Wednesday, August 09, 2006
Many Reasons the US Should Engage Syria
Many Reasons the US Should Engage Syria
by Joshua Landis
"Syria Comment," August 9, 2006
The debate over whether to find a diplomatic solution to the Lebanon conflict or to press for a total military victory is becoming ever more heated. More and more analysts are pressing President Bush to talk to Damascus. I will sum up the arguments for and against.
Arguments why Syria is key to any solution:
Syria is the key to controlling Hizbullah. Hizbullah's arms are all delivered through Syria, regardless of their point of origin. This gives Damascus an iron grip of Hizbullah’s weapon supplies; only when Damascus signs onto an agreement can Hizb be brought under control. Damascus has been the main patron of Hizbullah in the past, using it to hurt Israel in order to get it to cough up occupied Golan.
Diplomacy has worked in the past; it can work in the future: Syria's diplomacy has been marked by pragmatism not radicalism. Hafiz al-Asad kept his promises. He promised to hurt Israel so long as it did not give back the Golan; he did. During the 1990s he tried to reach a peace agreement with Israel, brokered by the US. Both Clinton and Israel’s head of military intelligence claimed Israel deserved more blame than Syria for the failure to reach an agreement. Bashar al-Asad has repeatedly asked for the same deal Barak got “cold feet” on.
The Asads' pragmatism is manifest in their accurate assessment of Syria’s limited power. Both father and son accurately assessed that Syria could not and can not attack Israel alone or directly, and must use proxies. Hafiz had a canny grasp of his constraints that Saddam Hussein did not. He exploited Syria's capabilities to punch above his weight. When American and Syrian interests coincided, Asad proved a capable partner. The Asads have kept Syria's border with Israel quieter than any other Arab border since 1973. When the US asked Hafiz to save Lebanon's Christians from subjugation by Lebanon's Muslim-PLO forces in 1976, he did. Syria brought Lebanon's civil war to an end, which no other country could do. Syria fought along side the US the 1991 Gulf War.
Syria did not try to ruin Lebanon or annex it. On the contrary, Syria’s security umbrella allowed Lebanon to stabilize and launch a stunning economic recovery. Asad did not try to colonize Lebanon or annex its land or water, as Israel did to the Palestinians. When asked by Lebanon's Communist Leader George Hrawi to unite the two countries, Hafiz al-Asad said, “No, Lebanon is its own entity," proving that Syria's presence in Lebanon was not governed by “Greater Syria” ideology. Nothing confirms this more than the swiftness and ease of Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, which was carried out in a matter of weeks. There were no important disruptions to either country's economic growth or underlying political structures. No Syrian spoke out against the withdrawal of Syria’s military from Lebanon. Almost all Syrians lamented that their government had not left Lebanon years earlier, under happier conditions. There is no grass roots constituency for annexing Lebanon. Yes Syria wants to retain Lebanon in its sphere of influence. This is hardly surprising, given its economic and strategic importance.
Bashar is turning out to be as shrewd as his father was. He has not miscalculated or misunderstood the realities of a “new era,” as so many have argued. He said the invasion of Iraq was a mistake and wrong; It was. In 2003, after opposing the invasion, he tried to patch up relations with the US, offering to continue giving the US intelligence on al-Qaida and to deliver senior Iraqi Baathists who had taken refuge in Syria and who were aiding the insurgency in Iraq, but at the price. Syria demanded that the US do nothing to end its influence in Lebanon. This was the same bargain that Asad the father had offered Bush the father so successfully in 1990. Bush the son refused it. Asad still thought he could reason with W. Bush and delivered a handful of top Iraqi Baathists to Washington, stopped the free flow of Jihadists from crossing into Iraq, and halved the number of Syrian troops in Lebanon, but US anti-Syrian invective did not diminish. Bush was determined to take Lebanon away from Syria with or without its cooperation on Iraq. Bashar did not miscalculate; Bush did.
The only real price Syria has paid for not cooperating with the US on Iraq is that Washington imposed ineffective economic sanctions on Syria and isolated it from visits from Western heads of state. This is a serious annoyance, but not a threat. Syria’s economy is growing faster than it has in a decade, its foreign debt is lower than ever, and it’s good relations with the West have been traded for good relations with the East. Losing Lebanon was not the price of opposing the US in Iraq. Washington never offered Lebanon for Iraq.
