AirLand Battle

I've been trying to find a good primer on this very much mentioned but very misunderstood doctrine ... and it was written by the Air Force.

Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle

Introduction

Modern combat resources allow the attack to be mounted in such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously over his whole depth and to delay the movement of his reserves to the threatened sector. We now have at our disposal resources like aviation . . . which can make these deep sallies [raids]. In this way the enemy should be pinned down over the entire depth of his dispositions, encircled and destroyed.
—Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski
Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1934

During the 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle. Their objective was to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force to induce a catastrophic failure in his defensive system. 1 Soviet deep-battle theory was driven by technological advancements and the hope that maneuver warfare offered opportunities for quick, efficient, and decisive victory. The concurrent development of aviation and armor provided a physical impetus for this doctrinal evolution within the Red Army. Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevski stated that airpower should be “employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance.”

[shakari]

Sir,
Could you throw more more light on the misunderstandinds regarding this doctrine?

[Officer of Engineers]

On the misunderstanding?

Primary that the birdbrains do the majority of the killing and the majority of winning. At best, the work left to the bellycrawlers is mopping up. There is a strong misunderstanding on how integrated the two forces are. People not accustom to the thinking don't realize that hitting an electrical plant in Baghdad had a direct effect on the trench fight at the Kuwait border; not realizing that Saddam has to approve all movement and thus, if he cannot communicate, those units in the trenches won't move.

The birds do help in the ground fight but the ground fight is just as nasty and just as bloody as every fight in history.

Also, the bellycrawlers give the birdbrains something to hit. The enemy has to mass to stop an army coming over the border. That mass is what allow the birds to hit directly. Without the massing to stop an army (as happenned in Kosovo), the enemy would dispurse and bury their assets; effectively nulling any effect from the birds.

[shakari]

Sir,
Thank you, so the role of ground forces is a lot more than "just giving a finishing touch" and the role of Air component is more than tactical assistance.
The primary function of air component in AirLand is to immobilize the enemy rather than destroying it, is that what sums what you said?
This might sound a naive question but : What is the basic difference between Blitzkrieg and AirLand Doctrines?
I thought Blitzkrieg was integration of Air and Land components at strategic and/or operational level and AirLand is integration of the both components at operational and/or tactical level. How much sense does this make?
Thanks

[Officer of Engineers]

The primary function of air component in AirLand is to immobilize the enemy rather than destroying it, is that what sums what you said?

I would say it's to isolate and blind rather to immobilize. It takes a hell of alot of fire to immobilize a division but so much as to kill the LOCs between the division and the outside world.

This might sound a naive question but : What is the basic difference between Blitzkrieg and AirLand Doctrines?

Well, for one, Blitzkreig is a a misnomer. It was never a formal term within the Wehrmacht nor the Luftwaffle.

I thought Blitzkrieg was integration of Air and Land components at strategic and/or operational level and AirLand is integration of the both components at operational and/or tactical level.

I would not call Blitzkreig an integration. The Luftwaffle was given a time and space to do their job and get the hell out of there before the Wehrmacht came onto the scene. The Americans did far, far more as far as fire support for the ground troops is concerned.

The best the Luftwaffle can do is to soften up enemy ground forces but cannot communicate what state the enemy ground forces were nor even reduce the ground forces to a combat-ineffective state.

AirLand is much more intense, namely because the technology is much more intense. The air component can target specific enemy positions just before the ground forces hit them head on.

Akin to the Cold War days when we were expected to be subjecated to at least 10 hours of artillery before being bayonet charged by a column of tanks while the ringing is still in our ears.

Modern AirLand not only replicate this but also eliminates the massing necessary for this to occur (and deprive the enemy a mass to hit back with).

[shakari]

Sir,

I would say it's to isolate and blind rather to immobilize. It takes a hell of alot of fire to immobilize a division but so much as to kill the LOCs between the division and the outside world.

I understand that cutting LOCs would be a lot simple than immobilizing, then what is the actual idea behind the concept of "chokepoints"? Or may be I got "pinned" at

Modern combat resources allow the attack to be mounted in such a way as to strike the enemy simultaneously over his whole depth and to delay the movement of his reserves to the threatened sector. We now have at our disposal resources like aviation . . . which can make these deep sallies [raids]. In this way the enemy should be pinned down over the entire depth of his dispositions, encircled and destroyed.
—Mikhail Nikolaevich Tukhachevski
Marshal of the Soviet Union, 1934

Well, for one, Blitzkreig is a a misnomer. It was never a formal term within the Wehrmacht nor the Luftwaffle.

This is news to me! What then, the Wehrmacht used as formal term, for their new Doctrine?

I would not call Blitzkreig an integration. The Luftwaffle was given a time and space to do their job and get the hell out of there before the Wehrmacht came onto the scene. The Americans did far, far more as far as fire support for the ground troops is concerned.The best the Luftwaffle can do is to soften up enemy ground forces but cannot communicate what state the enemy ground forces were nor even reduce the ground forces to a combat-ineffective state.

AirLand is much more intense, namely because the technology is much more intense. The air component can target specific enemy positions just before the ground forces hit them head on.

Thats what I meant by integration at strategic level. I mean in my framework of understanding! That in Blitzkrieg the two components are working together on the same objective at strategic level but not at operational level or tactical level.
What I conceptualized that the co-ordination is coming down the levels over the time and in AirLand, both components not only work together on the same objective at strategic level but also at operational and tactical levels. The next doctrine will integrate them at tactical and procedural levels. But that is my way of understanding the evolution, thanks for clearing it up.

Akin to the Cold War days when we were expected to be subjecated to at least 10 hours of artillery before being bayonet charged by a column of tanks while the ringing is still in our ears.

Modern AirLand not only replicate this but also eliminates the massing necessary for this to occur (and deprive the enemy a mass to hit back with).

What is this?

The Germans were not only the great innovators but more so great adoptors, open thinking at the highest levels of command and implementation to the point of perfection.
The "Hutier Tactics" of WW1 were built over the idea of a captured french pamphlet! No wonder the concept of AirLand assault was taken from the Russians, afterall the father of such tactics Heinz Guderian was trained in Russia in around 1925-30(just can't find the source ) when he was building the ideas on tank warfare.

[Officer of Engineers]

I understand that cutting LOCs would be a lot simple than immobilizing, then what is the actual idea behind the concept of "chokepoints"? Or may be I got "pinned" at

The Marshall was also including air inserted troops. The entire idea is isolation and reduction. Your primary force (be it ground or air) would be to isolate enemy forces leaving the job of reduction for superior follow on force. You aimed for the enemy's center of gravity which is defined by the reserves. You kill the reserves, you kill the entire force.

This is news to me! What then, the Wehrmacht used as formal term, for their new Doctrine?

Combined Arms.

Thats what I meant by integration at strategic level. I mean in my framework of understanding! That in Blitzkrieg the two components are working together on the same objective at strategic level but not at operational level or tactical level.

I still think you have the two mixed up. The role of the Luftwaffle was in this scenario is that of hunter of oppertunity. They don't have precised targetting listings against enemy formations (ie, divisional HQ). They see a tank. They'll kill that tank but they don't go out looking for and killing a specific tank battalion.

What is this?

"This" referes to the massing of enemy artillery and troop concentrations before you can take a prepared defence head on. AirLand eliminates the need to mass as the artillery is delivered by air and recee intel is relayed to the ground force on the march who don't have to stop and re-arrange themselves for a mass charge.

The Germans were not only the great innovators but more so great adoptors, open thinking at the highest levels of command and implementation to the point of perfection.

The Allies were better.