Reconstructing the cavalry force
Armor, Sept-Oct, 2004 by Christopher Connolly
The chief of cavalry doctrine has the difficult challenge of keeping up with the ever-changing cavalry organization. Of course, change is nothing new to the cavalry community or the U.S. Army; yet, debating the proper organization of the scout platoon lives on.
During the past 20 years, scout platoons have been comprised of M113s, Sheridans, Bradleys, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), dismounted scouts, human intelligence (HUMINT) soldiers, Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RVs), and various combinations of the aforementioned vehicles and personnel. Sometimes, it was a 10-truck platoon, sometimes a six-Bradley platoon. Stryker RVs are organized in four-vehicle platoons. Although the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security rarely change, many organizational variations create an innumerable amount of tactics, techniques, and procedures that soldiers and leaders must consider.
Based on extensive after-action reports (AARs), participant interviews, and other research, Operation Iraqi Freedom appears to have exposed the inadequacies of our reconnaissance platoons. In addition to written AARs and in-depth research of action reports from various U.S. Army and Marine Corps maneuver brigades, in October 2003 the U.S. Army Armor Center (USAARMC) conducted a series of lessons-learned seminars with 3d Infantry Division (3ID) covering the doctrine, organization, training, leader development, organization materiel, personnel, and facilities (DOTLOMPF) model. The 3ID brigades and task forces rarely led with their organic brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs) and scout platoons; the tempo was simply too fast for HMMWVs and dismounted scouts who were more suited for a deliberate pace of reconnaissance. It became a foregone conclusion that the current reconnaissance organizations within the brigades demanded a change.
This article does not lay down definitive doctrine for the employment of these new squadrons, nor are these organizational configurations chipped in stone. As we know, answering information requirements is what we do, thereby minimizing battlefield uncertainty, even if we never achieve 100-percent certainty.
Those familiar with the Stryker organization should recognize its similarity to the new organization--three ground troops and a habitually attached surveillance troop, which in this case, is organic to the newly created brigade troops battalion (BTB). By pushing tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), PROPHET, and ground surveillance radar/remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems to the squadron level, the squadron can extend the range and depth of its surveillance capability. The forward support company will not be organic, but its habitual attachment will provide the squadron a more robust combat service support organization than that of the Stryker brigade reconnaissance squadron, which only has a combat repair team (CRT). Currently, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), will suffice as a doctrinal reference for the short-term. (1) Fort Knox is publishing an updated version of FM 3-20.96 simply titled, Reconnaissance Squadron, which will incorporate these new organizations. (2)
This new reconnaissance squadron looks similar, but there are only two HMMWV-mounted reconnaissance troops. The platoon configurations should be familiar: six-vehicle platoons and 18 men. The key difference is the presence of a dismounted troop. As in any light organization, transporting these dismounted scouts is problematic. One solution may be that this troop receives HMMWVs in the future to give the squadron three mounted troops. Another is to mount these scouts, but fold them into the two mounted troops and create the 10-HMMWV platoon again, thereby increasing the dismounted capability of each platoon. Of particular note, this squadron has a fairly decent antiarmor capability with 12 tube-launched, optically tracked wire guided missile (TOW) systems and more than 24 Javelin systems.
The New Reconnaissance Platoons
Since the Stryker RV platoon is currently discussed in FM 3-20.98, this article will not reintroduce it. (3) Instead, it unveils the newest organizations in an effort to generate some discussion from the force.
Organization and equipment. As you can see, these platoons can place a minimum of eight to twelve soldiers on the ground while continuing to crew the M3s and HMMWVs. These platoons are heavy with 97E10 HUMINT collectors--some believe that this will better meet the requirements of the operational environment. Note the numbers and variations of weapons and communications systems. Having Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) in every vehicle should make the command and control of this organization a bit easier than before. There is the addition of a PSC-5 Spitfire radio system for each platoon, but there is no mention, at this time, of a high frequency radio set at platoon level or, more adversely, secure squad-level radios. Also, individual weapons are M9 pistols for the M3 crewmembers and M4s for everyone else. As we know, everyone needs to carry an M4, and this issue is currently being addressed, as well as the lack of shotguns, and the potential need for a marksmen. However, we need your thoughts on this organization on issues such as what is missing or what is overkill.
