2003, CONOPS Chapter 8: OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
8.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
This chapter discusses the Navy logistics process and analyzes a specific scenario to assess the Navy’s 2015 volume of fires and sustainment capabilities.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 identifies Sea Basing as one of the four components of the naval transformation roadmap. Sea Basing enables the accelerated projection, protection, and sustainment of all dimensions of networked naval power, providing joint force commanders with unprecedented speed and flexibility of employment and expanded operational reach. As a primary enabling concept for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and other expeditionary concepts, Sea Basing supports the principles of:
-- Preemption or striking with surprise from the vastness of the sea;
-- Use of the sea as maneuver space for naval and joint forces;
-- Creating and sustaining overwhelming operational tempo and momentum through maneuver;
-- Enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical mobility;
-- Rapid force closure and at-sea reconstitution;
-- Capitalizing on the force protection inherent in the naval command of the sea.1
The information set forth in this chapter is relevant to further development of the Sea Basing concept as it applies to surface combatants conducting naval fires by addressing the support requirements for sustained operations.
Footnote 1: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.
8.2 LOGISTICS PROCESS
Sustained land attack operations require that the forward-deployed forces receive the proper logistics support. Logistics is defined as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.2 The concept of operations as presented in this document has highlighted the integrated employment of the latest developments in naval systems. The Navy’s logistics system must also be capable of providing the required personnel, materiel, and facilities to sustain operations in remote areas of the world.
The Navy’s process for providing worldwide logistic support consists of several elements. The process starts in the United States with: (1) the production of the necessary materiel, (2) the training of the necessary personnel, and (3) the planning for and construction of forward based facilities and supply stations. The logistics process ends with the timely delivery of the necessary personnel and materiel to the deployed forces.
Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
8.2.1 Transportation to the Intermediate Support Base (ISB)
Efficient worldwide logistics requires both the transportation and storage of the proper materiel, as well as the availability of the proper personnel to operate and maintain these facilities. Supplies are normally transported to advanced naval bases such as advanced logistics support sites (ALSSs) and forward logistics support sites (FLSSs) by civilian Military Sealift Command ships or merchant marine ships. Efficient worldwide logistics support depends upon the availability of sufficient sealift/merchant marine forces and the proper planning to assure advanced shipment of the required supplies. The current national military strategy relies on the availability of storage depots and advanced naval bases located on foreign territory.
8.2.2 Transportation to the Surface Combatant
The Navy’s combat logistic force ships will be loaded at the advanced naval base with the necessary supplies for the surface combatant forces. Three types of supply ships are expected to be available in the 2015 timeframe: the TAOE fast combat support ships, the T-AKE auxiliary cargo and ammunition ships, and the T-AO oilers. The T-AOE provides fuel, ammunition, cargo, and water. The T-AKE is a new ship design with the capability to replenish cargo and ammunition. The T-AO provides only fuel to the fleet. The combat logistics force delivers necessary supplies to the designated underway replenishment (UNREP) area for the surface combatants. Typically the UNREP area is relatively close to the area of operations, but still sufficiently remote to be considered safe from enemy attack—normally a one to three hour transit time. Some combat logistics force ships are Navy manned and armed, but most are now operated by the Military Sealift Command with civilian crews and are unarmed.
8.2.3 Surface Combatant Replenishment
The surface combatant replenishment cycle consists of the combatant departing its assigned operational station, transiting to the UNREP area, receiving the supplies, and then returning to its operational station. During replenishment the combatant will receive supplies via either CONREP (refuel or replenish alongside) or vertical replenishment (VERTREP, replenish via helicopter). The amount of time required will depend upon the type of combat logistics force ships involved and the specific supplies needed.
Optimally, the combatant will receive all supplies in a single evolution. If multiple replenishment cycles from several ships are required, the time taken will be significantly longer. Under the best of conditions (i.e., daylight and calm seas) the UNREP process is hazardous and time consuming. The process is more difficult under adverse weather conditions. Vertical launched missiles cannot be resupplied at sea. Combatants must return to the advanced naval base to replenish these weapons. The Marine Corps has stated that the underway replenishment of all weapons is required to provide sustained fires.3
Footnote 3: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, CG MCCDC letter, dated 19 Mar 2002.
8.2.4 Surface Combatant Logistics
For this document it is assumed that weapons replenishment is the driving resupply factor for sustainment. Although combatants require fuel, water, food, spare parts, etc. to sustain extended operations, ideally they will receive these supplies during the time required to resupply the weapons. This section focuses on the process of providing the munitions necessary to keep the surface combatants on the firing line. If the simultaneous replenishment of other supplies with munitions is not possible, additional UNREP evolutions will be required and the overall resupply time extended.