Bashar did not miscalculate. Opposing Washington’s demands on Iraq and Lebanon was good politics. He has consolidated his power over his state and is more popular than ever. On the contrary, Bush and Chirac miscalculated; they said Bashar was weak and would fall within a year of his pullout from Lebanon. Bush’s Middle East policy is in ruins; Bashar’s looks prescient by contrast. Rather than trying to dictate policy to Asad, which has proven a failure, Bush should listen to Bashar.
Borders are the key: This is the time to set the stage for giving back the Golan and concluding a region wide solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the oft-talked about Palestinian state. The conflict is about borders more than ideology or religion.
Dry up the swamp: Radical groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas will be kept in check and may eventually melt away if regional governments are brought into a solution that they can sign onto. With the majority of Arabs on the side of peace, the minority will be deprived of the sea of resentment and recruits that nourish it. Economic development and stability will see to the rest.
We are losing: There is no military solution to the present conflict. We are losing the battle. If we press ahead with the destruction of Lebanon, we will only weaken the Lebanese central government and produce another failed state, giving greater freedom for radical groups to defy central authority and build on chaos. It is better to cut our losses and make peace, while Israel is at the top of its game and much more powerful than the Arabs. Israel should have made peace in 2000, when it was truly at the top of its game, but now is better than later. Hizbullah's fierce resistance proves that time is running against Israel - better for Israel and the West to lock in now while Syria is weak and Israel remains a regional super power.
The clearest, recent argument for engaging Syria is put forward by Alon Ben-Meir in his article:
Outside View: The case for engaging Syria
By Alon Ben-Meir Aug 8, 2006, UPI
He writes:
By refusing to engage Syria, the Bush administration will forfeit another historic opportunity to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, however remote that prospect may now seem.
But while Syria can be penalized for its underhanded activities, it cannot be left out of any arrangement involving Israel and Lebanon. Excluding Syria may seem appropriate punishment for its actions; yet the consequences will be far more negative for the United States and Israel.
It is hardly a secret that Syria has a special interest in Lebanon. Washington must accept the reality that, with or without Syrian troops in Lebanon and with or without Hezbollah`s active militia, this interest will not end. To suggest that any lasting resolution between Israel and Lebanon can be achieved without the full support of Damascus is more than utter naiveté: it is a truly dangerous illusion.
Arguments against engaging Syria:
Syria is evil and irrational. It cannot be negotiated with. The US tried to convince Bashar al-Asad to change his policies from 2000 to 2005 through diplomacy; this failed. The only real solution is for regime change. The second best solution is to weakening Syria such that it is deprived of its influence in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Bashar cannot be trusted.
This is a fight between Islamic fanaticism and Western civilization: It is not about borders. Withdrawing from Southern Lebanon and Gaza were mistakes which emboldened radical Islam and signaled Western weakness.
We are winning: We destroyed Saddam, turned Libya, weakened Syria, isolated Arafat, and have "moderate Arab regimes" on our side: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Hariri-led government of Lebanon. We are now destroying Hizbullah. This is no time to go wobbly. Press on to victory. This is an all or nothing battle. If we show any signs of weakness, radical Islam will win. Our allies are counting on us.
This argument is made by Dan Schueftan, a senior fellow at the capital's Shalem Center and a lecturer at the University of Haifa. He claims:
"Unless Arab radicalism is defeated historically and permanently, he says, Israel can't survive in this hostile region." Therefore, he stresses, Israel should not negotiate with Syria. "It is not the price of a particular agreement" that is the problem, he says, "but rather the value of such negotiations in the context of the broad currents in the Arab world.
"In a world in which Saddam is destroyed, Gaddafi is domesticated, Assad is frightened and permanently on the defensive, Arafat was quarantined and the new Palestinian government is in very deep trouble," a settlement would send the wrong message to the Arab world. "If you can be a radical and win," Schueftan says, there will be increased radicalism among the Arabs, "putting Israel in a more difficult situation."
In this context, "any settlement with Syria would only strengthen one of the most radical regimes in the Arab world".
