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  • Modern Cavalry

    Reconstructing the cavalry force
    Armor, Sept-Oct, 2004 by Christopher Connolly

    The chief of cavalry doctrine has the difficult challenge of keeping up with the ever-changing cavalry organization. Of course, change is nothing new to the cavalry community or the U.S. Army; yet, debating the proper organization of the scout platoon lives on.
    During the past 20 years, scout platoons have been comprised of M113s, Sheridans, Bradleys, high-mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), dismounted scouts, human intelligence (HUMINT) soldiers, Stryker reconnaissance vehicles (RVs), and various combinations of the aforementioned vehicles and personnel. Sometimes, it was a 10-truck platoon, sometimes a six-Bradley platoon. Stryker RVs are organized in four-vehicle platoons. Although the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security rarely change, many organizational variations create an innumerable amount of tactics, techniques, and procedures that soldiers and leaders must consider.
    Based on extensive after-action reports (AARs), participant interviews, and other research, Operation Iraqi Freedom appears to have exposed the inadequacies of our reconnaissance platoons. In addition to written AARs and in-depth research of action reports from various U.S. Army and Marine Corps maneuver brigades, in October 2003 the U.S. Army Armor Center (USAARMC) conducted a series of lessons-learned seminars with 3d Infantry Division (3ID) covering the doctrine, organization, training, leader development, organization materiel, personnel, and facilities (DOTLOMPF) model. The 3ID brigades and task forces rarely led with their organic brigade reconnaissance troops (BRTs) and scout platoons; the tempo was simply too fast for HMMWVs and dismounted scouts who were more suited for a deliberate pace of reconnaissance. It became a foregone conclusion that the current reconnaissance organizations within the brigades demanded a change.
    This article does not lay down definitive doctrine for the employment of these new squadrons, nor are these organizational configurations chipped in stone. As we know, answering information requirements is what we do, thereby minimizing battlefield uncertainty, even if we never achieve 100-percent certainty.
    Those familiar with the Stryker organization should recognize its similarity to the new organization--three ground troops and a habitually attached surveillance troop, which in this case, is organic to the newly created brigade troops battalion (BTB). By pushing tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAV), PROPHET, and ground surveillance radar/remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems to the squadron level, the squadron can extend the range and depth of its surveillance capability. The forward support company will not be organic, but its habitual attachment will provide the squadron a more robust combat service support organization than that of the Stryker brigade reconnaissance squadron, which only has a combat repair team (CRT). Currently, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), will suffice as a doctrinal reference for the short-term. (1) Fort Knox is publishing an updated version of FM 3-20.96 simply titled, Reconnaissance Squadron, which will incorporate these new organizations. (2)
    This new reconnaissance squadron looks similar, but there are only two HMMWV-mounted reconnaissance troops. The platoon configurations should be familiar: six-vehicle platoons and 18 men. The key difference is the presence of a dismounted troop. As in any light organization, transporting these dismounted scouts is problematic. One solution may be that this troop receives HMMWVs in the future to give the squadron three mounted troops. Another is to mount these scouts, but fold them into the two mounted troops and create the 10-HMMWV platoon again, thereby increasing the dismounted capability of each platoon. Of particular note, this squadron has a fairly decent antiarmor capability with 12 tube-launched, optically tracked wire guided missile (TOW) systems and more than 24 Javelin systems.
    The New Reconnaissance Platoons
    Since the Stryker RV platoon is currently discussed in FM 3-20.98, this article will not reintroduce it. (3) Instead, it unveils the newest organizations in an effort to generate some discussion from the force.
    Organization and equipment. As you can see, these platoons can place a minimum of eight to twelve soldiers on the ground while continuing to crew the M3s and HMMWVs. These platoons are heavy with 97E10 HUMINT collectors--some believe that this will better meet the requirements of the operational environment. Note the numbers and variations of weapons and communications systems. Having Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) in every vehicle should make the command and control of this organization a bit easier than before. There is the addition of a PSC-5 Spitfire radio system for each platoon, but there is no mention, at this time, of a high frequency radio set at platoon level or, more adversely, secure squad-level radios. Also, individual weapons are M9 pistols for the M3 crewmembers and M4s for everyone else. As we know, everyone needs to carry an M4, and this issue is currently being addressed, as well as the lack of shotguns, and the potential need for a marksmen. However, we need your thoughts on this organization on issues such as what is missing or what is overkill.
    Employment. These organizations will not be found among the pages of FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (4) There is no need to panic. The new platoon manual will be out sometime next summer. In the meantime, these platoons have six and eight vehicles, respectively, and 18 to 30 men--we have something to work with here, even using FM 17-98 or FM 3-20.98. (5)
    M3/HWMMV Platoon
    Obviously, the platoon diagram conveniently breaks out into three sections, matching a long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3)-equipped armored HMMWV with an M3. The platoon headquarters ostensibly organizes with two of the three sections with perhaps the senior scout leading the remaining section. In an aggressive, enemy-focused reconnaissance, the platoon leader could choose to lead with his M3s overwatched by his LRAS3-equipped HMMWVs. Conversely, when conducting a deliberate, time-consuming area or zone reconnaissance, he might use a hunter-killer relationship by leading with his scout trucks and dismounts and having his M3s overwatch. There are a number of ways to task organize this element based on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT-TC). There is even the opportunity for the troop commander to organize his command into four maneuver elements: two scout platoons of five HWMMVs and two sections of M3s in an antiarmor role.
    Recce Platoon of the Light Squadron
    This platoon is obviously the same organization as the platoons of the BRT. However, adding TOWs and Javelins gives the platoon leader a few more assets with which to work. This platoon could organize into two or three sections, where LRAS3-equipped scouts are overwatched by the TOWs and remaining gun truck. At the troop level, the commander can consolidate his TOW vehicles into one platoon and operate with two four-vehicle scout platoons, depending on METT-TC.
    Both platoon organizations, when augmented with additional engineers, combat observation and lasing teams, infantry, or armor, can be rounded into very capable reconnaissance or security elements. Again, this article is not intended to prescript doctrinal techniques of employment; it is intended to familiarize the force with what will be available.
    Training
    Platoon sergeants should already know this stuff! LRAS3 has been around for a few years, so scouts should not be uncomfortable with it. Matching it with the capabilities and limitations of the Bradley may take some getting used to. However, by adding a team of 97E10s and one 97B20 (counterintelligence agent), there is an opportunity for some necessary cross training. Each scout must become familiar with rudimentary tactical questioning techniques, as well as the report format that 97-series soldiers use for HUMINT reporting. Perhaps more important is the need to train the HUMINT soldiers in the 19D skill set; more often than not, they will operate as scouts first and as HUMINT soldiers second.
    Reconnaissance platoons will also have to continue to emphasize training with infantry, armor, and other combat support elements--this has been said for years. Platoon trainers should put forth training techniques that best worked for their platoons as they prepared for war in a time- and resource-constrained reality that a garrison army must endure.
    The shift in training focus should be toward operations that are less focused on fighting and more focused on reconnaissance and surveillance tasks. It may be tempting for a platoon to get their Bradleys and TOWs into a fight, but this initiates a decisive engagement, which means reconnaissance stops and the higher commander must extricate his reconnaissance force--something the new brigade combat teams, which have fewer maneuver forces, need to avoid.
    After Thoughts
    The cavalry community is experiencing instability. Division cavalry squadrons are on the chopping block. The future of the regiment is uncertain. The good news is that the Army has recognized the need for a cavalry organization organic to each brigade and has reorganized to meet that requirement. This does not mean that there is a "doctrine void" out there. The fundamentals of reconnaissance and security have not changed. The critical tasks of conducting a route reconnaissance or executing a short-duration observation post remain the same. The tools are not unfamiliar; they are merely combined in different ways.
    Doctrinal manuals will be published by the summer of 2005 and will discuss the employment of these new platoons and troops. For these manuals to be good products, your thoughts on what works and doesn't work with these organizations are critical. We want your input. Call the USAARMC Cavalry Doctrine Desk at DSN 464-1188 (commercial 502-624-1188) or email at [email protected].
    Notes
    (1) U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron (RSTA), U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 23 December 2002.
    (2) FM 3-20.96, Reconnaissance Squadron, GPO, Washington. D.C., TBP.
    (3) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO, Washington, D.C., 2 December 2002.
    (4) FM 17-98, Reconnaissance Platoon, GPO. Washington, D.C., superseded by FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
    (5) FM 3-20.98, Reconnaissance Platoon.
    Major Chris Connolly is currently a student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy, and is completing his M.Ed. at University of Louisville. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Cavalry Doctrine Branch, Directorate, Training, Doctrine, and Combat Developments, Fort Knox, KY; Afghan National Army Mobile Training Team, Task Force Phoenix, Afghanistan; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, TX; commander, C Company, 3d Battalion, 66th Armor Regiment, Fort Hood; S4 and assistant S3, 2d Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA; and XO, C Troop, 5th Squadron, 15th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY.
    COPYRIGHT 2004 U.S. Army Armor Center
    COPYRIGHT 2004 Gale Group
    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

  • #2
    The Stryker Cavalry Reconaissance Troop
    Captain Matthew L. Blome

    Stryker brigades and cavalry reconnaissance troops have served in Iraq since November 2003. After more than five years of existence, including two years of combat service in Iraq, it is time to review the experiences of this combined effort with an eye toward ongoing transformation.

