As an analyst conducting the postmortem on that attack observed: Who else could have found four scheduled American flights that took off on time?
After 9/11, terrorism analysts and other specialists within the U.S. government reexamined the pattern of Al Qaeda's earlier attacks in an effort to connect the dots. When those dots are connected, they reveal a dagger pointed from Al Qaeda's February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, through the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the warship USS Cole in October 2000, to the massive attack of 9/11. Indeed, the dagger points beyond what was achieved in that case to further mega-terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
When U.S. Special Forces, CIA operatives, and Afghan warlords toppled the Taliban government in Afghanistan in late 2001, the U.S. government and American journalists learned more about Al Qaeda than most had imagined they wanted to know. Overrunning hundreds of headquarters buildings, safe houses, training camps, and caves, they recovered tens of thousands of pages of documents, plans, videos, computers, and disks. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld found in this evidence "a number of things that show an appetite for WMD." Together with information extracted through interrogation of captured Al Qaeda operatives, these findings now provide a solid base for assessing Al Qaeda as a nuclear threat.
One of the untold stories of this drama has been the key role played by journalists in acquiring critical information. In December 2001, the Wall Street Journal purchased a desktop computer and a laptop computer looted from an Al Qaeda safe house that turned out to have been used by several top bin Laden lieutenants, including al-Zawahiri and bin Laden's former military commander, the late Mohammed Atef. In addition to hundreds of routine letters and memos dealing with the daily administration of Al Qaeda's terrorist network, the computers' hard drives contained password-protected files on a project code-named "al Zabadi," Arabic for "curdled milk." The curdled milk project sought to acquire chemical and biological weapons, and it had reached the point of testing nerve gas recipes on dogs and rabbits.
CNN discovered perhaps the most disturbing piece of evidence in the Kabul home of Abu Khabab, a senior Al Qaeda official-a twenty-five-page essay titled "Superbomb," which included information on types of nuclear weapons, the physics and effects of nuclear explosions, and the properties of nuclear materials. David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector who reviewed the document, concluded that "the author understood shortcuts to making crude nuclear explosives."
Excerpted from NUCLEAR TERRORISM by GRAHAM ALLISON Copyright © 2004 by Graham Allison. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc.
By GRAHAM ALLISON
Published: September 5, 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/05/bo...t-allison.html
WHY DO YOU use an axe when you can use a bulldozer?" That was Osama bin Laden's question in 1996 to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the chief planner of what grew into the most deadly attack on the American homeland in the nation's history. Mohammed is now in American custody, the highest-ranking Al Qaeda leader captured to date in the war on terrorism. He has told interrogators that the "axe" to which bin Laden referred was his proposal to charter a small plane, fill it with explosives, and crash it into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Bin Laden sent him back to the drawing board with a charge to devise a more dramatic, devastating blow against the "hated enemy."
In the months that followed, Mohammed proposed a number of "bulldozer" options for bin Laden's review. As he explained in an Al Jazeera interview in April 2002, just before he was seized, he and his colleagues "first thought of striking a couple of nuclear facilities." But with regret, he noted, "it was eventually decided to leave out the nuclear targets-for now." When the interviewer asked: "What do you mean 'for now'?" he replied sharply: "For now means for now."
AL QAEDA'S "MANHATTAN PROJECT"
In August 2001, during the final countdown to what Al Qaeda calls the "Holy Tuesday" attack, bin Laden received two key former officials from Pakistan's nuclear weapons program at his secret headquarters near Kabul. Over the course of three days of intense conversation, he and his second-in-command, the Egyptian surgeon and organizational mastermind Ayman al-Zawahiri, quizzed Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed about chemical, biological, and, especially, nuclear weapons. Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and two other as yet unidentified top-level Al Qaeda operatives who participated in these conversations had clearly moved beyond the impending assault on the World Trade Center to visions of grander attacks to follow.
Mahmood and Majeed's meeting with the leaders of Al Qaeda came at the end of months of prior meetings with subordinates. Al Qaeda had sought out Mahmood, one of Pakistan's leading specialists in uranium enrichment, for his capabilities, his convictions, and his connections. Mahmood's career spanned thirty years at the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, and he had been a key figure at the Kahuta plant, which had produced the enriched uranium for Pakistan's first nuclear bomb test. Thereafter, he headed the Khosib reactor in the Punjab that produces weapons-grade plutonium. In 1999, however, he was forced to resign abruptly for describing Pakistan's nuclear capability as "the property of a whole Muslim community" and for publicly advocating that Pakistan provide enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium to arm other Muslim states. But even though the government of Pakistan vehemently denounced Mahmood's views, it had been surreptitiously following a similar policy, having offered or supplied uranium enrichment technology and know-how to Iraq, Libya, Iran, and even North Korea.