8.2.4.1 Weapons
Surface combatants will have two types of weapons in the 2015 timeframe to support land attack operations: vertically launched missiles such as Tomahawk and ALAM, and gun fired munitions such as ERGM and LRLAP. Each type of weapon has its own unique logistics challenges and requirements. Understanding these logistics requirements is critical in developing the broader operational concepts for supporting land attack operations.
8.2.4.1.1 Missiles
Vertical launching system (VLS) installations on the cruisers originally included a strikedown crane for at-sea replenishment. However, today’s larger and heavier VLS missiles cannot be safely resupplied at sea even under ideal conditions. The strikedown cranes were subsequently removed from the VLS modules and the VLS missiles must now be resupplied pierside.
A single VLS cell can be resupplied in about 20 minutes under good conditions. A single 64-cell launcher would require about 24 hours to be fully resupplied at this rate. Even if only the Tomahawk and ALAMs require resupply, the remaining missiles may still have to be relocated to extend the VLS module’s plenum life.4 VLS resupply will generally require two to three days pierside at the advanced naval base, plus the round-trip transit time of the surface combatant from the operations area. Transit time to the advanced naval base would ideally be about 8 to 12 hours, however it could take much longer. As a result, a surface combatant can be expected to be off the firing line for three to four days minimum whenever a resupply of VLS missiles is required.
Footnote 4: Each 8-cell VLS module shares a common exhaust gas plenum. Each weapon type has a different affect on the wear of the plenum’s ablative resin affecting the module’s life.
8.2.4.1.2 Gun Munitions
Navy gun munitions may be resupplied via CONREP or VERTREP. Combat logistics force ships loaded with the appropriate supplies at the ISB will transit to the designated UNREP area to meet the ships. The T-AOE or T-AKE will conduct munitions replenishment operations in conjunction with the resupply of other goods. The time required to resupply the ammunition magazine varies with ship class and magazine capacity. The DDG 51 class 5-inch ammunition magazine will take approximately 16 hours to load out with 680 ballistic projectiles and associated propelling charges.5 This assumes favorable weather conditions and calm seas. The CG 47 class will require 12 to 16 hours for each 600 round magazine, assuming that sufficient manpower and replenishment assets are available to simultaneously resupply both forward and aft magazines.
The addition of extended range guided munitions such as ERGM or ANSR6 to the 5-inch inventory will require a manual magazine reconfiguration to accommodate the specific mix of ammunition provided.7 These guided munitions will also require additional load cycles because only 16 rounds will fit on a standard pallet vice 48 ballistic rounds.
Footnote 5: Based on Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic (FCTCLANT) estimates.
Footnote 6: The 5” Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR) is described in Appendix B.
Footnote 7: ERGM and ANSR are significantly longer and heavier than conventional ballistic ammunition, requiring special handling. Therefore, the resupply times to load these new ammunition types is expected to take at least as long as it currently takes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT BOX: Effect of Gun Barrel Life on Sustainment
The introduction of higher energy, hotter burning propellant for ERGM will reduce the expected gun barrel life. The threshold wear life of the Mk 45 Mod 4 gun 62-caliber gun barrel for ERGM is 1500 rounds with an objective of 3000 rounds.* The required barrel life for AGS is 3000 threshold and 6000 objective. This is compared with the current 5- inch 54-caliber barrel wear life in excess of 8000 rounds for ballistic ammunition fired with standard NACO propellants.
The 18 surface combatants in the NEA scenario (see section 8.3.1) would fire an average of over 4600 rounds from each gun during the 40-day campaign. Thus, on average every gun barrel would need to be replaced at least once, and in some cases maybe up to three times depending upon the actual wear experienced, assuming all rounds to be equivalent to ERGM or LRLAP in terms of barrel wear. That means all of the ships must return to the ISB at some point in the scenario for regunning. This will further affect the ability to provide sustained naval fires.
* Note: Extended range ammunition that uses a “boost to range” concept such as ANSR can be fired using cooler burning propellants such as NACO and therefore will not adversely affect barrel life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fully automated 155mm ammunition magazines on the new DD(X) ships are expected to require about 13 hours to resupply at sea including 50nm transit time. The magazine for each gun is projected to contain as many as 600 long range land attack projectiles (LRLAP) and associated propelling charges. The variety of ammunition types should not affect the resupply rate of this automated magazine. Actual resupply times for DD(X) will not be known until the final design and manning level is available.
8.3 VOLUME OF FIRES AND SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT
Surface combatants must be capable of providing both NSFS and NSS fires at the right time and of sufficient volume for the entire duration of the operation. These fires must also be fully integrated with other joint and coalition assets. Planning, coordination, communications, and operational strategy are of little value if the required number and mix of weapons are not available. This section examines the capability of the Navy of 2015 to provide the required fires to support a land attack operation.