    This article focuses on how the cavalry troop integrates into squadron and brigade operations and ways to improve the organization. Based on battlefield observations, the Stryker cavalry reconnaissance troop, as it is now organized, is an effective and adaptable organization able to conduct a wide variety of reconnaissance and security missions.

    The Stryker cavalry reconnaissance troop I commanded deployed to Iraq from November 2003 until October 2004. The troop conducted a variety of mission sets, which included:

    • Operations to isolate the city of Samarra in a mid-intensity fight.
    • Stability and reconstruction operations (SRO)-oriented area security missions over a large area, requiring integration of traditional security tasks, civil assistance and administration, and training and integrating internal security forces.
    • Border security missions with internal security forces focused on smuggling and moving foreign assistance and fighters.
    • Low-intensity, enemy-focused area security missions in urban areas.
    • Long distance convoy escort missions.

    The troop identified a number of problems initially, but quickly adapted and applied creative solutions. These problems, along with their solutions and an examination of current doctrine, are useful starting points to demonstrate how the Stryker concept and the transformation of cavalry units may improve.

    Although the Stryker cavalry concept was originally intended to maximize dismount capability, a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) shortage of dismounted soldiers at the platoon and troop levels prevents the troop from meeting its capabilities requirements. Training and operational deployment experience often shows that dismounts are the limiting factor for many operations. Too few dismounts prohibit the ability to conduct platoon-level tasks, such as hasty building searches or covering more than two named areas of interest (NAIs) with dismounts. This weakness is often exacerbated by force protection and other outside distracters.

    While the Stryker vehicle has excellent tactical and operational mobility, the troop has limited ability to sustain itself or conduct command and control (C2) on the move because the troop headquarters is tied to stationary and soft-skinned platforms. While human intelligence (HUMWT) soldiers are vital and serve as a huge combat multiplier at the troop level, they need to be located within the troop headquarters to maximize both their capabilities and the platoon's dismounted strength. Clearly, the Stryker cavalry troop requires a more robust organizational capability, particularly dismounted scouts, to better meet its current operational requirements in Iraq, as well as those outlined in doctrine.'
    Organizational Problems

    While conducting the various mission sets mentioned above, three problem areas in current Stryker cavalry doctrine and organization became clear: the troop is very flexible and adapts well to different mission sets, although it requires significant augmentation or task organization efforts for success; the squadron, and thus recce troops, must be able to operate independently in an economy of force role without the direct support of infantry elements or field artillery fires; and in any environment the troop must be able to fight to facilitate its reconnaissance or security mission, at least against a similar or less capable enemy. This includes both offensive and defensive tasks. particularly against a squad- or team-sized dismounted threat.

    These problems made mission execution unnecessarily difficult in Iraq and placed soldiers at unnecessary higher levels of risk, particularly in sustained combat. These problems begin at the platoon level and force the troop commander to mass multiple platoons, which can make the most minor contact or obstacle a troop fight.

    Dismount strength. Dismounted patrols were difficult to conduct and often required significantly more dismount power within the platoon to handle even a single enemy combatant, especially in an urban environment. Even during Mounted movement, the Stryker is soldier intensive. With a driver, gunner, vehicle commander, and air sentry, it requires a minimum of four soldiers. This need for security is especially acute in urban areas, where the terrain is more complex and there are more areas for the enemy to hide. While the Current doctrinal platoon and troop Manual shows only two soldiers remaining on the vehicle clurilh-1 dismounted operations, three are actually required to secure and effectively command and control the vehicle due to its site and the digital systems on board, while four soldiers are ideal. This aspect of operations alone immediately reduces the potential number of dismounts available to the platoon from twelve to eight, which might potentially operate in two dismount teams of two scouts and two counter-intelligence (CI) specialists each. Although platoons are rarely at full strength, due to normal details, taskings, wounded, and leaves/ passes, even at full MTOE authorization, platoons had only four to six soldiers available for dismounted maneuver.

    During area security operations in northwestern Iraq along the Syrian border and in Mosul, dismounts were absolutely vital to platoon and troop success. Platoons maximized their dismount capability by using two dismount teams of four soldiers each. However, the troop found that with the exception of the convoy escort missions, the degree of Success, whether in a rural open area or in broken or urban terrain, was directly proportionate to an increased number ot'diSITIOLints. When the mission required additional dismounts, platoons left one Stryker at the squadron forward operating base (FOB) or troop outpost to increase the number of dismounts by freeing up the vehicle crew. Dismounted Scouts were also pulled from one platoon to augment another when the entire troop was not required to conduct a particular mission or task.

    Sustainability. The lack of dismounted strength in the platoon leads to problems with several aspects of the sustainment of combat operations in any level of conflict. In Iraq, it was often necessary to develop a patrol schedule that rotated platoons throughout a 24-hour period to maintain coverage on a wide variety of NAIs in the troop's area of operations. The platoon was the smallest element suitable to conduct combat patrols or establish area security sets to observe counter mortar and rocket NAIs during troop operations in northwestern Mosul. Almost immediately, FOB operations often took away dismounted strength for operations to man guard towers and entry control points. FOB quick reaction force (QRF) requirements also took an additional platoon out of the fight. These factors arc the unavoidable price of doing business in Iraq.

    The shortage of dismount strength becomes most troubling when the troop suffers casualties. Due to a shortage of scouts in the recce platoon, several niortarnien were moved to scout platoons, bringing them closer to full strength. From a simple numbers standpoint, in a four-man reconnaissance team, if you take away two or three of the soldiers. the team is no longer effective. We augmented scout platoons from any available source, including the mortars, attached engineers. military police, or infantrymen. Often, recce platoons conducted missions with four to five different organic MOS soldiers, including the platoon medic.

    The troop headquarters struggles to fight and move its assets during continuous operations. First, the tactical operations center (TOC) shelter is ridiculously overweight and Cumbersome, based on an M I 113 chassis HMMWV with a small shelter. This Configuration gives it no protection, no tactical mobility for the troop XO, limited operational mobility, and takes the troop XO completely out of the direct fight if the commander is lost or _one. Only one soldier fits in the back. Soldiers in the front two cats cannot even operate voice radio communications without modifying the vehicle's hardware configuration it simply cannot operate on the move.

    Ongoing operations in the command post (CP) shelter leave insufficient space for both an operations NCO and the troop senior CI specialist. Since the vehicle is already overweight, it has difficulty pulling the troop headquarters' equipment trailer, which Must be line hauled over anything other than tactical distances. Without a combat vehicle, the first sergeant also lacks protection during movement, hampering his ability to accomplish logistics package (LOGPAC) operations or facilitate casualty evacuation in the presence of any threat elements without borrowed combat power from another platoon.

