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  • 2003 Navy Global Conops

    After searching for this report forever I finally found it.

    ==============================

    CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SURFACE COMBATANT LAND ATTACK WARFARE, 2005-2015 (January 2003)


    2003 CONOPS: Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION


    1.0 INTRODUCTION

    This chapter provides an introduction to the mission area of land attack, along with the purpose, scope, and approach used in developing this document.


    1.1 PURPOSE

    In the fall of 1999, Director of Surface Warfare created the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization to synchronize requirements and programs, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and make the most effective use of existing and future resources across the multitude of affected system commands, program executive offices, and program offices. This Capstone Organization created the Concept of Operations and Doctrine Working Integrated Product Team (C&D WIPT), chaired by N764G1, to:

    -- develop, publish, and periodically update an overarching concept of operations (CONOPS) focused on surface combatant land attack warfare

    -- ensure that the evolving platform-level capability requirements support the naval and joint warfighters

    -- support the development of associated doctrine in concert with the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)

    In response to the above requirement, this document updates and replaces the original version of the Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare dated July 2001 and focuses on how the naval surface combatant will conduct land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe.


    The purpose of this document is to:

    -- focus the land attack systems engineering effort by setting forth the manner in which supported ground forces will employ a capability not previously resident in surface combatants accelerate the discussions necessary for the future development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to govern the use of this developing capability

    -- provide practical guidance to the engineering community on surface combatant land attack warfare capability requirements and their proper technical interpretation

    -- provide a source document for the acquisition and training communities to use in curriculum and courseware development

    -- provide a common frame of reference so the Land Attack Capstone Organization can begin to coherently address the multitude of issues that are raised in this document

    This document provides the concept of operations of how surface combatants1 will employ their new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) and weapon assets to provide a revolutionary capability to conduct joint land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe. Although tactical naval aviation and submarines are outside the scope of this version of the document, their contribution to land attack warfare is acknowledged.

    Footnote 1: For the purpose of this document, surface combatants are defined as cruisers and destroyers that employ the land attack systems mentioned in this document.


    1.2 APPROACH

    The initial concept of operations dated July 2001 has been reviewed and signed by the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Executive Steering Committee. The initial CONOPS document defined land attack warfare; described surface combatant land attack missions, roles, and capabilities; identified the external land attack related agencies and systems, and the Marine Corps fire support requirements. Furthermore, it set forth some land attack weapon employment considerations and identified land attack operational issues requiring resolution.

    The goals of this revision of the CONOPS are to address the four key issues identified in the initial document (deconfliction, mission planning and targeting, force level command and information flow, and logistics), address some additional issues that were identified during the review process, and to present a set of architectural operational views (Chapter 4) to support the employment concepts defined in this document.

    As a first step in developing this document, a two-day workshop was held 24–25 October 2001. This workshop was designed to garner a broad range of input from subject matter experts representing the fleet, government agencies, and private industry. Participants were assigned to one of the four sub-groups, and each sub-group focused on one of the four key issue areas identified above. At the end of the workshop, each sub-group provided a list of key issues and recommended solutions. The product of the workshop, along with additional research, has been incorporated into this document.


    1.3 BACKGROUND

    During World War II, the primary employment of naval gunfire shifted to supporting amphibious operations and proved critical in enabling forcible entry operations against many heavily defended beachheads. The roles of naval gunfire support in these amphibious operations included:

    -- (1) delivering high volume bombardment and beach preparation fires to clear obstacles and neutralize enemy coastal defenses necessary to enable assault forces to establish positions ashore;

    -- (2) destroying critical targets necessary to ensure the seizure of the force beachhead;

    -- (3) interdicting and/or neutralizing counterattack forces to enable the landing force to fully transition and buildup combat ashore; and

    -- (4) attacking deep targets to support the breakout or continued operations of the landing force.

    During the Cold War, the surface Navy concentrated on undersea warfare and anti-air warfare to defend aircraft carriers and sea lines of communication from the former Soviet Union’s air and submarine threats. This blue-water period was highlighted by two significant trends: a reduction in the number and size of naval guns, and the introduction of the first air-defense missile systems on surface combatants. In the 1970s the Navy eventually adopted the 5-inch/54-caliber gun as its standard. This 13 nautical mile range gun was intended for general-purpose use against surface craft, slow moving aircraft, and near shore targets. In the 1980s and 1990s ships and submarines were augmented with the Tomahawk
    cruise missile system to provide a deep conventional and nuclear land attack capability.

    With the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1989, the Navy increased its focus on littoral operations by developing capabilities to more effectively influence events ashore. In light of modern defensive systems designed to counter traditional World War II amphibious operations, new operational concepts were required to effectively employ limited resources while minimizing both casualties and collateral damage.


    1.4 NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

    In the mid-1990s, the naval services defined their vision for the future in Forward…From the Sea. 2 This document restructured naval expeditionary forces for joint operations, thus requiring that naval fires systems be fully integrated with the emerging joint fires architecture. The vision called for an offensive maritime force for sustained operations in the challenging littoral regions.

    Today’s naval forces are continuing the transformation across a broad front to achieve a networked and sea-based power projection force that will enable joint force operations, deliver long range effective firepower, and assure sustained global access for U.S. forces.

    Footnote 2: Forward…From the Sea, signed by SecNav, CNO, and CMC, dated 19 September 1994.


    1.4.1 Naval Transformation Roadmap (3)

    The Naval Transformation Roadmap is a new operational construct that will transform the Navy to meet the wide array of 21st Century threats, and will fully integrate naval forces with the other joint forces operating across a unified battlespace. Four capabilities drive the Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea): Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.

    -- Sea Strike will project dominant, long range, decisive, and precise offensive power against key enemy targets using a wide array of means, both lethal and nonlethal, including long-range aircraft and missiles, information operations, Special Forces, and Marines. Success depends upon acute situational awareness, rapid and secure methods of sharing knowledge, and networked forces fully integrated into joint and national systems.

    -- Sea Shield will project both near and long range defensive power from the sea to protect the nation with forward deployed forces, assure allies and deter potential adversaries, assure theater access, and protect the joint forces ashore. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will provide the information superiority, and will build upon the tenets of network centric warfare. A mixture of manned and unmanned ISR systems will provide the foundation for battlespace dominance, and enable the capability to project defensive firepower deep overland.

    -- Sea Basing will use 70% of the earth’s surface as a vast maneuvering space to extend sovereignty around the world and provide support for joint forces. The independence of naval vessels operating on the high seas allows the U.S. to conduct combat operations anywhere and anytime, without asking for permission. Basing joint command and control, fire support, and logistics assets at sea provides the capability to immediately respond to a conflict, reduces the logistical footprint ashore, and minimizes airlift and force protection requirements. Warfighting capabilities are distributed across multiple sea-based platforms networked together and integrated with assets ashore to provide a unified joint battlefield.

    -- FORCEnet will integrate naval, joint, and national information grids to achieve unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management. This concept will provide the joint force commander with secure, highly mobile, in-theater afloat headquarters, and will take advantage of the advances in communication and sensor technologies.

    Footnote 3: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.


    A Navy built around the above concepts will provide the nation with a highly adaptable fleet ready to strike at a moment’s notice. This fleet will deploy expeditionary strike forces (ESF) that include:

    -- Carrier strike groups (CSGs) to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts

    -- Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) composed of amphibious ready groups with dedicated escorts optimized for littoral power projection missions.

    -- Surface/submarine action groups to conduct precision strike, sea control, maritime intercept, and intelligence operations


    1.4.2 Operational Maneuver From the Sea (4)

    The Marine Corps’ concepts for the projection of naval power ashore, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), attempt to fully exploit the tenets of maneuver warfare in the challenging littoral environment. These concepts capitalize on existing and emerging technological advancements in mobility, information management, and the range, lethality and responsiveness of naval fires to conduct forcible entry from the sea rapidly striking directly at an enemy’s center of gravity thus avoiding set-piece, phased and highly rigid amphibious operations of the past. Significant advancements in the mobility of expeditionary forces enable them to maneuver from over-the horizon directly to objectives far inland exploiting the full limits of the sea, air and land in an expanded battlespace.

    Footnote 4: OMFTS is the operational implementation of the Marine Corps Capstone Concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, dated 10 November 2001.

    The successful implementation of OMFTS is highly dependent on improved sea-based command- and-control, logistics, and supporting fires. Highly mobile and therefore lighter maneuver forces employed in OMFTS require long-range, highly responsive, highly lethal, accurate and continuous supporting naval fires. The longer ranges and improved responsiveness of naval fires also make them capable of supporting emerging lighter and more mobile Army forces, particularly those participating in early entry operations in the littorals. These supporting naval fires will be provided by a new generation of mutually supporting air, ground, naval surface and sub-surface assets.


    1.4.3 Global Information Grid and Future Naval Fires (5)

    The rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespacein support of simultaneous joint operations will require a shift from platform-centric to networkcentric warfare (NCW). NCW is a concept centered on a vast, complex information infrastructure, linking geographically dispersed warfighters at all levels to increase force synergy, combat power, and operational effectiveness. The physical infrastructure is envisioned as a global information grid providing seamless back-plane connectivity to support a sensor grid, a command and control grid, and an engagement grid 6

    This overarching network is intended to provide rapid global information dissemination and transfer, enabling theater and global information superiority and joint C4ISRT integration.

    To create an operational capability out of the NCW concept, one single overarching family of systems (FoS) 7 must integrate these three grids to both enable rapid self-synchronization and decisive actions, and to provide a sensor to weapons-on-target warfare mission capability.

    Footnote 5: Based on the Future Naval Fires White Paper published by NWDC, dated Apr 2002.

    Footnote 6: Example does not show all existing or potential systems that would be included in the global information grid.

    Footnote 7: The FoS includes legacy, emerging, and developmental systems working together.


    1.4.3.1 Sensor Grid

    Advances in sensing capability as well as the distribution of sensor data are required to support this family of systems. A sensor grid capable of providing continuous surveillance down to the tactical level throughout the battlespace is required to achieve the full potential of future naval fires. This sensor grid will integrate information from all available sensors into a common information base that will support the other two grids. It will overlay intelligence and surveillance information from multiple joint sensors and quickly detect, classify, and precisely locate targets for disposition by the command and control, and engagement grids.

    This overlaying process will be accomplished through automating, coordinating, and correlating the processing of multiple tactical data streams from various surveillance and intelligence sources in near real-time.8 The sensor grid will then provide time-critical cueing information for advanced sensor systems as well as precision targeting coordinates for advanced weapon systems.

    Footnote 8: CJCSM 3500.04B Universal Joint Task List, 1 Oct 99, OP2.5.3 defines near real-time as “…within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence.”





    1.4.3.2 Command and Control Grid

    Command and control of naval fires must be flexible and scaleable, allowing the linking of multiple control nodes throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of battle. The system must allow the control node to pass engagement orders to individual firing units. It must also be capable of operating in a decentralized manner using command by negation to override any unwanted engagements. This flexibility will allow control nodes to exist at the combatant commander level located far from the engagement, in theater on either a navy ship, ashore with the ground combat commander, or on an enhanced command and control aircraft.

    Additionally, the system must have the capability for programmable or selectable levels of unmanned systems autonomy. This flexible network architecture will allow for high-level control of engagements during contingencies as well as tactical level synchronization when required by the tempo of operations and enabled by the appropriate rules of engagement.

    Speed of command will flatten the command hierarchy, place decision makers in parallel with shooters, and transform warfare from multiple, discrete functions into a single, continuous process. Once implemented, commanders will be able to collaboratively plan and execute missions in a dynamic environment with accurate, timely, and sustained situational awareness. Similarly, on-scene commanders will be able to rapidly respond to battlefield developments and decisively influence events. Advanced C4ISRT networks, the backbone that supports the entire structure, will integrate tactical and technical support applications with connections to enhanced satellite systems and other networks.

    Deconfliction tools must be developed that allow both the firing platform and other joint assets to rapidly deconflict ordnance flight paths to assist in rapid, safe engagements and enable horizontal, fully integrated operations. 9

    Footnote 9: Deconfliction as a subset of coordination is addressed in detail in Chapter 6.


    1.4.3.3 Engagement Grid

    The family of systems must be capable of generating fire control solutions, executing engagements, monitoring and managing engagements in progress, and providing data links between sensors and weapons. Every weapon capable of receiving in-flight target updates could be assigned a network address. This information must be passed to the sensors in the network that individually or in aggregate are responsible for providing updated data to the munitions to ensure in-flight target updates are correctly transmitted and acted upon by the desired ordnance.

    Additionally, engagement control would include the management and scheduling of sensors to ensure that fire control quality data is available at the appropriate time during the weapons’ flight path.

    The engagement grid also plays a role in the deconfliction process. Examples of potential technology assisted deconfliction are: (1) the capability to automatically display ordnance flight paths prior to the firing of the ordnance as well as when the ordnance is in-flight, (2) shipboard combat direction systems that communicate with each other and generate alerts about flight path conflicts, and (3) ordnance that communicates with airborne systems to generate alerts about potential collision situations. Technology assisted deconfliction will allow rapid engagement of time sensitive targets and dynamically coordinated strikes. Additionally, information regarding munitions and aircraft flight paths must be provided to friendly air defense networks to prevent an inadvertent response to our own weapons.


    1.4.4 Land Attack Vision

    Because naval forces are forward deployed in international waters, they will often be on the scene before trouble starts. In the war on terror they will be the land attack weapons that wait providing the volume of precision fires across the littorals and “Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains.” 10 Surface combatants and submarines will bring unique all-weather, day/night, sustainable, and responsive fires as a complement to the capabilities provided by aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings.

    These enhanced land attack capabilities are the result of advances in sensors, precision targeting systems, weapons, information exchange, and integrated command and control systems. Once all of these components are fully integrated, surface combatants and submarines will have the capability to conduct early, responsive, and precision tactical, operational, and strategic land attack missions while supporting the arrival of follow-on naval, joint, and coalition forces.

    Director of Surface Warfare (N76)11 has defined land attack as the integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and joint and coalition forces for projecting combat power into and on the ground portion of the battlespace to protect vital national interests and achieve national and military objectives. Employed forces can include aviation and sea- and ground-based assets. Figure 1-2 highlights how land attack warfare fits into the larger concept of joint, naval, and Navy fires. This figure focuses on naval surface combatant land attack.



    Footnote 10: Operational goal from Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated 30 September 2001.

    Footnote 11: The Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) is on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, responsible for the development of surface warfare requirements and resources.


    1.4.4.1 Land Attack Missions

    For the surface combatant, land attack warfare encompasses the dual missions of naval surface fire support and naval surface strike.

    Naval surface fire support (NSFS) encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives.12 NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces.

    Naval surface strike (NSS) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants. These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting operations against U.S. or Allied forces.13 These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, warmaking capacity, the will to make war, and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS is usually executed independent of ground maneuver forces.

    Footnote 12: Definition from Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

    Footnote 13: Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) memorandum, Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document, Ser: N864/OU653919, dated 11 September 2000.


    1.4.4.2 Land Attack Roles

    Surface combatants must be fully capable and responsive across the entire spectrum of warfare, from major theater war to small-scale contingencies (such as precision strikes against terrorist cells, training facilities, and staging areas) and non-combatant evacuation operations; from multi-ship battlegroups to independent operations. While conducting these operations, the surface combatant will perform one or more of the following roles.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Text Box: Development of the Roles

    The following role descriptions were developed by a working group and were approved and set forth in the Director of Surface Warfare letter dated 11 September 2000. The firing unit role was added later. These five roles provide a useful model for surface combatant employment for land attack missions. They should not be viewed as a comprehensive classification of all possible situations, but neither should they be considered as merely a cursory classification effort.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The NSFS Supporting Unit (figure 1-3) provides fires in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. In this role, surface combatants receive orders to fire from a fire support coordination agency of the supported unit via network connectivity or directly from a forward observer. The network connectivity flows through either the supporting arms coordination center [(SACC) as depicted] or a controlling unit.





    The NSFS Controlling Unit (figure 1-4) directs and controls the fires of two or more surface combatants in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. The controlling unit receives requests for fire support from fire support coordination agencies, processes the requests in accordance with appropriate commander’s guidance and rules of engagement (ROE), and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide the requested fires. A ship in this role conducts tactical fire direction for supporting units.





    The NSS Single Unit (figure 1-5), a single surface combatant operating alone, either by design or in anticipation of a greater force arriving in theater, must be capable of planning, targeting, controlling, synchronizing, integrating, coordinating, executing, and assessing own ship fires. The ship will receive mission orders, commander’s guidance, and ROE from higher authority, with no higher level on-scene commander or fires coordinating element in the area of operation. The ship will execute fire missions based upon surveillance and targeting data provided by reconnaissance and surveillance elements ashore or organic or off-board targeting systems. The ship will have the authority to determine which targets to engage, with what weapons, and to what degree, consistent with mission orders, existing ROE, and commander’s guidance.





    The NSS Multi-Unit Commander (figure 1-6) directs and controls the fires of a group of surface combatants operating together but apart from a battlegroup or other controlling agency ashore while conducting NSS missions. The multi-unit commander will plan, target, synchronize, integrate, coordinate, execute, and assess the results of fires for the group.





    The NSS Firing Unit (figure 1-7) conducts strike missions as directed by either the Tomahawk strike coordinator or the NSS multi-ship commander (as depicted).