8.3.1 Scenario
Several analyses and studies were conducted over the past few years based on a North East Asian (NEA) conflict. Results from three of these studies8 were used to establish a basis for determining the naval fires volume and sustainment requirements during a Major Theater War (MTW). Two of the studies focused on a mid to high intensity scenario over a 17- to 19-hour period. The third study involved a 62-day campaign. The scenarios include the use of naval air, artillery, and NSFS. The types of missions assigned to naval surface fires are based upon the optimal pairing of weapons to targets.(9)
Footnote 8: The three NEA source studies used in the preparation of this document are: Volume of Fire Study by NSWC Dahlgren Division, the NSFS Requirements and Capabilities Study by JHU-APL (both mid to high intensity scenario runs), and the Surface Combatant Force Level Study (SCFLS-II) by NSWC Dahlgren Division (a campaign run). A composite average was developed for use in this document to reflect neither the lowest or highest potential requirement for naval fires. Results from the three studies were combined to establish an average requirement for this operational situation. Estimates of the volume and sustainment capabilities for naval surface fires were determined using both a 10-day assault rate and a 30-day sustained rate of fire. This analysis illustrates the overall projected capabilities of the naval forces involved.
Footnote 9: It is possible to use different weapons delivery assets such as close air support rather than NSFS; however, this would result in suboptimal weapons pairings. Factors impacting optimal weapons pairing include weather, responsiveness, and specific weapons effectiveness
The active Navy had a force level of 316 ships in the year 2000 (table 8-1).10 Current budgetary and procurement plans suggest that the Navy will have difficulty maintaining a fleet of more than 300 ships through the next decade. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the 2015 carrier strike group (CSG) were projected by assuming that the 316 ship force level will be retained.
Footnote 10: Congressional Budget Office numbers based on data from the Navy.
Historically, approximately 60% of all ships are available for deployment at any given time (the others being in overhaul, maintenance, or predeployment). Therefore, it was assumed that two carrier strike groups would be on station to provide fires for the NEA MTW scenario. Table 8-2 lists the number of surface combatants projected to form the two CSGs. Frigates will not have an NSFS or NSS capability and are not included in subsequent analysis.
Table 8-3 lists the associated combatant logistics support ships assumed available to resupply these two CSGs.
8.3.2 Surface Combatant and Combat Logistics Force Capacities
Table 8-4 lists the assumed loadouts for the available surface combatants at the start of the scenario. This inventory will be depleted as fires are requested. Individual ships will be removed from supporting land attack missions once all of the relevant weapons are expended, and either assigned to other missions (e.g., theater air defense) or sent to a resupply point (UNREP or ISB). The mix between TLAM and ALAM, and the other vertical launch missiles is assumed to reflect the NSFS/NSS primary mission area for these ships. Gun munition loadout assumes that the ANSR rounds would use the same ERGM stowage ratio11 relative to the standard ballistic ammunition. The ERGM/ANSR mix used for this analysis was 40/60. The magazine capacities for DD(X) are based on a reduced DD-21 design goal.
Footnote 11: Each ERGM requires the same magazine stowage space as 2.3 standard ballistic rounds.
Table 8-5 lists the assumed capacities for the combat logistics force ships supporting the NEA MTW scenario.
8.3.3 Weapon Expenditure Rates
The expenditures for the NEA scenario calculated from the three studies are presented in table 8-6. All munitions are expected to be ERGM, ANSR, or LRLAP equivalent. An AGS firing LRLAP at 12 rounds per minute is considered equivalent to one 155mm artillery battery (6 guns) firing at 2 rounds per gun per minute. The average surge and sustained rates used in this document are also listed in the table.
A comparison of tables 8-4 and 8-6 shows that the total of 5,089 ERGM, ANSR, and LRLAP rounds available on the surface combatants will provide fires for less than one day at the assault rate and for 3 to 4 days at the sustained rate. Therefore, in order to sustain fires throughout the scenario, a sufficient inventory and resupply capability is required.
Calculations based upon study data indicate that during the sustained level of support the ground force will generate approximately one NSFS fire mission every 20 minutes. During the assault phase, one NSFS fire mission will be generated every 4-1/2 minutes on average. These missions vary in types such as suppression, destruction, interdiction, neutralization, etc., such that on average each mission requires 22 rounds.12 Since the average fire mission is 22 rounds, then the average rate of fire at the sustained level is about one round every minute, whereas the high intensity (surge) scenario requires about five rounds per minute.