Mahmood is representative of a significant faction of Pakistani "nuclear hawks" who through the 1990s grew increasingly estranged from the country's more moderate leadership. Under the leadership of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the revered "father of the Islamic bomb," these scientists had thrust Pakistan into the ranks of the declared nuclear powers, and through their work they became some of the most respected members of Pakistani society. But for many of them, the mission was not only to overcome India's conventional superiority but to stand up for the Muslim world. As Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto revealed in his memoir (written from prison just before his execution in 1979), these scientists were ordered in January 1972 to "achieve a full nuclear capability" in order to demonstrate that "Islamic Civilization" was the full equal of "Christian, Jewish, and Hindu Civilizations."
Mahmood was-and is today-an Islamic extremist. In the late 1980s, Mahmood published an essay titled "Mechanics of Doomsday and Life after Death," in which he argued that natural catastrophes are inevitable in countries that succumb to moral decay. In contrast, he later praised the virtues of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which he called the vanguard of the "renaissance of Islam." His spiritual leader, the Lahore-based Islamic radical cleric Israr Ahmad, declared in the fall of 2001 that the U.S. attack on Afghanistan was the beginning of "the final war between Islam and the infidels." Ahmad condemned the U.S. war on terrorism as a "materialistic jihad," in contrast to the Muslims' jihad, which he characterized as being for "the sole purpose to gain the pleasure of Allah and for the preservation of justice and equality." Ominously, Ahmad's student Mahmood predicted in an essay that, "by 2002, millions may die through mass destruction weapons, terrorist attacks, and suicide."
After his forced departure from Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission in 1999, Mahmood founded a "charitable agency" that he named Ummah Tamer-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Community) to support projects in Afghanistan. Majeed also retired in 1999 and joined Mahmood's organization. Under this cover, they traveled frequently to Afghanistan to develop projects, one of which called for mining uranium from rich deposits in that country. Other members of the board of Mahmood's foundation included a fellow nuclear scientist knowledgeable about weapons construction, two Pakistani Air Force generals, one Army general, and an industrialist who owned Pakistan's largest foundry.
At the time of Mahmood and Majeed's visit to bin Laden in the summer of 2001, relations between the United States and Pakistan were still in a deep freeze, in response to Pakistan's test of a nuclear weapon in 1998. The United States had immediately imposed economic sanctions on the country, and President Bill Clinton denounced the Pakistani government for its decision, saying, "I cannot believe that we are about to start the 21st century by having the Indian subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th century when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or personal fulfillment." In 1999, relations deteriorated further when General Pervez Musharraf seized power in a coup d'état that ousted the democratically elected prime minister, Nawaz Sharif.
When reports about the August 2001 meeting reached CIA headquarters at Langley after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, alarm bells sounded. Analysts at the Counterterrorism Center recognized the story line. In 1997, Pakistani nuclear scientists had made secret trips to North Korea, the result of which was that Pakistan would provide North Korea with technical assistance for its nuclear weapons program in exchange for North Korean assistance in Pakistan's development of long-range missiles. The CIA had additional information about a third Pakistani nuclear scientist, who had been negotiating with Libyan intelligence agents over the price for which he would sell nuclear bomb designs. CIA director George Tenet was so alarmed by the report of Mahmood's meeting with bin Laden that he flew directly to Islamabad to confront President Musharraf.
On October 23, Mahmood and Majeed were arrested by Pakistani authorities and questioned by joint Pakistani-CIA teams. Mahmood claimed that he had never met bin Laden, but repeatedly failed polygraph tests in which he was asked about his trips to Afghanistan. His memory improved, however, after his son Asim told authorities that bin Laden had asked his father about "how to make a nuclear bomb and things like that." According to Mahmood, bin Laden was particularly interested in nuclear weapons. Bin Laden's colleagues told the Pakistani scientists that Al Qaeda had succeeded in acquiring nuclear material for a bomb from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Mahmood explained to his hosts that the material in question could be used in a dirty bomb but could not produce a nuclear explosion. Al-Zawahiri and the others then sought Mahmood's help in recruiting other Pakistani nuclear experts who could provide uranium of the required purity, as well as assistance in constructing a nuclear weapon. Though Mahmood characterized the discussions as "academic," Pakistani officials indicated that Mahmood and Majeed "spoke extensively about weapons of mass destruction," and provided detailed responses to bin Laden's questions about the manufacture of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
After their arrest and interrogation, Mahmood and Majeed were found to have violated Pakistan's official secrets act. Their passports were lifted and they remain, in effect, under house arrest. Nonetheless, the Pakistani government refused to bring the two to trial for fear of what they might reveal about Pakistan's other secret nuclear activities. This was not an idle fear. In a prescient article published less than a month before he was kidnapped and executed while investigating the "shoe bomber" Richard Reid, Daniel Pearl of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Pakistani military authorities found it "inconceivable that a nuclear scientist would travel to Afghanistan without getting clearance from Pakistani officials," because Pakistan "maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists, using a special arm of the Army's general headquarters to monitor them even after retirement."