    1.4.4.3 Land Attack Tenets

    The following tenets summarize the naval services’ land attack vision:

    -- Land attack will be offensive, integrated, network-centric, and sea-based

    -- In conjunction with maneuver, land attack will be the primary means to engage an adversary

    -- Land attack will be executed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and at the lowest possible echelon

    -- Land attack will be sufficiently flexible to successfully engage fixed, mobile, time critical, and hardened targets at long ranges

    -- Land attack will have the capability to provide both precision and volume fires over a sustained period

    -- Land attack assets will be dynamically allocated, coordinated, and deconflicted from a network-based architecture

    -- Land attack system design will use human systems integration based on human centered design principles

    -- Land attack systems will meet joint interoperability requirements

    In short, land attack warfare will include the full spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic attack capabilities. These capabilities will be fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint force commander’s concept of operation and target priorities, and the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. Joint systems integration will allow the Navy to focus on providing the required effects, at the required locations, and at the required times. This land attack vision necessarily portends fundamental organizational and doctrinal changes across the joint services to fully exploit these new capabilities.

    Once these changes are made, the capability to provide tactically responsive fires at long ranges to maneuvering ground forces can be leveraged to successfully engage time critical targets within their window of vulnerability.


    1.4.5 Land Attack Implementation Plan

    In 1994, the Navy realized that it needed a comprehensive near and far term strategy to develop a land attack capability to support its evolving operational maneuver doctrine. For the near term, the Navy’s objective is to leverage existing systems to provide capability as soon as possible.

    This will be accomplished through an aggregation of incremental improvements to existing gun, missile, weapon control, and C4ISRT systems, as well as leveraging global positioning system (GPS) technology to allow extended range munitions to achieve precision accuracy. These near term improvements will add to the Navy’s land attack capabilities, but they are neither intended nor expected to meet all of the Marine Corps’ stated NSFS requirements.14

    The Navy has recently established the surface combatant family of ships program to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants designed to meet multi-mission warfare areas to include littoral warfare operations. Completion of the lead ship is expected in 2012. Included in this family are the DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and littoral combat ship. Technology developments are expected to include a 155mm advanced gun system and new land attack missiles to meet the ground forces’ requirements for range, lethality, sustainability, volume of fire, and responsiveness. The Navy will employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

    These new land attack platforms and systems will provide commanders a greater choice of weapons than formerly available. The current practice of employing naval guns for short-range tactical missions and Tomahawk missiles for long-range strike missions will be modified in favor of putting the desired effects on target from the most suitable weapon available. For example, Tactical Tomahawk is designated to serve as an interim tactical missile until the advanced land attack missile is deployed. The specific mission objectives and constraints will determine selection among the advanced gun, land attack missile, or cruise missile weapons. These new capabilities will allow land commanders to balance maneuver with fires to meet their operational goals.

    Footnote 14: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter, dated 19 March 2002.

  • #2
    2003 CONOPS, Chapter 2:
    NAVAL FORCES LITTORAL THREAT CONTINUUM



    2.0 NAVAL FORCES LITTORAL THREAT CONTINUUM

    This chapter discusses conventional and unconventional threats to naval surface forces operating in the littoral.


    2.1 INTRODUCTION

    Naval forces operating in the littoral in the near to mid-range timeframe (2005 to 2015) will face a variety of threats and will be required to engage a large number and variety of targets. Threats will derive from hostile (rogue) nations as well as non-state actors that may be ethnic, religious, or criminal-based. These threats will increase in sophistication and lethality further into the mid-range timeframe. However, most potential threat entities may not have procured the more sophisticated weapons in large numbers.

    Even if procured, the weapons systems must be employed properly which may require a significant training infrastructure, or alternatively, foreign advisors. Fire-and-forget weapons must also be properly employed to be effective. If rogue nations and non-state threat entities do not choose to upgrade their arsenals, due to fiscal or other reasons, lower technology weapons will continue to pose a danger to friendly naval forces.

    The threat to naval forces will vary depending on the scenario. The principal threat will be to the naval units operating in the littoral, the forces involved in the ship-to-objective phase of operations, and the sensors and sensor platforms supporting these operations. Threat entities may seek to interdict or degrade the effectiveness of naval surface fires and associated command and control networks. Terrorists may also pose a threat to naval forces in their homeport, overseas, or while underway.


    2.2 CONVENTIONAL LITTORAL DEFENSES

    Naval forces, networks, and naval fires ordnance are susceptible to attack from a wide variety of enemy weapon systems and information warfarerelated activities. This tactical activity can be categorized as reactive or proactive depending on the normal mode in which they engage their targets. The following lists define what is meant by each category, and provide examples of weapons systems or platforms that typically fall into that category.

    2.2.1 Reactive Defenses

    Weapons systems or platforms that react to the approach of opposing forces:
    -- coastal defense cruise missiles (mobile or fixed)
    -- coastal defense artillery (mobile or fixed)
    -- coastal defense torpedoes (fixed)
    -- mines
    -- integrated air defense systems
    -- ground forces (patrols and garrisons)
    -- aircraft (defensive counter air and close air support)
    -- patrol boats (can be equipped with cruise missiles, torpedoes, and guns)
    -- radio-frequency weapons

    2.2.2 Proactive Defenses

    Weapons systems or platforms that seek and engage opposing forces:
    -- surface combatants (can be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and guns)
    -- aircraft (offensive counter air and strike aircraft)
    -- special operations forces (SOF)
    -- submarines (including mini-subs)
    -- tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs)
    -- information warfare attack operations designed to deny, deceive, disrupt, or destroy

    Table 2-1 summarizes the type and basic capabilities of threats likely to be encountered in the near to mid-range timeframe. As higher technology weapons proliferate, threat capabilities will improve. The ranges provided are average. Some specific higher technology weapon systems may greatly exceed the listed range, e.g., the S-400 Series SAMs have an advertised 250 nautical mile (nm) range.





    2.3 UNCONVENTIONAL LITTORAL THREATS

    Potential threats will most likely use unconventional means against U.S. naval forces by taking advantage of the constraints imposed by rules of engagement and U.S. forces’ adherence to the laws of war. Some rogue nations possess large numbers of fast, highly maneuverable, surface craft armed with crew served weapons and small arms that may conduct swarm attacks. Several potential rogue nations have large numbers of missile firing craft that could also engage friendly forces, generating multi-axis strikes in an attempt to overwhelm defenses. Commercial shipping can also be modified to carry hidden weapons similar to Q-ships1 from World Wars I and II. Non-state actors may use similar craft and ships for attacks against friendly shipping and/or port facilities.

    Footnote 1: Combatants disguised as noncombatant vessels. These ships appeared to be harmless until they were in a position to attack.

    Rogue nations can also use commercial and general aviation aircraft as surveillance assets and potentially as weapons platforms or as remote controlled weapons. Non-state actors can use similar aircraft as weapons.

    Several rogue nations, as well as non-state actors, are known to either possess or are actively seeking chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) agents and related material. The proliferation of CBRNE agents, the means of delivering them, and the expressed desire by several non-state actors to employ them to cause mass casualties suggests these agents may be used against U.S. naval forces in the future. In general, chemical or biological agents and radiological material are considered to be cheaper and easier to produce or acquire than nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the seizure of special nuclear materials on the black market has lent new credibility to the nuclear threat as well. The combination of unconventional tactics, possibly including suicide attacks with CBRNE weapons, place U.S. naval forces operating in the littorals at increased risk throughout the timeframe of this document.

    Comment


    • #3
      2003 CONOPS Chapter 3:
      REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES



      3.0 REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES

      This chapter addresses the required capabilities and employment objectives of naval fires within the context of the naval surface combatant.


      3.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRES

      Fires is defined as the effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Fire support is fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Joint fire support consists of joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters.1

      Joint doctrine defines strike as an attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.2 Broadly characterized, this definition encompasses all offensive actions that can be taken by air, naval, or ground forces to produce an effect (damage) on a defined objective. The naval services have refined this definition to narrow its scope in an attempt to differentiate between strike operations and fire support.

      Footnote 1: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

      Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


      3.1.1 Subsystems of Fires

      Fires is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, command and control, and attack resources.3

      -- Target Acquisition (TA). The goal of the target acquisition system is to provide timely and accurate information to enhance the attack of specified targets. Target acquisition systems and equipment perform the key tasks of target detection, location, tracking, identification, classification, and battle damage assessment. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.

      -- Command and Control (C2). Employing command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems with unity of effort is key to effective coordination of fires, and includes the vertical and horizontal coordination accomplished by fire support coordinators, agencies and liaison elements. Successful C2 of fires integrates planning and coordination, technical and tactical fire direction procedures, and air operations to achieve the supported commander’s desired effects. C2 is further discussed in Chapter 4.

      -- Attack Resources. Attack resources include air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and subsurface- to-surface delivery assets. Fires also includes nonlethal and disruptive operations, such as psychological operations and electronic warfare. Detailed airspace and ground coordination is required regardless of the attack system employed. Coordination is further discussed in Chapter 6.

      Footnote 3: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.


      3.1.2 Naval Surface Fires

      Naval surface fires must be fully integrated with the fires of all services to provide a full spectrum capability designed to unbalance and rapidly defeat an increasingly sophisticated, dangerous, and more complicated adversary. Often as the first on-scene force, surface combatants are capable of providing initial joint command and control of fires. When additional forces can be brought to bear, surface combatants will provide naval fires as part of a combined arms operations in joint campaigns.

      Naval surface strike (NSS) has been defined in Chapter 1 as the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants.

      These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting hostile operations against U.S. or Allied forces. These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, war-making capacity, will to make war and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS, usually conducted independent of ground maneuver forces, can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fires or joint fires. Naval surface fire support (NSFS), also defined in Chapter 1, encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces. Surface combatants tasked with providing NSFS must remain cognizant of the four basic tasks that are the focus of fire support plans: support to forces in contact, support the concept of operations, synchronize fire support, and sustain fire support operations. NSFS can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fire support or joint fire support.

      Achieving rapid and decisive effects against our adversary will require a shift from our current sequential approach4 to warfare. Future naval fires will support opportunities for simultaneous operations. The Navy will conduct strategic, operational and tactical fires throughout the littoral area that can be integrated with the direct insertion of highly mobile ground forces. Providing fires in support of simultaneous operations will require a fires system capable of providing the rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespace. Achieving rapid, integrated fires requires a fully netted digital fires network capable of combining sensors, command and control, and fires.

      Footnote 4: This sequential approach begins with strikes against air defenses and military and industrial infrastructure sites and transitions to support of ground forces only after significant degradation to the adversary’s capabilities.

      Effective naval fires also require advances in existing support capabilities. These include at sea replenishment, joint and coalition interoperability, data transfer, organizational adaptability, and training.5

      Footnote 5: Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.


      3.1.3 Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)

      Time sensitive targeting (TST) is a recently defined targeting and engagement process that is primarily being performed by air assets. Surface combatants with their improved land attack capabilities will also be able to conduct time sensitive engagements. TST has its foundation in Joint Vision 2010, from which the idea of precision engagement flows.

      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      TEXT BOX: Definitions of Time Sensitive and Time Critical Targets (6)

      Time sensitive targets (TST) are defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly force or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.” Key factors include value, mobility, and time sensitivity. Although not currently approved by joint doctrine, many joint commands use the term “time critical target (TCT)” as a sub-category of TST. These TCTs are deemed to pose such a threat to friendly forces that they are afforded distinctive ROE by the joint force commander (JFC). The JFC determines those situations, if any, where immediate engagement of the TCT threat outweighs other operational considerations. Joint TCTs are normally based upon adversary capabilities. In other words, a joint TCT is a target of great immediacy that possesses such a significant threat to the joint force that it is specifically designated by the JFC for immediate engagement in order to prevent damage to friendly forces.

      Footnote 6: Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, Appendix F, dated 22 March 2002.

      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

      The current goal is to identify and effectively attack a target within 30 minutes (table 3-1). To achieve this goal requires an array of dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that have been organized in accordance with an intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The rules of engagement must facilitate rapid decision making by the commander or his battlestaff. The command and control systems must be technically capable of quickly disseminating targeting information to the engagement system. Time sensitive targets are further discussed in Chapter 7. 5 Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.





      3.2 NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT


      3.2.1 Marine Corps Required Capabilities

      The Marine Corps has formally stated its requirements for naval surface fire support in the document titled, Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.7 This section summarizes those requirements.

      Footnote 7: Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter 3900 C428, dated 19 March 2002.


      3.2.1.1 Sea-Based Fires as a Component of Combined Arms

      Naval surface fire support augments the organic fires of the maneuver force with complementary, all weather fires that support the deep, close, and rear battle. The sea-based fire support system should include an all weather target acquisition capability that can produce target data for first round fire for effect. Further, a robust NSFS capability, to include counterfire detection/ engagement, is critical to support expeditionary operations during all stages of ship-to-objective maneuver.

      Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. It pairs firepower with mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy. Marine Corps fire support doctrine is based upon this philosophy, whereby target destruction is frequently not the primary benefit of indirect fires.

      Combined arms does not focus on specific percentages normally associated with damage criteria (e.g., 30% damage for destruction) but must concentrate on what fires can do to the enemy to shape the battlespace, set conditions for decisive action, and support maneuver. Fires can be used to create both some degree of hazard and the perception that the hazard is severe enough to merit deviation from a desired course of action. For example, if the enemy assumes a posture with the intent to protect himself from incoming fires he may sustain no physical damage but his cost of survival is the inability to perform his assigned mission.

      -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      INSET BOX: Illustrative Scenario:

      In the following illustrative scenario, a friendly mechanized infantry unit encounters an enemy mechanized infantry unit arrayed in a defensive position that is tied in with the terrain. The defensive position lies between the friendly unit and its assigned objective, and bypassing the position is impossible. The unit commander decides to attack through the left flank and into the enemy’s rear in an attempt to turn the position and pry the enemy out of his prepared defenses. Assuming an average rate of movement of 15 kilometers per hour, the attack will take a total of approximately 36 minutes. This rate of movement assumes that no counter-mobility obstacles will need to be breached, and that enemy indirect fire assets have been sufficiently suppressed to prevent any significant impact by these systems on the friendly force.



      Fires have been planned to accomplish the following:

      -- Suppress Target 1 to facilitate its attack by direct-fire ground systems and rotary-wing close air support (RW CAS).

      -- Suppress and obscure Target 2 to prevent enemy force located there from effectively engaging friendly maneuver force with direct-fire weapon systems, and to facilitate its follow-on attack by friendly ground forces and RW CAS.

      -- Suppress, neutralize or destroy enemy at Target 3 to prevent it from maneuvering against the flank of the attacking friendly force, and to prevent it from counter-attacking (Target 4) as the friendly force continues to maneuver to its objective.

      -- Disrupt an enemy counter-attack from beyond the intermediate objective in the vicinity of Target 4 (on-call fire missions).
      ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


      Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on target. The psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. Marines applying the tenets of maneuver warfare will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary. Volume and precision fires are equally important in achieving the desired effects on an enemy.


      3.2.1.2 Operational Phases

      The following provides a breakdown of the phases of an expeditionary operation to facilitate placing NSFS requirements into context.

      -- Shaping the Battlespace. The emphasis in this phase will be on destruction, harassment, interdiction, and neutralization fires to degrade enemy capabilities within the battlespace. Naval fires are required for advance force and supporting operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. They will be used primarily for providing deep fires against critical fixed and relocatable targets.

      -- Forcible Entry. In this phase, emphasis shifts from shaping operations to supporting the force as it maneuvers to objectives ashore. This is the most demanding phase for NSFS. Deep fires provided by naval aviation and NSFS continue to shape the battlespace while simultaneously providing close supporting fires and counterfire to forces ashore. Of primary importance will be the close supporting fires (destruction, neutralization, and suppression) in direct support of the maneuver force. During ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), fire support must provide immediate and responsive high volume fires in support of highly mobile forces as they maneuver throughout the non-linear battlespace.

      -- Sustained/Subsequent Operations Ashore. If the expected duration of the operation ashore warrants a general unloading of the landing force, organic ground-based fire support systems will provide the bulk of highly responsive, close supporting fires. NSFS will continue to provide deep and close supporting fires, augmenting organic ground-based systems.


      3.2.1.3 Command and Control

      Command and control (C2) for expeditionary fire support demands a system compatible with on-scene or arriving forces. Throughout the entire planning and execution process, all components of the expeditionary fire support system must be interoperable and collaborative.

      Given the joint nature of future operations, a reexamination of traditional command relationships is required to make these relationships more responsive and flexible. Central to an effective naval fire support system is that the commander responsible for the mission or for a phase of an operation, has the ability to plan, allocate, control, and coordinate fires from all available systems.

      Commanders exercise authority within the four dimensional limits of boundaries established by a higher headquarters. The commander has complete targeting and organic weapons release authority and is responsible for the effects of all fires delivered into or within these boundaries. Once these boundaries have been established, the command and control of fires is a function of the fire support coordinator within whose boundaries the effects of the fires will be realized.

      This includes coordination with adjacent units whose battlespace is affected by the flight path or terminal effects of the weapons system/munition. NSFS controlling units support the airspace deconfliction process by providing weapons information, e.g., launch point and trajectory to the fire support coordination agency. This means that any adverse effects of NSFS delivered on a requested target are the responsibility of the requesting agency, not the commander of the ship who provided the fires.