A single Mk 45 Mod 4 gun can fire ERGM or ANSR rounds at a maximum rate of approximately 10 rounds for the first minute. The sustained rate is 2 to 4 rounds per minute and depends upon the magazine crew’s ability to manually move rounds from the shipping container to the hoist. The DD(X)’s advanced gun system will provide a sustained firing rate of 12 rounds per minute. Therefore, the scenario’s average sustained rate of fire could be met by a DDG with a single gun, but the surge rate would require either a single DD(X), two DDGs with one Mk 45 gun apiece, or one CG with two Mk 45 guns.
Footnote 12: From the JHU/APL NSFS Requirements and Capabilities Study, the average fire mission requires 22 rounds of 155mm LRLAP to achieve desired effects. Therefore it is assumed that the sustained or surge firing rates will be divided into individual engagements each averaging 22 rounds.
8.3.4 Time-on-Station
At the start of the scenario, 9 of the 18 available surface combatants are assumed to be on station and ready to provide fires in support of the land attack missions. The remaining 9 would be assigned other missions until required to replace ships that have depleted their magazine inventories.
The 9 surface combatants on station contain 441 land attack missiles and 2,544 long range projectiles. Two or three of the ships would be prioritized to handle as many fire requests as possible while the remaining ships on the firing line would handle the overflow when multiple fire requests are made simultaneously. This ensures that all 9 ships would not require replenishment at the same time.
In this scenario for the sustainment phase, each ship would operate an average of 4+ hours on the firing line before running out of ammunition, assuming no reserve ammunition is retained prior to pulling the ship off the firing line. Rotating all of the 18 ships available to the firing line will sustain operations for approximately 80 hours. If the first ship UNREPs and returns to the firing line before this time, then the requirement for naval surface fires could be sustained indefinitely.
The previous UNREP analysis indicates approximately 24 hours is required to resupply the gun ammunition and return to the operational area. This would meet the sustainment requirements; however, if the ship is required to return to an advanced naval base to resupply the missiles, then it may exceed the required 80-hour time limit.
The assault phase of the scenario generates a fire request every 4 to 5 minutes. Two or more guns are required to support this rate of fire requests. Therefore, on average one ship must be replaced on the firing line every hour. Since there are only 18 ships available in this scenario and the projected UNREP evolution takes 24 hours, the first ship would not return before the last ship expends its magazine.
Another major limiting factor is the time required for the combat logistics force ships to resupply the surface combatants. There are three ships capable of resupplying gun ammunition at the UNREP area: one T-AOE and two T-AKEs. Each supply ship would handle every third combatant, which would arrive on average about every 13 hours at the sustained rate. If each ship could be reloaded in less than 13 hours, then sustained operations are possible. The DDGs and CGs would require about 16 hours as previously discussed in paragraph 8.2.4.1.
Because the surface force consists of 16 DDGs and CGs and only two DD(X)s, additional combat logistics force ships and/or a faster UNREP capability are required. The ammunition replenishment limitation is further exacerbated when supporting assault level operations.
These calculations assume the combat logistics force ships are dedicated to resupplying the surface combatants. However, they also have a requirement to replenish the other ships in the battle groups. Additionally, one of the three supply ships must return to the advanced naval base every 3 or 4 days to reload. The turn around time for a combat logistics force ship (including loadout and transit to and from the advanced naval base) is about a week. Based on this scenario, additional combat logistics force ships are required to support the operation.13
Footnote 13: A more thorough resupply analysis for this two CSG scenario is necessary to determine the CLF requirement.
8.3.5 Conclusion
The planning, stationing, scheduling, and rotation of mission assignments among surface combatants and supply ships are the key elements in providing and sustaining the required volume of fires needed in the NEA MTW scenario. Minimizing the off station and resupply times will improve the situation. More combat logistics support ships; faster, more automated UNREP resupply systems; and larger surface combatant magazine capacities are necessary to meet the requirement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT BOX: Comments by Adm. Mullen concerning replenishment at sea.
Replenishment at sea is sustainment and must remain the cornerstone of “…anywhere…anytime.” But doing business the old way (labor-intensive replenishment at sea) will not suffice on optimally manned ships.
Automation, palletization, and modularization not only reduce the Sailor workload, but make replenishment at sea more efficient and less time-consuming. The entire spectrum of replenishment needs to be viewed from a systems approach. We must think of the shipboard magazine as just one component of a complete ammunition supply, storage, and retrieval system. Technology and innovation – thinking future, not past – will build towards a rapid and sustainable replenishment at sea capability. If we are to be sustained contributors across the entire spectrum of the battle, we must have the capacity to address Volume Fires needs. Automated replenishment at sea will be an enabler. We should push as much of the logistics and sustainment piece as far forward as possible, maintaining inventory levels sufficient to sustain the fleet in any eventuality.
Rear Admiral Mike Mullen
Director, Surface Warfare
11 September 2000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
8.0 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT
This chapter discusses the Navy logistics process and analyzes a specific scenario to assess the Navy’s 2015 volume of fires and sustainment capabilities.