    Finally, the Stryker cavalry troop lacks the combined arms capability that is the hallmark of other cavalry formations in the army - a primary strength of cavalry units. While doctrine makes it clear that the squadron will require augmentation to fulfill some tasks during high-intensity conflict, the troop will iced to be augmented as it currently stands for any level of conflict, from SRO to high-intensity conflict. Even in the low-intensity_ conflict that characterizes the insurgency in Iraq, there is[bad scan] need for firepower to deal with enemy forces hiding in hunkers and stone or brick buildings, and those located out of small arms range.
    The dilemma of Striker reconnaissance. The troop can gather information in an urban area. [Bad scan]

    [Bad scan]

    Each troop established traffic control points to control movement on main avenues of approach into the city. However, the recce troops and squadron were restricted from conducting any kind of reconnaissance in the city of Samarra prior to the beginning of attacks during Operation Ivy Blizzard for force protection reasons. Units from 4th Infantry Division operating in and around the city had more than three weeks of reconnaissance focused operations in the city prior to the attack and were able to conduct extensive target development, close target reconnaissance, route reconnaissance, and area of operation familiarization prior to the attack. Had the troops been able to conduct more than one day of reconnaissance within the city, they could have, at a minimum, provided detailed reconnaissance of avenues of approach, trafficability of routes, close target reconnaissance on known targets, and possibly some further target development. As a result of this restriction, the limited information available forced the infantry battalions to "troll for contact;" in the words of one battalion commander, until they could develop their own actionable intelligence or confirm the correct location for identified targets within the city. This reconnaissance could have also assisted troops in identifying heavily and lightly trafficked areas to allow for greater focus and refinement to traffic control point locations once the squadron began operations to isolate the city.

    Obviously, reconnaissance objectives and allocations of Combat power need to be adjusted to fit the environment and nature of the threat. However, in any operation. specific intelligence requirements can be assigned to ground recce troops, for which rifle companies are not well suited, and will greatly facilitate offensive operations by infantry battalions.

    The other side of the dilemma faced the squadron when it was required to relieve another unit in the western half of Mosul for area security operations in that it was expected to conduct tasks that could have easily exceeded its potential for combat power without augmentation. This economy-of-force mission allowed the brigade to allocate infantry forces elsewhere. While recce troop operations were severely restricted in Samarra, troops effectively replaced rifle companies in Mosul. The troop conducted an area security mission focused on counter-mortar/rocket operations.

    In Mosul, the troop handled most security tasks within the city, which included presence patrols, close target reconnaissance, and actions on contact with complex ambushes against platoon-sized enemy elements using small arms, rocket propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and vehicle-borne IEDs. Although the brigade prohibited recce platoons from acting as the assault element for cordon and search missions prior to the squadron's operations in Mosul, recce troops may be better suited than infantry companies for the exploitation phase of cordon and search operations due to their familiarity with embedded and organic HUMINT assets.

    Regardless of its role, the troop must he able to light with enough combat power to facilitate its outlined reconnaissance or security missions in any environment. While the squadron's economy-of-Corcc mission was non-doctrinal, the troop spent the majority of its time conducting missions supporting this role. However, in its doctrinal role, outside of the high-intensity conflict, it is still necessary for the troop to fight in contact to allow the infantry battalions to conduct decisive maneuver out of contact.

    Current Doctrinal Position

    Ironically, in view of experiences in Iraq and the associated low-intensity conflict, one might conclude that the troop and squadron may actually he optimally organized for major theater war within the limitations outlined in current doctrine. This is only after considering its emphasis on information gathering through stealth, a reduced presence on the battle[ield, its emphasis on dismounted reconnaissance, and the apparent desire for security operations mostly out of contact. These emphases are consistent with an orientation on Cacilitating the conventional lethal fires targeting drill. In other words, it is the most efficient way for a light organization to adapt to conventional high-intensity combat.

    While current doctrinal capabilities support the intent of the troop and squadron to operate by stealth in the context of high-intensity conflict, a brief comparison of these capabilities, the troop's organizational abilities, and operational requirements clearly show disparities between doctrine, organization, and experience. Instead of just needing heavy augmentation to perform offensive and defensive missions, the troop requires significant augmentation to perform tasks in support of its specified missions.

    Obviously, strictly mounted operations preclude the conduct of HUMINT or intelligence collections, and severely limit the use of stealth for reconnaissance. How anyone can "with organic counterintelligence (CI) assets, conduct detailed mounted operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT)-dominant reconnaissance" in any environment is a mystery, since one simply must dismount to talk to people. Clearly, this comment on the adverse affect of continuous reconnaissance is true, since any element conducting sustainment operations will reduce the number of areas for reconnaissance.

    Aggressive reconnaissance against a lightly equipped threat is not possible for several areas, which would require more than a platoon for many situations during routine combat reconnaissance patrols. More than one platoon is required to mass sufficient dismounts for types of contact other than defending the unit for the purpose of breaking contact.

    Close, stealthy reconnaissance is certainly possible, but completely dependent on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civilians (METT TC), and is of limited use in Iraq based on the vast cultural differences and the alternating closely built-up or open terrain. While you may hide a Stryker in the rolling hills of the open prairie at night, you will not hide one in the streets of Mosul at any lime.'- The combination of dense middle-eastern construction, dogs, population density, shepherds, children, and close-knit neighborhoods will almost always prevent concealment.

    The troop's ability to reduce risk to the Stryker brigade combat team by assuring survivability through information to avoid contact or achieve overwhelming combat power at the decisive point depends entirely on its ability to maintain an economy of force at all other places away from the decisive point, at least through observation. This observation is only as viable as the troop's or squadron's ability to make contact on terms that allow the infantry battalions to remain out of contact.

    Not only will platoons and troops have difficulty meeting all doctrinal requirements, the doctrinal missions have been defined so narrowly that they do not address the missions that the squadron is asked to do, both in doctrine and in recent operational experience. The experience of the squadron at combat training centers is also consistent with these disparities. These disparities will require minor revisions to doctrine as it currently exists and major changes to the MTOE and force structure of the recce platoon and Stryker cavalry troop.'

    A more robust troop organization is required. Current doctrine shows an outdated organization for the troop as the commander now has a reconnaissance vehicle, the section includes the nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) truck, and the troop is authorized only one E5 supply soldier.

    While the Stryker is a uniquely capable vehicle, we are not maximizing its potential as the troop is currently configured. The bench seats actually seat up to ten dismounts comfortably during tactical movement, while we have at most two or three at any one time, including the attached platoon medic. In fact, when our relief unit relieved us, we fit two scout platoons (nearly 40 soldiers) in each platoon of RV Strykers, so that every man in the relieving unit could participate on the right-seat-ride missions. There is also plenty of space for additional communications systems.

    Recce platoons have plenty of leadership, but not a lot of led. In a 20-man platoon with one officer, ten NCOs, and only 10 enlisted soldiers, there are more leaders than led within each platoon. This top-heavy aspect of the platoon often creates shortages by grade and confusion among the ranks about who works for whom. As a result, dismounted patrols often contain a plethora of sergeants, but very few enlisted soldiers. The NCOs fill positions long recognized by the Army, which include a senior scout, vehicle commander, section leader, and team leader. The MTOE seems to have left out the soldiers necessary to fill out the organization.

    Recce Troop Organization
    The mortar platoon sergeant is slotted against a five-ton cargo truck with trailer. From this platform, he is expected to provide command and control in the same environment as his mortar carrier Strykers, as well as provide his own fire direction, since the crew of each Stryker is consumed with the tasks of operating the vehicle and the gun. The mortar platoon sergeant should have a vehicle that can operate with the same degree of protection and mobility as the mortar carriers, as well as support the systems required for basic fire direction. The troop definitely requires a more robust organization to address these problems.

    Reorganizing the Recce Troops
    The headquarters section should include two carrier vehicle (CV) or reconnaissance vehicle (RV) variants, one infantry carrier vehicle (ICV), and one fire support vehicle (FSV), with a medium tactical vehicle-based CP shelter for static and HUMINT operations. The most important addition is dismount strength, each RV carries not only a crew of three soldiers, but also a four-man dismounted recon team, more than doubling dismount strength. The reccc platoon retains six vehicles, including four RV and two mobile gun system (MGS) Strykers operating in three two-vehicle sections or two two-vehicle sections.4 This infusion of manpower is vital to address most of the disparities between doctrine, organization, and experience. The additional MGS vehicles provide a combined arms capability at the platoon level, as well as a degree of flexibility and robustness now absent, by providing more capability within the platoon, as well as allowing the troop commander to task organize into four viable maneuver elements. The mortar section includes two mortar carrier vehicles (MCVs), and a medical evacuation vehicle (MEV) chassis Stryker (or IAV) configured to hold additional ammunition and the fire direction center (FDC) equipment.

    These additional assets are critical to providing the capability to take on limited nontraditional cavalry tasks in support of traditional doctrinal cavalry missions. These tasks include hasty cordon and search missions for targets of opportunity, screening operations against primarily dismounted or motorized threats, and area security over widely dispersed areas for reconnaissance handover to the brigade's infantry elements. Also, the combined arms nature of these organizations will enhance the ability to conduct stealthy dismounted reconnaissance and other unique capabilities of the Stryker-equipped cavalry troop by providing the security and organic sustainability required.