      3.2.1.4 Response Times

      Ground forces require assistance in locating hostile fire support platforms in both the initial phases of amphibious operations and during subsequent operations ashore. A flexible and robust counterfire detection and location capability from the sea is a required component of the fire support system. The system should be responsive enough to achieve the first round away within 2.5 minutes of acquiring the counterfire target. The system must be fully interoperable and integrated with joint, automated, fire support C2 systems. Target acquisition will be accomplished from a combination of sensors netted together to provide the required area coverage.

      The required system response times for all NSFS systems are drawn from the call for fire mission processing times specified for Marine Corps field artillery. Considering all mission types and all artillery munitions, the Marine Corps threshold requirement for NSFS execution responsiveness is 2.5 minutes. The objective requirement is to reduce response time to the limits of technology. The following diagram provides a breakdown of the fire support process with regard to responsiveness.

      At extended ranges, time of flight can add minutes to the overall mission response time. A total mission time (call for fire to rounds on target) greater than 10 minutes significantly increases the probability of missing a relocatable target. Minimizing time of flight, as well as the total mission processing time is of vital importance when providing close supporting fires to maneuver forces in contact with the enemy.




      3.2.1.5 Sustainability

      Maneuver forces require all-weather, reliable, sustained fire support. Per the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document signed by Rear Admiral Mullen on 11 September 2000, “Replenishment at sea is sustainment.” The current technical difficulties of reloading vertical launch system (VLS) cells at sea require an increased reliance on shore based infrastructure.

      The availability of friendly ports for reloading VLS cells cannot be counted upon in a highly uncertain future. The limitations of a shrinking surface fleet and the numerous taskings given to multi-mission capable ships will require that those ships assigned to NSFS roles possess greater staying power to continue support of forces ashore. The rapid conduct of ammunition resupply is an essential enabler to maintain continuous fire support. Sustainability is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

      Footnote 8: NWP 3-09.1, Navy Strike and Fire Support (Draft), dated 6 February 2002.



      3.3 NAVAL SURFACE STRIKE (NSS)

      Naval surface strike is a subset of strike warfare, which also includes air strike, special operations, and subsurface strike. NSS missions are designed to attack targets that comprise an adversary’s capacity to wage war, and to interdict enemy reinforcements and isolate these reinforcements from the battlefield.8 Currently, the Tomahawk missile is the only long-range weapon available to the surface combatant to perform NSS. Future weapons (such as the advanced gun system) and munitions (such as extended range guided munition, long range land attack projectile, and advanced land attack missile) will dramatically expand the choice of weapons available to perform NSS.

      The basic requirements of NSS are as follows: 9

      -- Provide a conventional capability against tactical, operational, and strategic targets during crisis response, regional conflicts, or a major theater war.

      -- Respond to a broad range of desired terminal effects to include destruction, neutralization, interdiction, and suppression.

      -- Destroy or neutralize enemy targets through the use of coordinated, precision strike weapons.

      -- Deliver timely effects on target regardless of environmental conditions or time of day.

      -- Engage time critical targets.

      Footnote 9: Derived from the Surface Combatant Family of ShipsDD(X) CRD (Draft) (U).



      3.4 MANPOWER, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING

      We can no longer afford to generate requirements or design systems without considering the impact on operator and decision maker performance and on the ability of battle groups and amphibious ready groups to train and operate in a joint battlefield environment. Today, responsibility for land attack warfare systems design and acquisition is spread across several program executive offices and program management offices in Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The signatories of the memorandum of agreement establishing the Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization understand that while each land attack program is managed in response to individual requirements funding, unless coordinated, there is potential to produce systems which will not meet the tests of joint and fleet interoperability, compatibility, and supportability.

      Developed in isolation, any or all of these land attack warfare systems will likely result in inefficient use of scarce resources and incur higher life cycle costs.

      We must not design and field individual systems without considering from day one the impact they will have on our ability to train for and execute the full spectrum of land attack operations, from an individual sailor’s ability to operate and/or maintain specific pieces of equipment to the conduct of joint operations. In short, we must fundamentally change our cultural perspective on manpower, personnel, and training through consistent application of the principles of human systems integration (HSI) to achieve optimal manning and better mission training. Our ability to effectively and successfully employ a land attack warfare system will directly reflect our commitment to these principles and processes across all land attack warfare programs.

      Navy ships and attendant combat systems are complex and present enormous HSI challenges. As a matter of routine, ships prepare for and operate in all weather and climates conducting multiple and simultaneous operations quite possibly in a multi-warfare environment with systems manned and operated by crews determined by diverse personnel and manning plans.

      Performance demands, including those placed on these sailors by the design of complex combat systems, are unique in the breadth of their scope and the depth of their complexity. Navy ship systems employed in the fleet today, and those being designed for future operations, make intense demands on the readiness, performance effectiveness, and mental and physical capabilities of the personnel who man them. Specifically, many of these systems are extremely demanding on the senses. They will demand that the operators develop improved motor and cognitive skills, as well as better decision making and situational awareness. Add the highly varied nature of the threat, the need to conduct multi-warfare scenarios, and the need to integrate, coordinate, and interpret information from multiple sources. Without adequate design and support, mission risk increases and responsiveness decreases due to high workload and mission demands.

      Department of Defense and Department of the Navy acquisition directives mandate that HIS initiatives be pursued to optimize total system performance and minimize total ownership costs by ensuring systems are built and employed to accommodate human performance characteristics.

      Accordingly, it is imperative that in development of a land attack warfare concept of operations and, in particular tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for land attack warfare systems, human performance be given top priority. Land attack warfare systems CONOPS and TTP requirements must be developed in close collaboration with all individual land attack warfare programs to identify commonalities, merge requirements, and avoid duplication. Particular attention should be given to the identification of operator tasks in order to reduce workload, facilitate situational awareness, and enhance decision making.

      Systems should be designed to facilitate and support supervisory control – that is user supervision of “smarter” automated systems. Workload should be reduced or eliminated, particularly with regard to data input and manipulations done between non-congruent land-attack system components. A “system of systems” in land attack warfare is needed which produces quality and concise task products which personnel can approve or edit quickly. This result will facilitate mission execution speed and accuracy, with consistency across land attack warfare platforms. The design and production of such systems begins with thorough task and procedural analysis, and uses human factors engineering to apply quality design solutions that are tested in an iterative manner with fleet personnel.

      Required operator functions/tasks must be adaptable to various training configurations inport and underway, single and multi-ship, and scalable to distance learning. These functions/tasks must ultimately be integrated into training systems that will provide operators with (1) a synthetic training environment, (2) a merged environment of live data augmented by synthetic information, and (3) segregated live and synthetic training capability to support individual and team training.

      The Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Training Requirements Document (TRD), was approved 26 January 2001 by the Land Attack Capstone Flag Level Steering Committee. It states the requirements of mission area training and provides specific guidelines to program managers for the integrated development of land attack warfare mission area training capability. The Draft Revision 1 to the TRD contains a separate chapter on HSI requirements. Brief descriptions of HSI methodologies/tools are also provided. The TRD provides the foundation for ensuring that future surface navy sailors are appropriately selected and trained to accomplish land attack warfare.

      Comment


      • #4
        2003 CONOPS, Chapter 4: COMMAND AND CONTROL



        4.0 COMMAND AND CONTROL

        This chapter provides an overview of the command and control issues associated with conducting surface combatant land attack missions. It also presents examples of the flow of command and control information in each of the five surface combatant roles.


        4.1 INTRODUCTION

        This chapter sets forth general and specific guidance regarding command and control (C2) functions as they apply to surface combatants conducting naval fires operations. It begins with a summary of several factors and considerations affecting C2, and then provides an overview of the joint and naval organization and structure within which surface combatants operate. It covers the various types of command relationships with emphasis on the supporting and supported relationships that could be most common and relevant for surface combatant commanding officers. The command relationships discussion is followed by a summary table of the inherent responsibilities of a surface combatant in each of the five surface combatant naval fires roles. The final section of the chapter presents specific illustrative examples, to include detailed diagrams, of how a fire mission would be processed in each of the five roles. These examples were developed during the workshop referred to in Chapter 1.1

        Footnote 1: The October 2001 workshop examined four specific tactical situations, each highlighting one or more surface combatant roles. The primary goal was to trace the flow of command information required to deliver fires in each specific situation to develop generalized conclusions regarding command and control of fires. A secondary goal was to develop operational sequence diagrams (OSD) that depict the agencies involved in conducting fire missions and to highlight the actions that would be performed. Section 4.5 provides a detailed discussion of the four OSDs.


        4.2 FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS

        The organization, structure, and command relationships are normally established by a common superior commander or establishing authority based on mission, nature, and expected duration of the operation, forces available, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. The increased capabilities of naval surface fire support (NSFS) and naval surface strike (NSS) weapons, the demands for shorter response times, and the added complexity of future command and control systems suggest a re-evaluation of the organization, structure, and command relationships and the many factors and considerations involved. A notional C2 structure for the future is presented in section 4.3.

        4.2.1 Definition

        Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.2

        Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

        Command and control responsibilities extend beyond direct control of forces and weapons to include the coordination of various weapons throughout the battlespace. This control and coordination not only creates the desired effects on the enemy through the decisive and combined use of firepower, but also avoids physical conflict between weapons or delivery systems, and prevents friendly casualties. Coordination is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

        4.2.2 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

        Rules of engagement (ROE) are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE implement the inherent right of self-defense, define use of force for mission accomplishment, and apply throughout the spectrum of conflict. New systems will enable fast, efficient command and control to be exercised from any level, tactical through strategic. Commanders may have access to a much broader array of weapons. Consequently, the ability to rapidly amend ROEs, to include guidance on weapons release authority, will become increasingly important.

        4.2.3 Establishing Directive

        A superior commander establishes support relationships between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. A support relationship is often appropriate for amphibious operations or on other occasions when surface combatants are supporting ground forces.3 An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should identify responsibilities for strike planning and execution, and fire support planning and coordination among commanders involved in the support relationship (e.g., an amphibious operation). The role of a surface combatant may change throughout the course of the operation, as it moves from first on scene to part of a larger force, shifting between strike and fire support missions. The establishing directive must support these changing roles by articulating clear, responsive command relationships, NSFS/NSS priorities, and procedures for conflict resolution.

        Footnote 3: See Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, for a detailed discussion of command relationships in amphibious operations.

        4.2.4 Task Organization

        Task organization establishes the supporting and supported relationships essential to creating unity of command, synchronizing operations, preventing fratricide, and maximizing the effects of fires. The organization of forces, especially in a joint environment, directly affects command and control, responsiveness, and versatility during land attack operations. Forces are organized based on mission, commander’s vision, and overall concept of operations. Other factors include forces available, unity of effort, and provision for centralized planning and decentralized execution.

        Centralization of key functions should not restrict the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Sophisticated command and control networks and the increased range and accuracy of weapons provide commanders access to a broad array of forces and weapons systems from outside the operations area. This ready access blurs the distinct lines that once separated forces assigned to surface strike from those assigned to fire support. For example, a surface combatant may be tasked to execute a strike mission while performing a fire support mission. The command and control systems, both internal and external to the ship, should be able to accommodate this situation.



        4.3 ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

        Surface combatants are elements of the joint and Navy operational command organizations (figure 4-1). The unified theater combatant commander designates joint force or joint task force commanders (JFC/JTFC) to conduct sustained operations or campaigns. Offensive naval forces organized into carrier strike groups (CSGs), surface and submarine strike groups, and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) will be assigned to a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).



        Surface combatants will operate as elements of all of the above naval groups. For either surface strike or fire support missions, surface combatants will be tasked to coordinate with and/or respond to naval and joint force fires agencies.

        4.3.1 Notional External Command and Control Organization

        Figure 4-2 depicts the notional command and control structure for surface combatants in the execution of NSS or NSFS missions. The JFMCC has operational control of one or more naval elements [CSG, surface action group (SAG), or ESG] that include individual surface combatants.



        Naval fires coordination agencies, such as the supporting arms coordination center (SACC), force fires coordination center (FFCC), fire support coordination center (FSCC), Tomahawk strike coordinator (TSC), Tomahawk launch area coordinator (LAC), and others exist within the framework of the Navy’s traditional command and control structure. The command elements have operational control over the surface combatants, but the fires from the surface combatants, both NSS and NSFS, are controlled through the naval fires coordination agencies. Strike agencies, the TSC and the LAC, coordinate with fire support agencies, SACC, FFCC/FSCC, etc., to prevent conflict and to enhance the mission effectiveness.

        The naval fires coordinator (NFC)4 as proposed in this document would have overall responsibility for coordinating both NSFS and NSS missions.

        Footnote 4: NFC is more fully defined in Chapter 6.

        4.3.2 Internal Shipboard Organization

        On Aegis equipped surface combatants there is currently no requirement to integrate the existing Aegis weapon system and the new naval fires capabilities.5 Additionally, although the same operator working at the same console will conduct strike and naval gunfire support functions, these functions will be performed independently.

        The notional naval fires command and control structure presented in figure 4-2 may require adjusting the duties and responsibilities that currently exist within the combat information center (CIC) in order to support evolving NSS and NSFS capabilities. To optimize transparency of fires, the future combat system functions must be integrated, interoperable, and collaborative, facilitating control and awareness of all shipboard fires functions by systems operators, supervisors, and battle watch staff. The ship’s commanding officer must be able to maintain situational awareness over the multi-warfare tactical picture, resolve resource conflicts, manage weapons and fire control, and ensure compliance with commander’s guidance and ROE.

        Footnote 5: Desirability of integrating [AEGIS and naval fires] is recognized by OPNAV, but has not been funded due to fiscal constraints.



        4.4 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

        The naval component commander exercises operational control through the numbered fleet commanders or other subordinate task forces. These forces are task organized as battle forces, task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements composed of individual units necessary to accomplish specific operational missions. The officer in command of any of the task organizations is designated as the officer in tactical command (OTC) and has primary responsibility for executing that may create as many task groupings as necessary, assigning OTC responsibilities as deemed appropriate. The naval component commander retains critical theater level perspective on naval operations. To facilitate execution and establish combat responsibilities the Navy uses a C2 arrangement referred to as the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept integrating ships, submarines, aircraft, and land based forces.

        The Navy employs the CWC concept as the doctrinal cornerstone of its task force operational and tactical C2 system. The CWC concept enables the OTC of a naval force to conduct combat operations in functional areas against air, surface, subsurface, and land threats while contributing to the overall campaign of the JFC. The CWC uses OPGENs6 to set actual at-sea arrangements for operational control, tactical control, supported, and/or supporting relationships.

        Footnote 6: Stands for operational general matters and is a message format within the maritime tactical messages system, a standardization of Navy general operating instructions, NWP 5.

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        INSET BOX:

        Overview of Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) Doctrine and Organization (NWP-3-56 (Rev. A), Chapter 2) CWC Doctrine

        The CWC doctrine embodies a basic organizational structure that is responsive to the demands of modern Naval warfare and provides a body of operational principles with associated supporting procedures. Use of this doctrine enables the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to wage offensive and defensive combat operations aggressively against air, surface, undersea, and land-based threats while carrying out the primary mission of the force. The OTC may implement CWC procedures whenever and to whatever extent required depending upon the composition and mission of the force and the nature and severity of the threat. Flexibility of implementation, reinforced by clear guidance to subordinates, is the key element of this doctrine.

        The CWC doctrine offers a methodology for effective decentralized C2 by recognizing that the magnitude of some threat scenarios requires dividing up the C2 work among several commanders to achieve effective spans of control.

        The CWC doctrine also recognizes that timing or communication limitations may not allow commanders and units to seek and obtain clearance from their seniors before responding to certain threats. A negative aspect of decentralized C2, however, is the risk of improper execution of policies and misinterpretation of guidance from higher authority.

        CWC Command Organization

        The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission of the forces assigned. He may delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all warfare areas to designated subordinate warfare commanders. The OTC is normally the CWC. However, the CWC concept allows an OTC to delegate tactical command (TACOM) to the CWC. The CWC would exercise TACOM of the Principal Warfare Commanders who include Air Defense Commander (ADC), Antisubmarine Commander (ASWC), Information Warfare Commander (IWC), Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) and Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC). The CWC is also over the Functional Warfare Commanders such as the Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC) and Screen Commander (SC) as well as asset and resource Coordinators such as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), Launch Area Coordinator and TLAM Strike Coordinator (TSC). The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting and disseminating information and, in certain situations, are delegated the authority to respond to threats with assigned assets. The CWC command structure is highly flexible with the OTC assigning forces and authority based on the specific requirements of the situation.
        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        4.4.1 Operational Control (OPCON)

        OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing forces assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.7 OPCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon below the level of combatant commander, however, it would be more frequently exercised at echelons higher than the individual surface combatant.

        Footnote 7: JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), dated 10 July 2001, pp. III-7, 8.

        4.4.2 Tactical Control (TACON)

        TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.8 TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of the theater commander. TACON is the most likely command relationship for the surface combatant NSFS controlling unit or the NSS multi-unit commander role.

        Footnote 8: Ibid, p. III-8.

        4.4.3 Support 9

        Support is a command authority appropriate when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command relationship is especially relevant to amphibious operations. For example, the establishing authority in an amphibious operation defines a support relationship between commanders within the amphibious force as well as other designated commanders as appropriate. The support relationships are intentionally flexible. The establishing authority will specify the purpose of the support, the desired effect, and the scope of action to be taken.

        Footnote 9: Ibid, pp. III-9, 10.

        4.4.3.1 Supported Commander

        The supported commander has the authority to exercise the general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, the timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported commander may be designated for the entire operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, functions, or events. If the operation is relatively short, the establishing authority may select one supported commander for the entire operation.

