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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SURFACE COMBATANT LAND ATTACK WARFARE, 2005-2015 (January 2003)
2003 CONOPS: Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an introduction to the mission area of land attack, along with the purpose, scope, and approach used in developing this document.
1.1 PURPOSE
In the fall of 1999, Director of Surface Warfare created the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization to synchronize requirements and programs, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and make the most effective use of existing and future resources across the multitude of affected system commands, program executive offices, and program offices. This Capstone Organization created the Concept of Operations and Doctrine Working Integrated Product Team (C&D WIPT), chaired by N764G1, to:
-- develop, publish, and periodically update an overarching concept of operations (CONOPS) focused on surface combatant land attack warfare
-- ensure that the evolving platform-level capability requirements support the naval and joint warfighters
-- support the development of associated doctrine in concert with the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
In response to the above requirement, this document updates and replaces the original version of the Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare dated July 2001 and focuses on how the naval surface combatant will conduct land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe.
The purpose of this document is to:
-- focus the land attack systems engineering effort by setting forth the manner in which supported ground forces will employ a capability not previously resident in surface combatants accelerate the discussions necessary for the future development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to govern the use of this developing capability
-- provide practical guidance to the engineering community on surface combatant land attack warfare capability requirements and their proper technical interpretation
-- provide a source document for the acquisition and training communities to use in curriculum and courseware development
-- provide a common frame of reference so the Land Attack Capstone Organization can begin to coherently address the multitude of issues that are raised in this document
This document provides the concept of operations of how surface combatants1 will employ their new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) and weapon assets to provide a revolutionary capability to conduct joint land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe. Although tactical naval aviation and submarines are outside the scope of this version of the document, their contribution to land attack warfare is acknowledged.
Footnote 1: For the purpose of this document, surface combatants are defined as cruisers and destroyers that employ the land attack systems mentioned in this document.
1.2 APPROACH
The initial concept of operations dated July 2001 has been reviewed and signed by the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Executive Steering Committee. The initial CONOPS document defined land attack warfare; described surface combatant land attack missions, roles, and capabilities; identified the external land attack related agencies and systems, and the Marine Corps fire support requirements. Furthermore, it set forth some land attack weapon employment considerations and identified land attack operational issues requiring resolution.
The goals of this revision of the CONOPS are to address the four key issues identified in the initial document (deconfliction, mission planning and targeting, force level command and information flow, and logistics), address some additional issues that were identified during the review process, and to present a set of architectural operational views (Chapter 4) to support the employment concepts defined in this document.
As a first step in developing this document, a two-day workshop was held 24–25 October 2001. This workshop was designed to garner a broad range of input from subject matter experts representing the fleet, government agencies, and private industry. Participants were assigned to one of the four sub-groups, and each sub-group focused on one of the four key issue areas identified above. At the end of the workshop, each sub-group provided a list of key issues and recommended solutions. The product of the workshop, along with additional research, has been incorporated into this document.
1.3 BACKGROUND
During World War II, the primary employment of naval gunfire shifted to supporting amphibious operations and proved critical in enabling forcible entry operations against many heavily defended beachheads. The roles of naval gunfire support in these amphibious operations included:
-- (1) delivering high volume bombardment and beach preparation fires to clear obstacles and neutralize enemy coastal defenses necessary to enable assault forces to establish positions ashore;
-- (2) destroying critical targets necessary to ensure the seizure of the force beachhead;
-- (3) interdicting and/or neutralizing counterattack forces to enable the landing force to fully transition and buildup combat ashore; and
-- (4) attacking deep targets to support the breakout or continued operations of the landing force.
During the Cold War, the surface Navy concentrated on undersea warfare and anti-air warfare to defend aircraft carriers and sea lines of communication from the former Soviet Union’s air and submarine threats. This blue-water period was highlighted by two significant trends: a reduction in the number and size of naval guns, and the introduction of the first air-defense missile systems on surface combatants. In the 1970s the Navy eventually adopted the 5-inch/54-caliber gun as its standard. This 13 nautical mile range gun was intended for general-purpose use against surface craft, slow moving aircraft, and near shore targets. In the 1980s and 1990s ships and submarines were augmented with the Tomahawk
cruise missile system to provide a deep conventional and nuclear land attack capability.
With the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1989, the Navy increased its focus on littoral operations by developing capabilities to more effectively influence events ashore. In light of modern defensive systems designed to counter traditional World War II amphibious operations, new operational concepts were required to effectively employ limited resources while minimizing both casualties and collateral damage.
1.4 NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
In the mid-1990s, the naval services defined their vision for the future in Forward…From the Sea. 2 This document restructured naval expeditionary forces for joint operations, thus requiring that naval fires systems be fully integrated with the emerging joint fires architecture. The vision called for an offensive maritime force for sustained operations in the challenging littoral regions.
Today’s naval forces are continuing the transformation across a broad front to achieve a networked and sea-based power projection force that will enable joint force operations, deliver long range effective firepower, and assure sustained global access for U.S. forces.
Footnote 2: Forward…From the Sea, signed by SecNav, CNO, and CMC, dated 19 September 1994.