    Current doctrine and organization seem to treat the Stryker simply as a limited fighting capability edition of the heavy troop with some cursory mention of "multidimensional aspects of reconnaissance," rather than as an opportunity to finally provide sufficient dismount capability and robustness to answer the bri-ade commander's priority information requirements (PIR) in the full spectrum of conflict. These proposals meet the needs identified in Iraq, as well as the shortcomings identified in doctrine.'
    The reorganization of the troop's embedded HUMINT personnel is also crucial. While they were a huge combat multiplier ill Iraq. these soldiers need to be reallocated within the troop to maximize their effectiveness. This is in no way to say that they should be taken out of the cavalry reconnaissance troop, but they are of oreatar use as a consolidated asset. This proposal would pill] 97B personnel out of platoons and keep platoons 19-series pure. It would reduce the number of 97-scries soldiers to three two-man teams, plus one staff scrgeant-level senior CI specialist in one section, maintained within the troop headquarters. This has the key advantage of consolidating the troop staff for information management and analysis, fiacilitatino, intelligence information flow up and down reporting channels. It also better allows the commander to mass or distribute assets to each of his recce platoons, without taking away dismount strength from the platoons. As HUMINT personnel are currently con1igured as are an integral part of the platoon, these personnel Used interchangeably with scouts during routine missions and patrols. Often, to maximize the capabilities of HUMINT personnel, it is essential to stay at the troop level to avoid being consumed by the ground scout role.

    The Stryker cavalry troop is a capable and adaptive organization that can contribute valuable assets within the current operating environment. There have been several great articles published recently about how light cavalry troops and tank companies mounted in HMMWVs have successfully adapted to the threat environment in Iraq. However, when one looks closely at the MTOE differences between the Stryker reconnaissance troop and these other light- or HMMWV-mounted organizations, there is little difference, other than a larger vehicle for the same few dismounts to ride in. The Stryker cavalry squadron has also been very successful and has adapted well to combat experiences in Iraq. Based on a careful examination of doctrine, training, and operational experiences, it requires more assets to meet its doctrinal and operational reconnaissance and surveillance missions in any environment.

    There seems to be a trend in the armor/cavalry community to force orUanizations to do the same with less, rather than take advantage of combat multipliers, such as increased range, stand off, mobility, and protection, to do much more with the same. Each time the armor community introduces a digital architecture, advanced communications, or long-range sights or weapons, which increase the lethality and span of control capable within any organization, we immediately trade off the advantage gained by these changes by reducing the size of our formations. In other words, every time we add a 25 to 30 percent capability to our formations, we give that advantage back by getting rid of 25 to 30 percent of the formation.` We should keep that advantage and use it for destroying or defeating 25-30 percent more of the enemy, or in the case of reconnaissance, identifying the enemy for destruction. It makes no sense for modern tankers and cavalrymen to gain advantage through new technology and training if we discard that advantage by simply reducing numbers. It is time for the armor and cavalry community to recognize that it truly has a place in transformation outside of the heavy force and design formations that are capable of sustained fighting and winning against any future threat, rather than looking for artificial economies of manpower and equipment best suited for the Cold War.

    Captain Matthew Blome is currently assigned to the Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. He received a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captains Career Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Cavalry Leaders Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include assistant S3, 1st Squadron, 14th (1-14) Cavalry, Fort Lewis, WA; troop commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-14 Cavalry, Fort Lewis; troop commander, B Troop, 1-14 Cavalry, Iraq; troop XO, 1st Squadron, 7th (1-7) Cavalry. Fort Hood, TX; and tank platoon leader, 1-7 Cavalry, Fort Hood.
    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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    • #3
      French cavalry forces (1e REC for example) rely on the AMX-10RC and a cavalry regiment typically has 48 AMX-10RCs, 12 VCAC-HOT carriers and 4 VABs at regimental HQ along with VBLs, P-4s and motorcycles for liasion work. ERC-90s are kept around for peacekeeping operations and crews are detailed to be sent to reinforce operations in Africa. These units were formed to help handle a War-Pact invasion into France were the French army would rely on highly mobile operations (targeting Russian flanks or getting behind them possibly leaving their own flanks open) to fight the Russians.

      Lighter units like 1e RHP (Parachute Hussar Regiment) has ERC-90s and P-4s with MILANs.

      During ODS something like 100 AMX-10RCs and 12 ERC-90s (1e RHP) were sent with the 6th division compared to some 44 AMX-30B2 tanks. So most of the AT work if needed would be conducted by the AMX-10RCs; I know some 560 105mm rounds were fired during the war but don't have a break down.

      Recce work is the primary job but they are also suited to more direct actions if needed. For peace keeping operations they often deploy with ERC-90s which are lighter and easier to move by air.

      Sort of a different approach compared to the Stryker cavalry. The Stryker cavalry has more dismounts while a French cavalry regiment would have more direct fire weapons but lacking dismounts.

      Different approachs to cavalry I guess. With the Javs in the Styker recce units would an MGS simply be a waste to attach to recce units if the Javs in the SBCT are primary tank killers and the MGS exists for direct fire support?
      Last edited by troung; 27 Nov 06,, 21:09.
      To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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      • #4
        http://www.defence.gov.au/ARMY/lwsc/..._w_2004_05.pdf

        This guy seems to be pretty deadset on our Cavalry serving as an offensive force. He's right in the sense that they're probably going to HAVE TO serve as our main offensive maneuver forces in at least some future conflicts, since at least until our LHDs are complete, we'll have no way of lifting our Abrams tanks overseas. It's true that the Australian Army is definately infantry oriented, for a variety of good reasons as well as being a consequence of past MoD mistakes which have robbed us of the ability to sustain a heavier force, at least until recently. Personally I'd have no problem with ASLAVs forming the Armoured support for Light BattleGroups, with the caveat that we need some sort of real AT capability for them, if only by attatching some TOW armed Vehcles at the Troop level. He's also right that the argument that ASLAVs are too vulnerable should be taken with a grain of salt in a Force that is so short on armoured vehicles that we're using the Bushmaster as a font-line APC, when its little more than a bigger armoured Hummvee. If we chuck RPG cages on them etc. then we'll increase their survivability, and as I said some TOW armed Vehicles would give them the ability to stand up to tougher foes than they can now.
        Basically without changing our equipment around too much we could be looking at forming around 4 basic BattleGroup templates if you will, one being the more conventional Mechanized one with Tank and Mechanized Infantry, we don't have any SP Artillery so we'd have to forgo some of the elements you'd find in such a unit's US or UK equivalent. Then we could have a Light BattleGroup with Light or Motorized Infantry based around Bushmasters, with Cavalry troops or Squadrons attatched as required to provide fire support as well as screening. Then we could have an Armoured Cavalry BattleGroup as he discussed, based around Tank, Light Horse and a smaller Mechanized Infantry contribution, and then finally we might want to consider having an Amphibious Assault group formed, something like a smaller MEU which would be built around the capabilities of the LHDs we're building. We are an Island nation after all, amphibous warfare is something we should always have in the back of our minds. Right now we're gearing towards being able to field about 6 battlegroups, which of course is not enough in my opinion, and that will probably grow as we add on new infantry battalions and split existing ones, currently we're going from 6 to 8, 12 sounds better to me but one step at a time I guess.

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        • #5
          My son is still set on being a cav scout.

          PLEASE, somebody talk him into the Air Force....

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          • #6
            Originally posted by Bluesman View Post
            My son is still set on being a cav scout.

            PLEASE, somebody talk him into the Air Force....
            Nah, you know how we detest those flyboy types on this forum ;) .
            In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
            The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

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            • #7
              Originally posted by Stan187 View Post
              Nah, you know how we detest those flyboy types on this forum ;) .
              HEY!!!!