[end]
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua...gage-syria.htm
Many Reasons the US Should Engage Syria
Many Reasons the US Should Engage Syria
by Joshua Landis
"Syria Comment," August 9, 2006
The debate over whether to find a diplomatic solution to the Lebanon conflict or to press for a total military victory is becoming ever more heated. More and more analysts are pressing President Bush to talk to Damascus. I will sum up the arguments for and against.
Arguments why Syria is key to any solution:
Syria is the key to controlling Hizbullah. Hizbullah's arms are all delivered through Syria, regardless of their point of origin. This gives Damascus an iron grip of Hizbullah’s weapon supplies; only when Damascus signs onto an agreement can Hizb be brought under control. Damascus has been the main patron of Hizbullah in the past, using it to hurt Israel in order to get it to cough up occupied Golan.
Diplomacy has worked in the past; it can work in the future: Syria's diplomacy has been marked by pragmatism not radicalism. Hafiz al-Asad kept his promises. He promised to hurt Israel so long as it did not give back the Golan; he did. During the 1990s he tried to reach a peace agreement with Israel, brokered by the US. Both Clinton and Israel’s head of military intelligence claimed Israel deserved more blame than Syria for the failure to reach an agreement. Bashar al-Asad has repeatedly asked for the same deal Barak got “cold feet” on.
The Asads' pragmatism is manifest in their accurate assessment of Syria’s limited power. Both father and son accurately assessed that Syria could not and can not attack Israel alone or directly, and must use proxies. Hafiz had a canny grasp of his constraints that Saddam Hussein did not. He exploited Syria's capabilities to punch above his weight. When American and Syrian interests coincided, Asad proved a capable partner. The Asads have kept Syria's border with Israel quieter than any other Arab border since 1973. When the US asked Hafiz to save Lebanon's Christians from subjugation by Lebanon's Muslim-PLO forces in 1976, he did. Syria brought Lebanon's civil war to an end, which no other country could do. Syria fought along side the US the 1991 Gulf War.
Syria did not try to ruin Lebanon or annex it. On the contrary, Syria’s security umbrella allowed Lebanon to stabilize and launch a stunning economic recovery. Asad did not try to colonize Lebanon or annex its land or water, as Israel did to the Palestinians. When asked by Lebanon's Communist Leader George Hrawi to unite the two countries, Hafiz al-Asad said, “No, Lebanon is its own entity," proving that Syria's presence in Lebanon was not governed by “Greater Syria” ideology. Nothing confirms this more than the swiftness and ease of Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, which was carried out in a matter of weeks. There were no important disruptions to either country's economic growth or underlying political structures. No Syrian spoke out against the withdrawal of Syria’s military from Lebanon. Almost all Syrians lamented that their government had not left Lebanon years earlier, under happier conditions. There is no grass roots constituency for annexing Lebanon. Yes Syria wants to retain Lebanon in its sphere of influence. This is hardly surprising, given its economic and strategic importance.
Bashar is turning out to be as shrewd as his father was. He has not miscalculated or misunderstood the realities of a “new era,” as so many have argued. He said the invasion of Iraq was a mistake and wrong; It was. In 2003, after opposing the invasion, he tried to patch up relations with the US, offering to continue giving the US intelligence on al-Qaida and to deliver senior Iraqi Baathists who had taken refuge in Syria and who were aiding the insurgency in Iraq, but at the price. Syria demanded that the US do nothing to end its influence in Lebanon. This was the same bargain that Asad the father had offered Bush the father so successfully in 1990. Bush the son refused it. Asad still thought he could reason with W. Bush and delivered a handful of top Iraqi Baathists to Washington, stopped the free flow of Jihadists from crossing into Iraq, and halved the number of Syrian troops in Lebanon, but US anti-Syrian invective did not diminish. Bush was determined to take Lebanon away from Syria with or without its cooperation on Iraq. Bashar did not miscalculate; Bush did.
The only real price Syria has paid for not cooperating with the US on Iraq is that Washington imposed ineffective economic sanctions on Syria and isolated it from visits from Western heads of state. This is a serious annoyance, but not a threat. Syria’s economy is growing faster than it has in a decade, its foreign debt is lower than ever, and it’s good relations with the West have been traded for good relations with the East. Losing Lebanon was not the price of opposing the US in Iraq. Washington never offered Lebanon for Iraq.