1.4.1 Naval Transformation Roadmap (3)
The Naval Transformation Roadmap is a new operational construct that will transform the Navy to meet the wide array of 21st Century threats, and will fully integrate naval forces with the other joint forces operating across a unified battlespace. Four capabilities drive the Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea): Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.
-- Sea Strike will project dominant, long range, decisive, and precise offensive power against key enemy targets using a wide array of means, both lethal and nonlethal, including long-range aircraft and missiles, information operations, Special Forces, and Marines. Success depends upon acute situational awareness, rapid and secure methods of sharing knowledge, and networked forces fully integrated into joint and national systems.
-- Sea Shield will project both near and long range defensive power from the sea to protect the nation with forward deployed forces, assure allies and deter potential adversaries, assure theater access, and protect the joint forces ashore. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will provide the information superiority, and will build upon the tenets of network centric warfare. A mixture of manned and unmanned ISR systems will provide the foundation for battlespace dominance, and enable the capability to project defensive firepower deep overland.
-- Sea Basing will use 70% of the earth’s surface as a vast maneuvering space to extend sovereignty around the world and provide support for joint forces. The independence of naval vessels operating on the high seas allows the U.S. to conduct combat operations anywhere and anytime, without asking for permission. Basing joint command and control, fire support, and logistics assets at sea provides the capability to immediately respond to a conflict, reduces the logistical footprint ashore, and minimizes airlift and force protection requirements. Warfighting capabilities are distributed across multiple sea-based platforms networked together and integrated with assets ashore to provide a unified joint battlefield.
-- FORCEnet will integrate naval, joint, and national information grids to achieve unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management. This concept will provide the joint force commander with secure, highly mobile, in-theater afloat headquarters, and will take advantage of the advances in communication and sensor technologies.
Footnote 3: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.
A Navy built around the above concepts will provide the nation with a highly adaptable fleet ready to strike at a moment’s notice. This fleet will deploy expeditionary strike forces (ESF) that include:
-- Carrier strike groups (CSGs) to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts
-- Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) composed of amphibious ready groups with dedicated escorts optimized for littoral power projection missions.
-- Surface/submarine action groups to conduct precision strike, sea control, maritime intercept, and intelligence operations
1.4.2 Operational Maneuver From the Sea (4)
The Marine Corps’ concepts for the projection of naval power ashore, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), attempt to fully exploit the tenets of maneuver warfare in the challenging littoral environment. These concepts capitalize on existing and emerging technological advancements in mobility, information management, and the range, lethality and responsiveness of naval fires to conduct forcible entry from the sea rapidly striking directly at an enemy’s center of gravity thus avoiding set-piece, phased and highly rigid amphibious operations of the past. Significant advancements in the mobility of expeditionary forces enable them to maneuver from over-the horizon directly to objectives far inland exploiting the full limits of the sea, air and land in an expanded battlespace.
Footnote 4: OMFTS is the operational implementation of the Marine Corps Capstone Concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, dated 10 November 2001.
The successful implementation of OMFTS is highly dependent on improved sea-based command- and-control, logistics, and supporting fires. Highly mobile and therefore lighter maneuver forces employed in OMFTS require long-range, highly responsive, highly lethal, accurate and continuous supporting naval fires. The longer ranges and improved responsiveness of naval fires also make them capable of supporting emerging lighter and more mobile Army forces, particularly those participating in early entry operations in the littorals. These supporting naval fires will be provided by a new generation of mutually supporting air, ground, naval surface and sub-surface assets.
1.4.3 Global Information Grid and Future Naval Fires (5)
The rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespacein support of simultaneous joint operations will require a shift from platform-centric to networkcentric warfare (NCW). NCW is a concept centered on a vast, complex information infrastructure, linking geographically dispersed warfighters at all levels to increase force synergy, combat power, and operational effectiveness. The physical infrastructure is envisioned as a global information grid providing seamless back-plane connectivity to support a sensor grid, a command and control grid, and an engagement grid 6
This overarching network is intended to provide rapid global information dissemination and transfer, enabling theater and global information superiority and joint C4ISRT integration.
To create an operational capability out of the NCW concept, one single overarching family of systems (FoS) 7 must integrate these three grids to both enable rapid self-synchronization and decisive actions, and to provide a sensor to weapons-on-target warfare mission capability.
Footnote 5: Based on the Future Naval Fires White Paper published by NWDC, dated Apr 2002.
Footnote 6: Example does not show all existing or potential systems that would be included in the global information grid.
Footnote 7: The FoS includes legacy, emerging, and developmental systems working together.
1.4.3.1 Sensor Grid
Advances in sensing capability as well as the distribution of sensor data are required to support this family of systems. A sensor grid capable of providing continuous surveillance down to the tactical level throughout the battlespace is required to achieve the full potential of future naval fires. This sensor grid will integrate information from all available sensors into a common information base that will support the other two grids. It will overlay intelligence and surveillance information from multiple joint sensors and quickly detect, classify, and precisely locate targets for disposition by the command and control, and engagement grids.