        4.4.3.2 Supporting Commander

        The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications that will be used to provide the support. He will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on the employment and limitations of support, assist with planning, and ensure the supporting units are fully aware of the supported commander’s needs and intent.

        4.4.3.3 Supporting and Supported Relationships in Joint Environments

        The land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within their areas of operations (AOs) designated by the JFC. Within these AOs, the supported commanders have the authority to designate target priorities, munitions effects, and the timing of weapons delivery to best synchronize maneuver and fires. The JFC also has the authority to establish priorities that will be executed throughout the theater or joint operations area (JOA), including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs. Commanders designated by the JFC have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs, but they must be coordinated with the land and naval force commanders.

        4.4.4 Transfer of Command and Control

        Surface combatants must be able to smoothly transition from one role10 to another. In response to a developing crisis, first on the scene surface combatants can operate independently until follow-on forces can be dispatched to the operating area. Operating in the NSS single unit role, the ship must be able to provide for the ship’s self defense and employ its land attack capability. If the conflict widens and additional surface combatants arrive on scene, the senior commanding officer may be assigned as the NSS multi-unit commander to commence attacks against the enemy.

        During amphibious operations, a surface combatant normally begins in a NSFS supporting unit role and receives orders to fire from the SACC. As the operation progresses, the surface combatant may assume the NSFS controlling unit role if the SACC transfers authority for tactical fire direction over other surface combatants.

        The surface combatant must be interoperable with joint forces when they arrive on scene. Upon arrival of a more senior commander, the combatant will transfer command and control functions as directed. Joint interoperability and connectivity of command and control systems must be achieved for surface combatants to operate effectively in the land attack roles.

        Footnote 10: See Chapter 1 for definitions of the five roles.

        4.4.5 Liaison Elements for Land Attack

        With the evolution of the surface combatant’s land attack mission area, NSFS and NSS missions will be conducted in support of operations that have not historically included fires from surface combatants as key elements of the associated fire plans. Therefore, the need for effective liaison between the supported and supporting forces becomes more important as the capability of naval fires increases.

        For NSFS, the traditional Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, procedures, and organization for naval gunfire support provide for liaison between surface combatants and the supported units. Key to effective liaison is the staffing of doctrinal billets 11 and the training of surface warfare officers in land attack warfare.

        The current liaison structure and training for naval gunfire support may not be sufficient to respond to the expanded capabilities of both NSFS and NSS. New land attack weapons systems (e.g., ERGM and TACTOM) have flight profiles significantly different than traditional naval gunfire and require more extensive coordination than has been performed in the past by the naval gunfire liaison officer. This coordination could be effected through the establishment of a new coordination detachment within the JFACC.

        This document recommends the establishment of a naval coordination detachment (NCD)12 as identified above and described in Appendix C. The NCD would provide on-site representation within the JFACC regarding surface combatant land attack matters.

        Footnote 11: Naval gunfire officers and naval gunfire liaison officers. (Note: these titles should be changed to reflect the broader function of naval surface fires; e.g., NSF officer and NSFLnO.)

        Footnote 12 The NCD expands on the responsibility of the naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE) as described in draft NWP 3-09.1 and could be included within or replace the NALE.

        The presence of Army and coalition forces involved in land attack warfare presents additional challenges. The elimination of the air and naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICOs) from the active Marine Corps force structure reduced the liaison support capability naval forces can provide to the U.S. Army and coalition forces.13 Recognizing the value that ANGLICO added to the joint force, the Marine Corps has decided to re-activate ANGLICO in both I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). These active component liaison companies will become operational in 2003.

        The range and precision of new land attack weapons makes them also relevant to Army operations. The Army may find it necessary to develop a liaison structure that will enhance its ability to operate with supporting surface combatants. For example, the Army could embark a liaison team onboard a surface combatant in a controlling unit role, with the necessary equipment to support an Army operation.

        Special operations forces (SOF) interoperability with supporting surface combatants may require a SOF liaison detachment14 on the ship. The two main functions of the SOF detachment would be: (1) to provide or advise on communications with supported SOF units, and (2) to advise the ship’s commanding officer regarding any special considerations for the employment of land attack weapons in support of SOF units.

        Footnote 13: Two ANGLICOs were maintained in the Marine Corps Reserve.

        Footnote 14: The SOF liaison detachment could consist of a single liaison officer with appropriate communications. requires the surface combatant to perform specific functions and assume certain responsibilities.

        4.4.6 Inherent Responsibilities for Surface Combatants

        Surface combatants operate in one of the five roles described in detail in Chapter 1. Each role Shipboard command and control responsibilities must be clearly defined. The surface combatant and the agency or unit being supported must have the same understanding of those functions and responsibilities. To prevent confusion, minimize excessive voice communications, and increase mission responsiveness, a set of common practices or inherent responsibilities specifies a surface combatant’s functions and relationships with higher headquarters and supported units. These responsibilities will vary, depending on the surface combatant’s role.

        Table 4-1 is based on an artillery model15 and summarizes the inherent responsibilities for surface combatants in a matrix format. It addresses several issues unique to surface combatants that:
        -- operate in firing areas vice a specific geographic location,
        -- have multi-warfare ship self-defense responsibilities,
        -- have multi-warfare sensor capabilities,
        -- are responsible to the battlegroup commander for other mission areas, and
        -- have different command relationships.



        The inherent responsibilities define standard tactical support responsibilities for each role to facilitate task organization, improve communications, and reduce the need for detailed coordination. The matrix defines these responsibilities regarding priority of fires, zones or areas of responsibility, targeting sources, communications, fire planning, and sensor allocation.

        Footnote 15: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Appendix B, Fire Support Missions, dated 12 May 1998.


        The following situation illustrates the importance of standard inherent responsibilities: Several surface combatants are assigned the Supporting Unit role to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

        Based on table 4-1 the ships would:

        1. Answer fires tasking in priority from the MEB (supported unit) and also answer any tasking from higher HQ.

        2. Have its zone of fire determined by the MEB.

        3. Receive targeting from the supported unit (FFCC/SACC (ashore/afloat)). Targeting may also be provided directly by forward observers assigned to MEB maneuver units.

        4. Establish communications with the supported unit (FFCC/SACC) or as assigned.

        5. Have fires planned by MEB (FFCC/SACC). This means pre-planned fires will be provided to the ships for scheduling and execution as directed by the supported unit. For example, the FFCC/SACC sends informationto the ships that includes target data, weapons/munitions data, and timing data for schedules of fire. The ships would process and prepare the schedule of execution on the pre-arranged timeline.

        6. Allocate assigned sensor resources in response to MEB targeting priorities.



        4.5 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) WITHIN THE ROLES

        The section sets forth a specific situation for each of the five roles (note: section 4.5.4 includes two roles) and uses narrative and associated operational sequence diagrams (foldout figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10) to describe how a fire support or strike mission could be prosecuted in that situation. Symbols used in figures 4-3 through 4-10 are taken from FM 101-51/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Term and Graphics which is in compliance with MILSTD-2525A.


        4.5.1. Naval Surface Fire Support Supporting Unit Role:
        Amphibious Operation, Call for Fire

        4.5.1.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-3)

        An amphibious task force (ATF) has been deployed to Country ORANGE to conduct an amphibious assault. The mission of the ATF is to prevent enemy occupation of the vital port and industrial complex in Country ORANGE to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces in theater. A lead battalion of an enemy motorized rifle regiment is located 16 km east of RED Beach. Enemy forces are consolidating their positions and displacing logistics forward. Indications are that the enemy will move to occupy the port and industrial complex (10 km west of RED Beach) within the next several days.



        Battalion landing team, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2 / 1) is an assault battalion of the landing force. Its mission is to attack across RED Beach 1 at 0600, D-Day, to seize Division Objective 1 and establish a blocking position to prevent the movement of enemy forces along Route 15, into the port and industrial complex. The BLT 2 / 1 commander’s intent is to conduct a surface assault across RED Beach 1 with two companies abreast, avoid decisive engagement on or near the beach, and move swiftly inland to seize the high ground, in zone, which dominates Route 15.

        At 0530, thirty minutes before H-Hour, a reconnaissance team on Hill 300 observes an estimated platoon sized enemy mechanized unit (with two ZSU-23 / 2 twin towed AA systems) in the vicinity of Hill 84 on the left flank of BLT 2 / 1’s axis of advance. Informed of this development, the BLT 2 / 1 commander decides not to alter his scheme of maneuver, but to try to neutralize the enemy unit by fire and bypass. If that fails, he would have his left flank company (Echo Company) block the enemy advance while his right flank company (Fox Company), and reserve company (Golf Company) move swiftly to seize the objective.

        The BLT 2 / 1 commander notifies the Echo Company commander of the threat. He reminds the Echo Company commander that attack helicopters are on station and available to attack the enemy mechanized forces, but that the ZSU-23s need to be suppressed before the helos go in.

        The Echo Company commander immediately briefs his platoon commanders, his forward air controller, and his NSFS Spot Team of the situation. He directs the NSFS Spot Team, which is equipped with a target location designation and handoff system (TLDHS), to strive for first round accuracy in the suppression mission not only to prevent effective employment of the weapons, but also to hinder their displacement to new firing positions before the attack helicopters can complete their attack on the enemy mechanized forces.

        4.5.1.2 Assumptions

        -- The amphibious force is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade / Amphibious Ready Group (MEB / ARG).
        -- Command is afloat and the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is the supported commander.
        -- An amphibious objective area (AOA) has been established and is bounded by a ceiling altitude as delineated by the air control plan.
        -- The tactical air control center (TACC), which is automated and co-located with the SACC, exercises airspace control within the AOA.
        -- The airspace control authority (ACA) is the JFACC for the overall joint operations area.
        -- The SACC has been equipped with an automated fire support and mission planning system, the core of which is the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS).
        -- The primary mission of the surface combatants is fire support.

        4.5.1.3 Sequence of OSD Events

        (See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-7, at the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

        T0

        The NSFS Spot Team with Echo Company, equipped with a TLDHS, accurately locates and designates the target and generates a fire request (FR). The data communication path is via SINCGARS radio, which interfaces with the DACT component of the TLDHS, via relay to the automated fire support system terminal located in the SACC. The FR data is also provided, via internal LAN, to the AFATDS also located in the SACC. The AFATDS updates the databases of all AFATDS ashore once they are able to receive data transmissions.

        T1

        The AFATDS in the SACC processes the FR by performing the following functions: target processing, target filtering, attack analysis, and mission execution. A summary of the functions of the automated fire support system in the SACC is described below:

        During target processing, the FR is received and a verification of sufficient target data is performed. If required data is missing from the FR, the AFATDS operator may manually insert the missing data fields. A target number is assigned and the FR is compared against target selection standards established as part of commander’s guidance.

        During target filtering,16 the target data is contrasted against the existing target list to check for duplication. A no-later-than (NLT) time for attack is determined and the target is contrasted against pre-determined mission priorities.

        As part of the attack analysis, the AFATDS determines which of the several fire support ships17 is best able to deliver the desired effects on the target and the applicable fire support coordination requirements. If the fire mission violates a FSCM or airspace coordination measure, then the SACC transmits a data coordination message via the AFATDS to the agency that has established the measure. (For mission execution, see T2)

        Footnote 16: Although not applicable for this operational scenario, a moving target intercept point for attacking mobile targets, and a build-up area check would be accomplished as part of target filtering.

        Footnote 17: The T+N on each NSFS ship is responsible for reporting to the supported unit when they are on station and ready to receive fire missions, as well as their weapon status and ammunition inventory. The T+N must continuously update the supported unit with the NSFS ship’s location, and any change to the weapon status (e.g., local airspace fouled, gun mount casualty, etc.). The T+N must also report ammunition expenditure upon completion of every fire mission and upon request from the supported or higher unit.

        T2

        The mission is directed to the appropriate ship (firing unit) to execute the fire mission, based upon results of the processing and filtering of the target and the attack analysis. In this scenario, the AFATDS selects NSFS to provide suppression fires to allow attack helos to engage the mechanized force. The AFATDS in the SACC sends a data order to fire (OTF) to the TTWCS and NFCS (T+N)18 configuration aboard the firing unit.

        T3

        A data message to observer (MTO) is sent from the AFATDS in the SACC to the TLDHS with the NSFS Spot Team providing status of the FR.

        T4

        The T+N aboard the firing ship receives the OTF, via the automated digital network system (ADNS), from the SACC. A T+N operator conducts target processing functions to ensure availability of appropriate ordnance and to facilitate local area coordination. The NLT time for ordnance on target is verified. The T+N forwards the target to the Mk 160 gun computer system to conduct a trial solution19 that is monitored by shipboard personnel. After validation of the trial solution, the mission is scheduled and forwarded as an engagement order to the Mk 160 for execution.

        Footnote 18: T+N is a configuration that allows the naval fires control system (NFCS) to share the Tactical Tomahawk weapons control system (TTWCS) consoles. Operator must toggle between NFCS and TTWCS to view each system’s display. See Appendix B for individual system descriptions.

        Footnote 19: A trial solution message is submitted from NFCS to the Mk 160 GCS to assist in mission planning. For a trial solution NFCS provides ownship location data, target location data, environmental data and desired ammunition type (e.g., ERGM) to GCS. GCS then automatically performs technical fire control computations based on these input parameters and returns pertinent trial solution data to NFCS. Trial solution data includes munition trajectories, minimum and maximum times-of-flight, MRSI capability and failure mode hazard areas. The trial solution computations are conducted as background processing within the GCS and do not affect normal GCS processing.

        T5

        The T+N operator also sends a message to the NSFS spot team acknowledging receipt of the mission.

        T6–T8

        After the firing ship acknowledges receipt of the mission to the NSFS spot team, data communications flow directly between the NSFS spot team and the firing ship with other interested agencies (SACC, landing force operations center (LFOC), Bn) monitoring. When the firing ship executes the mission, an observer mission update report is sent by T+N to the TLDHS held by the NSFS spot team with a shot report and projected time the ordnance will arrive on target. Additionally, five seconds prior to impact, the T+N aboard the firing ship generates an observer mission update splash report, which is then sent to the TLDHS held by the NSFS spot team. An end of mission (EOM) message with battle damage assessment (BDA), from the NSFS spot team, ends the mission. A mission fired report (MFR) is generated by the firing ship T+N and sent to AFATDS in the SACC. The AFATDS in the SACC updates the firing unit ammunition inventory based on the expenditure reported in the MFR.

        4.5.1.4 Insights and Observations

        -- Replacement of voice communications with data communications for “splash” reports and, to a lesser extent, “shot” reports may require special procedures. Data connectivity will not produce the instantaneous transmission of reports, as is the case with voice communications. Voice splash reports conveyed to observers five seconds prior to ordnance impact are self-confirming as far as receipt and acknowledgement by the observer. The transmission of a data splash report five seconds before impact, however, will not guarantee that it is received, much less acknowledged, before impact. A possible solution may be to send the splash time along with an earlier data observer mission update so that the observer’s forward entry device could keep track of the predicted impact time and notify the observer several seconds before impact. Other similar anomalies between data and voice processing of fire missions may arise requiring adjustments in techniques and procedures.
        -- The SACC needs to know that a ship will be able to execute a fire mission the SACC assigns to it. All ships assigned to the general NSFS mission are assumed to be ready to fire unless the ship’s commanding officer informs the SACC that he cannot accept a mission for a specific reason (e.g., someone has fouled his ship’s local airspace; gun casualty).
        -- Voice communications provide fire support coordination agencies, ships, supported units, and observers, with the capability to monitor appropriate nets to maintain situational awareness. Data communications, however, require that all necessary agencies are subscribers in the network in order to receive the data being transmitted. The data subscriber network must be configured so that all firing units have all of the unique reference numbers (URNs) of the artillery forward observers, NSFS spot teams, and anyone else who may be involved in fire missions that the firing unit may be assigned.



        4.5.2 Naval Surface Fire Support Controlling Unit Role:
        U.S. Army, Operations in Urban Terrain, Call for Fire

        4.5.2.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-4)

        The CJTF attack on ORANGE forces in BLUE Capital City has begun with the objective of regaining control of the city and removing ORANGE forces. Various elements of the ORANGE forces form mobile fire teams of platoon and company-size throughout the city hoping to prolong its occupation of the BLUE capital until world opinion and diplomatic channels force all parties to the peace table rather than fighting a static defense. These mobile fire teams will conduct hit-and-run attacks on allied forces, reinforce or provide fire support to ORANGE positions, and support localized counterattacks.



        The Army’s response to this tactical threat consists of a three-phased plan: first, detect and track the dispersed mobile ORANGE teams; second, target them; and third, destroy them through a combination of supporting arms and a combined arms quick reaction force.

        After ambushing a BLUE mechanized infantry platoon, one such mobile ORANGE team is tracked moving into the U.S. Army’s zone of action, then maneuvered into an area by quick reaction forces, and eventually surrounded. The area is isolated from reinforcements. The surrounded mobile ORANGE team refuses to capitulate. Instead, it attempts to break out of its situation by counterattacking in the direction of the closest ORANGE position.

        As the mobile ORANGE team counterattacks, it runs into a blocking position established by 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry. At time T = zero (T0) the platoon leader calls for a fire mission on the ORANGE force. The urban terrain the two opposing forces find themselves in is very mixed in shape and layout with high-rise apartment buildings and office skyscrapers, wide and narrow city streets, park areas, and one and two story structures intermingled. 1st Battalion 22nd Infantry has been assigned priority of fire by the brigade commander. All fire requests are routed through the brigade fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) because of concerns regarding collateral damage, coordination with adjacent allied forces, and ammunition levels.