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 identifies Sea Basing as one of the four components of the naval transformation roadmap. Sea Basing enables the accelerated projection, protection, and sustainment of all dimensions of networked naval power, providing joint force commanders with unprecedented speed and flexibility of employment and expanded operational reach. As a primary enabling concept for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), and other expeditionary concepts, Sea Basing supports the principles of:
-- Preemption or striking with surprise from the vastness of the sea;
-- Use of the sea as maneuver space for naval and joint forces;
-- Creating and sustaining overwhelming operational tempo and momentum through maneuver;
-- Enhancing strategic, operational, and tactical mobility;
-- Rapid force closure and at-sea reconstitution;
-- Capitalizing on the force protection inherent in the naval command of the sea.1
The information set forth in this chapter is relevant to further development of the Sea Basing concept as it applies to surface combatants conducting naval fires by addressing the support requirements for sustained operations.
Footnote 1: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.
8.2 LOGISTICS PROCESS
Sustained land attack operations require that the forward-deployed forces receive the proper logistics support. Logistics is defined as the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.2 The concept of operations as presented in this document has highlighted the integrated employment of the latest developments in naval systems. The Navy’s logistics system must also be capable of providing the required personnel, materiel, and facilities to sustain operations in remote areas of the world.
The Navy’s process for providing worldwide logistic support consists of several elements. The process starts in the United States with: (1) the production of the necessary materiel, (2) the training of the necessary personnel, and (3) the planning for and construction of forward based facilities and supply stations. The logistics process ends with the timely delivery of the necessary personnel and materiel to the deployed forces.
Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
8.2.1 Transportation to the Intermediate Support Base (ISB)
Efficient worldwide logistics requires both the transportation and storage of the proper materiel, as well as the availability of the proper personnel to operate and maintain these facilities. Supplies are normally transported to advanced naval bases such as advanced logistics support sites (ALSSs) and forward logistics support sites (FLSSs) by civilian Military Sealift Command ships or merchant marine ships. Efficient worldwide logistics support depends upon the availability of sufficient sealift/merchant marine forces and the proper planning to assure advanced shipment of the required supplies. The current national military strategy relies on the availability of storage depots and advanced naval bases located on foreign territory.
8.2.2 Transportation to the Surface Combatant
The Navy’s combat logistic force ships will be loaded at the advanced naval base with the necessary supplies for the surface combatant forces. Three types of supply ships are expected to be available in the 2015 timeframe: the TAOE fast combat support ships, the T-AKE auxiliary cargo and ammunition ships, and the T-AO oilers. The T-AOE provides fuel, ammunition, cargo, and water. The T-AKE is a new ship design with the capability to replenish cargo and ammunition. The T-AO provides only fuel to the fleet. The combat logistics force delivers necessary supplies to the designated underway replenishment (UNREP) area for the surface combatants. Typically the UNREP area is relatively close to the area of operations, but still sufficiently remote to be considered safe from enemy attack—normally a one to three hour transit time. Some combat logistics force ships are Navy manned and armed, but most are now operated by the Military Sealift Command with civilian crews and are unarmed.
8.2.3 Surface Combatant Replenishment
The surface combatant replenishment cycle consists of the combatant departing its assigned operational station, transiting to the UNREP area, receiving the supplies, and then returning to its operational station. During replenishment the combatant will receive supplies via either CONREP (refuel or replenish alongside) or vertical replenishment (VERTREP, replenish via helicopter). The amount of time required will depend upon the type of combat logistics force ships involved and the specific supplies needed.
Optimally, the combatant will receive all supplies in a single evolution. If multiple replenishment cycles from several ships are required, the time taken will be significantly longer. Under the best of conditions (i.e., daylight and calm seas) the UNREP process is hazardous and time consuming. The process is more difficult under adverse weather conditions. Vertical launched missiles cannot be resupplied at sea. Combatants must return to the advanced naval base to replenish these weapons. The Marine Corps has stated that the underway replenishment of all weapons is required to provide sustained fires.3
Footnote 3: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, CG MCCDC letter, dated 19 Mar 2002.
8.2.4 Surface Combatant Logistics
For this document it is assumed that weapons replenishment is the driving resupply factor for sustainment. Although combatants require fuel, water, food, spare parts, etc. to sustain extended operations, ideally they will receive these supplies during the time required to resupply the weapons. This section focuses on the process of providing the munitions necessary to keep the surface combatants on the firing line. If the simultaneous replenishment of other supplies with munitions is not possible, additional UNREP evolutions will be required and the overall resupply time extended.