This overlaying process will be accomplished through automating, coordinating, and correlating the processing of multiple tactical data streams from various surveillance and intelligence sources in near real-time.8 The sensor grid will then provide time-critical cueing information for advanced sensor systems as well as precision targeting coordinates for advanced weapon systems.
Footnote 8: CJCSM 3500.04B Universal Joint Task List, 1 Oct 99, OP2.5.3 defines near real-time as “…within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence.”
1.4.3.2 Command and Control Grid
Command and control of naval fires must be flexible and scaleable, allowing the linking of multiple control nodes throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of battle. The system must allow the control node to pass engagement orders to individual firing units. It must also be capable of operating in a decentralized manner using command by negation to override any unwanted engagements. This flexibility will allow control nodes to exist at the combatant commander level located far from the engagement, in theater on either a navy ship, ashore with the ground combat commander, or on an enhanced command and control aircraft.
Additionally, the system must have the capability for programmable or selectable levels of unmanned systems autonomy. This flexible network architecture will allow for high-level control of engagements during contingencies as well as tactical level synchronization when required by the tempo of operations and enabled by the appropriate rules of engagement.
Speed of command will flatten the command hierarchy, place decision makers in parallel with shooters, and transform warfare from multiple, discrete functions into a single, continuous process. Once implemented, commanders will be able to collaboratively plan and execute missions in a dynamic environment with accurate, timely, and sustained situational awareness. Similarly, on-scene commanders will be able to rapidly respond to battlefield developments and decisively influence events. Advanced C4ISRT networks, the backbone that supports the entire structure, will integrate tactical and technical support applications with connections to enhanced satellite systems and other networks.
Deconfliction tools must be developed that allow both the firing platform and other joint assets to rapidly deconflict ordnance flight paths to assist in rapid, safe engagements and enable horizontal, fully integrated operations. 9
Footnote 9: Deconfliction as a subset of coordination is addressed in detail in Chapter 6.
1.4.3.3 Engagement Grid
The family of systems must be capable of generating fire control solutions, executing engagements, monitoring and managing engagements in progress, and providing data links between sensors and weapons. Every weapon capable of receiving in-flight target updates could be assigned a network address. This information must be passed to the sensors in the network that individually or in aggregate are responsible for providing updated data to the munitions to ensure in-flight target updates are correctly transmitted and acted upon by the desired ordnance.
Additionally, engagement control would include the management and scheduling of sensors to ensure that fire control quality data is available at the appropriate time during the weapons’ flight path.
The engagement grid also plays a role in the deconfliction process. Examples of potential technology assisted deconfliction are: (1) the capability to automatically display ordnance flight paths prior to the firing of the ordnance as well as when the ordnance is in-flight, (2) shipboard combat direction systems that communicate with each other and generate alerts about flight path conflicts, and (3) ordnance that communicates with airborne systems to generate alerts about potential collision situations. Technology assisted deconfliction will allow rapid engagement of time sensitive targets and dynamically coordinated strikes. Additionally, information regarding munitions and aircraft flight paths must be provided to friendly air defense networks to prevent an inadvertent response to our own weapons.
1.4.4 Land Attack Vision
Because naval forces are forward deployed in international waters, they will often be on the scene before trouble starts. In the war on terror they will be the land attack weapons that wait providing the volume of precision fires across the littorals and “Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains.” 10 Surface combatants and submarines will bring unique all-weather, day/night, sustainable, and responsive fires as a complement to the capabilities provided by aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings.
These enhanced land attack capabilities are the result of advances in sensors, precision targeting systems, weapons, information exchange, and integrated command and control systems. Once all of these components are fully integrated, surface combatants and submarines will have the capability to conduct early, responsive, and precision tactical, operational, and strategic land attack missions while supporting the arrival of follow-on naval, joint, and coalition forces.
Director of Surface Warfare (N76)11 has defined land attack as the integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and joint and coalition forces for projecting combat power into and on the ground portion of the battlespace to protect vital national interests and achieve national and military objectives. Employed forces can include aviation and sea- and ground-based assets. Figure 1-2 highlights how land attack warfare fits into the larger concept of joint, naval, and Navy fires. This figure focuses on naval surface combatant land attack.
Footnote 10: Operational goal from Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated 30 September 2001.
Footnote 11: The Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) is on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, responsible for the development of surface warfare requirements and resources.
1.4.4.1 Land Attack Missions
For the surface combatant, land attack warfare encompasses the dual missions of naval surface fire support and naval surface strike.
Naval surface fire support (NSFS) encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives.12 NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces.
Naval surface strike (NSS) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants. These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting operations against U.S. or Allied forces.13 These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, warmaking capacity, the will to make war, and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS is usually executed independent of ground maneuver forces.
Footnote 12: Definition from Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Footnote 13: Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) memorandum, Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document, Ser: N864/OU653919, dated 11 September 2000.
1.4.4.2 Land Attack Roles
Surface combatants must be fully capable and responsive across the entire spectrum of warfare, from major theater war to small-scale contingencies (such as precision strikes against terrorist cells, training facilities, and staging areas) and non-combatant evacuation operations; from multi-ship battlegroups to independent operations. While conducting these operations, the surface combatant will perform one or more of the following roles.