        4.5.2.2 Assumptions

        -- The Army has adopted the fires and effects system concept20 as a modification to current doctrinal fire support C2 agencies.
        -- The Army has one corps (three divisions) fully digitized.
        -- A surface action group composed of a CG and three DDGs is providing naval fires in support of the Army units. The CG is the controlling unit.
        -- NFCS has a controlling unit capability.

        Footnote 20: Fires and effects coordination is the continuing process of planning, integrating, and orchestrating full-spectrum fires and effects in support of the combined arms operation to achieve the commander’s desired end state. This process includes the management of delivery assets and sensors, and direct coordination with the combined arms commander. Effects-based fires focuses on achieving a desired effect against a target in the battlespace for a specified purpose in the combined arms operation.

        4.5.2.3 Sequence of OSD Events

        (See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-8, a the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

        T0

        The platoon forward observer transmits the call for fire, via voice or data, to the company fire support team (FIST) using Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below System (FBCB2)21 communications capability. The FIST forwards the call for fire digitally to the brigade using the forward entry device (FED). The platoon forward observer receives feedback on the status of his request (e.g., the request for fire was accepted and is being processed, additional information is required, or fire support cannot be provided with a reason why).

        The request for fire goes directly to the brigade FECC22 with the battalion fire support element (FSE) receiving simultaneous notification so that it can monitor the request.23 The battalion commander has veto authority over the fire mission. By monitoring the situation and transmission, the battalion FSE ensures compliance with ROE and meets the commander’s intent for fires.

        Footnote 21: FBCB2 is a digital battle command and control information system that will provide on-the-move, near real-time battle command and situational awareness, and the ability to generate spot reports, calls for fire, and operation overlays.

        Footnote 22: The brigade fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) performs all capabilities of a Fire Support Element (FSE) plus it has the ability to integrate available non-lethal capabilities into targeting, to establish a link to the Common Ground Station, manage counterfire, execute information operations, and establish improved joint fires connectivity.

        T1–T6

        The AFATDS receives the fire support request and filters, screens, and processes the request. AFATDS prioritizes the request for fire based upon different factors, data, and criteria predefined and uploaded into the system. If AFATDS recommends supporting arms attack the target, it will also recommend an available weapon system to engage the target. In this scenario, NSFS (ERGM unitary warhead) is recommended to attack the target because enemy counterfire radar renders artillery and rocket fire particularly vulnerable. AFATDS generates a fire request and recommends an attack method for the ERGM. The brigade effects coordinator (ECOORD) concurs with AFATDS recommendation.

        Footnote 23: An intervention point has been established at the brigade FECC for all its subordinate units’ fires because of concerns about collateral damage, the need to coordinate with adjacent allied forces, and the need to monitor ammunition inventories across the force.

        T7–T11

        The recommended use of ERGM requires coordination with the JAOC due to the clearance of fire criteria in effect for coordinating airspace. These criteria are resident in the logic tables of AFATDS. Following input of weapon platform information from the NSFS controlling unit, AFATDS sends an airspace coordination request to the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) located in the joint air operations center (JAOC). The request is sent through the chain of command (division and corps) via the tactical internet that predominately relies upon EHF radio and SATCOM as communication media. The corps FECC coordinates airspace ashore within its designated boundaries.

        The JAOC coordinates all other airspace. With the brigade FECC having selected “Warning Order” in AFATDS for method of control, the fire request is transmitted from the brigade FECC to the controlling unit (CG). The controlling unit forwards the warning order to the firing unit(s) to prepare for the mission. NFCS returns weapons readiness status on all ships through the AFATDS network to the requestor.

        The FECC organization includes a NSFS team liaison that advises the ECOORD on the employment of naval fires and communicates the brigade combat team commander’s maneuver plan to the controlling unit.

        T12–T14

        JAOC notifies the corps FECC when the airspace coordination is accomplished. An order to fire (OTF) is then transmitted from the brigade FECC via the controlling unit to the firing unit(s) for execution. The controlling unit has the capability to intervene as required.

        T15–T19

        T+N in the CIC on the firing ship(s) receives the OTF with targeting data from the controlling unit. Local airspace coordination is conducted within CIC and potential conflicts identified. (Conflicts that preclude mission execution are provided to the controlling unit.) When authorized by the firing ship’s commanding officer or his designated representative, the mission is executed.

        T20–T21

        After the controlling unit receives the OTF, a digital data message to observer is sent to the company FIST. This information is transmitted through the different levels of command. Since it is data being transmitted digitally, the message is monitored simultaneously at all command levels. It does not stop at each level of command to be acknowledged and then forwarded.

        The FIST communicates fire mission information to and from the platoon forward observer. Thereafter, the FIST communicates digitally with the controlling unit through the tactical internet systems. The various command levels involved monitor these digital communications simultaneously rather than serially acknowledging them and forwarding them to the next echelon. To conclude the mission the observer sends an end of mission message that includes BDA to the firing ship(s). At end of mission, the firing ship(s) send a mission fired report to the Brigade FECC.

        4.5.2.4 Insights and Observations

        -- Local airspace coordination is the responsibility of each firing ship. All other coordination is performed by the FECC.
        -- An NSFS liaison team is required at the brigade FECC and Army representation may be required aboard the CG to ensure effective mission execution.
        -- The U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team must have the capability to communicate directly with a firing ship operating over-the-horizon.
        -- Digital data communication between the brigade FECC and the controlling unit, which is over the horizon, may have to be relayed. This requirement for a relay could occur if organic over-the-horizon communication equipment below the division command level is not available to provide a direct communications link.
        -- Digital data communication from the FIST to the firing ship through various command nodes (via tactical internet systems) is nearly simultaneous vice sequential.
        -- Digital data communication transmissions received at command nodes, acting as servers, will be forwarded via a digital path of least resistance. This path may differ with each transmission and is transparent.
        -- Digital data systems do not eliminate the need for voice communications.



        4.5.3 Naval Surface Strike Single Unit Role:
        Strike Mission Against Rebel Forces Attacking a U.S. Embassy

        Although it is recognized that funding for the production of the vertical takeoff unmanned aerial vehicle (VTUAV) has been withdrawn, this scenario is included to demonstrate the NSS single unit role and illustrate the requirement for an organic targeting capability on surface combatants.

        4.5.3.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-5)

        Rebel forces, supported by a neighboring enemy government, have successfully maintained a state of unrest in the friendly country of PURPLE for several years. Rebel forces have conducted raids and terrorist attacks and are threatening to overthrow the PURPLE government. Cease-fire and peace negotiations led by a third party have failed to make any progress in reducing the level of rebel activity. In fact, the rebel forces have grown in strength and the level of activity has been increasing.



        Recently, the rebel forces have been observed moving from the more remote countryside toward the capital city. The presumed intent of this action is to launch a consolidated attack on the capital city, take control of key facilities, and to attempt to overthrow the PURPLE government. Because of the western support for the PURPLE regime, the rebels have been making strong threatening statements towards the U.S. Embassy. The PURPLE government has made it clear that it will not be able to guarantee the safety of the embassy in the event of a significant rebel assault on the capital.

        With evidence mounting that the rebel forces are in fact preparing for a major operation, the United States decides to move the nearest Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) into the area. The MEU is involved in split-ARG training operations. Logistic demands of reembarking troops and equipment from disparate locations and the relatively slow speed of amphibious ships could preclude arrival of the ARG / MEU offshore PURPLE before rebel forces mount what appears to be an imminent attack.

        To expedite responsiveness, a reinforced rifle platoon from the MEU is embarked aboard a DDG, which proceeds to the vicinity of the PURPLE capital city at maximum speed. The remainder of the MEU and associated assets follow.

        The DDG with a tactical UAV detachment embarked arrives first on scene and 36 hours before the rest of the force. The rifle platoon is shuttled to the embassy to protect American lives and to make preparations for potential evacuation of the embassy should it come under attack by the rebel forces.

        The platoon also deploys reinforced squads within the city along avenues of approach to the embassy. The intent is to provide intelligence on rebel activity and movement and to disrupt or delay any rebel attack on the embassy. Soon after arrival on site, rebel activity and SIGINT indicate that the rebel forces intend to attack the U.S. Embassy, possibly before the remainder of the U.S. force can arrive on scene.

        The tactical UAV is employed to provide surveillance of avenues of approach, where preplanned targets have been established. These preplanned targets were selected based on surrounding urban terrain and the desire to limit collateral friendly casualties and damage. Rules of engagement provide the DDG commanding officer authority to initiate engagement of the enemy when the rebel forces threaten the embassy.

        Figure 4-5 provides a map of the operations area in the vicinity of the U.S. Embassy. The primary rebel force concentrations are to the northeast of the city with lesser force concentrations to the southeast.

        4.5.3.2 Assumptions

        -- The ARG and MEU staffs, aboard the amphibious command ship (LHD), conducted considerable mission planning prior to detaching the DDG and associated advanced forces. This pre-planning included (1) resource identification, (2) rules of engagement (ROE), and (3) command relationships. Resource identification dealt with communication plans and equipment, NIMA map/chart products, target acquisition equipment, supporting assets including UAVs or LAMPS. All operation area maps, charts, commander’s criteria, and preplanned targets were loaded into the NFCS and TTWCS aboard the DDG prior to arrival on scene.
        -- The DDG will be ‘over the horizon’ from the capital city with its operational location approximately 25–50nm from the embassy. This assumption implies that ERGM and TACTOM will be the fire support assets available for the mission and that the communications from the deployed land forces to the firing ship cannot depend upon line of sight only and will require either an airborne relay or UHF SATCOM capability to maintain connectivity.
        -- The DDG will have full responsibility for all tactical area surface and air coordination. The ability to effectively perform this task is limited by and to ship assets. There is no immediate support available from AWACS or other non-organic assets in the operational area.
        -- Necessary C4ISRT assets are in place to support situation awareness (SA), intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), planning, cueing and battle damage assessment (BDA)

        4.5.3.3 Sequence of OSD Events

        (See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-9, a the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

        Figure 4-9 provides the operational sequence and command and communication relationships for this operation. Because the ARG / MEU is not on scene, the task force (element) commander is the DDG commanding officer. A rifle company XO is deployed with the forces at the embassy. A tactical command net is established between the DDG and the embassy (company XO and rifle platoon). A Marine fire support liaison officer is provided to the ship’s CIC.

        T1–T3

        The Marine platoon commander is able to communicate directly with the NFCS aboard the DDG to conduct strikes against preplanned targets. The platoon commander conducts security patrols throughout the urban area surrounding the embassy, identifying likely rebel avenues of approach to the embassy and choke points along those approaches. The platoon commander also collects information that helps define no-fire areas (NFAs) and validate friendly forces locations. Information gathered by the platoon becomes the key planning factor in determining tactical UAV surveillance missions.

        T4–T6

        On the DDG, T+N provides mission planning for targets nominated by the rifle platoon or from other sources. The tactical UAV controlled via TCS on the DDG flies surveillance over routes determined by prior intelligence gathering (reconnaissance patrols, map studies, aerial photos, interviews of local population). The tactical UAV detects rebel troop movement toward the embassy and transmits real-time surveillance data via TCS to the DDG. The DDG commanding officer designates targets to be engaged to prevent or delay a rebel advance on the embassy.

        T7–T9

        The DDG CO is responsible for airspace coordination for the entire operations area in preparation for naval fires missions. Special attention must be paid to any evacuation operations that may be underway. Once airspace coordination has been completed, the CO approves the fire order(s). The T+N passes necessary information to the weapon control systems to launch missiles and/or fire the gun in support of the strike mission(s). The higher headquarters (HHQ) and the embassy are notified when weapons are fired.

        T10

        The tactical UAV collects battle damage assessment (BDA) and continues surveillance of planned areas. The rifle platoon may also be employed to collect BDA. A mission fired report to HHQ and the embassy concludes the mission.

        4.5.3.4 Insights and Observations

        -- Organic targeting capability is required for a surface combatant to perform the NSS single unit role. Note: if no organic targeting capability is available, a significant reachback capability (e.g., naval fires network (NFN))24 must be provided. The reach back requirement will also necessitate an expanded communications capability onboard the surface combatant.
        -- An ability to communicate at beyond line-of-sight ranges requires an airborne relay or satellite connectivity.
        -- Preplanning of targets with the assistance of external agencies will enhance effectiveness of this role.
        -- The single unit commanding officer needs clear cut lines of authority and ROE to accomplish the mission.
        -- Liaison officers should be exchanged between the embassy and the ship.

        Footnote 24: NFN is aggregate of the following systems: GCCS-M,TES-N, and JSIPS-N as described in Appendix B.

        4.5.4.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-6)

        Joint task force (JTF) follow-on forces have entered the area of operations and have built up sufficient forces to conduct offensive operations to restore the territorial integrity of the invaded country. During the build up of CJTF forces, the enemy has been able to install a sophisticated and integrated air defense system. The enemy has deployed combined arms forces arrayed in mobile defense with mobile SAM assets linked via shared command and control to coordinate engagements against CJTF air assets. Enemy tactics are to move SAM batteries every two hours unless they have fired on incoming aircraft. An individual battery moves as soon as possible after it fires. Radar is used in brief periods from multiple sites to confuse true locations and to abate the HARM engagement attempts.



        In order to conduct ground offensive operations, local air superiority must be achieved. Multiservice assets will be used to detect targets. JFACC will provide available target information for engagement. A SAG consisting of a CG (multi-unit commander) and two DDGs (firing units) is directed to respond to time critical targets detected by JTF sensors.

        The JFACC ashore is coordination authority for all fires and aircraft in the zone of action. The multi-unit commander coordinates local airspace when conducting naval fires. A dedicated EHF SATCOM data channel has been established between the joint air operation center (JAOC) and the multi-unit commander.

        A JSTARS aircraft has been monitoring an area of interest for likely transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) positions approximately 25 miles inland in the vicinity of hills 210 and 200. Route 15 runs east to west between the hills and through a forested area about 15 miles long. A mobile SAM system, detected by onboard sensors of the JSTARS aircraft, has been located at the eastern edge of the forested area. The SAM is providing air defense coverage for the TEL and would impose a high risk to tactical aircraft attacking the TEL. The SAM would also be effective against missiles such as TACTOM.

        4.5.4.2 Assumptions

        -- JAOC has the systems and manning necessary to coordinate fires in the battlespace in near real-time.
        -- A naval coordination detachment (NCD) has been established and collocated in the JAOC as part of the joint fires cell.
        -- The multi-unit commander (CG) has an NFNlike capability.
        -- Sensors can provide timely and accurate target locations needed to effectively employ precision munitions.
        -- TACTOMs have been allocated to support this mission.
        -- The command and control capability exists to be able to distribute and assign targets.

        4.5.4.3 Sequence of Events

        (See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-10, at the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

        Up to T0

        Based upon the commander’s guidance, the JAOC tasks the JSTARS aircraft and its target acquisition sensors. The sensors must be able to identify and classify the number of contacts in relation to time. These sensors are required to give locations of the targets and provide the mapping frame of reference, to give the target location error associated with the contact, and to indicate if there is any movement detected within the target area.

        The JSTARS mission is to detect and identify potential targets or target sets and downlink this information to the Army common ground station (CGS) collocated with the JAOC ashore. This information is transmitted via a surveillance control data link (SCDL).25

        Footnote 25: SCDL is a time division multiple access data link incorporating flexible frequency management. The system employs wideband frequency hopping, coding, and data diversity to achieve robustness against hostile jamming.

        T0

        The JSTARS detects a suspected TEL and SAM.

        T1–T2

        The JAOC initiates the targeting process upon receipt of the target detections from JSTARS, focusing initially on validating the target(s). The JAOC joint fires cell confirms target identification and determines the specific target locations based on the best available target information. Key items of information used in mission planning are the commander’s guidance, the rules of engagement, fire support coordination measures, and other battlefield geometry along with the air control order and air tasking order. JAOC designates the TEL and SAM as time critical targets and determines that the best engagement option is to attack them with naval fires.

        T3–T4

        The JAOC has a joint fires cell that includes an NCD to assist in planning and executing naval fires. The NCD would be a small liaison element with enough personnel to maintain 24-hour operations. In this scenario, the NCD recommends to the JAOC that this mission be assigned to the NSS multi-unit commander. The JAOC joint fires cell passes the validated target information to the NSS multi-unit commander with instructions to destroy the TEL.

        T5–T8

        Upon receipt of mission tasking, the NSS multi-unit commander augments information received from the JAOC with information available from NFN to refine targeting data. The NSS multi-unit commander plans for a coordinated strike to suppress the SAM and destroy the TEL. The NSS multi-unit commander then conducts weapon-target pairing and decides to suppress the SAM with ERGM while attacking the TEL by providing an aimpoint update to a loitering TACTOM under control of one of the DDGs. The NSS multi-unit commander coordinates local airspace for itself and the firing units, and issues tasking orders to the two DDGs. DDG(1) is instructed to prepare a new aimpoint (the TEL) for its loitering TACTOM to be executed upon command of the NSS multi-unit commander. DDG(2) is instructed to suppress the SAM with ERGM upon command of the NSS multi-unit commander.

        T9–T13

        Both firing units (DDGs) receive their tasking orders from the multi-ship unit and prepare their missions, reporting computed time on target back to the NSS multi-unit commander. The NSS multi-unit commander plans for the coordinated suppression and destruction missions and provides orders to fire to the DDGs with precise time on target requirements and, for the suppression mission, a duration of fire. Once final airspace coordination is effected, the NSS multi-unit commander transmits the command to execute the coordinated attack.