Bashar did not miscalculate. Opposing Washington’s demands on Iraq and Lebanon was good politics. He has consolidated his power over his state and is more popular than ever. On the contrary, Bush and Chirac miscalculated; they said Bashar was weak and would fall within a year of his pullout from Lebanon. Bush’s Middle East policy is in ruins; Bashar’s looks prescient by contrast. Rather than trying to dictate policy to Asad, which has proven a failure, Bush should listen to Bashar.
Borders are the key: This is the time to set the stage for giving back the Golan and concluding a region wide solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the oft-talked about Palestinian state. The conflict is about borders more than ideology or religion.
Dry up the swamp: Radical groups such as Hizbullah and Hamas will be kept in check and may eventually melt away if regional governments are brought into a solution that they can sign onto. With the majority of Arabs on the side of peace, the minority will be deprived of the sea of resentment and recruits that nourish it. Economic development and stability will see to the rest.
We are losing: There is no military solution to the present conflict. We are losing the battle. If we press ahead with the destruction of Lebanon, we will only weaken the Lebanese central government and produce another failed state, giving greater freedom for radical groups to defy central authority and build on chaos. It is better to cut our losses and make peace, while Israel is at the top of its game and much more powerful than the Arabs. Israel should have made peace in 2000, when it was truly at the top of its game, but now is better than later. Hizbullah's fierce resistance proves that time is running against Israel - better for Israel and the West to lock in now while Syria is weak and Israel remains a regional super power.
The clearest, recent argument for engaging Syria is put forward by Alon Ben-Meir in his article:
Outside View: The case for engaging Syria
By Alon Ben-Meir Aug 8, 2006, UPI
He writes:
By refusing to engage Syria, the Bush administration will forfeit another historic opportunity to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, however remote that prospect may now seem.
But while Syria can be penalized for its underhanded activities, it cannot be left out of any arrangement involving Israel and Lebanon. Excluding Syria may seem appropriate punishment for its actions; yet the consequences will be far more negative for the United States and Israel.
It is hardly a secret that Syria has a special interest in Lebanon. Washington must accept the reality that, with or without Syrian troops in Lebanon and with or without Hezbollah`s active militia, this interest will not end. To suggest that any lasting resolution between Israel and Lebanon can be achieved without the full support of Damascus is more than utter naiveté: it is a truly dangerous illusion.
Arguments against engaging Syria:
Syria is evil and irrational. It cannot be negotiated with. The US tried to convince Bashar al-Asad to change his policies from 2000 to 2005 through diplomacy; this failed. The only real solution is for regime change. The second best solution is to weakening Syria such that it is deprived of its influence in Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Bashar cannot be trusted.
This is a fight between Islamic fanaticism and Western civilization: It is not about borders. Withdrawing from Southern Lebanon and Gaza were mistakes which emboldened radical Islam and signaled Western weakness.
We are winning: We destroyed Saddam, turned Libya, weakened Syria, isolated Arafat, and have "moderate Arab regimes" on our side: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and the Hariri-led government of Lebanon. We are now destroying Hizbullah. This is no time to go wobbly. Press on to victory. This is an all or nothing battle. If we show any signs of weakness, radical Islam will win. Our allies are counting on us.
This argument is made by Dan Schueftan, a senior fellow at the capital's Shalem Center and a lecturer at the University of Haifa. He claims:
"Unless Arab radicalism is defeated historically and permanently, he says, Israel can't survive in this hostile region." Therefore, he stresses, Israel should not negotiate with Syria. "It is not the price of a particular agreement" that is the problem, he says, "but rather the value of such negotiations in the context of the broad currents in the Arab world.
"In a world in which Saddam is destroyed, Gaddafi is domesticated, Assad is frightened and permanently on the defensive, Arafat was quarantined and the new Palestinian government is in very deep trouble," a settlement would send the wrong message to the Arab world. "If you can be a radical and win," Schueftan says, there will be increased radicalism among the Arabs, "putting Israel in a more difficult situation."
In this context, "any settlement with Syria would only strengthen one of the most radical regimes in the Arab world".
[end]
http://faculty-staff.ou.edu/L/Joshua...gage-syria.htm
I wonder what people who have been studying the issue on WAB and who are better informed than me, have to say
Comment