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Text Box: Development of the Roles
The following role descriptions were developed by a working group and were approved and set forth in the Director of Surface Warfare letter dated 11 September 2000. The firing unit role was added later. These five roles provide a useful model for surface combatant employment for land attack missions. They should not be viewed as a comprehensive classification of all possible situations, but neither should they be considered as merely a cursory classification effort.
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The NSFS Supporting Unit (figure 1-3) provides fires in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. In this role, surface combatants receive orders to fire from a fire support coordination agency of the supported unit via network connectivity or directly from a forward observer. The network connectivity flows through either the supporting arms coordination center [(SACC) as depicted] or a controlling unit.
The NSFS Controlling Unit (figure 1-4) directs and controls the fires of two or more surface combatants in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. The controlling unit receives requests for fire support from fire support coordination agencies, processes the requests in accordance with appropriate commander’s guidance and rules of engagement (ROE), and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide the requested fires. A ship in this role conducts tactical fire direction for supporting units.
The NSS Single Unit (figure 1-5), a single surface combatant operating alone, either by design or in anticipation of a greater force arriving in theater, must be capable of planning, targeting, controlling, synchronizing, integrating, coordinating, executing, and assessing own ship fires. The ship will receive mission orders, commander’s guidance, and ROE from higher authority, with no higher level on-scene commander or fires coordinating element in the area of operation. The ship will execute fire missions based upon surveillance and targeting data provided by reconnaissance and surveillance elements ashore or organic or off-board targeting systems. The ship will have the authority to determine which targets to engage, with what weapons, and to what degree, consistent with mission orders, existing ROE, and commander’s guidance.
The NSS Multi-Unit Commander (figure 1-6) directs and controls the fires of a group of surface combatants operating together but apart from a battlegroup or other controlling agency ashore while conducting NSS missions. The multi-unit commander will plan, target, synchronize, integrate, coordinate, execute, and assess the results of fires for the group.
The NSS Firing Unit (figure 1-7) conducts strike missions as directed by either the Tomahawk strike coordinator or the NSS multi-ship commander (as depicted).
1.4.4.3 Land Attack Tenets
The following tenets summarize the naval services’ land attack vision:
-- Land attack will be offensive, integrated, network-centric, and sea-based
-- In conjunction with maneuver, land attack will be the primary means to engage an adversary
-- Land attack will be executed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and at the lowest possible echelon
-- Land attack will be sufficiently flexible to successfully engage fixed, mobile, time critical, and hardened targets at long ranges
-- Land attack will have the capability to provide both precision and volume fires over a sustained period
-- Land attack assets will be dynamically allocated, coordinated, and deconflicted from a network-based architecture
-- Land attack system design will use human systems integration based on human centered design principles
-- Land attack systems will meet joint interoperability requirements
In short, land attack warfare will include the full spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic attack capabilities. These capabilities will be fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint force commander’s concept of operation and target priorities, and the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. Joint systems integration will allow the Navy to focus on providing the required effects, at the required locations, and at the required times. This land attack vision necessarily portends fundamental organizational and doctrinal changes across the joint services to fully exploit these new capabilities.
Once these changes are made, the capability to provide tactically responsive fires at long ranges to maneuvering ground forces can be leveraged to successfully engage time critical targets within their window of vulnerability.
1.4.5 Land Attack Implementation Plan
In 1994, the Navy realized that it needed a comprehensive near and far term strategy to develop a land attack capability to support its evolving operational maneuver doctrine. For the near term, the Navy’s objective is to leverage existing systems to provide capability as soon as possible.
This will be accomplished through an aggregation of incremental improvements to existing gun, missile, weapon control, and C4ISRT systems, as well as leveraging global positioning system (GPS) technology to allow extended range munitions to achieve precision accuracy. These near term improvements will add to the Navy’s land attack capabilities, but they are neither intended nor expected to meet all of the Marine Corps’ stated NSFS requirements.14
The Navy has recently established the surface combatant family of ships program to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants designed to meet multi-mission warfare areas to include littoral warfare operations. Completion of the lead ship is expected in 2012. Included in this family are the DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and littoral combat ship. Technology developments are expected to include a 155mm advanced gun system and new land attack missiles to meet the ground forces’ requirements for range, lethality, sustainability, volume of fire, and responsiveness. The Navy will employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
These new land attack platforms and systems will provide commanders a greater choice of weapons than formerly available. The current practice of employing naval guns for short-range tactical missions and Tomahawk missiles for long-range strike missions will be modified in favor of putting the desired effects on target from the most suitable weapon available. For example, Tactical Tomahawk is designated to serve as an interim tactical missile until the advanced land attack missile is deployed. The specific mission objectives and constraints will determine selection among the advanced gun, land attack missile, or cruise missile weapons. These new capabilities will allow land commanders to balance maneuver with fires to meet their operational goals.
Footnote 14: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter, dated 19 March 2002.