In the end, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Mahmood and Majeed had provided bin Laden with a blueprint for constructing nuclear weapons. Thereafter, sometimes in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and otherwise unilaterally, American operatives have sought to intercept further "vacations" in Afghanistan by Pakistani nuclear physicists and engineers. The CIA's summary of the matter, submitted to President Bush, concluded that while Mahmood and his charity claimed "to serve the hungry and needy of Afghanistan," in fact, it "provided information about nuclear weapons to Al Qaeda."
Advertisement
PATIENCE, THOUGHTFULNESS, AND EXPERTISE
Andrew Marshall, director of net assessments at the Department of Defense and one of the wise men among national security insiders, has long warned that "if the U.S. ever faced a serious enemy, we would be in deep trouble." Al Qaeda qualifies as a formidable foe. With an annual budget of over $200 million during the 1990s, Al Qaeda brought more than sixty thousand international recruits to Afghanistan for training in terrorist attacks. It established cells, including sleeper cells, in approximately sixty countries. It created affiliate relationships with major terrorist groups around the world, from Chechnya to Indonesia, from Saudi Arabia to Germany, and within the United States itself. Indeed, an Al Qaeda sleeper cell in Singapore, among the most secure and watchful societies in the world, was narrowly prevented from launching an attack on the U.S. and Israeli embassies there, with ten times the amount of explosives used by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. As one Singaporean official observed, "If they could do it here, they could do it anywhere."
Even before 9/11, Al Qaeda's attacks demonstrated an organizational capacity to plan, coordinate, and implement operations well above the threshold of competence necessary to acquire and use a nuclear weapon. Veterans of the most successful U.S. covert actions agree with Tenet's bottom line: the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was "professionally conceived and executed-it showed patience, thoughtfulness, and expertise." As an analyst conducting the postmortem on that attack observed: Who else could have found four scheduled American flights that took off on time?
After 9/11, terrorism analysts and other specialists within the U.S. government reexamined the pattern of Al Qaeda's earlier attacks in an effort to connect the dots. When those dots are connected, they reveal a dagger pointed from Al Qaeda's February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, through the August 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the warship USS Cole in October 2000, to the massive attack of 9/11. Indeed, the dagger points beyond what was achieved in that case to further mega-terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
When U.S. Special Forces, CIA operatives, and Afghan warlords toppled the Taliban government in Afghanistan in late 2001, the U.S. government and American journalists learned more about Al Qaeda than most had imagined they wanted to know. Overrunning hundreds of headquarters buildings, safe houses, training camps, and caves, they recovered tens of thousands of pages of documents, plans, videos, computers, and disks. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld found in this evidence "a number of things that show an appetite for WMD." Together with information extracted through interrogation of captured Al Qaeda operatives, these findings now provide a solid base for assessing Al Qaeda as a nuclear threat.
One of the untold stories of this drama has been the key role played by journalists in acquiring critical information. In December 2001, the Wall Street Journal purchased a desktop computer and a laptop computer looted from an Al Qaeda safe house that turned out to have been used by several top bin Laden lieutenants, including al-Zawahiri and bin Laden's former military commander, the late Mohammed Atef. In addition to hundreds of routine letters and memos dealing with the daily administration of Al Qaeda's terrorist network, the computers' hard drives contained password-protected files on a project code-named "al Zabadi," Arabic for "curdled milk." The curdled milk project sought to acquire chemical and biological weapons, and it had reached the point of testing nerve gas recipes on dogs and rabbits.
CNN discovered perhaps the most disturbing piece of evidence in the Kabul home of Abu Khabab, a senior Al Qaeda official-a twenty-five-page essay titled "Superbomb," which included information on types of nuclear weapons, the physics and effects of nuclear explosions, and the properties of nuclear materials. David Albright, a former nuclear weapons inspector who reviewed the document, concluded that "the author understood shortcuts to making crude nuclear explosives."
Excerpted from NUCLEAR TERRORISM by GRAHAM ALLISON Copyright © 2004 by Graham Allison. Excerpted by permission.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc.
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