8.2.4.1 Weapons
Surface combatants will have two types of weapons in the 2015 timeframe to support land attack operations: vertically launched missiles such as Tomahawk and ALAM, and gun fired munitions such as ERGM and LRLAP. Each type of weapon has its own unique logistics challenges and requirements. Understanding these logistics requirements is critical in developing the broader operational concepts for supporting land attack operations.
8.2.4.1.1 Missiles
Vertical launching system (VLS) installations on the cruisers originally included a strikedown crane for at-sea replenishment. However, today’s larger and heavier VLS missiles cannot be safely resupplied at sea even under ideal conditions. The strikedown cranes were subsequently removed from the VLS modules and the VLS missiles must now be resupplied pierside.
A single VLS cell can be resupplied in about 20 minutes under good conditions. A single 64-cell launcher would require about 24 hours to be fully resupplied at this rate. Even if only the Tomahawk and ALAMs require resupply, the remaining missiles may still have to be relocated to extend the VLS module’s plenum life.4 VLS resupply will generally require two to three days pierside at the advanced naval base, plus the round-trip transit time of the surface combatant from the operations area. Transit time to the advanced naval base would ideally be about 8 to 12 hours, however it could take much longer. As a result, a surface combatant can be expected to be off the firing line for three to four days minimum whenever a resupply of VLS missiles is required.
Footnote 4: Each 8-cell VLS module shares a common exhaust gas plenum. Each weapon type has a different affect on the wear of the plenum’s ablative resin affecting the module’s life.
8.2.4.1.2 Gun Munitions
Navy gun munitions may be resupplied via CONREP or VERTREP. Combat logistics force ships loaded with the appropriate supplies at the ISB will transit to the designated UNREP area to meet the ships. The T-AOE or T-AKE will conduct munitions replenishment operations in conjunction with the resupply of other goods. The time required to resupply the ammunition magazine varies with ship class and magazine capacity. The DDG 51 class 5-inch ammunition magazine will take approximately 16 hours to load out with 680 ballistic projectiles and associated propelling charges.5 This assumes favorable weather conditions and calm seas. The CG 47 class will require 12 to 16 hours for each 600 round magazine, assuming that sufficient manpower and replenishment assets are available to simultaneously resupply both forward and aft magazines.
The addition of extended range guided munitions such as ERGM or ANSR6 to the 5-inch inventory will require a manual magazine reconfiguration to accommodate the specific mix of ammunition provided.7 These guided munitions will also require additional load cycles because only 16 rounds will fit on a standard pallet vice 48 ballistic rounds.
Footnote 5: Based on Fleet Combat Training Center, Atlantic (FCTCLANT) estimates.
Footnote 6: The 5” Autonomous Naval Support Round (ANSR) is described in Appendix B.
Footnote 7: ERGM and ANSR are significantly longer and heavier than conventional ballistic ammunition, requiring special handling. Therefore, the resupply times to load these new ammunition types is expected to take at least as long as it currently takes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT BOX: Effect of Gun Barrel Life on Sustainment
The introduction of higher energy, hotter burning propellant for ERGM will reduce the expected gun barrel life. The threshold wear life of the Mk 45 Mod 4 gun 62-caliber gun barrel for ERGM is 1500 rounds with an objective of 3000 rounds.* The required barrel life for AGS is 3000 threshold and 6000 objective. This is compared with the current 5- inch 54-caliber barrel wear life in excess of 8000 rounds for ballistic ammunition fired with standard NACO propellants.
The 18 surface combatants in the NEA scenario (see section 8.3.1) would fire an average of over 4600 rounds from each gun during the 40-day campaign. Thus, on average every gun barrel would need to be replaced at least once, and in some cases maybe up to three times depending upon the actual wear experienced, assuming all rounds to be equivalent to ERGM or LRLAP in terms of barrel wear. That means all of the ships must return to the ISB at some point in the scenario for regunning. This will further affect the ability to provide sustained naval fires.
* Note: Extended range ammunition that uses a “boost to range” concept such as ANSR can be fired using cooler burning propellants such as NACO and therefore will not adversely affect barrel life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fully automated 155mm ammunition magazines on the new DD(X) ships are expected to require about 13 hours to resupply at sea including 50nm transit time. The magazine for each gun is projected to contain as many as 600 long range land attack projectiles (LRLAP) and associated propelling charges. The variety of ammunition types should not affect the resupply rate of this automated magazine. Actual resupply times for DD(X) will not be known until the final design and manning level is available.
8.3 VOLUME OF FIRES AND SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT
Surface combatants must be capable of providing both NSFS and NSS fires at the right time and of sufficient volume for the entire duration of the operation. These fires must also be fully integrated with other joint and coalition assets. Planning, coordination, communications, and operational strategy are of little value if the required number and mix of weapons are not available. This section examines the capability of the Navy of 2015 to provide the required fires to support a land attack operation.