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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SURFACE COMBATANT LAND ATTACK WARFARE, 2005-2015 (January 2003)
2003 CONOPS: Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an introduction to the mission area of land attack, along with the purpose, scope, and approach used in developing this document.
1.1 PURPOSE
In the fall of 1999, Director of Surface Warfare created the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization to synchronize requirements and programs, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and make the most effective use of existing and future resources across the multitude of affected system commands, program executive offices, and program offices. This Capstone Organization created the Concept of Operations and Doctrine Working Integrated Product Team (C&D WIPT), chaired by N764G1, to:
-- develop, publish, and periodically update an overarching concept of operations (CONOPS) focused on surface combatant land attack warfare
-- ensure that the evolving platform-level capability requirements support the naval and joint warfighters
-- support the development of associated doctrine in concert with the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
In response to the above requirement, this document updates and replaces the original version of the Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare dated July 2001 and focuses on how the naval surface combatant will conduct land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe.
The purpose of this document is to:
-- focus the land attack systems engineering effort by setting forth the manner in which supported ground forces will employ a capability not previously resident in surface combatants accelerate the discussions necessary for the future development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to govern the use of this developing capability
-- provide practical guidance to the engineering community on surface combatant land attack warfare capability requirements and their proper technical interpretation
-- provide a source document for the acquisition and training communities to use in curriculum and courseware development
-- provide a common frame of reference so the Land Attack Capstone Organization can begin to coherently address the multitude of issues that are raised in this document
This document provides the concept of operations of how surface combatants1 will employ their new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) and weapon assets to provide a revolutionary capability to conduct joint land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe. Although tactical naval aviation and submarines are outside the scope of this version of the document, their contribution to land attack warfare is acknowledged.
Footnote 1: For the purpose of this document, surface combatants are defined as cruisers and destroyers that employ the land attack systems mentioned in this document.
1.2 APPROACH
The initial concept of operations dated July 2001 has been reviewed and signed by the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Executive Steering Committee. The initial CONOPS document defined land attack warfare; described surface combatant land attack missions, roles, and capabilities; identified the external land attack related agencies and systems, and the Marine Corps fire support requirements. Furthermore, it set forth some land attack weapon employment considerations and identified land attack operational issues requiring resolution.
The goals of this revision of the CONOPS are to address the four key issues identified in the initial document (deconfliction, mission planning and targeting, force level command and information flow, and logistics), address some additional issues that were identified during the review process, and to present a set of architectural operational views (Chapter 4) to support the employment concepts defined in this document.
As a first step in developing this document, a two-day workshop was held 24–25 October 2001. This workshop was designed to garner a broad range of input from subject matter experts representing the fleet, government agencies, and private industry. Participants were assigned to one of the four sub-groups, and each sub-group focused on one of the four key issue areas identified above. At the end of the workshop, each sub-group provided a list of key issues and recommended solutions. The product of the workshop, along with additional research, has been incorporated into this document.
1.3 BACKGROUND
During World War II, the primary employment of naval gunfire shifted to supporting amphibious operations and proved critical in enabling forcible entry operations against many heavily defended beachheads. The roles of naval gunfire support in these amphibious operations included:
-- (1) delivering high volume bombardment and beach preparation fires to clear obstacles and neutralize enemy coastal defenses necessary to enable assault forces to establish positions ashore;
-- (2) destroying critical targets necessary to ensure the seizure of the force beachhead;
-- (3) interdicting and/or neutralizing counterattack forces to enable the landing force to fully transition and buildup combat ashore; and
-- (4) attacking deep targets to support the breakout or continued operations of the landing force.
During the Cold War, the surface Navy concentrated on undersea warfare and anti-air warfare to defend aircraft carriers and sea lines of communication from the former Soviet Union’s air and submarine threats. This blue-water period was highlighted by two significant trends: a reduction in the number and size of naval guns, and the introduction of the first air-defense missile systems on surface combatants. In the 1970s the Navy eventually adopted the 5-inch/54-caliber gun as its standard. This 13 nautical mile range gun was intended for general-purpose use against surface craft, slow moving aircraft, and near shore targets. In the 1980s and 1990s ships and submarines were augmented with the Tomahawk
cruise missile system to provide a deep conventional and nuclear land attack capability.
With the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1989, the Navy increased its focus on littoral operations by developing capabilities to more effectively influence events ashore. In light of modern defensive systems designed to counter traditional World War II amphibious operations, new operational concepts were required to effectively employ limited resources while minimizing both casualties and collateral damage.
1.4 NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
In the mid-1990s, the naval services defined their vision for the future in Forward…From the Sea. 2 This document restructured naval expeditionary forces for joint operations, thus requiring that naval fires systems be fully integrated with the emerging joint fires architecture. The vision called for an offensive maritime force for sustained operations in the challenging littoral regions.
Today’s naval forces are continuing the transformation across a broad front to achieve a networked and sea-based power projection force that will enable joint force operations, deliver long range effective firepower, and assure sustained global access for U.S. forces.
Footnote 2: Forward…From the Sea, signed by SecNav, CNO, and CMC, dated 19 September 1994.