              Comment


              • #8
                wink wink, no harm done
                In Iran people belive pepsi stands for pay each penny save israel. -urmomma158
                The Russian Navy is still a threat, but only to those unlucky enough to be Russian sailors.-highsea

                Comment


                • #9
                  More power to him, I wanted exactly the same job before my recruiters suggested I go for Officer Candidacy instead. I still hope to be an Armoured Corps officer, which in the Reserves in my state would put me into our equivalent of an ACR Light, as the Prince of Wales Light Horse is converting over to IMVs with scout teams of 6 in each patrol, the full details havent been worked out yet as far as I know. They were using M113s but these are being turfed over to our Mechanized Infantry, which I don't feel great about, I'd rather see them in proper IFVs and leave the M113s in supporting roles, or alternatively put onto the shelf so to speak and then shipped out as required when we need some stronger protection, such as the US and Canada have been in sending their M113s overseas. For Cavalry the ASLAV works for me, but like I said I'd like to see a TOW variant for fire-support.
                  One idea I've personally been toying with, and I'm sure this isn't unique to me, is splitting off the recon-dedicated units of the Armoured Corps and forming a new Corps of Reconaissance, which would include Light Recon, being dismounted personnel, Motor Recon, which would be like Hummvee equipped ACR Light, Mechanized Recon with ASLAV Observer variants and Suveillance with HUMINT, UAVs etc. which are combined into Recon Units for smaller Battlegroups and Recon Groups for Brigade Deployments.
                  This would leave the Armoured Corps to operate their units in Combat Protection and of course in their main role, that being to destroy enemy Armour.

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Inside The Pentagon
                    by Elaine M. Grossman
                    February 10, 2005
                    Pg. 1

                    Does the modular brigade need armed recon facilitators?
                    ARMY CAVALRY REGIMENT MAY BE LAST BASTION IN ‘FIGHT FOR INFORMATION’

                    Army cavalry officers are engaged in a heated debate with others in the service — and the Defense Department more broadly — over the question of whether U.S. forces will be required to “fight for information” into the future, or if instead advanced sensors and computers will render that longstanding mission obsolete.

                    At service headquarters and the Joint Staff, nearly all contemplation of the nature of future combat centers on such concepts as employing “network-centric warfare” and achieving “full-spectrum dominance” through “information superiority.” The Army has built these ideas into its notional force of the future, in which the service reorganizes around brigade-size units that are to be “modular” and operate more independently.

                    But even amid a growing swell of excitement throughout the services for these “transformational” ideas, Army cavalry officers largely shun the catch phrases in favor of embracing an old-fashioned approach they call the “fight for information.”

                    Perhaps nowhere has that view coalesced more than at Ft. Carson, CO. The Colorado Springs base may be just a two-hour drive from Denver, but in some respects officers serving with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment there could be light years away from many of their Pentagon counterparts.

                    Drawing off lessons U.S. troops have learned from combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, cavalry leaders — many of them now war veterans themselves — say the best understanding U.S. forces have developed about insurgents and other enemy fighters has come only after making direct contact in battle. Before forcing an enemy’s hand, it is often difficult to understand his true intentions, motives, morale or capabilities, these officers say. Wartime lessons show that reliably predicting an adversary’s behavior prior to engaging in battle could be impossible, they say.

                    That view may be regarded as near heresy among those who believe advanced sensors and computers can someday soon virtually eliminate the fog of war by erasing uncertainty about an adversary’s stance and perhaps even his plans.

                    “We must acknowledge the fact that forces will have to continue to fight for information and we must continue to organize, train and equip formations to do so,” Col. H.R. McMaster, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment commander, wrote last summer in an e-mail widely circulated in the Army. Enemy countermeasures like concealment, dispersion, deception and intermingling with civilian populations will continue to vex America’s advanced technologies, he wrote.

                    “The information we desire most about the enemy — his real fighting power and his intentions — lie in the psychological and human dimensions rather than the physical,” McMaster wrote. “We must … acknowledge that the enemy plays a role in the future course of events and recognize that the enemy will develop countermeasures (tactical as well as technological) to any capability we develop.”

                    Despite that view, the Army’s initial concept for modular “units of action” assumes technology will offer troops such a clear picture of the enemy before a battle begins that these new brigades will be able to operate with near impunity, assaulting at times and places of their own choosing, according to an issue paper McMaster wrote in November 2003 while completing a fellowship at Stanford University in California.

                    The unit of action — or “UA” — under development and experimentation by the Army “is intended to be a ‘system of systems’ that is ‘empowered by dominant situational understanding resident in a vibrant knowledge network,’” McMaster wrote in the paper, quoting a 2003 Army posture statement.

                    But trimmed down for quick deployment and agility, the UA will lack an adequate ability to probe enemy disposition and intentions, or protect itself when surprised by enemy attack, McMaster argues.

                    Enter the cavalry regiment. The “3rd ACR” — as McMaster’s unit is known for short — is the last of its kind, with the Army last year converting the 2nd Cavalry Regiment into a light “Stryker Brigade.” Among the capabilities that make the 3rd ACR unique is that every soldier — regardless of mission specialty — is trained as a reconnaissance “scout,” able to collect and disseminate intelligence. Further, air-ground capabilities and support functions are built into the regiment, training and operating year-round with one another.

                    McMaster argues that as part of the Army’s new force concept, his 5,200-troop regiment not only should be maintained into the future, but become a model for more such brigade-sized units. The cavalry regiment might act as a facilitator for the swifter and more agile UAs, he says.

                    The regiment boasts 123 M1A2 main battle tanks, 125 M3A2 Bradley fighting vehicles, 16 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, 24 OH-58D Kiowa reconnaissance helos and 15 UH-60L troop-carrying helos, among other weapon and support platforms.

                    “A cavalry formation, with its integrated air and ground capabilities — the mobile protected firepower that we have — compensates for the small [UA] packages that we can put out widely dispersed,” McMaster told Inside the Pentagon in a Jan. 7 interview at his home. The regiment has “the ability to integrate air-ground [capabilities] and conduct logistical support … We could secure those wide areas,” he said.

                    Each of the regiment’s battalion commanders — called “squadron” commanders in the cavalry — can draw off of not only the normal complement of company-level elements, but also an organic howitzer battery they train with all the time. And each squadron has its own aviation and tank companies.

                    “In a typical divisional brigade, they’ll task-organize when they go.

                    They’ll bring in tanks, and they’ll give up some of their Bradley vehicles to that other brigade,” Maj. Robert Short, the 3rd ACR intelligence director, told ITP in a Jan. 6 interview. “We already have that mix put together. It’s already tied in and our guys are always operating together.”

                    The ability to carry out even some traditionally depot-level maintenance on aircraft and vehicles within the regiment is particularly critical to uninterrupted operations, officers say.

                    One disadvantage to relying on tracked vehicles like the tanks and Bradleys is they require steady maintenance to keep running. They are generally more difficult to transport to hotspots and, once there, slower on-the-move than their lightly armored, wheeled counterparts. But they also generally provide greater force protection, more firepower and better maneuverability over difficult terrain.

                    At the regiment, Short has his own 70-person intelligence center — normally found at the division level — to collect, analyze and disseminate battlefield information.

                    The cavalry unit typically is assigned to a three-star general who commands a corps or joint task force.

                    “We’ve got fighting vehicles and combat vehicles that allow us to position ourselves and gain contact with an enemy and maintain that contact. And [we] report back to that corps commander, ‘Hey, this is where the bad guys are. You need to start moving,’” Short said. “He makes the decision to reposition a typical division-type element so you can come back in there and fight. Meanwhile, we maintain the contact and let him know what’s going on.”

                    The armored cavalry also is considered an “economy of force” unit trained to operate over wide areas, officers say. After U.S. forces took Baghdad in the 2003 war in Iraq, the 3rd ACR was assigned to Anbar province, a vast swath of land the size of California that includes borders with Syria and Saudi Arabia. Some troops refer to the area as the “Wild West,” as it has served as terrain for nomadic tribes, smugglers, fugitives and insurgent resupply.

                    During that period, the regiment was augmented with infantry, engineers, military police and civil affairs troops, swelling its numbers to 8,200, Short said.

                    Without the cavalry’s big guns from the air and ground, “what you think of as an intelligence collector would walk in and get killed,” Short said of such an environment. Conversely, in the cavalry, “these guys bring a little backup and fight. They can fight their way in and fight their way out.”

                    Though “accountants will not like this,” that kind of reconnaissance and security support is exactly what the UAs require if they are to operate on a widespread, “distributed” battlefield, as the Army envisions, McMaster argued in the e-mail last summer.

                    “Cavalry is combined arms and cavalry represents our whole Army in one little package,” McMaster said in the interview. But it does not exist in isolation, he said. The cavalry’s key principle for security operations is, “Orient on the main body,” he said. That means “everything we do has to be relevant and useful to the forces that we’re there supporting by conducting reconnaissance and security,” McMaster explained.

