The long-term manipulation of the "trend" in football, basketball, would be training to increase the "soft-power" skills, selection to improve the squad and building up the reputation.Originally Posted by Officer of Engineers
Possibly also by familiarising yourself with the coaches, the other oppossing players over different seasons. Manipulate the transfer market (especially in soccer).
Dont know if im anywhere close though..
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit - Scottish Motto
"They that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that dislike it, heresy; and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion” Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan
Mr.Andy the SHI sounds interesting. But I don't understand a word of the concept.
I am a lowly Ifn Medic who knows next to nothing about tactics.Can you please direct me to a source which explains in simpler terms. I tried out google but I am still unable to get a clearer picture...
Seek Save Serve Medic
I would like to take one step back and look at it from Shi as I understood it.
1. First one considers all elements when dealing with an “issue” or a “goal” hard, soft, etc. identify the trend.
2. Manage and manipulate the trend by moving all elements and their interlinks in your favor.
3. Put oneself in such a favorable position by riding the trend, when the event unfold or time to show the card, you already won.
Andy,
Help me out here. Let's use something that we've spent time on. WZC and in fact, let's use the one example of WZC, the 1962 War
1) What are the elements?
2) I see two trends, the politcal/diplomatic (catching the Indians unaware) and the military (positioning of forces). What am I missing?
3) What was the trend that they were riding? On paper at least, the InA was just as prepared as the PLA was. Nothing I've read would suggest that the PLA knew the sorry state of the Indian soldiers. In fact, by their very preparation, they were expecting and prepared for a much bigger fight.
I think the Shi is a bunch of tactical "victories" by managing trends, in pursuit of a larger goal. Just use all the resources at your disposal- politics, war, economics, to keep getting favourable position after another, whilst moving with a clear end goal in mind.
Easier said than done.
Karmani Vyapurutham Dhanuhu
My bow is stretched for its task
1) What are the elements?
Clarify? 1962, WZC or both.
Initiatives and active defense, You can not master the trend with out initiatives.
2) I see two trends, the politcal/diplomatic (catching the Indians unaware) and the military (positioning of forces). What am I missing?
The goal is India out of tibet.
3) What was the trend that they were riding? On paper at least, the InA was just as prepared as the PLA was. Nothing I've read would suggest that the PLA knew the sorry state of the Indian soldiers. In fact, by their very preparation, they were expecting and prepared for a much bigger fight.
PRC wants to be India's friend and a new defense accord signed last week. Know thy enemy, know thyself, in every aspect.
Already, India commentaries, some of them extremely nationalistic, speak of the value of trade. Not that I believe there will be a war, in fact, far from it. India is moving upward, thus the trend is change and the old position via Pakistan is not working as well as it once was.
Last edited by xinhui; 03 Jun 06, at 17:21.
AHA! Thank you. That was the missing piece.
So, if I understand this right, within the SHI concept, both the diplomatic and military actions were not designed to humiliate India but to establish a border on China's behalf ... and that would happen regardless if the PLA win or lose because India is now aware that China will fight and to interfere in Tibet would require a substantial bigger effort, one that India is neither willing nor capable of affording.
And my head hurts once more. I had thought China had an entire army to use against India. Remember Chinawarrior stated that the CCP wanted war while the PLA did not during the 80s border zig zag by both sides? The PLA informed the CCP that the only way they could fight such a war was to open a 2nd front through Pakistan. That to me stated that not only the PLA had plans to use Pak territory but also plans to use the Pak Army.
Now, you're saying this is not the case anymore. I need a shot of Glenlivet.
maybe OT
The Chinese high command page 492-493
Mao’s ten points of theater operation 1947
1. Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first; attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.
2. Take small and medium cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
3. Made wiping out the enemy’s effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a city or place our main objective. Holding or seizing a city or place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy’s effective strength, and often a city or place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.
4. In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force (tow, three, four, and sometimes even five or six times the enemy’s strength), encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing the enemy crushing blows, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and attack on one or both his flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part of routing another so that our army can swiftly move its troop to smash other enemy force. Strive to avoid battles of attrition, in which we lose more than we gain or break even. In this way, although inferior as a while (in terms of numbers), w shall be absolutely superior in every part and every specific campaign, and this insures victory in the campaign. As time goes on, we shall become superior as a while and eventually wipe out al the enemy [this was the tactic Mao used to win the first 4 encirclement campaign conducted by the KMT during the late 20s]
5. Fight no battle unprepared; fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle; made every effort to insure victory in the given set of condition as between the enemy and ourselves.