        T14–T15

        Via NFN, the NSS multi-unit commander obtains BDA confirming destruction of the TEL. A mission complete is transmitted to the firing units, the JAOC/JFACC, and the NCD.

        4.5.4.4 Insights and Observations

        -- Sensors must be able to provide significant information about the enemy TEL and its protective SAM. This information would include identification and classification of the targets with respect to time, target location along with the accuracy of the location (i.e., target location error), and indication of expected target dwell time (e.g., the time the TEL is expected to remain in its current location).
        -- The NSS multi-unit commander must have an NFN-like capability in order to conduct this mission.
        -- The process of performing BDA needs to be planned in advance to determine if reattack is required.
        -- Airspace coordination is a shared responsibility. Target area coordination was the responsibility of the JAOC. The launch and over-water coordination was the responsibility of the NSS multi-unit commander.
        -- An agency (i.e., cell, detachment, element) is required to plan and coordinate joint fires for the JTF. This agency should be composed of members of the JFC’s staff, representatives of the component commanders, and other experts as needed. This agency would provide the capability to accomplish joint fires planning and coordination functions. A joint fires cell concept has been experimented with as part of several Fleet Battle Experiments in several different shipboard and shore based configurations. Air Force experimentation has examined different internal organizational architectures for a fire cell within the JAOC. Experimentation involving Marine Corps and Army fires element organization has also taken place. The common thread in each of these efforts is functions and not systems.

        Comment


        • #5
          2003 CONOPS Chapter 5: COMMUNICATIONS


          5.0 COMMUNICATIONS

          This chapter provides an overview of the communications networks and external interfaces necessary to control surface combatant land attack missions. It also highlights key issues relevant to the design of an effective land attack communications system.


          5.1 INTRODUCTION

          Surface combatants must be able to communicate with supported maneuver forces, the battle force, Tomahawk mission planning facilities and systems, and joint force and theater command centers. Communications for land attack will be satisfied by a blend of voice and data communications systems. Land attack systems are highly dependent on effective communications among command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) assets; supported units ashore; and firing units afloat.

          Communications with airborne platforms, ground forces ashore, and among ships involves systems ranging from short-range, line-of-sight (LOS) relay communications, to over-the-horizon (OTH) communications, including satellite systems.1 Advances in sensors, precision targeting systems, command and control systems, weapons, and digital information exchange have led to increased land attack operational capabilities.

          Footnote 1: Details of these and other related communications systems are provided in Appendix B.

          Once these systems are fully integrated, surface combatants will have the capability to simultaneously conduct naval surface strike (NSS) and naval surface fire support (NSFS) missions from the same platform at a faster pace, with improved situational awareness, and with increased lethality.

          Communications during NSFS operations include high frequency (HF), very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF), and extremely high frequency (EHF) radio systems. The surface combatant’s radio system and networking infrastructure (ISNS/ADNS) provide both voice and data connectivity to amphibious ships and to maneuver force fire support coordination elements ashore. This also constitutes a supporting reachback infrastructure providing imagery, intelligence, other supporting data, and command and control connectivity.

          For long-range NSS missions, fleet satellite communications in the UHF, super high frequency (SHF), and EHF bands provide required connectivity between Tomahawk command and control agencies and weapons platforms. Fleet operations centers and naval force units currently exchange data using a number of information exchange systems to develop an OTH tactical picture for planning Tomahawk overwater routes.

          Figures 5-1 through 5-5, presented on the following pages, illustrate notional communications structures that support land attack. See appendices B and C for system descriptions.


          Land Attack Supporting Communications Systems













          5.2 LAND ATTACK MISSION PLANNING SYSTEMS EXTERNAL INTERFACES

          The land attack mission planning systems, Tactical Tomahawk weapons control system (TTWCS) and naval fires control system (NFCS) (T+N), onboard the surface combatant will be interoperable with the C4I systems as shown in Figure 5-6. These external interfaces will provide the land attack operational orders, common operational picture, and fire missions.



          The internal interfaces for TTWCS and NFCS are shown in light gray for completeness and are discussed further in the Surface Combatant Land Attack System Requirements Document.2

          Footnote 2: The Surface Combatant Land Attack System Requirements Document: Increment 1 – 2003(U), (DRAFT) dated 28 March 2001 was produced by the Systems Working Integrated Product Team within the Land Attack Capstone Organization.

          TTWCS will support the employment of all Tomahawk missiles, and provide on-board mission planning for the Tactical Tomahawk missile. The Tomahawk command and control system connects the external Tomahawk communications system (TCOMMS) to both TTWCS and the new personnel computer-based mission distribution system (MDS). MDS interfaces with the ashore cruise missile support activities (CMSA), the carrier-based afloat planning systems (APS), the Tomahawk command and control nodes, and the in-flight Tomahawk missiles. TCOMMS provides communications links via the STU-III and ADNS, as well as the EHF and UHF satellite communication (SATCOM) nets. All Tomahawk systems are designed to send and process top secret strike missions, and thus have been historically isolated from the tactical fire support world and the rest of the Aegis combat system. TTWCS accesses global command and control system (GCCS-M) information via the Aegis LAN interconnect system (ALIS).

          NFCS is the surface combatant’s naval surface fires support (NSFS) mission planning and coordination system for the ballistic and extended- range gun launched weapons. NFCS connects via several tactical radio systems (VHF, UHF, or HF) to ship- and shore-based advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS), and forward observers using target location designation and handoff system (TLDHS). NFCS uses ALIS to talk to the gun weapon system, access GCCS-M data, and receive external IP-based data via ADNS.


          5.3 COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

          New systems and concepts rely heavily on uninterrupted communications links. Joint and coalition operations require a certain level of commonality and interoperability in the design and operations of communications systems. The following section addresses specific topics of relevance to the challenge of land attack warfare.

          5.3.1 Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Communication with Maneuver Forces

          A significant deficiency in the overall C4ISRT framework for surface combatants conducting land attack warfare (LAW) missions is the limited capability to conduct reliable OTH ship-to-shore point-to-point (ship to forward observer) communications. The introduction of longer range munitions such as ERGM and Tactical Tomahawk will necessitate reliable extended range OTH communications with maneuver forces, both Marine Corps and Army

          Communications equipment available to support LAW includes the following:

          -- The very high frequency (VHF) single channel ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS) is widely populated and extensively employed by all maneuver forces. SINCGARS provides the voice and a minimal data backbone for the radio net that is used by fire support systems. These radios are limited to line-of-sight (LOS) ranges with a relay capability provided by connecting two radios back-to-back. Because of this configuration, tactical data messages may be delayed several minutes at each relay point. SINCGARS are installed in all amphibious ships and on DDG 76 and follow-on new construction surface combatants.

          -- The ultra high frequency (UHF) enhanced position location reporting system (EPLRS) is a LOS, data-only, digital radio that provides the communications backbone for the tactical internet at brigade and below levels for both the Army and the Marine Corps. It is the primary means of near real-time data distribution for sensor-to-shooter links. EPLRS employs an automated “netting” capability as long as each radio is within sight of at least one other EPLRS unit active in the net. EPLRS are installed on all large deck amphibious ships as part of the AN/KSQ-1 amphibious assault direction system as a standalone system. EPLRS is not currently programmed for installation in any surface combatant. EPLRS can also be used as a UHF relay facility to extend ranges OTH.

          -- High frequency (HF) radios are available to both maneuver forces and surface combatants but are limited by bandwidth and data transmission rates. HF transmissions are highly susceptible to atmospheric conditions, jamming, and counter detection.

          -- UHF satellite communications (SATCOM) radios are installed in all surface combatants and available in limited numbers to forces operating ashore. Although fleet battle experiments have demonstrated an OTH capability using this equipment, maneuver forces cannot employ SATCOM while moving due to the directional nature of the antennas that must be used. Employment requires users ashore to stop, set up the necessary ground terminal, acquire the satellite, establish communications with forces at sea, transmit/ receive as needed, and when complete, tear down the terminal before moving again.

          -- Extra high frequency (EHF) SATCOM radios are installed in all surface combatants, available in limited numbers to forces operating ashore, and subject to the same limitations as UHF SATCOM radios. Additionally, Navy EHF SATCOM terminals are interoperable with those procured jointly by the Marine Corps and Army only in the low data rate (2400 bps) mode.

          It is anticipated that at some time during the time period covered by this document (2005–2015) the joint tactical radio system (JTRS) will be fielded. JTRS is a follow-on system for existing radios (VHF, UHF, and HF) that provides reconfigurable waveforms. JTRS will also enhance joint interoperability of these communications systems.

          Surface combatants lack an adequate communications capability to operate in support of maneuver forces operating ashore. Airborne relay capabilities for both UHF and VHF LOS radios have been demonstrated in exercises such as Extending the Littoral Battlefield (ELB). The follow-on Office of Naval Research (ONR) effort is known as JTF Warnet and will include a prototype to be deployed on a 7th Fleet expeditionary strike group (ESG) and carrier strike group (CSG) during 2004. There is no funded program to transition either JTF Warnet or the ELB technology to provide the necessary airborne relay capability, although JTRS may include this. The Navy VTUAV ORD has a requirement to provide an airborne relay package but production funding was withdrawn further exacerbated this problem. Additionally, neither the architecture nor the requirements have been developed by the services to support this capability.

          The services need to develop an operational requirement for an airborne relay for LOS transmissions and provide funding to field this capability to both forces at sea and maneuver units operating ashore. Additionally, an analysis needs to be conducted to determine whether EPLRS should be integrated into the SACC automation and/or installed in land attack capable surface combatants.

          5.3.2 Interoperability

          The distributed nature of future naval operations and the extended ranges of warfighting require wide bandwidth, low latency, with a secure, robust, redundant, long-range data transfer capability. Data transfer capabilities are essential to exchange command and control data and to build the knowledge and understanding required to conduct the information-based warfare of the future. Furthermore, these capabilities are necessary to develop a common shared awareness of the battlespace that will enable innovation, initiative, and decisive operations.

          5.3.3 Bandwidth and Security

          The network should have sufficient bandwidth to support the various types of communications needed at all echelons. This includes voice, text, raw and processed digital data, imagery, and video. These communications will require a multi-level security structure employing encryption systems for sharing data between allied and coalition forces. Secure firewalls will also be employed to prevent unauthorized intrusion.

          Comment


          • #6
            2003 CONOPS Chapter 6: COORDINATION OF FIRES


            6.0 COORDINATION OF FIRES

            Naval forces plan and execute naval fires in direct support of naval and joint forces performing assigned missions. Naval fires include, in part, strike missions and fire support missions. The naval air, surface, and submarine combat arms will contribute to both of these missions. This chapter discusses existing as well as new concepts for coordinating these fires across naval and joint assets.


            6.1 INTRODUCTION

            Historically naval operations against targets and objectives ashore have been classified as strike warfare or naval surface fire support (NSFS) and are planned and executed by two different agencies. Land attack warfare is a new construct that has been proposed in order to draw attention to two issues in this regard: (1) greatly expanded and integrated surface combatant capabilities to engage targets and support maneuver forces ashore; and (2) tighter integration of surface combatant capabilities with naval fires as an effective warfighting capability.

            Joint Publication 1-02 defines fire support coordination as “the planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons.” Within the construct of joint fires coordination this concept of operations uses two additional terms that are not defined in joint publications: integration and deconfliction. Integration is a proactive means of planning and executing fires to achieve the synergistic effects of combined arms. Deconfliction is a reactive measure used by exception to arbitrate gaps in the integration of fires, and accommodate changing priorities as friendly forces encounter the fog of war.

            6.1.1 Background

            New land attack weapons will operate in every part of the battlespace. Successful operations with these capabilities follow informed, responsive planning activities to coordinate operations across the battlespace and electro-magnetic spectrum. This will necessitate improved fires coordination, especially in the joint warfighting environment. Changes in doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, equipment, and training will be required to achieve the successful coordination of naval fires in the future.

            Coordination of NSFS operations with the overall fire support plan has traditionally been accomplished by the supported maneuver commander who then issues an order to fire to the surface combatant. With the introduction of new land attack weapons and their enhanced ranges, surface combatants will not only be able to deliver NSS fires against deep targets beyond the area of operation (AO) of the land component commander or the amphibious objective area (AOA) far into the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) deep battlespace, but will also be able to deliver long range NSFS in support of land or amphibious maneuver forces. Coordination with the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and land and maritime components whose airspace these fires will traverse will be particularly important especially for non-ballistic flight profiles.

            The supported maneuver commander may not have all the information or authority required to coordinate the fire mission independently. The Aegis air warfare coordinator and the force air defense commander, for example, each have another part of the fires picture necessary for a successful fires coordination capability.

            Naval fire support and naval strike resources typically include air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and subsurface-to-surface delivery assets. It also frequently includes nonlethal and disruptive operations, such as electronic warfare. In order to maximize combat power, we must use all the available resources to best advantage. Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. Regardless of the attack system or systems employed, naval fires require detailed airspace and ground coordination.

            Adding to the challenges noted above is the fact that fires are the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, command and control, and attack resources.1 Successful fires depend on detailed coordination of these subsystems. Coordinating the processes and procedures of all three subsystems binds fires resources together so the effects of each asset are synchronized to support the commander’s intent and concept of operation.

            Naval fire support assets used within the joint environment must be fully coordinated with other non-naval fires. This not only includes all other joint fires, but also other naval weapons such as Tomahawk that are typically allocated by the joint force commander. This point highlights the complexity that long-range precision weapons add to the fires coordination problem.

            Simply stated, not all weapons launched from a naval asset are supporting naval forces. In order to achieve this type of complex coordination among different component commanders, a high degree of joint functionality is required in fires personnel, systems, and procedures. This joint functionality will require a shared, automated picture of the battlespace and changes to the procedural methods currently employed by fires personnel, agencies, and commanders.

            A key aspect of this coordination problem is the inability of the air defense command and control (C2) systems to communicate with the land attack C2 systems. The potential of hundreds of land attack assets per hour transiting through controlled air space could lead to their misidentification and engagement by the air defense forces. Procedures need to be centrally controlled in order to decentralize coordination and execution of all fires. Eventually the air and land tactical pictures should be combined so that the predicted launch times and flight paths of the land attack weapons will be automatically consolidated into the air defense picture.

            Footnote 1: For more detailed discussion, refer to Chapter 3.

            Expeditionary fire support requires an integrated system or family of systems compatible with onscene or arriving joint forces. All components of expeditionary fire support must work together throughout the entire planning and execution process. Given the joint nature of future operations, a re-examination of traditional command relationships is required to make these relationships more responsive and flexible.(2) Effective naval fires requires that the commander responsible for the mission or for a phase of an operation has the ability to plan, allocate, control, and coordinate fires from all available systems. Since that responsibility may shift between the Navy and landing force commander during operations, the transition must be seamless and effective. This means that information must be shared, and air and surface fires coordinated, not only between the Navy and the landing force, but also with higher, adjacent and joint units.

            Footnote 2: A notional structure for these new C2 relationships is provided in Chapter 4.

            6.1.1.1 Workshop Analysis

            The October 2001 workshop examined the coordination of future naval fires. A scenario-based vignette was used that emphasized joint task force (JTF) and joint fires architecture. Scarce resources associated with the vignette required that the JTF request support from the JFC and that the JFC required resources from the JTF. Issues such as which agency conducts targeting, selects weapons, assigns shooters, and coordinates fires were discussed. Four basic situations were examined. The first situation required fires within the JTF joint operating area (JOA), and the JTF commander had the assets to engage the target. The second situation required the JTF commander to attack targets outside his JOA as directed by the JFC with JTF assets. The third situation required fires to be delivered on targets in the JTF JOA by higher authority with assets/weapons that were not organic to the JTF. The fourth situation required the JTF commander to request fires from external assets. Regardless of the weapon employed, boundaries inside and outside the JOA required detailed coordination.

            6.1.2 Problem Statement

            Proper coordination of fires includes those systems internal to the firing unit as well as those external systems with which the firing unit must be interoperable. In order to conduct this assessment, there is a requirement to use joint terminology, but without being constrained by current doctrine. Most of the existing doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures have been developed to support air operations. There is a requirement to identify and address issues such as when to rely on procedural methods vice positive control. These concepts can be tested in future exercises. Additionally, this chapter will address current and planned capabilities and identify gaps. Multi-mission capable surface combatants can be tasked to perform traditional NSFS missions while concurrently being tasked by the joint commander to conduct naval surface strike (NSS) missions. The same operators, systems, and weapons will be used to perform both missions. These concurrent taskings blur the distinctions between these missions and require more sophisticated agencies and systems to achieve proper coordination of all fires.

            Before a naval fires asset transits through another agency’s controlled air space, its mission and flight profile must be coordinated with the controlling agency. Air space coordination consists of the following:
            -- The asset must avoid interfering with other systems,
            -- The asset must avoid interference by other systems, and
            -- The asset must avoid causing friendly casualties.

            Two new key aspects of air space coordination are fratricide of the weapons and management of the air space between the firing ship and the maneuver commander. Correct identification of some friendly naval fires assets is further complicated by the following:
            -- The weapons have no identification friend or foe (IFF) capability,
            -- The weapons may fly dogleg profiles to the target making their point of origin unknown,
            -- Precision guided weapons may not follow their predicted trajectories, and
            -- Tactical Tomahawks have the ability to fly a loiter pattern and can be retargeted in flight.