                    “We could also conduct a security operation forward of these units of action so they can move unimpeded [and] keep the maximum numbers uncommitted to fights, so they can achieve greater speed of action,” the colonel said. “We could also help transition between a fight . . . that employs surveillance platforms and joint fires to a close fight with the enemy, based on the enemy’s ability to foil those technological capabilities with dispersion, concealment [or] intermingling with civilian populations.”

                    Lacking the tools to fight for information in a future, sensor-dependent world, the UAs might be anything but aggressive when faced with an ill-understood adversary, McMaster worries.

                    “Leaders will be predispositioned to wait for information rather than take resolute action,” he writes in his 2003 paper. “Indeed, they will have to act cautiously to ensure their force’s survival. Ironically, a force that was designed to be fast and agile will operate ponderously.”

                    UA commanders might alternatively use the cavalry to facilitate their own missions: “We can find that enemy. We could isolate strong enemy positions, we can determine what their real fighting power is based on their training level, morale, their intentions,” he argued in last month’s interview. “We can reveal their intentions.”

                    In this way, “when these units of action are employed, they’re employed in such a way as to maximize their capabilities, strike against enemy weakness while we help isolate the strength. That’s what cavalry has always done,” he said.

                    The alternative could be that the 3rd ACR will be converted into a UA identical to others being formed, Army officials say. The Fort Carson unit is slated to undergo a transformation in fiscal year 2006, after it returns from its second yearlong deployment to Iraq, according to these officials.

                    But Army headquarters has not yet said how 3rd ACR will change. Though McMaster and his top officers would like to play a role in that discussion, their immediate focus has been preparing for Iraq, they say.

                    Generally, the Army has delineated two major types of UAs: “maneuver” and “support.” Among the maneuver UAs, the service is creating some “heavy” brigades and other, lighter “infantry” brigades. As a vanguard unit in the transformation plan, the 3rd Infantry Division at Ft. Stewart, GA, has reorganized its maneuver brigades into heavy UAs (ITP, Jan. 22, 2004, p1). At the same time, the 10th and 101st divisions are converting their combat brigades to infantry UAs, according to the Army.

                    Support UAs come in different varieties, including: “aviation,” “maneuver enhancement,” “fires,” “sustainment,” and “reconnaissance and surveillance,” according to the Army.

                    The reconnaissance and surveillance UAs have officially been termed “RSTA,” short for “reconnaissance, surveillance and target attack.” The service reportedly intends to build about five such RSTA brigades.

                    But there has been great concern in the cavalry community — which extends beyond the 3rd ACR to those who have previously served in such regiments or in smaller cavalry units tied to divisions — that these new RSTA UAs would be ill-equipped and inadequately trained to fight for information or to defend themselves, Army officials say.

                    Moreover, it appears plans for similarly structured reconnaissance battalions — which would be part of infantry UAs — regard these units as relatively interchangeable with other battalions. They may be limited to performing intelligence functions solely within their battalion area rather than for the higher headquarters’ entire area of operations, as cavalry units have done in the past, sources tell ITP.

                    If the same approach is taken to creating the larger RSTA brigades, the concern is that a division commander will lack “organic” reconnaissance assets that he can tap to advise him on enemy disposition anywhere in his area of responsibility.

                    “Is that exactly the right organization for the unit of action — the way the RSTA squadron is organized?” McMaster asked in the interview last month, using the cavalry term “squadron” for what are called “battalions” in the infantry. “The Army is taking a hard look at that now.”

                    In fact, Army officers hotly debated the issue during a “reconnaissance summit” held at Ft. Benning, GA, in mid-January, service officials say. The discussion revealed some stark differences in thinking. One official reportedly argued the term “cavalry” should be eliminated from discussion of the RSTA battalions, while others insisted the Army must retain a significant capability to fight for information, according to sources familiar with the event.

                    “I would argue that we need to take a hard look at it, and that the [RSTA] structure may have been influenced by some flawed assumptions about not having to fight for information,” McMaster told ITP. “You know, being able to use surveillance and information technologies to lift the fog of war, remove ambiguity — and I think we’ve proven every day in Afghanistan and Iraq that’s not the case.”

                    The regiment commander added that the Army has begun calling the reconnaissance elements of heavy UAs “armed reconnaissance squadrons,” which he regards as an affirmation that intelligence collection must continue to be backed up by weapons.

                    “The Army’s already moving in that direction, to make that squadron more capable of fighting for information,” McMaster said. “I think we’ll get it right, over time, as long as we keep an open mind and don’t try to force this thing to work. If we don’t think it’s working, [we] keep modifying it.”

                    During a Jan. 6 regiment-wide exercise at Ft. Carson, McMaster urged his unit leaders to continuously view the battlespace as a whole and visualize the enemy’s evolving disposition in it (ITP, Jan. 27, p1). He urged them to use the new technologies as tools to aid their understanding, but not to rely on sensors alone to tell them all that they need to know.

                    “We need a holistic, unified view of what is happening in our training area,” McMaster said at the battlefield update briefing. “Because the value of this information is limited in time, we need to react to it very quickly. The drag on that is we are reacting to the incident itself … We need to get inside the mind of the enemy who is doing this attack.”

                    “Our Army is striving to be a campaign quality Army, which implies the ability to sustain operations — high speed, offensive operations without pause,” McMaster told ITP in the interview. That requires an “the ability to deliver multiple blows against the enemy from unexpected directions so that you seize and retain the initiative so you can finish a campaign rapidly,” he said. “And then transition quickly into the kind of security [and stability] role that we find ourselves in in Iraq. And I think cavalry assists you in doing all that.”

                    “Just like the 82nd Airborne is its own unique unit, we are our own unique unit,” Short agreed in the interview last month. “Occasionally you’ve just got to have that one thing, and we bring that one [capability] for fighting for information.”

                    Elaine M. Grossman

                    Grossman Archive

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                    To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

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                    • #11
                      This guy seems to be pretty deadset on our Cavalry serving as an offensive force.
                      Well cavalry has throughout history been an offensive force. The ASLAV-25 is a reasonably capable vehicle and has the second largest direct fire system in the RAA. So if it is forced to fight then it could engage the enemy with a lot more then a 12.7mm machine gun or a 5.56mm F-89 SAW/LMG.

                      Personally I'd have no problem with ASLAVs forming the Armoured support for Light BattleGroups, with the caveat that we need some sort of real AT capability for them, if only by attatching some TOW armed Vehcles at the Troop level.
                      Have you guys received the Javelin yet?

                      And what is the dismount strength for a troop (not just how many could the vehicles carry in theory)? I remember reading it was something like 4 men in the PC and none in the 25. And that in each troop was 4 ASLAV-25s and 2 ASLAV-PCs. That would make for 8 dismounts per troop.
                      Last edited by troung; 28 Nov 06,, 07:47.
                      To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        ASLAV’s carry the fight forward.
                        by John Armstrong
                        Faster, further and with precision day/night firepower are the combat capabilities the Australian Army expects of its cavalry squadrons, and the new Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV-3) has the performance, armour and firepower to deliver this combat capability.

                        In the hands of the modern cavalry trooper the ASLAV combines better attack capability with force protection through awesome fight-back capability.
                        This special two-part series will examine the new ASLAV vehicle, what it means to Australian Army capability; it will dispel some myths about cavalry roles and tasks, and in our next issue describe how the Army would use the ASLAV in combat.

                        The 2nd Cavalry Regiment based at Robertson Barracks, Darwin is building up its first squadron of 25 new ASLAVs following the formal acceptance of the Light Armoured Vehicle in early-May.
                        2 Cav Regt is the first of two Land Command units to receive the enhanced ASLAVs, with another squadron expected to be handed over in September to the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment, Queensland Mounted Infantry based in Brisbane. All ASLAVs have undergone an extensive retrofit at the General Dynamics Land Systems facility at Pooraka in South Australia. The new ASLAVs are equipped with the latest night-fighting equipment, high tech target locating and fire control systems, and improved armament. On the road and in all types of terrain the new ASLAV excels with improved suspension and increased engine power enabling road speeds up to 100 km/h, with crew and passenger endurance increased through better handling and climate controlled cabin area.
                        But it is the integration of the advanced fire control system combined with enhanced agility that has impressed the professional warriors who will take the ASLAV into a wide range of operational situations – and potentially against enemy forces. It is this combination of performance, technology operated by an expert combat team that makes the cavalry element a formidable opponent.
                        “Electrical power, mobility, a digital radio harness, Intra-Vehicular Navigation System (IVNS), a first-rate fire control system operated by technically competent individuals predisposed to technology and action produce a highly adaptable and versatile combat force,” according to the Commanding Officer of the 1st Brigade’s 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Noble.
                        “With the ASLAV’s capability any cavalry team is always a hard target – hard to find and fix, hard to hit, hard to penetrate – and capable of hitting back hard immediately and with considerable firepower, using a range of weapons and precision accuracy out to 3200 metres.”