6. Give full play to our style of fighting – courage in battle, no fear of sacrifices, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time without rest)
7. Strive to wipe out the enemy when he is on the move, At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities.
8. With regard to attacking cities, resolutely seize all enemy fortified points and cities which are weakly defended, At opportune moments, size all enemy fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. As for strongly defended fortified points and cities, wait till condition are ripe and then take them.
9. Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy. Our army’s main sources of manpower and material are at the front [this address the condition of the Chinese civil war]
10. Make good use of intervals between campaigns to rest, train and consolidate our troops. Period of rest, training, and consolidation should not in general be very long, and the enemy should in so far as possible be permitted no breathing space
The communist pattern of tactical or strategic attack has usually been either to swiftly seize key terrain with the main force, while using secondary force or even guerrillas to delay or prevent the timely arrival of enemy reinforcements, or conversely, to threaten key terrain with secondary force, while seeking to annihilate enemy reinforcements with the main force. In general, the communists selected key terrain on the basis of its value to the enemy as an avenue of withdrawal; that is location on a major avenue of approach into or withdrawal from the overall (strategic) area of operation. The objective in sizing or threatening such a point was to force the enemy to attempt to recover the point by moving in a predictable direction through terrain where the communists could select the site for a decisive tactical battle (point even of Mao’s ten point) [The problem with 79, the Vietnamese did not move, they dig in a wait, it is their turf]
While those tactics characterized communist behavior in countless isolated tactical battles during the Kiangsi and sino-japanese war period, they were translated onto a vast strategic stage only during the Civil war. In the initial phase of the Liao-Shen Campaign, Lin Piao threw a secondary force against ShanHaiKuan and Chinchou in order to isolate the strategic area of operations from further nationalist reinforcement from the south of the Great Wall. While secondary force threatened the major national garrison at Changchun, the main communist force moved toward chinchou in anticipation of decisive battle with what they assumed would be a major reinforcement nationalist column from shenyang. At the outset of this campaign, the communist sought to isolate the entire nationalist force by closing off its main land avenue of approach and withdrawal. The Huai-Hai Campaign also began with main force attack against Huang Po-Tao where troops, locate don the eastern flank of the nationalist army, were most likely to escape along the Lung-hai railroad to the east coast. While secondary force harassed other more powerful units along the Lung-Hai railroad, Huang’s force were isolated and defeated piecemeal.
Once again, the Peiping-Tientsin campaign began with swift strikes by secondary forces against both the western and eastern flanks of Fu-Tsoi’s army, in order to preclude his sudden escape in either direction. Finally the great offensive against the Southwest began with a secondary force attack against Hu Tsung nan’s army in Northern Szechwan, in order to delay his withdrawal and preclude his linkup with Pai Chung His’s force south of the Yangtze river.
So, if I understand this right, within the SHI concept, both the diplomatic and military actions were not designed to humiliate India but to establish a border on China's behalf ... and that would happen regardless if the PLA win or lose because India is now aware that China will fight and to interfere in Tibet would require a substantial bigger effort, one that India is neither willing nor capable of affording.
Same can apply to 1979
I had a great deal of respect for China warrior, but I am speaking the current trend, not 1987. Note where PLA place their latest toys.
Shi is "the propensity of things"--the flow of dynamic, alternating forces, which expresses itself at every level, form the individual to the cosmos, and in every time. The trick is to recognize this flow and take advantage of it.
Shi is expressed in everything, but to the Westerner it can most clearly be seen in a popular poetic text such as the I Ching and in popular art such as calligraphy and landscape painting:
* Calligraphy: One can understand a fundamental difference in Western and Chinese thought simply by observing the differing tools for the production of writing. Unlike in the West where content takes precedence over form, in China, the two are one. This can clearly be seen in Chinese calligraphy where the tension and balance of the letters is inherent to the art and its expression in masterfully drawn characters is a pure expression of shi. The balancing in yin and yang, of polar yet complimentary energies expressed in calligraphy are the same qualities that the Chinese apply to the content of the ideograms form, whether it be poetry or more practical matters such as foreign policy.
* Landscape Painting: Whereas in the West, the dominant art form is narrative, in China it is painting. The balance of forces expressed in calligraphy are also expressed in this related art of the brush stroke. Landscape painting is emphasized because the human subject does not take center stage in the Chinese worldview. The setting is as important as the subject and the recognition of the external force of shi takes precedence over individual virtues. What is most important in landscape painting is that the shi of a scene is expressed--its tension, its potential, its propensity. This is done at the level of form, of general structure, not at the level of details, in which God resides in the West.