1.4.1 Naval Transformation Roadmap (3)
The Naval Transformation Roadmap is a new operational construct that will transform the Navy to meet the wide array of 21st Century threats, and will fully integrate naval forces with the other joint forces operating across a unified battlespace. Four capabilities drive the Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea): Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.
-- Sea Strike will project dominant, long range, decisive, and precise offensive power against key enemy targets using a wide array of means, both lethal and nonlethal, including long-range aircraft and missiles, information operations, Special Forces, and Marines. Success depends upon acute situational awareness, rapid and secure methods of sharing knowledge, and networked forces fully integrated into joint and national systems.
-- Sea Shield will project both near and long range defensive power from the sea to protect the nation with forward deployed forces, assure allies and deter potential adversaries, assure theater access, and protect the joint forces ashore. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will provide the information superiority, and will build upon the tenets of network centric warfare. A mixture of manned and unmanned ISR systems will provide the foundation for battlespace dominance, and enable the capability to project defensive firepower deep overland.
-- Sea Basing will use 70% of the earth’s surface as a vast maneuvering space to extend sovereignty around the world and provide support for joint forces. The independence of naval vessels operating on the high seas allows the U.S. to conduct combat operations anywhere and anytime, without asking for permission. Basing joint command and control, fire support, and logistics assets at sea provides the capability to immediately respond to a conflict, reduces the logistical footprint ashore, and minimizes airlift and force protection requirements. Warfighting capabilities are distributed across multiple sea-based platforms networked together and integrated with assets ashore to provide a unified joint battlefield.
-- FORCEnet will integrate naval, joint, and national information grids to achieve unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management. This concept will provide the joint force commander with secure, highly mobile, in-theater afloat headquarters, and will take advantage of the advances in communication and sensor technologies.
Footnote 3: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.
A Navy built around the above concepts will provide the nation with a highly adaptable fleet ready to strike at a moment’s notice. This fleet will deploy expeditionary strike forces (ESF) that include:
-- Carrier strike groups (CSGs) to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts
-- Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) composed of amphibious ready groups with dedicated escorts optimized for littoral power projection missions.
-- Surface/submarine action groups to conduct precision strike, sea control, maritime intercept, and intelligence operations
1.4.2 Operational Maneuver From the Sea (4)
The Marine Corps’ concepts for the projection of naval power ashore, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), attempt to fully exploit the tenets of maneuver warfare in the challenging littoral environment. These concepts capitalize on existing and emerging technological advancements in mobility, information management, and the range, lethality and responsiveness of naval fires to conduct forcible entry from the sea rapidly striking directly at an enemy’s center of gravity thus avoiding set-piece, phased and highly rigid amphibious operations of the past. Significant advancements in the mobility of expeditionary forces enable them to maneuver from over-the horizon directly to objectives far inland exploiting the full limits of the sea, air and land in an expanded battlespace.
Footnote 4: OMFTS is the operational implementation of the Marine Corps Capstone Concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, dated 10 November 2001.
The successful implementation of OMFTS is highly dependent on improved sea-based command- and-control, logistics, and supporting fires. Highly mobile and therefore lighter maneuver forces employed in OMFTS require long-range, highly responsive, highly lethal, accurate and continuous supporting naval fires. The longer ranges and improved responsiveness of naval fires also make them capable of supporting emerging lighter and more mobile Army forces, particularly those participating in early entry operations in the littorals. These supporting naval fires will be provided by a new generation of mutually supporting air, ground, naval surface and sub-surface assets.
1.4.3 Global Information Grid and Future Naval Fires (5)
The rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespacein support of simultaneous joint operations will require a shift from platform-centric to networkcentric warfare (NCW). NCW is a concept centered on a vast, complex information infrastructure, linking geographically dispersed warfighters at all levels to increase force synergy, combat power, and operational effectiveness. The physical infrastructure is envisioned as a global information grid providing seamless back-plane connectivity to support a sensor grid, a command and control grid, and an engagement grid 6
This overarching network is intended to provide rapid global information dissemination and transfer, enabling theater and global information superiority and joint C4ISRT integration.
To create an operational capability out of the NCW concept, one single overarching family of systems (FoS) 7 must integrate these three grids to both enable rapid self-synchronization and decisive actions, and to provide a sensor to weapons-on-target warfare mission capability.
Footnote 5: Based on the Future Naval Fires White Paper published by NWDC, dated Apr 2002.
Footnote 6: Example does not show all existing or potential systems that would be included in the global information grid.
Footnote 7: The FoS includes legacy, emerging, and developmental systems working together.
1.4.3.1 Sensor Grid
Advances in sensing capability as well as the distribution of sensor data are required to support this family of systems. A sensor grid capable of providing continuous surveillance down to the tactical level throughout the battlespace is required to achieve the full potential of future naval fires. This sensor grid will integrate information from all available sensors into a common information base that will support the other two grids. It will overlay intelligence and surveillance information from multiple joint sensors and quickly detect, classify, and precisely locate targets for disposition by the command and control, and engagement grids.