8.3.1 Scenario
Several analyses and studies were conducted over the past few years based on a North East Asian (NEA) conflict. Results from three of these studies8 were used to establish a basis for determining the naval fires volume and sustainment requirements during a Major Theater War (MTW). Two of the studies focused on a mid to high intensity scenario over a 17- to 19-hour period. The third study involved a 62-day campaign. The scenarios include the use of naval air, artillery, and NSFS. The types of missions assigned to naval surface fires are based upon the optimal pairing of weapons to targets.(9)
Footnote 8: The three NEA source studies used in the preparation of this document are: Volume of Fire Study by NSWC Dahlgren Division, the NSFS Requirements and Capabilities Study by JHU-APL (both mid to high intensity scenario runs), and the Surface Combatant Force Level Study (SCFLS-II) by NSWC Dahlgren Division (a campaign run). A composite average was developed for use in this document to reflect neither the lowest or highest potential requirement for naval fires. Results from the three studies were combined to establish an average requirement for this operational situation. Estimates of the volume and sustainment capabilities for naval surface fires were determined using both a 10-day assault rate and a 30-day sustained rate of fire. This analysis illustrates the overall projected capabilities of the naval forces involved.
Footnote 9: It is possible to use different weapons delivery assets such as close air support rather than NSFS; however, this would result in suboptimal weapons pairings. Factors impacting optimal weapons pairing include weather, responsiveness, and specific weapons effectiveness
The active Navy had a force level of 316 ships in the year 2000 (table 8-1).10 Current budgetary and procurement plans suggest that the Navy will have difficulty maintaining a fleet of more than 300 ships through the next decade. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the 2015 carrier strike group (CSG) were projected by assuming that the 316 ship force level will be retained.
Footnote 10: Congressional Budget Office numbers based on data from the Navy.
Historically, approximately 60% of all ships are available for deployment at any given time (the others being in overhaul, maintenance, or predeployment). Therefore, it was assumed that two carrier strike groups would be on station to provide fires for the NEA MTW scenario. Table 8-2 lists the number of surface combatants projected to form the two CSGs. Frigates will not have an NSFS or NSS capability and are not included in subsequent analysis.
Table 8-3 lists the associated combatant logistics support ships assumed available to resupply these two CSGs.
8.3.2 Surface Combatant and Combat Logistics Force Capacities
Table 8-4 lists the assumed loadouts for the available surface combatants at the start of the scenario. This inventory will be depleted as fires are requested. Individual ships will be removed from supporting land attack missions once all of the relevant weapons are expended, and either assigned to other missions (e.g., theater air defense) or sent to a resupply point (UNREP or ISB). The mix between TLAM and ALAM, and the other vertical launch missiles is assumed to reflect the NSFS/NSS primary mission area for these ships. Gun munition loadout assumes that the ANSR rounds would use the same ERGM stowage ratio11 relative to the standard ballistic ammunition. The ERGM/ANSR mix used for this analysis was 40/60. The magazine capacities for DD(X) are based on a reduced DD-21 design goal.
Footnote 11: Each ERGM requires the same magazine stowage space as 2.3 standard ballistic rounds.
Table 8-5 lists the assumed capacities for the combat logistics force ships supporting the NEA MTW scenario.
8.3.3 Weapon Expenditure Rates
The expenditures for the NEA scenario calculated from the three studies are presented in table 8-6. All munitions are expected to be ERGM, ANSR, or LRLAP equivalent. An AGS firing LRLAP at 12 rounds per minute is considered equivalent to one 155mm artillery battery (6 guns) firing at 2 rounds per gun per minute. The average surge and sustained rates used in this document are also listed in the table.
A comparison of tables 8-4 and 8-6 shows that the total of 5,089 ERGM, ANSR, and LRLAP rounds available on the surface combatants will provide fires for less than one day at the assault rate and for 3 to 4 days at the sustained rate. Therefore, in order to sustain fires throughout the scenario, a sufficient inventory and resupply capability is required.
Calculations based upon study data indicate that during the sustained level of support the ground force will generate approximately one NSFS fire mission every 20 minutes. During the assault phase, one NSFS fire mission will be generated every 4-1/2 minutes on average. These missions vary in types such as suppression, destruction, interdiction, neutralization, etc., such that on average each mission requires 22 rounds.12 Since the average fire mission is 22 rounds, then the average rate of fire at the sustained level is about one round every minute, whereas the high intensity (surge) scenario requires about five rounds per minute.