Employment. These organizations will not be found among the pages of FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (4) There is no need to panic. The new platoon manual will be out sometime next summer. In the meantime, these platoons have six and eight vehicles, respectively, and 18 to 30 men--we have something to work with here, even using FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (5)
M3/HWMMV Platoon
Obviously, the platoon diagram conveniently breaks out into three sections, matching a long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped armored HMMWV with an M3. The platoon headquarters ostensibly organizes with two of the three sections with perhaps the senior scout leading the remaining section. In an aggressive, enemy-focused reconnaissance, the platoon leader could choose to lead with his M3s overwatched by his LRAS3-equipped HMMWVs. Conversely, when conducting a deliberate, time-consuming area or zone reconnaissance, he might use a hunter-killer relationship by leading with his scout trucks and dismounts and having his M3s overwatch. There are a number of ways to task organize this element based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). There is even the opportunity for the troop commander to organize his command into four maneuver elements: two scout platoons of five HWMMVs and two sections of M3s in an antiarmor role.
Recce Platoon of the Light Squadron
This platoon is obviously the same organization as the platoons of the BRT. However, adding TOWs and Javelins gives the platoon leader a few more assets with which to work. This platoon could organize into two or three sections, where LRAS3-equipped scouts are overwatched by the TOWs and remaining gun truck. At the troop level, the commander can consolidate his TOW vehicles into one platoon and operate with two four-vehicle scout platoons, depending on METT-TC.
Both platoon organizations, when augmented with additional engineers, combat observation and lasing teams, infantry, or armor, can be rounded into very capable reconnaissance or security elements. Again, this article is not intended to prescript doctrinal techniques of employment; it is intended to familiarize the force with what will be available.
Training
Platoon sergeants should already know this stuff! LRAS3 has been around for a few years, so scouts should not be uncomfortable with it. Matching it with the capabilities and limitations of the Bradley may take some getting used to. However, by adding a team of 97E10s and one 97B20 (counterintelligence agent), there is an opportunity for some necessary cross training. Each scout must become familiar with rudimentary tactical questioning techniques, as well as the report format that 97-series soldiers use for HUMINT reporting. Perhaps more important is the need to train the HUMINT soldiers in the 19D skill set; more often than not, they will operate as scouts first and as HUMINT soldiers second.
Reconnaissance platoons will also have to continue to emphasize training with infantry, armor, and other combat support elements--this has been said for years. Platoon trainers should put forth training techniques that best worked for their platoons as they prepared for war in a time- and resource-constrained reality that a garrison army must endure.
The shift in training focus should be toward operations that are less focused on fighting and more focused on reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. It may be tempting for a platoon to get their Bradleys and TOWs into a fight, but this initiates a decisive engagement, which means reconnaissance stops and the higher commander must extricate his reconnaissance force--something the new brigade combat teams, which have fewer maneuver forces, need to avoid.
After Thoughts
The cavalry community is experiencing instability. Division cavalry squadrons are on the chopping block. The future of the regiment is uncertain. The good news is that the Army has recognized the need for a cavalry organization organic to each brigade and has reorganized to meet that requirement. This does not mean that there is a "doctrine void" out there. The fundamentals of reconnaissance and security have not changed. The critical tasks of conducting a route reconnaissance or executing a short-duration observation post remain the same. The tools are not unfamiliar; they are merely combined in different ways.
Doctrinal manuals will be published by the summer of 2005 and will discuss the employment of these new platoons and troops. For these manuals to be good products, your thoughts on what works and doesn't work with these organizations are critical. We want your input. Call the USAARMC Cavalry Doctrine Desk at DSN 464-1188 (commercial 502-624-1188) or email at [email protected].
Notes
(1) U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 23 December 2002.
(2) FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington. D.C., TBP.
(3) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, D.C., 2 December 2002.
(4) FM 17-98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO. Washington, D.C., superseded by FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
(5) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
Major Chris Connolly is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and is completing his M.Ed. at University of Louisville. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Cavalry Doctrine Branch, Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Developments, Fort Knox, KY; Afghan National Army Mobile Training Team, Task Force Phoenix, Afghanistan; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX; commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Fort Hood; S4 and assistant S3, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and XO, C Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY.
COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group
Armor, Sept-Oct, 2004 by Christopher Connolly
The chief of cavalry doctrine has the difficult challenge of keeping up with the ever-changing cavalry organization. Of course, change is nothing new to the cavalry community or the U.S. Army; yet, debating the proper organization of the scout platoon lives on.
During the past 20 years, scout platoons have been comprised of M113s, Sheridans, Bradleys, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), dismounted scouts, human intelligence (HUMINT) soldiers, Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RVs), and various combinations of the aforementioned vehicles and personnel. Sometimes, it was a 10-truck platoon, sometimes a six-Bradley platoon. Stryker RVs are organized in four-vehicle platoons. Although the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security rarely change, many organizational variations create an innumerable amount of tactics, techniques, and procedures that soldiers and leaders must consider.
Based on extensive after-action reports (AARs), participant interviews, and other research, Operation Iraqi Freedom appears to have exposed the inadequacies of our reconnaissance platoons. In addition to written AARs and in-depth research of action reports from various U.S. Army and Marine Corps maneuver brigades, in October 2003 the U.S. Army Armor Center (USAARMC) conducted a series of lessons-learned seminars with 3d Infantry Division (3ID) covering the doctrine, organization, training, leader development, organization materiel, personnel, and facilities (DOTLOMPF) model. The 3ID brigades and task forces rarely led with their organic brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs) and scout platoons; the tempo was simply too fast for HMMWVs and dismounted scouts who were more suited for a deliberate pace of reconnaissance. It became a foregone conclusion that the current reconnaissance organizations within the brigades demanded a change.
This article does not lay down definitive doctrine for the employment of these new squadrons, nor are these organizational configurations chipped in stone. As we know, answering information requirements is what we do, thereby minimizing battlefield uncertainty, even if we never achieve 100-percent certainty.
Those familiar with the Stryker organization should recognize its similarity to the new organization--three ground troops and a habitually attached surveillance troop, which in this case, is organic to the newly created brigade troops battalion (BTB). By pushing tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), PROPHET, and ground surveillance radar/remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems to the squadron level, the squadron can extend the range and depth of its surveillance capability. The forward support company will not be organic, but its habitual attachment will provide the squadron a more robust combat service support organization than that of the Stryker brigade reconnaissance squadron, which only has a combat repair team (CRT). Currently, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), will suffice as a doctrinal reference for the short-term. (1) Fort Knox is publishing an updated version of FM 3-20.96 simply titled, Reconnaissance Squadron, which will incorporate these new organizations. (2)
This new reconnaissance squadron looks similar, but there are only two HMMWV-mounted reconnaissance troops. The platoon configurations should be familiar: six-vehicle platoons and 18 men. The key difference is the presence of a dismounted troop. As in any light organization, transporting these dismounted scouts is problematic. One solution may be that this troop receives HMMWVs in the future to give the squadron three mounted troops. Another is to mount these scouts, but fold them into the two mounted troops and create the 10-HMMWV platoon again, thereby increasing the dismounted capability of each platoon. Of particular note, this squadron has a fairly decent antiarmor capability with 12 tube-launched, optically tracked wire guided missile (TOW) systems and more than 24 Javelin systems.
The New Reconnaissance Platoons
Since the Stryker RV platoon is currently discussed in FM 3-20.98, this article will not reintroduce it. (3) Instead, it unveils the newest organizations in an effort to generate some discussion from the force.
Organization and equipment. As you can see, these platoons can place a minimum of eight to twelve soldiers on the ground while continuing to crew the M3s and HMMWVs. These platoons are heavy with 97E10 HUMINT collectors--some believe that this will better meet the requirements of the operational environment. Note the numbers and variations of weapons and communications systems. Having Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) in every vehicle should make the command and control of this organization a bit easier than before. There is the addition of a PSC-5 Spitfire radio system for each platoon, but there is no mention, at this time, of a high frequency radio set at platoon level or, more adversely, secure squad-level radios. Also, individual weapons are M9 pistols for the M3 crewmembers and M4s for everyone else. As we know, everyone needs to carry an M4, and this issue is currently being addressed, as well as the lack of shotguns, and the potential need for a marksmen. However, we need your thoughts on this organization on issues such as what is missing or what is overkill.