This overlaying process will be accomplished through automating, coordinating, and correlating the processing of multiple tactical data streams from various surveillance and intelligence sources in near real-time.8 The sensor grid will then provide time-critical cueing information for advanced sensor systems as well as precision targeting coordinates for advanced weapon systems.
Footnote 8: CJCSM 3500.04B Universal Joint Task List, 1 Oct 99, OP2.5.3 defines near real-time as “…within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence.”
1.4.3.2 Command and Control Grid
Command and control of naval fires must be flexible and scaleable, allowing the linking of multiple control nodes throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of battle. The system must allow the control node to pass engagement orders to individual firing units. It must also be capable of operating in a decentralized manner using command by negation to override any unwanted engagements. This flexibility will allow control nodes to exist at the combatant commander level located far from the engagement, in theater on either a navy ship, ashore with the ground combat commander, or on an enhanced command and control aircraft.
Additionally, the system must have the capability for programmable or selectable levels of unmanned systems autonomy. This flexible network architecture will allow for high-level control of engagements during contingencies as well as tactical level synchronization when required by the tempo of operations and enabled by the appropriate rules of engagement.
Speed of command will flatten the command hierarchy, place decision makers in parallel with shooters, and transform warfare from multiple, discrete functions into a single, continuous process. Once implemented, commanders will be able to collaboratively plan and execute missions in a dynamic environment with accurate, timely, and sustained situational awareness. Similarly, on-scene commanders will be able to rapidly respond to battlefield developments and decisively influence events. Advanced C4ISRT networks, the backbone that supports the entire structure, will integrate tactical and technical support applications with connections to enhanced satellite systems and other networks.
Deconfliction tools must be developed that allow both the firing platform and other joint assets to rapidly deconflict ordnance flight paths to assist in rapid, safe engagements and enable horizontal, fully integrated operations. 9
Footnote 9: Deconfliction as a subset of coordination is addressed in detail in Chapter 6.
1.4.3.3 Engagement Grid
The family of systems must be capable of generating fire control solutions, executing engagements, monitoring and managing engagements in progress, and providing data links between sensors and weapons. Every weapon capable of receiving in-flight target updates could be assigned a network address. This information must be passed to the sensors in the network that individually or in aggregate are responsible for providing updated data to the munitions to ensure in-flight target updates are correctly transmitted and acted upon by the desired ordnance.
Additionally, engagement control would include the management and scheduling of sensors to ensure that fire control quality data is available at the appropriate time during the weapons’ flight path.
The engagement grid also plays a role in the deconfliction process. Examples of potential technology assisted deconfliction are: (1) the capability to automatically display ordnance flight paths prior to the firing of the ordnance as well as when the ordnance is in-flight, (2) shipboard combat direction systems that communicate with each other and generate alerts about flight path conflicts, and (3) ordnance that communicates with airborne systems to generate alerts about potential collision situations. Technology assisted deconfliction will allow rapid engagement of time sensitive targets and dynamically coordinated strikes. Additionally, information regarding munitions and aircraft flight paths must be provided to friendly air defense networks to prevent an inadvertent response to our own weapons.
1.4.4 Land Attack Vision
Because naval forces are forward deployed in international waters, they will often be on the scene before trouble starts. In the war on terror they will be the land attack weapons that wait providing the volume of precision fires across the littorals and “Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains.” 10 Surface combatants and submarines will bring unique all-weather, day/night, sustainable, and responsive fires as a complement to the capabilities provided by aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings.
These enhanced land attack capabilities are the result of advances in sensors, precision targeting systems, weapons, information exchange, and integrated command and control systems. Once all of these components are fully integrated, surface combatants and submarines will have the capability to conduct early, responsive, and precision tactical, operational, and strategic land attack missions while supporting the arrival of follow-on naval, joint, and coalition forces.
Director of Surface Warfare (N76)11 has defined land attack as the integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and joint and coalition forces for projecting combat power into and on the ground portion of the battlespace to protect vital national interests and achieve national and military objectives. Employed forces can include aviation and sea- and ground-based assets. Figure 1-2 highlights how land attack warfare fits into the larger concept of joint, naval, and Navy fires. This figure focuses on naval surface combatant land attack.
Footnote 10: Operational goal from Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated 30 September 2001.
Footnote 11: The Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) is on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, responsible for the development of surface warfare requirements and resources.
1.4.4.1 Land Attack Missions
For the surface combatant, land attack warfare encompasses the dual missions of naval surface fire support and naval surface strike.
Naval surface fire support (NSFS) encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives.12 NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces.
Naval surface strike (NSS) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants. These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting operations against U.S. or Allied forces.13 These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, warmaking capacity, the will to make war, and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS is usually executed independent of ground maneuver forces.
Footnote 12: Definition from Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
Footnote 13: Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) memorandum, Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document, Ser: N864/OU653919, dated 11 September 2000.
1.4.4.2 Land Attack Roles
Surface combatants must be fully capable and responsive across the entire spectrum of warfare, from major theater war to small-scale contingencies (such as precision strikes against terrorist cells, training facilities, and staging areas) and non-combatant evacuation operations; from multi-ship battlegroups to independent operations. While conducting these operations, the surface combatant will perform one or more of the following roles.