                        Cavalry Operations Facts and Myths

                        What irritates cavalry officers and troopers most of all is the misconception that the ASLAV squadrons, and indeed cavalry regiments in general, confine their operations to the armed reconnaissance role, but this is only one of many combat-related which the modern cavalry can perform.
                        “This is probably a result of our [military] education that gives little focus to the cavalry and has it doomed to perpetually ride out ahead, write ‘the Green’, be ‘the screen’ and do the cavalry operations that will produce information for everyone else [to act upon],” LTCOL Noble said.
                        “Reconnaissance is simply a task not a unit role. Cavalry can be stealthy or not; it can fight for information or not; it can work mounted, dismounted or both; and it can rapidly transition to appropriate action when the enemy is actually encountered.”
                        Another urban myth is that LAVs are highly vulnerable and poorly protected because of the thickness of armour protection. However, cavalry troopers say this ignores the fact that ASLAV armour is thicker than the entire B vehicle fleet, every SF wheeled vehicle – and it is comparable in armour thickness with the M113 and the Bushmaster. But protection is actually a function of the composition of joint and land forces and their modus operandi they contend dictate the level of protection.
                        “Protective measures include firepower, mobility, armour, situational awareness, connectivitiy and tactics – and it is this combination of factors an enemy considers when planning an attack, and whether to attack at all,” LTCOL Noble said.
                        “Under this definition the ASLAV cavalry organisation is arguably the best protected currently fielded manoeuvre capability in the Army.”
                        Survivability is further increased when ASLAVs operate as part of a combined arms team – enhancing the strengths and minimising the weaknesses of each element.
                        “Just like all other manoeuvre force elements the cavalry must be fully integrated into the combined arms team in order for it to effectively execute close combat tasks,” LTCOL Noble said.
                        “ASLAV mounted cavalry easily operate with tanks, special forces, aviation and mechanised or motorised infantry – and this is standard practice for the 1st Brigade.”

                        Upgrades to the ASLAV

                        While there are a number of small changes to the ASLAV hull, such as strengthening the suspension and improving maintenance utility the big difference is in the turret, which now houses a fully integrated and computerised fire control system comparable with that of a new-generation main battle tank. This means that the acquisition-to-shoot interval has been reduced to about two seconds and the shot is far more accurate. According to the operators, this level of fire control integration is “as good as it gets”, with an auto-lay function and a laser rangefinder allowing targets to be hit more accurately and at greater ranges from an ASLAV on the move.
                        Also integrated into the fire control system is the thermal imager, called the DTAS site (Delco Target Acquisition System).
                        “DTAS is also on the ASLAV-2 but integrated into the fire control system on ASLAV-3 makes it the best thermal imager in the Army by a long way,” LTCOL Noble said. “It’s basically a gunner’s sight, and integrated into the whole fire control system means we can hit things day and night.”This increased accuracy and range is particularly important in peace enforcing operations: increasing lethality of the ASLAV and reducing the risk of collateral loss of life and damage.
                        The other significant change is in the turret, with the hydraulic system of the ASLAV-2 replaced with an electric drive turret, which is quieter, faster to reposition, more energy efficient and cooler. Without hydraulic oil pumping around operating the ASLAV is also safer. According to LTCOL Noble, “for us it’s a marked difference; it’s almost deadly quiet, we can talk and whisper and traverse the turret onto a target quickly and fire accurately.”
                        Better navigation and positioning accuracy is achieved through the Intra Vehicle Navigation System (INVS). All ASLAV3s are fitted with GPS linked to the IVNS, which enables crews to pre-program routes, waypoints and rendezvous positions without having to constantly update track and positioning requirements. This enables commanders to pass tactical orders virtually in the clear, with only crews using the navigation system understanding the tasking data. The sophisticated avionics in the IVNS drives in-turret screen presentations that guide operators to designated points. This enables the ASLAV crew to concentrate on ‘fighting the fight’ as directed by commanders rather than having to expend time with manual navigation and positioning fixes.
                        A key element is the laser rangefinder within the fire control system, enabling the crew to ‘laze’ the target, lock-on and fire or lock-on and move while keeping the gun pointing at the last ‘lased’ position.
                        Communications has also been enhanced with provision of a digital VIC3 radio harness in the turret, which has implications for not only improved command and control but also the transmission of intelligence with full encryption. This capability combined with potential upgrades would give the ASLAV an important role in a true networked force.
                        “Whilst we don’t yet have the technology you see in the US Army Striker Brigade with the C-class digital radio and FBCB-2 situational awareness system, this capability or something like it could be added in another phase of ASLAV or as part of other acquisitions planned in the Defence Capability Plan,” LTCOL Noble said.“With that capability, hopefully linked to the IVNS as well, we would be in a position to start sharing information as well. With this system, once we’ve lased the enemy - everybody knows, and this opens up options on what to do about it. We can’t do that yet, but that’s where I think we probably could go, and we’ll probably do that over time.”
                        “There are several Defence projects related to networking, digital radios and the like. Hopefully, they’ll feed into ‘the lab’ and work well, resulting in further enhancement to our networked force capability.”
                        The combined effect of the ASLAV-3 enhancements produces a highly mobile vehicle that can still swim. The Australian Army selected the lighter LAV over the ‘Striker’ used by the US Army and the Kiwi GEN-3 LAV, both of which don’t swim.
                        “We’ve also increased our protection by the lethality of the turret, meaning faster response to a threat; and we’ve increased our ability to manoeuvre with the digital radio harness linked to the IVNS system, so we know exactly where we are and we can share positional information with one another,” LTCOL Noble said.
                        “While this may be seen as a modest improvement, in terms of battle procedure and being quicker than your enemy it’s a major step forward.”
                        This speed of manoeuvre premise enables the cavalry to be agile and adaptable, and when combined with digital communications and IVNS improvements the ASLAV squadron steps up its attack capability.
                        “This agility and the fact that we how have a very fast moving and capable vehicle manned by good soldiers means we can transition between jobs really quickly,” LTCOL Noble said.
                        “We can be doing an attack or a convoy escort and leave that task to do something else, like react to do an attack at another location, react to do a roadblock, react to do a convoy escort. That agility is probably the significant thing for us.”

                        The Hardened Army

                        Because the ASLAV-3 squadrons are harder to find and detect, because they are quieter and move quickly, and because they are harder to penetrate, the ASLAV-3 contributes to the ‘Hardened Army’ imperative.
                        During the last Gulf War in 1994/95, U.S. Marines using the LAV-GEN1 were hit with multiple weapons including Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and other anti-armour weapons without a vehicle catastrophically destroyed.
                        “So it’s actually a pretty resilient vehicle when you place it into the tactics package of operating with other LAVs, defensive support, situational awareness, and its speed of manoeuvre,” LT COL Noble said.
                        “Any force contemplating an ambush on the side of the road in Baghdad, for example, can expect us to respond immediately and very accurately with a range of weapons – machine guns, cannons and grenade launches on the vehicles for example, or we can use our dismount elements to fire the whole range of infantry weapons.”
                        In terms of a ‘hardened’ element the ASLAV-equipped cavalry presents a very ‘hard’ target. “I look at that as protection – from the perspective of the enemy,” LTCOL Noble said. “If you look at what is happening in Iraq, it seems many of the attacks are on soft vehicles or even civilian in convoys because they don’t respond. It doesn’t mean they won’t attack heavily armed organisations like us, but it’s a serious decision by the enemy to do so.”