            Commanders exercise authority within the four dimensional limits of boundaries established by a higher headquarters. The commander has target identification and engagement authority for organic weapons and is responsible for the effects of all fires delivered into or within these boundaries. Once these boundaries have been established, the command and control of fires is a function of the fire support coordinator within whose boundaries the effects of the fires will be realized. This includes coordination with adjacent units whose battlespace is affected by the flight path or terminal effects of the weapons system/munition. Any adverse effects of NSFS delivered on a requested target are the responsibility of the requesting agency, not the commander of the ship who provided the fires. This also requires a change to traditional weapons release and engagement authority.

            The techniques and procedures for command and control of fires throughout an extended joint littoral battlespace will continue to evolve. Weapons systems with extended horizontal ranges, high altitude apogees, variable flight paths, and on-station loiter times will present greater challenges to commanders exercising command and control of fires. These weapons systems can be expected to cross multiple unit boundaries, fire support control measures, and other battlefield geometries en route to their designated targets. The employment of these new weapons will require detailed fire planning, coordination, and synchronization3 of fires among commanders and their staffs in near real-time.

            The remainder of this chapter will deal with coordinating fire support and strike during standard missions and attempt to address the management of the battlespace geometry.

            Footnote 3: The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. Joint Pub 1-02


            6.2 JOINT NATURE OF FIRES

            To achieve proper coordination and synchronization of fires, it is necessary to specify how a commander joint task force (CJTF) interacts with the component commanders designated by the JFC. This will help resolve issues such as the relationship between the joint air operations center (JAOC) and the joint fires element (JFE).

            Under current doctrine the JFE is an advisory/ liaison agency and lacks the execution, monitoring, personnel and equipment capabilities to provide a real-time air picture and corresponding fire support coordination capability. Some hybrid JFE type agency with the proper functionality will be required for future planning, coordination, and execution of fires. An agency, such as the JFE, operating with the authority of the CJTF/JFC will ensure that targeting, planning, integration, and deconfliction are in accordance with the commander’s intent and operate with a complete picture of the battlespace. The functions and required operational capabilities for this organization need to be identified. The planning function of this agency is particularly important because the more time spent on fire integration the less time will be required for deconfliction.

            This is an essential point. Deconfliction is reactive and is used when deviating from the integrated fire plan. Fire coordination, to include integration and deconfliction, is a continuous process.


            6.3 NAVAL FIRES

            Naval fires consists of naval fire support and naval strike. Naval fire support for expeditionary warfare in the littorals is generally recognized today as those fires consisting of naval guns, missiles, close air support, and non-lethal fires within defined boundaries and short of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Naval surface fire support is just one piece of naval fire support.

            Naval strike has historically been characterized as those fires delivered beyond the FSCL or when no FSCL has been established. In future operational concepts of STOM and OMFTS, an FSCL may or may not be established. Weapon system ranges and effects-based targeting blur the distinction between naval strike and naval fire support. The surface fleet needs to be able to coordinate fires with aviation and Tomahawk assets to provide a scalable set of effects on the land battle. These effects range from a single precision missile strike to a sustained barrage and include both lethal and non-lethal effects.”4

            The effect for the maneuver commander should be transparent, that is, fires should meet his intent whether the shooter is a ship, an aircraft, or an artillery battery. This does not diminish the importance of the unique characteristics inherent in each fire support system when addressing specific targets. Transparency of fires will be joint in nature by including all assets within and outside the operating theater.

            Future joint fires will be characterized by the overall desired effect of those fires on the enemy and not by the specific weapons system being employed. Complementary effects of specific weapons systems must be understood and used in the planning and coordination of naval fire support with all other joint fires and during the development of the fire support plan. The Navy needs to commit to building architecture that coordinates all fires to provide this transparency of fires.

            Footnote 4: NWP 3-09.1, Navy Strike and Fire Support (Draft), dated 6 February 2002, para A.2.2.

            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            BOX: “It has become clearer with each fleet battle experiment the future naval offensive and defensive capabilities quickly overwhelm the current naval capability to perform detailed planning for their use—both at the tactical and the operational level” NWP 3-09, A.4.1.2.
            --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



            6.4 CONCEPT FOR THE COORDINATION OF FIRES

            6.4.1 General

            The concept for the coordination of fires needs to articulate the problem in terms of integration and deconfliction (both procedural and dynamic). Command relationships play a key role in the planning for the coordination of fires. All components can plan and coordinate fires. During different phases of an operation, command relationships may change such as supported/supporting relationships. For instance, during pre-assault operations, COMNAVFOR could be designated as the supported commander.

            The Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, states, “The key to effective integration of Joint fire support is the thorough and continuous inclusion of fire support in the planning process and a vigorous execution of the plan with aggressive coordination efforts. The purpose of joint fire support planning is to optimize its employment by integrating and synchronizing joint fire support with the supported commander’s maneuver plan.”5

            Footnote 5: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, dated 12 May 1998, page 3-1.

            6.4.2 Procedural Fires Coordination

            Procedural fires coordination is the implementation of preplanned fire coordination measures for the entire battlespace. These measures facilitate the execution of fire plans, minimize real-time deconfliction of fires, and contribute to achieving transparency of fires. The result is a more effective and timely execution of fires.

            Procedural fires coordination can become more complex when long-range high trajectory and/or loitering munitions are added to the mix. The various components and agencies involved in a joint operation can be informed as to the preplanned activities of each other, however they do not have the picture of what is actually being executed. One issue is whether or not the JFE has the full view of the fires that are being planned and executed and, if so, using what systems?

            Procedural fires coordination is further complicated by the use of various weapons systems that require interaction with different agencies such as the tactical air command center for air support, the TLAM strike coordinator for Tomahawk, and the supporting arms coordination center (SACC) for NSFS. Additionally, the SACC may be limited to integrating fires within the purview of the joint force maritime component commander and that agency’s authority may not extend into the adjacent joint battlespace. For instance, if a JFC asset fires a land attack missile into the JTF battlespace, procedures must be developed to coordinate this mission with all affected agencies. Procedural measures alone will not resolve all fire support coordination issues.

            6.4.3 Real-Time Fires Coordination

            The real-time coordination of fires depends upon the creation of the single integrated air picture (SIAP). SIAP is not expected to be available before the 2015 timeframe as covered by this CONOPS, but is discussed here for completeness. SIAP will provide a single continuous realtime track and positive identification for all airborne objects within joint sensor range. This real-time air picture will: (1) enable dynamic four-dimensional deconfliction of long-range, high-altitude ordnance and aircraft flight paths, (2) provide track and identification information to joint air defense networks to prevent an inadvertent response to friendly air assets, and (3) enable force self-synchronization to increase speed of command and accelerate mission execution.

            Self-synchronization is the capability of a well-informed force to coordinate complex warfare activities from the bottom-up, instead of the traditional top-down approach. For example, a manned aircraft conducting a time critical strike mission would be instantly notified if the aircraft’s current track would potentially intersect the predicted future flight path of any other airborne object. Any flight path conflicts would prompt the system to recommend a corrective action to the pilot.

            It is important to note that the SIAP will minimize, not eliminate, the need for airspace control measures. Some control measures will always be required because: (1) tracking and bandwidth resources will always be limited, especially in the congested littoral environment; (2) safety will always be a concern; and (3) backup measures in case of system failure must always be available. A step in developing the SIAP is the cooperative engagement capability (CEC), which integrates sensors and fire control systems into a common tactical picture.

            6.4.4 Near Real-Time Procedural Coordination (NRTPC)

            Improvements in procedural coordination must be pursued as the primary solution until a realtime coordination capability is available. Procedural coordination needs to be provided in near real-time allowing for opening and closing corridors and bubbles around targets and weapons enroute. As tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed and shared situational awareness improves, the timeframe for accomplishing this should approach the 5-minute update range.

            There is no specified agency that has the authority, capability, and systems to properly execute this process of NRTPC in support of the JFC. New capabilities require the merger of procedural measures with the real-time picture. Aegis has a capability to overlay airspace coordination measures onto real-time track information. However, there is no current requirement to integrate maneuver control and fire support coordination measures within Aegis. The complete implementation of NRTPC will require the continued development of technology to reduce the latency of information and enhance the effectiveness of procedural coordination to integrate and deconflict joint fires and the real-time control of assets. Unit boundaries and fire support coordination and control measures can be safely expanded both seaward and inland to encompass the increased ranges of weapons systems available to the battlespace commander with an enhanced coordination capability.

            Implementation of the NRTPC concept requires that a single authority exercise coordination of all fires within the designated boundaries of the battlespace. This coordination function includes all ground, naval surface, subsurface, and air delivered fires, as well as non-lethal operations. A naval fires coordinator (NFC) will be designated with the authority to integrate all naval fires with all other joint fires.6 Depending on the requirements of the operation, the NFC may be assigned to either Navy or Marine Corps control. The NFC may be located in the carrier intelligence center (CVIC), the SACC, or the FFCC where the existing capabilities of these agencies can be employed to perform this function.

            Footnote 6: See section 4.3.1 for a description of this notional command structure.

            The NFC must be supported with the appropriate personnel and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) assets to provide the level of coordination necessary for a given operation. It may be necessary to establish a separate naval fires coordination cell (NFCC)7 to perform this function. Until a real-time coordination capability is fielded, the NFC requires the automated capability to manage battlespace geometries to arbitrate conflicts in their use.

            Footnote 7: NFC and NFCC are further discussed in Appendix C.

            Comment


            • #7
              2003 CONOPS Chapter 7:
              Planning, Targeting, And Execution



              7.0 PLANNING, TARGETING, AND EXECUTION

              The effectiveness of future naval surface fires will be enhanced through a streamlined continuous loop process that includes mission planning, target acquisition and development, execution, and assessment. This process emphasizes an effects-based1 approach to warfare that is focused on achieving the commander’s objectives by all available means with the least risk, time, and expenditure of resources.

              Footnote 1: Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, page I-4.


              7.1 INTRODUCTION

              Land attack warfare involves the coordinated use of all available joint planning, targeting, and execution assets. These individual systems must be able to function as one overall land attack system-of-systems, capable of rapidly and efficiently conducting this mission area. For example, target data from disparate space, air, and ground sensors must be readily accessible to the proper command and control systems to facilitate the targeting process. This target data must then be efficiently distributed to the various weapon systems to facilitate mission planning, assignment, and execution. In addition, weapon delivery information must be coordinated with battle damage assessments to complete the loop back to command and control for mission evaluation.


              7.2 PLANNING

              Land attack planning starts with rules of engagement and commander’s guidance, and includes attack analysis, scheduling fires, preparing for attacks against targets of opportunity and time critical targets, coordinating assets, positioning assets, allocating communications resources, providing combat service support, and computing firing data. In the past, much of this planning effort has been done manually at various levels of the command structure.

              Land attack planning conducted at the joint force commander (JFC) level optimizes employment of fires by integrating and synchronizing them with the supported commander’s concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. Targets are selected for their tactical, operational, and strategic values.

              Ground component commanders prepare fire support plans and determine the requirements for close air support, naval surface strike (NSS), naval surface fire support (NSFS), field artillery, and mortars. The desired effect on the target, as well as the potential for collateral damage around the target, are major considerations in selecting the weapon type and amount of munitions.

              Targeting teams assist the commander by synchronizing operations, recommending targets to acquire and attack, and evaluating battle damage assessment (BDA). Fire support planning at the maneuver element commander’s level concentrates on identifying on-call targets, integrating fire plans with the scheme of maneuver, and executing fire plans.

              The Navy’s global command and control system (GCCS-M) will provide common situational awareness data and information to land attack command and control elements and engagement planners via the common operational picture (COP). The COP will display current battlespace information in a graphical manner through links to detailed operational data and information.

              7.2.1 Naval Surface Fire Support

              NSFS missions may be performed by any of the onboard weapon systems. Coordinating NSFS with the movement of forces ashore will become increasingly complex. The MV-22 tilt-rotor assault transport and the advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV) will enable faster and longer ranging maneuver force capabilities. As a consequence, the increased range of the new land attack weapons supporting OMFTS will require rapid time-space coordination and deconfliction across a much larger battlespace. With the introduction of new mission planning and coordination systems and the mobile ground combat operations centers (COCs), fire planning will become more responsive to the maneuver commander.

              The naval fires control system (NFCS) is the surface combatant’s land attack mission planning and coordination system that will provide digital connectivity between the shipboard land attack systems and the off-board land attack command and control systems. The initial NFCS configuration consists of installed hardware and software that can operate on any of the four TTWCS consoles. NFCS mission tasking may be received from shipboard targeting systems or from off-board sources such as a supporting arms coordination center (SACC), a fire support coordination center (FSCC), a fire support element (FSE), or a forward observer. NFCS also allows land attack personnel to manually input information received from voice radio circuits. Planning for TACTOM as a fire support weapon will be accomplished via the TTWCS system as discussed in the following section.

              7.2.2 Naval Surface Strike

              Naval surface strike (NSS) missions may be performed by any of the onboard weapon systems. For most NSS missions, Tomahawk is the weapon of choice and will be until other systems are fielded, such as the extended range guided munition (ERGM), long-range land attack projectile (LRLAP), and advanced land attack missile (ALAM).

              The Tomahawk missile system uses both the cruise missile support activities (CMSAs) and afloat planning system (APS) detachments to plan the route and flight profile for Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM) missions from the first preplanned waypoint to the target. These agencies provide the expertise and equipment necessary to fully employ the unique capabilities of the Tomahawk missile to support the regional combatant commander or joint force commander. APSs have the ability to plan conventional TLAM missions end-to-end, as would a CMSA, but on a much more limited basis. They also generate new missions by modifying existing ones contained in their master mission library. APS is designed to provide the battle force/battlegroup commander operational flexibility by quickly generating some missions as a rapid response to emerging targets.2

              The Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) weapon control system (TTWCS) aboard surface combatants is capable of planning strategic, operational and tactical missions for the TACTOM missile, while retaining the preplanned mission capabilities of earlier missiles.3 In addition, the TACTOM missile, when placed in a loitering mode, may be used as a quick response weapon against time critical targets. The shipboard Tomahawk weapon system, using the launch platform mission planning function, will provide this responsiveness by speeding the mission planning process, taking into account airspace control requirements and fire support coordination measures through use of manually entered no fly/must fly areas, and reducing the probability of attrition by avoiding known threats. TTWCS will interface with existing and evolving land attack and fire support systems to support the tactical mission objectives.

              Footnote 2: APS will transition to strike planning cells in 2004.

              Footnote 3: Refer to the Tomahawk Weapon System Baseline IV Phase 1 Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence Support Plan (C4ISP) for a more detailed account of the employment of the Tactical Tomahawk.

              7.2.3 Munitions Loadout

              The surface combatant of the 2015 timeframe will have a variety of munitions that can be used in support of land attack warfare. Ships will have 5-inch and 155mm gun systems that will deliver ballistic and guided munitions against targets ashore, as well as vertically launched Tomahawk cruise missiles and an advanced land attack missile. A key consideration will be to maximize use of available weapon storage/ carrying capacity while maintaining the capability for the combatant to meet all of its assigned multi-warfare mission area requirements. The munitions loadout mix must be carefully tailored to both meet the specific threat requirements in the combatant’s assigned area of operations, as well as to maintain the flexibility to meet any unexpected threats that may arise.

              The loadouts for the naval gun systems will depend upon the mission areas allocated to the guns on each type of ship. Three mission areas have been identified for the 5-inch/62-caliber guns on the Aegis cruisers and destroyers: NSFS, surface warfare (SUW), and anti-air warfare (AAW). On the DD(X) ships, the 155mm gun system is expected to provide capability in NSFS and SUW. Although the gun systems are primarily a fire support weapon for troops ashore, they also have the capability to attack most operational and strategic targets within range.

              The loadouts for the Tomahawk weapon system and the advanced land attack missile4 will depend on anticipated preplanned and tactical mission requirements for satisfying land attack mission objectives. Both missiles will provide capabilities against a wide variety of tactical, operational, and strategic targets, and will be capable of meeting rapid response times against time-critical targets.

              The Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS)5 is the storage and launching system for the Tomahawk cruise missile, the air-defense standard missiles, the vertical launch anti-submarine rocket, and the evolved sea sparrow missile. The number of VLS cells available on a ship must accommodate a mix of weapons designed for different offensive and defensive missions. Because of these competing demands, the actual number of land attack missiles per ship will be significantly less than the total VLS cell capacity, and will be determined by their availability and the requirements for the other VLS-launched weapons.

              Land attack planners also need to consider and schedule missile and ammunition replenishment of surface combatants. This is particularly important when the tactical situation may involve sustained operations ashore, as the extended range of the new land attack weapons will increase the likelihood that they will be employed for the duration of the operation. Reliance on sea-based land attack weapons may significantly increase if the troops ashore require high mobility and maintain only a minimum of shore-based fire support assets. These factors must be considered when estimating replenishment needs for the land attack combatants.6

              Footnote 4: There is currently no defined program for the advanced land attack missile.

              Footnote 5: Mk 41 VLS is a below-deck launching system comprised of 25-foot-high launching modules. It is installed on all Aegis combatants except the Baseline 1 cruisers (CG47–51).

              Footnote 6: Chapter 8 covers logistics in detail.

              7.2.4 Allocation and Control

              Higher command echelons may allocate land attack resources, including gun-launched munitions and VLS launched missiles, for specific uses or among subordinate components or commands. Guidance on gun-launched munition allocation will most likely be provided the commander, amphibious task force; commander, landing force; or a corps commander, although the supported land or naval force commander may also provide inputs.