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Text Box: Development of the Roles
The following role descriptions were developed by a working group and were approved and set forth in the Director of Surface Warfare letter dated 11 September 2000. The firing unit role was added later. These five roles provide a useful model for surface combatant employment for land attack missions. They should not be viewed as a comprehensive classification of all possible situations, but neither should they be considered as merely a cursory classification effort.
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The NSFS Supporting Unit (figure 1-3) provides fires in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. In this role, surface combatants receive orders to fire from a fire support coordination agency of the supported unit via network connectivity or directly from a forward observer. The network connectivity flows through either the supporting arms coordination center [(SACC) as depicted] or a controlling unit.
The NSFS Controlling Unit (figure 1-4) directs and controls the fires of two or more surface combatants in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. The controlling unit receives requests for fire support from fire support coordination agencies, processes the requests in accordance with appropriate commander’s guidance and rules of engagement (ROE), and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide the requested fires. A ship in this role conducts tactical fire direction for supporting units.
The NSS Single Unit (figure 1-5), a single surface combatant operating alone, either by design or in anticipation of a greater force arriving in theater, must be capable of planning, targeting, controlling, synchronizing, integrating, coordinating, executing, and assessing own ship fires. The ship will receive mission orders, commander’s guidance, and ROE from higher authority, with no higher level on-scene commander or fires coordinating element in the area of operation. The ship will execute fire missions based upon surveillance and targeting data provided by reconnaissance and surveillance elements ashore or organic or off-board targeting systems. The ship will have the authority to determine which targets to engage, with what weapons, and to what degree, consistent with mission orders, existing ROE, and commander’s guidance.
The NSS Multi-Unit Commander (figure 1-6) directs and controls the fires of a group of surface combatants operating together but apart from a battlegroup or other controlling agency ashore while conducting NSS missions. The multi-unit commander will plan, target, synchronize, integrate, coordinate, execute, and assess the results of fires for the group.
The NSS Firing Unit (figure 1-7) conducts strike missions as directed by either the Tomahawk strike coordinator or the NSS multi-ship commander (as depicted).
1.4.4.3 Land Attack Tenets
The following tenets summarize the naval services’ land attack vision:
-- Land attack will be offensive, integrated, network-centric, and sea-based
-- In conjunction with maneuver, land attack will be the primary means to engage an adversary
-- Land attack will be executed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and at the lowest possible echelon
-- Land attack will be sufficiently flexible to successfully engage fixed, mobile, time critical, and hardened targets at long ranges
-- Land attack will have the capability to provide both precision and volume fires over a sustained period
-- Land attack assets will be dynamically allocated, coordinated, and deconflicted from a network-based architecture
-- Land attack system design will use human systems integration based on human centered design principles
-- Land attack systems will meet joint interoperability requirements
In short, land attack warfare will include the full spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic attack capabilities. These capabilities will be fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint force commander’s concept of operation and target priorities, and the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. Joint systems integration will allow the Navy to focus on providing the required effects, at the required locations, and at the required times. This land attack vision necessarily portends fundamental organizational and doctrinal changes across the joint services to fully exploit these new capabilities.
Once these changes are made, the capability to provide tactically responsive fires at long ranges to maneuvering ground forces can be leveraged to successfully engage time critical targets within their window of vulnerability.
1.4.5 Land Attack Implementation Plan
In 1994, the Navy realized that it needed a comprehensive near and far term strategy to develop a land attack capability to support its evolving operational maneuver doctrine. For the near term, the Navy’s objective is to leverage existing systems to provide capability as soon as possible.
This will be accomplished through an aggregation of incremental improvements to existing gun, missile, weapon control, and C4ISRT systems, as well as leveraging global positioning system (GPS) technology to allow extended range munitions to achieve precision accuracy. These near term improvements will add to the Navy’s land attack capabilities, but they are neither intended nor expected to meet all of the Marine Corps’ stated NSFS requirements.14
The Navy has recently established the surface combatant family of ships program to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants designed to meet multi-mission warfare areas to include littoral warfare operations. Completion of the lead ship is expected in 2012. Included in this family are the DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and littoral combat ship. Technology developments are expected to include a 155mm advanced gun system and new land attack missiles to meet the ground forces’ requirements for range, lethality, sustainability, volume of fire, and responsiveness. The Navy will employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions.
These new land attack platforms and systems will provide commanders a greater choice of weapons than formerly available. The current practice of employing naval guns for short-range tactical missions and Tomahawk missiles for long-range strike missions will be modified in favor of putting the desired effects on target from the most suitable weapon available. For example, Tactical Tomahawk is designated to serve as an interim tactical missile until the advanced land attack missile is deployed. The specific mission objectives and constraints will determine selection among the advanced gun, land attack missile, or cruise missile weapons. These new capabilities will allow land commanders to balance maneuver with fires to meet their operational goals.
Footnote 14: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter, dated 19 March 2002.
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