Employment. These organizations will not be found among the pages of FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (4) There is no need to panic. The new platoon manual will be out sometime next summer. In the meantime, these platoons have six and eight vehicles, respectively, and 18 to 30 men--we have something to work with here, even using FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (5)
M3/HWMMV Platoon
Obviously, the platoon diagram conveniently breaks out into three sections, matching a long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped armored HMMWV with an M3. The platoon headquarters ostensibly organizes with two of the three sections with perhaps the senior scout leading the remaining section. In an aggressive, enemy-focused reconnaissance, the platoon leader could choose to lead with his M3s overwatched by his LRAS3-equipped HMMWVs. Conversely, when conducting a deliberate, time-consuming area or zone reconnaissance, he might use a hunter-killer relationship by leading with his scout trucks and dismounts and having his M3s overwatch. There are a number of ways to task organize this element based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). There is even the opportunity for the troop commander to organize his command into four maneuver elements: two scout platoons of five HWMMVs and two sections of M3s in an antiarmor role.
Recce Platoon of the Light Squadron
This platoon is obviously the same organization as the platoons of the BRT. However, adding TOWs and Javelins gives the platoon leader a few more assets with which to work. This platoon could organize into two or three sections, where LRAS3-equipped scouts are overwatched by the TOWs and remaining gun truck. At the troop level, the commander can consolidate his TOW vehicles into one platoon and operate with two four-vehicle scout platoons, depending on METT-TC.
Both platoon organizations, when augmented with additional engineers, combat observation and lasing teams, infantry, or armor, can be rounded into very capable reconnaissance or security elements. Again, this article is not intended to prescript doctrinal techniques of employment; it is intended to familiarize the force with what will be available.
Training
Platoon sergeants should already know this stuff! LRAS3 has been around for a few years, so scouts should not be uncomfortable with it. Matching it with the capabilities and limitations of the Bradley may take some getting used to. However, by adding a team of 97E10s and one 97B20 (counterintelligence agent), there is an opportunity for some necessary cross training. Each scout must become familiar with rudimentary tactical questioning techniques, as well as the report format that 97-series soldiers use for HUMINT reporting. Perhaps more important is the need to train the HUMINT soldiers in the 19D skill set; more often than not, they will operate as scouts first and as HUMINT soldiers second.
Reconnaissance platoons will also have to continue to emphasize training with infantry, armor, and other combat support elements--this has been said for years. Platoon trainers should put forth training techniques that best worked for their platoons as they prepared for war in a time- and resource-constrained reality that a garrison army must endure.
The shift in training focus should be toward operations that are less focused on fighting and more focused on reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. It may be tempting for a platoon to get their Bradleys and TOWs into a fight, but this initiates a decisive engagement, which means reconnaissance stops and the higher commander must extricate his reconnaissance force--something the new brigade combat teams, which have fewer maneuver forces, need to avoid.
After Thoughts
The cavalry community is experiencing instability. Division cavalry squadrons are on the chopping block. The future of the regiment is uncertain. The good news is that the Army has recognized the need for a cavalry organization organic to each brigade and has reorganized to meet that requirement. This does not mean that there is a "doctrine void" out there. The fundamentals of reconnaissance and security have not changed. The critical tasks of conducting a route reconnaissance or executing a short-duration observation post remain the same. The tools are not unfamiliar; they are merely combined in different ways.
Doctrinal manuals will be published by the summer of 2005 and will discuss the employment of these new platoons and troops. For these manuals to be good products, your thoughts on what works and doesn't work with these organizations are critical. We want your input. Call the USAARMC Cavalry Doctrine Desk at DSN 464-1188 (commercial 502-624-1188) or email at [email protected].
Notes
(1) U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 23 December 2002.
(2) FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington. D.C., TBP.
(3) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, D.C., 2 December 2002.
(4) FM 17-98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO. Washington, D.C., superseded by FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
(5) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
Major Chris Connolly is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and is completing his M.Ed. at University of Louisville. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Cavalry Doctrine Branch, Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Developments, Fort Knox, KY; Afghan National Army Mobile Training Team, Task Force Phoenix, Afghanistan; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX; commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Fort Hood; S4 and assistant S3, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and XO, C Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY.
COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Armor Center
COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group
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