              The JFC may reserve a specific number of Tomahawk missiles to achieve specific operational and strategic effects. Some Tomahawk missiles may also be allocated to subordinate commanders for tasking and employment. Although normally assigned to deep strike and interdiction targets, Tactical Tomahawk missiles may also be allocated to a maneuver unit and be employed in direct support. Scheduling would be on the air tasking order (ATO) in a manner similar to close air support.

              At the tactical level, commanders may further allocate fire support resources by assigning priority of fires. Priority of fires is usually assigned to the unit designated as the main effort, and provides guidance to a fire support planner to organize and employ available fire support assets.

              7.2.5 Stationing

              Surface combatant stationing is another important consideration in the employment of land attack resources. The naval commander will need to consider his multi-warfare mission requirements along with the number and specific capabilities of each assigned surface combatant. The following paragraphs cover some of the typical considerations that must be taken into account.

              Fire support areas (FSAs) are maneuver areas assigned to fire support ships. Fire support stations (FSSs) are exact locations within a FSA. With the added range and flight characteristics of the new land attack weapons, the positioning of the fire support ships will be less constrained by such things as the gun target line (GTL), ship maneuvering room, and obstacles. However, GTL considerations may still be a factor when highvolume/ long duration suppression fires using low-cost ballistic munitions are needed.

              Ship stationing is also an important consideration for controlling the firing of munitions across boundaries. Proper stationing can reduce the challenge of fire support coordination by limiting the volume and complexity of airspace requiring deconfliction. Communications connectivity should also be considered when stationing surface combatants. Depending on the communications frequency and satellite footprints, ships may need to be repositioned to maintain connectivity with the units maneuvering ashore. Tomahawk launch baskets are stations from which the surface combatants launch TLAMs. The missile must be launched to meet the specific mission requirements.

              7.2.6 Mission Effects

              Land attack missions are categorized by the desired effect. This categorization provides a clear description of the land attack mission being planned and executed. A number of factors must be considered when selecting the appropriate weapon for attacking a target:
              -- Nature and importance of the target
              -- Engagement time window
              -- Target dwell time
              -- Availability and location of attack assets
              -- Range to target
              -- Location of target
              -- Target location error
              -- Desired mission effects
              -- Potential collateral damage

              Table 7-1 lists the mission effects for NSS and NSFS, and provides a short definition of each mission effect.



              (Reader Note: Table 7-1 is also reproduced here as a series of text lines: )

              Table 7-1. NSS and NSFS Mission Effects

              Destruction -- NSS/ NSFS

              Definition: Fires delivered for the sole purpose of destroying the target’s combat effectiveness.

              Considerations: Land attack munitions utilizing precision guidance systems for navigation, target location and weapon guidance, carrying submunitions or unitary blast fragmentation payloads, can be accurately delivered and effective against a wide range of targets. Some targets may require a high volume of fires to achieve destruction.

              Neutralization -- NSS/ NSFS

              Definition: Fires intended to render the target temporarily ineffective or unusable.

              Considerations: Land attack munitions utilizing precision guidance systems guidance can be effective and accurately delivered to quickly neutralize targets that may be difficult to destroy.

              Suppression*/ SEAD -- NSS/ NSFS

              Definition: Fires placed on or about a weapons system** which degrade its performance below the level needed to fulfill its mission for some period of time.

              Considerations: The long range, high accuracy and predictable time on-target delivery of land attack munitions may be suitable for SEAD or short duration suppression missions. The relatively high cost of precision guided munitions may limit their usefulness in volume fire missions.

              * Suppression includes counterfire/counterbattery.

              Interdiction -- NSS/NSFS

              Definition: Fires placed in an area to divert, disrupt, delay, or restrict the enemy’s freedom of movement or prevent the enemy from using the area.

              Considerations: The long range and accuracy of land attack munitions may be suitable for interdiction missions. The relatively high cost of precision-guided munitions may limit their usefulness in volume fire missions.

              Harassing

              Definition: NSFS Fires designed to disturb the enemy’s rest, curtail movement, or lower morale.

              Considerations: Land attack munitions can be used in conjunction with aircraft, artillery and mortars to effectively provide harassing fires. Low cost ballistic munitions can be used over extended periods to provide sustained effects.

              Screening or Obscuration

              Definition: NSFS Fires used to conceal friendly maneuver elements or suppress the enemy by obscuring his view of the battlefield.

              Considerations: NSFS high explosive or white phosphorus rounds are available to achieve this mission effect within the ballistic range capability of the gun system.

              Illumination

              Definition: NSFS Fires used to allow observation of enemy operations and movement during periods of reduced visibility.

              Considerations: NSFS can deliver illumination out to the ballistic range of the gun system.

              ** Weapons system is a combination of one or more weapons including all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment.



              7.3 TARGETING

              Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities.

              Strategic, operational, and tactical objectives dictate targeting priorities. Tactical targeting is based on the friendly scheme of maneuver and the fire support capabilities at the commander’s disposal. Targeting includes an assessment of the weather, terrain, and the enemy’s situation, and identifies enemy units, equipment, facilities, and terrain that must be attacked or influenced to ensure success. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying resources (targets) the enemy can least afford to lose or that provide him with the greatest advantage. Targets must be detected, accurately located,7 identified, and prioritized for effective attack. Maneuver, fires, electronic attack, or a combination of these may be used to attack the selected targets.

              Footnote 7: The GPS guidance systems use the WGS-84 datum. All targeting data must be referenced to this datum.

              7.3.1 Targeting Process

              Joint doctrine and existing service planning procedures for the acquisition, selection, and attack of targets have four common stages:
              -- Decide in advance what is to be targeted
              -- Detect the target
              -- Deliver an attack against it
              -- Assess the results of the attack

              This targeting process shown in figure 7-1 represents the effective integration of command and staff activities, intelligence systems, and weapons systems. The targeting process is the same whether the targets and objectives are strategic, operational, or tactical, and is not tied to any particular weapon system. The phases shown in the diagram are not separate segments, but instead, blend into each other and are continuously updated and adjusted.



              Among many factors that must be considered during the targeting process, two key factors are the target location error (TLE) and the target dwell time. The TLE describes the error inherent in the process of locating a target. Every target acquisition sensor has some inherent error that drives the total TLE. If the TLE is unknown, the type of sensor used to locate the target should be included in the mission report in order to estimate TLE. The dwell time is the length of time a target is expected to remain in one location. For effective engagement of stationary mobile targets, the anticipated dwell time of the target, the time of detection, and the overall response time of the system must be considered. Therefore, data time tags and target dwell time estimates are essential parts of the targeting data.8

              7.3.2 Targeting Products

              Several products are generated during the targeting process that assist the commander in accomplishing his operational objectives, and help him set criteria to be used. These products include the high payoff target list (HPTL), the attack guidance matrix (AGM), and the target selection standards (TSS).

              Footnote 8: For a more detailed description of the targeting process, see Joint Pub 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, 17 January 2002, and Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, 12 May 1998.

              7.3.2.1 High Payoff Target List (HPTL)

              High payoff targets are targets that, if successfully attacked, would contribute substantially to friendly operations. The HPTL prioritizes these targets to reflect the commander’s precedence list and the threat. Table 7-2 is an example of an HPTL.




              7.3.2.2 Attack Guidance Matrix (AGM)

              The AGM condenses the staff and commander’s decisions for attack of planned targets and targets of opportunity. Included in the AGM is a prioritized list of high payoff targets, when and how the target should be attacked, the desired effect of the attack, and any special instructions or requirements for BDA. The AGM provides an easy to read single source document for most of the targeting information. Table 7-3 is an example of an AGM.




              7.3.2.3 Target Selection Standards (TSS)

              The TSS are the criteria the targeting team uses to differentiate actual targets from suspected targets. The TSS considers attack system requirements, target characteristics (size, activity, etc.), and the timeliness of the targeting information. Table 7-4 is an example of TSS.





              7.3.3 Target Types

              7.3.3.1 Point Target

              A point target is one of such small dimension that it requires the accurate placement of ordnance to neutralize or destroy it. Examples of point targets are mobile guns and missile launchers, single vehicles, aircraft shelters, and bunkers.

              7.3.3.2 Area Target

              An area target consists of a very large object or a set of target elements distributed over an area. Area target examples are enemy formations or materiel targets such as armored formations, truck parks, ammunition dumps, petroleum/ oil/lubricant (POL) dumps, and communication centers. Using predetermined fire patterns or sheafs9 allows land attack weapons to effectively engage area targets. It is important to define the size and shape of an area target to ensure accurate engagement.

              Footnote 9: In artillery and naval gunfire support, planned planes (lines) of fire that produce a desired pattern of bursts with rounds fired by two or more weapons.

              7.3.3.3 Moving Target

              Moving targets are typically tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles used by a mechanized ground force. Land attack weapons can be effective against a moving target if the overall movement of the target during time of flight can be reasonably predicted (e.g., movement restricted to a road or transit of a known choke point) or if the target’s movement can be stalled temporarily. However, to hit a moving target with a high probability of kill requires a weapon that can either receive last minute precision targeting updates, or has a terminal seeker capability.

              7.3.3.4 Planned Target

              A planned target is one that is known to exist in an operational area and can be either scheduled or on-call. A scheduled target is included in a fire support plan or ATO for attack during a specified time window. An on-call target is also included in the fire support plan or ATO, but is only attacked when required.

              7.3.3.5 Target of Opportunity

              Targets of opportunity are targets encountered that were not previously known or planned. When an emergent target is of high value/high payoff or an immediate threat, the fires system must be able to respond expeditiously. This may involve prearranged procedures designed to send targeting data directly from a sensor to the firing unit. Targets of opportunity will continue to represent a large portion of the targets engaged at the tactical level.

              7.3.3.6 Time Sensitive Target

              A time sensitive target (TST) is defined as “Targets requiring immediate response because they pose a clear and present danger to friendly forces or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.”10 A time sensitive target falls into three broad categories:
              -- One that presents an immediate and significant threat because of its capability, speed, and/or range
              -- One that is a high priority target that offers a short window of vulnerability
              -- One that becomes a priority due to its military significance during a particular phase of a conflict

              A TST can have importance from a tactical, operational, or strategic perspective. They can be found throughout the battlespace and must be identified and categorized during the planning phase. Normally, the joint force commander establishes time sensitive target priorities during the commander’s objective and guidance phase of the joint planning process. Target acquisition assets are then prepositioned to detect and identify the TSTs, and specific weapon systems are reserved to engage and destroy them. Up to now the focus of engaging TSTs has been with aviation assets. Surface combatants can also be integrated into the TST process once new fast response targeting systems and weapons reach the fleet.

              Footnote 10: Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

              Tactical ballistic missile transporter-erector launchers (TBM TELs) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction represent a serious threat to friendly forces. The problem is compounded by the TEL’s ability to quickly emerge from prepared camouflaged or hardened shelters, shoot, and then return to the shelter. These targets may be specifically designated as time critical targets (TCTs) where immediate engagement outweighs other operational considerations.11 Many decisions and steps in the attack sequence must be preprogrammed or automated to meet the necessary reaction times for this target category. High priority launch and hide sites will be assigned continuous sensor and weapon coverage.

              The integrated engagement process will correlate track data and target identification confidence levels to determine suitable sensor to- weapon-to-target matching, and then communicate the results to the decision makers, if not directly to the weapons. An evaluation of the success of the attack must also be performed so that the TST can be re-engaged as required.

              Footnote 11: TCT is a sub-category of TSTs and the differences between them are discussed in Chapter 3.


              7.3.4 Targeting Sources

              The scope of targeting sources ranges from national assets and intelligence for identifying preplanned targets, to forward observers on the ground and in the air to identify targets of opportunity. National and theater level sensors provide data to intelligence processing facilities that in turn provide intelligence support to the fleet. Commanders and coordination centers then develop strategic and operational target lists that are relayed to the appropriate firing unit. The surface combatant will typically receive missions and primary targeting information from external sources. If performing in the NSS single unit or multi-unit commander role, the combatant may also have the capability to receive raw, unevaluated data directly from an organic or nonorganic sensor (e.g., from an unmanned aerial vehicle) and develop precision targeting data.

              7.3.4.1 Non-Organic Sources

              Non-organic sources of pre-processed targeting information (in the form of mission data) could include a supporting arms coordination center, a fire support coordination center, a force fires coordination center, a fire support element, a strike warfare commander, a surface battlegroup commander, or a joint intelligence center. Sources of unprocessed targeting information could include national sensors, other intelligence information, the joint surveillance and targeting attack radar system (JSTARS), theater and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles, fixed and rotary winged aircraft, ground force targeting systems such as the target location designation and handoff system (TLDHS), and voice messages.

              As mentioned in Chapter 1, the future networkcentric battlespace will divide the warfighting problem into a sensor, command and control, and engagement grid. The naval fires network (NFN) will initially integrate the sensor grid elements, overlaying intelligence information from pre-existing databases and multiple realtime air, space, and ground sensors. NFN will integrate the surveillance/reconnaissance pictures and present the resulting information in a form that enables rapid target detection, identification, and localization. This targeting information can then be rapidly transmitted to the command and control, and engagement grids for disposition. NFN will ultimately evolve to a combat systems network, integrating the sensor, C2, and engagement grid elements to achieve time sensitive targeting.

              7.3.4.2 Organic Sources

              The surface combatant can augment non-organic source information with available organic target acquisition sensors. Organic sources of targeting data can include the AN/SPY-1 radar in a potential counterfire/counterbattery mode, a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) controlled by the ship, a thermal imaging sensor system or electro-optical sight, and an improved LAMPS MH-60R helicopter with an electro-optical sensor and video data link.

              Since publishing the original Conops in July 2001, funding for the production of the vertical takeoff tactical UAV (VTUAV) has been withheld. The VTUAV program is critical to providing combatants the organic capability to conduct land attack warfare as envisioned in the Naval Transformation Roadmap. This system was included in the October 2001 workshop in preparation for this document.

              7.3.5 Weapon Employment Considerations

              Details on the employment of the individual weapon systems can be found in Appendix B. Table 7-5, at the end of this chapter, summarizes these considerations.



              7.4 EXECUTION

              7.4.1 Mission Timelines

              Various missions have different planning and execution timelines. Surface combatants must have the capability to plan and execute fires to respond to tactical, operational, and strategic mission requirements. These fires must be coordinated with other fires and maintain consistency with the JFC’s intent and campaign objectives. Fires delivered in close proximity to friendly forces require detailed coordination with the fire and maneuver of those forces.

              Tactical fires are characterized by short response times (2.5 minutes or less) because the targets are immediately threatening friendly forces. Examples include counterfire/counterbattery and final protective fires.

              Operational fires are characterized by relatively short response times (tens of minutes to several hours) because the targets have the potential to threaten friendly forces in the near future. They are normally delivered at some distance from friendly forces. For example, interdiction fires could disrupt or delay enemy reinforcements, thereby increasing the effectiveness of friendly ground operations.

              Strategic fires are characterized by long response times (hours or days) because the targets are fixed or are not in a position to immediately threaten friendly forces. Typical targets include enemy centers of gravity or nodes critical to the execution of the enemy’s campaign plan.

              7.4.2 Commanding Officer’s Responsibility

              The responsibility of the ship’s commanding officer will depend on the role the ship is performing and the existing command and control relationships. This responsibility could vary from simply executing orders to fire received in the NSFS supporting unit role, to performing the surveillance, targeting, mission planning, and mission execution functions in the NSS single unit role. The command and control structure of future surface combatants conducting land attack warfare must be sufficiently robust to support this broad range of responsibilities.

              In the NSFS controlling unit and NSS multi-unit commander roles, the surface combatant directing the fires of other ships would probably be the ship with an embarked commander (such as a group commander or DESRON), or a properly equipped cruiser. The commanding officer takes on additional responsibilities for fires direction and coordination when exercising this role.

              Future Marine Corps expeditionary operations will place greater reliance on sea-based support. The surface combatants must be able to sustain the required firepower and C4ISRT support to the forces ashore under all conditions. New weapons systems are being developed to allow the surface combatant to remain over the horizon. However, circumstances may require that the surface combatant approach the shore to extend the range of the fire support assets, reduce projectile time of flight, perform counterfire missions with sea-based assets, or perform search and rescue operations.

              7.4.3 Shared Resources

              Surface combatants are being upgraded to provide significant new land attack, theater ballistic missile defense, and cooperative engagement capability functionality. However, there are only a limited number of existing consoles and operators available to support these new capabilities, operator training is already too long and complex, and crew sizes may be significantly reduced in the near future.12

              Footnote 12: See the ‘Training Requirements Document’ published by the Manpower and Training WIPT for further detail.

              These new capabilities create demands for flexible manning options such as special support teams, either created from shipboard personnel or brought aboard as mission specific teams, to support the more specialized functional areas. Future reduced-manning platforms may also require personnel to operate across multiple warfare areas. This situation will place additional requirements for cross certification of specialties, and standardized man-machine interfaces and procedures.

              Land attack operations require the use of the multi-warfare capable gun, VLS, TUAV, and radar assets. The ship’s commanding officer must closely monitor the real-time multi-warfare tactical picture and manage his available assets across multiple mission areas. For example, if an anti-ship missile threat exists the ship may not have the radar resources available to perform the counterfire mission. The nature of the complex littoral operational environment requires careful planning across multiple warfare areas and execution using all shared resources.

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