It is telling that in attempting to fill the slots of myth Slotkin lays out for us, that the slots of narrative and genre are filled by calligraphy landscape painting. In the West the focus is on the individual, on the hero. In China the emphasis is on the situation and the setting, not on individual virtues. What is important is not the qualities inherent in the individual but recognizing the qualities inherent in the situation. The ultimate value is efficacy in the achievement of ones goals, and so if we must assign an individual virtue that the Chinese seeks to embody, it would be efficacy and the graceful expression of shi. One gets the sense that whereas Max Weber claimed that capitalism flourished in Calvinistic Protestant societies because worldly success was taken to be a sign of one's salvation, in China, the appreciation of the beauty of efficacy in nature and the expression of such efficacy in ones own life was a sign of grace and wisdom. This is why, perhaps, traditionally, the Chinese were not artists by trade but become artists late in life in order to manifest their understanding of shi. Because once one begins to understand shi, one can apply that understanding to all fields, because the patterns of shi flow through all things and at all levels. We can, for instance, appreciate, the beauty of the above painting at several levels for its expression of shi. We can, for instance, appreciate who the artist captures the kinetic tension of the dragons--itself the central symbol of shi--and the balance between order and chaos in the painting. The alternation of feeling in the painting is the essence of shi, and if one can see the shi in this painting, the Chinese suggest, one can see it everywhere, and once one can do that, he or she can apply this knowledge in one's day-to-day life.
* Confucius and the moralists held that a leader is effective because he or she is virtuous. If a ruler is not virtuous, is not moral and just, than the world will be out of balance and that ruler must change or be displaced by one better suited for the position.
* Lao Tzu and the legalists maintained that the person matters less than the position itself. As long as a ruler maintained the tenuous balances surrounding the advantages of his position, he or she would maintain power no matter what his or her personal virtues.
Regardless of ones political and ideological leanings, however, everyone worked within an understanding that the main thing was recognizing the flow of things and manipulating the situation to one's advantage. The moralists maintained that shi follows along a moral path, the legalist maintained that it followed its own path, neither moral or immoral and that effective action need not be moral action.
Policy making is a speculative field and like any speculative field, there is risk involved.
Chinese try to lessen this risk by understanding that there will always be ups and downs, the trick is to see them coming--the trick is to see the dragons. The key is adaptability and the knowledge that every situation has within it a set of patterns that one can trace, that one needs to trace, not only one or two moves ahead, but into the foreseeable future so that, for instance, we do not fund and train groups of people to fight our current enemy only to have these same groups later turn on us. Such things can be avoided with proper positioning. The current political trend of the major powers on the planet is globalization. We are in the midst of trying to define a new world order in which our aims are fairly clear--maintain a position of dominance and prosperity as we extend our frontiers and our spheres of influece--but our methodology is lacking in shi. We are acting on instincts and old myths, and its leading us down very dangerous paths. We engaged in a globally unpopular pre-emptive war without making any plans for even its economic costs let alone its potentially devastating cost in human life. The Chinese must be shaking their heads. We need to pursue our ends with a clearer sense of the big picture. Head on conflict right now puts us on the ebb, we are in a weak position, and gambling that victory will reverse our position, but not really knowing. We need to stop seeing our options as "this or that" and start seeing that there may be many paths to our ends, most of which would be more effective that our current course of action. In a game of Othello, sometimes the whole board changes when the final piece is put down. A master of the game may appear to be losing early on, but he sees where he needs to be positioned to achieve victory in the end. We need to look at the world this way. We need to make sure we know where the final piece will be placed before we start the game.
"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."
I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.
HAKUNA MATATA
And my brain is hurting again.
"Regardless of ones political and ideological leanings, however, everyone worked within an understanding that the main thing was recognizing the flow of things and manipulating the situation to one's advantage."
what above statement is a good summary. And, once your advantage is surpreme, like a tial wave, you win before the a shot is fired.
manipulating the situation might not always work, note the counter examples of Jiaman shelling I cited in my first post.
Col,
IMHO the grestest Shi master of the 20th century is Ronald Reagan and the way he won the cold war. So what the SDI does not work, it was not the point, the point was to force the other guy to spend the money he did no thave.
The other side of the coin, George W Bush is one of the worst Shi wanta-be in recently memory. His one-dimensional beliefs that by bring demo-crazy to Iraqi, it will end war on terrorism and peace in that region will not earn his a place in Shi hall of fame anytime soon.
It might have worked but for Rumsfeld's mistakes; primarily not enough men on the ground when the insurgency started.
You might be interested in this debate on what went wrong
http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/sho...t=Tommy+Franks
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