A single Mk 45 Mod 4 gun can fire ERGM or ANSR rounds at a maximum rate of approximately 10 rounds for the first minute. The sustained rate is 2 to 4 rounds per minute and depends upon the magazine crew’s ability to manually move rounds from the shipping container to the hoist. The DD(X)’s advanced gun system will provide a sustained firing rate of 12 rounds per minute. Therefore, the scenario’s average sustained rate of fire could be met by a DDG with a single gun, but the surge rate would require either a single DD(X), two DDGs with one Mk 45 gun apiece, or one CG with two Mk 45 guns.
Footnote 12: From the JHU/APL NSFS Requirements and Capabilities Study, the average fire mission requires 22 rounds of 155mm LRLAP to achieve desired effects. Therefore it is assumed that the sustained or surge firing rates will be divided into individual engagements each averaging 22 rounds.
8.3.4 Time-on-Station
At the start of the scenario, 9 of the 18 available surface combatants are assumed to be on station and ready to provide fires in support of the land attack missions. The remaining 9 would be assigned other missions until required to replace ships that have depleted their magazine inventories.
The 9 surface combatants on station contain 441 land attack missiles and 2,544 long range projectiles. Two or three of the ships would be prioritized to handle as many fire requests as possible while the remaining ships on the firing line would handle the overflow when multiple fire requests are made simultaneously. This ensures that all 9 ships would not require replenishment at the same time.
In this scenario for the sustainment phase, each ship would operate an average of 4+ hours on the firing line before running out of ammunition, assuming no reserve ammunition is retained prior to pulling the ship off the firing line. Rotating all of the 18 ships available to the firing line will sustain operations for approximately 80 hours. If the first ship UNREPs and returns to the firing line before this time, then the requirement for naval surface fires could be sustained indefinitely.
The previous UNREP analysis indicates approximately 24 hours is required to resupply the gun ammunition and return to the operational area. This would meet the sustainment requirements; however, if the ship is required to return to an advanced naval base to resupply the missiles, then it may exceed the required 80-hour time limit.
The assault phase of the scenario generates a fire request every 4 to 5 minutes. Two or more guns are required to support this rate of fire requests. Therefore, on average one ship must be replaced on the firing line every hour. Since there are only 18 ships available in this scenario and the projected UNREP evolution takes 24 hours, the first ship would not return before the last ship expends its magazine.
Another major limiting factor is the time required for the combat logistics force ships to resupply the surface combatants. There are three ships capable of resupplying gun ammunition at the UNREP area: one T-AOE and two T-AKEs. Each supply ship would handle every third combatant, which would arrive on average about every 13 hours at the sustained rate. If each ship could be reloaded in less than 13 hours, then sustained operations are possible. The DDGs and CGs would require about 16 hours as previously discussed in paragraph 8.2.4.1.
Because the surface force consists of 16 DDGs and CGs and only two DD(X)s, additional combat logistics force ships and/or a faster UNREP capability are required. The ammunition replenishment limitation is further exacerbated when supporting assault level operations.
These calculations assume the combat logistics force ships are dedicated to resupplying the surface combatants. However, they also have a requirement to replenish the other ships in the battle groups. Additionally, one of the three supply ships must return to the advanced naval base every 3 or 4 days to reload. The turn around time for a combat logistics force ship (including loadout and transit to and from the advanced naval base) is about a week. Based on this scenario, additional combat logistics force ships are required to support the operation.13
Footnote 13: A more thorough resupply analysis for this two CSG scenario is necessary to determine the CLF requirement.
8.3.5 Conclusion
The planning, stationing, scheduling, and rotation of mission assignments among surface combatants and supply ships are the key elements in providing and sustaining the required volume of fires needed in the NEA MTW scenario. Minimizing the off station and resupply times will improve the situation. More combat logistics support ships; faster, more automated UNREP resupply systems; and larger surface combatant magazine capacities are necessary to meet the requirement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TEXT BOX: Comments by Adm. Mullen concerning replenishment at sea.
Replenishment at sea is sustainment and must remain the cornerstone of “…anywhere…anytime.” But doing business the old way (labor-intensive replenishment at sea) will not suffice on optimally manned ships.
Automation, palletization, and modularization not only reduce the Sailor workload, but make replenishment at sea more efficient and less time-consuming. The entire spectrum of replenishment needs to be viewed from a systems approach. We must think of the shipboard magazine as just one component of a complete ammunition supply, storage, and retrieval system. Technology and innovation – thinking future, not past – will build towards a rapid and sustainable replenishment at sea capability. If we are to be sustained contributors across the entire spectrum of the battle, we must have the capacity to address Volume Fires needs. Automated replenishment at sea will be an enabler. We should push as much of the logistics and sustainment piece as far forward as possible, maintaining inventory levels sufficient to sustain the fleet in any eventuality.
Rear Admiral Mike Mullen
Director, Surface Warfare
11 September 2000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Comment