                        ASLAV Squadrons

                        The composition of each of the three cavalry squadrons that make up the fighting force of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment is based on a number of five-vehicle cavalry troops comprising 4 x Type 1 ASLAV-25 (stabilized 25mm cannon, a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun, a flex-mounted 7.62mm machine gun and a HE/Smoke 76mm grenade launch system) plus a Type 2 ASLAV-PC (non-stabilised .50 calibre machine gun).
                        Each squadron headquarters has two command variants (ASLAV-C with more communications equipment for the mobile Command Post role) and 2 x Type 1 ASLAV-25.
                        The Echelon element, which is the squadron commander’s combat support package, comprises one ASLAV-25, an ASLAV-R recovery variant, an ASLAV-F repair vehicle, and an ASLAV-8 ambulance vehicle.
                        All ASLAV variants are fitted with GPS and an Intra Vehicular Navigation System (IVNS) and a digital VIC3 radio harness capable of supporting secure VHF, HF and UHF radios. All vehicles are armoured and fitted with Automatic Fire Suppression Systems.
                        The dismounted cavalry scouts can employ a variety of weapons including F88 GLA, F89, 84mm Carl Gustav and 66mm SRAAW. By end-2004 they will be equipped with secure VHF/HF radios, Javelin medium-range missile, a Thermal Surveillance System, Unattended Ground Sensors, plus NINOX, GPS and LAZER range-finding binoculars.

                        Project Outline

                        Delivery of the ASLAV3 is the culmination of more than a decade of development of light armoured vehicles. Phase 1 began in 1990 with a one-year evaluation of 15 LAVs purchased form the United States Marine Corps. In 1992 under Phase 2 of the Program, the Army acquired 111 of the Australian version of the Canadian-manufactured LAV. By 1997 the 2nd Cavalry Regiment was fully equipped with the ASLAV. Phase 3 approved the follow on purchase of 144 new vehicles. 2nd Cavalry Regiment will be fully equipped with and converted to ASLAV3 by the close of December 2004. The current Phase 2 vehicles will be upgraded and these vehicles plus some of the new ASLAV3s will be issued to the 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment.
                        Defence Minister Robert Hill said the new ASLAVs are being delivered on schedule and on budget as part of the $700 million Project LAND 112. The complete acquisition program involves procurement and staged delivery of 144 new ASLAVs and upgrading the current 113-vehicle fleet to incorporate the new enhanced capabilities.
                        The ASLAV-3 has an eight wheeled configuration (selecting either four or eight wheeled drive), with excellent battlefield mobility as all wheels are equipped with a solid-core secondary tyre next to the hub, allowing the vehicle to function even with eight ‘flat’ tyres.
                        The vehicle is fitted with air-conditioning “climate control” that reduces temperatures at the crew positions to outside levels. The use of non-permanent Mission Role Installation Kits (MRIKs) generates several variants from a single hull design. These variants include:
                        ASLAV-25 - A three-man vehicle armed with an M242 dual-feed 25mm Bushmaster cannon and two 7.62mm MAG58 machine guns.
                        ASLAV-PC - A two-man personnel carrier armed with a .50 calibre machine gun and capable of carrying seven scout troops.
                        ASLAV-C (Command) - A vehicle equipped with enhanced radio installation and radio masts, mapboard, stowage compartments, appropriate seating and annex.
                        ASLAV-S - A specialised surveillance vehicle to be equipped with thermal imager, laser range finder and day television camera.
                        ASLAV-A – Ambulance variant equipped with medical equipment and litter stations to carry three lying patients or six sitting patients.
                        An ASLAV-A – Evacuation vehicle.
                        ASLAV-F - Maintenance support vehicle crewed by Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) for the repair and maintenance of ASLAV vehicles.
                        ASLAV-R - Maintenance support vehicle, also crewed by RAEME soldiers for recovering damaged or bogged vehicles.

                        Future Operations

                        With the ASLAV-3 the 2nd Cavalry Regiment has stepped up its warfighting capability in its assigned role, and that is to operate as a highly mobile, multi-role combat organization able to perform a wide variety of tasks and missions across the spectrum of conflict. The cavalry patrol is now networked, mobile, protected, has excellent day/night optics, an advanced fire control system and can fight mounted or dismounted. As such the cavalry is ideally suited for uncertainty – able to adapt and carry out a range of combat-related, peace enforcing and security protection roles. For situations requiring a small, low signature, low manpower force the cavalry can have a disproportionate influence in any situation requiring armed intervention.
                        To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Originally posted by troung View Post
                          Well cavalry has throughout history been an offensive force. The ASLAV-25 is a reasonably capable vehicle and has the second largest direct fire system in the RAA. So if it is forced to fight then it could engage the enemy with a lot more then a 12.7mm machine gun or a 5.56mm F-89 SAW/LMG.



                          Have you guys received the Javelin yet?

                          And what is the dismount strength for a troop (not just how many could the vehicles carry in theory)? I remember reading it was something like 4 men in the PC and none in the 25. And that in each troop was 4 ASLAV-25s and 2 ASLAV-PCs. That would make for 8 dismounts per troop.
                          To the best of my knowledge, and this stuff is changing a bit right now so I can't exactly lay it down as law, there are four patrols of 3 vehicles in each troop, with each patrol consisting of two 25s and one PC.
                          The PC carries 4 scouts normally. In the reserve unit I'm probably going into when I finally finish my officer training its a bit different, I believe every patrol is 4 6-wheel protected land rovers, fitting in with the motor recon idea. The scout team for them is built around 6 dismounts.
                          And yeah we're buying about 100 launchers for javs, (if I had my way that'd be more like 3-400, I'm a big fan of redundancy) so I guess we could operate them from LC Patrols. At present we have no equivalent of the HMMVW TOW, which is a shame since our largely motorised forces could benefit from the additional firepower to make up for our lack of armour.

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by troung View Post
                            French cavalry forces (1e REC for example) rely on the AMX-10RC and a cavalry regiment typically has 48 AMX-10RCs, 12 VCAC-HOT carriers and 4 VABs at regimental HQ along with VBLs, P-4s and motorcycles for liasion work. ERC-90s are kept around for peacekeeping operations and crews are detailed to be sent to reinforce operations in Africa. These units were formed to help handle a War-Pact invasion into France were the French army would rely on highly mobile operations (targeting Russian flanks or getting behind them possibly leaving their own flanks open) to fight the Russians.

                            Lighter units like 1e RHP (Parachute Hussar Regiment) has ERC-90s and P-4s with MILANs.

                            During ODS something like 100 AMX-10RCs and 12 ERC-90s (1e RHP) were sent with the 6th division compared to some 44 AMX-30B2 tanks. So most of the AT work if needed would be conducted by the AMX-10RCs; I know some 560 105mm rounds were fired during the war but don't have a break down.

                            Recce work is the primary job but they are also suited to more direct actions if needed. For peace keeping operations they often deploy with ERC-90s which are lighter and easier to move by air.

                            Sort of a different approach compared to the Stryker cavalry. The Stryker cavalry has more dismounts while a French cavalry regiment would have more direct fire weapons but lacking dismounts.

                            Different approachs to cavalry I guess. With the Javs in the Styker recce units would an MGS simply be a waste to attach to recce units if the Javs in the SBCT are primary tank killers and the MGS exists for direct fire support?
                            In my opinion the Stryker is too undergunned for cavalry work, it needs at least a 25mm gun on the standard RV in my view. Combine that with 4-6 dismounts (armed with a Javelin CLU) and you have a very lethal cavalry force.

                            The more I think about it the more I feel the Stryker Brigades would have better as medium cavalry than motorised infantry, but that's a different topic.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Originally posted by Wraith601 View Post
                              In my opinion the Stryker is too undergunned for cavalry work, it needs at least a 25mm gun on the standard RV in my view. Combine that with 4-6 dismounts (armed with a Javelin CLU) and you have a very lethal cavalry force.

                              The more I think about it the more I feel the Stryker Brigades would have better as medium cavalry than motorised infantry, but that's a different topic.
                              I've toyed with the idea of maybe making a class of medium infantry battalions that fit in between motorised light infantry and the mechanised heavy infantry we currently deploy. Maybe the stryker would be a useful vehicle for us, it comes in pertainent variants, its light enough and has a lot of commonality with the ASLAV through it's shared heritage in the Pirhana. The way I see it, we could be gunning for a large body of motorised light infantry with Bushmasters as their primary vehicle, and a smaller body of Stryker-mounted Medium infantry and M113 mounted Mechanised Infantry to provide a range of capabilties for BattleGroup through to Brigade Group deployments. Plus the Stryker fits a full section, something the ASLAV PC does not do.

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