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Thread: ACIG thread - WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)

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    ACIG thread - WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)

    This is from the Air Combat Information Group, Hot Spots ( "What if" and Commentary Only ) forum, WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?) Thread.

    My purpose is to provide a former Warsaw Pact service member's view of how the WP saw how the action through the Fulda Gap was to ensure.

    There are certain things I disagree with Michael such as I sincerely doubt that they could get through my minefields over the weekend.

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    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
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    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    ACIG Forum
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 19, 2002
    Posts: 1678 Posted: 2002-02-20 07:25
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    Tomcat114
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    (12/28/01 8:56:37 am)
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    Reply | Edit | Del All WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
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    Chaps,
    here's the thread for discussions about what might have happened in the case of the WWIII between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces on the so-called "Central Front".

    For easier understanding of those which might not know what was going on there, let me offer you the following resume:

    - the "Central Front" (CF) was considered as THE place where any war between the NATO and War Pact would be fought with ultimate engagement of all available forces; this was THE front, the place where best of the best of both sides would clash;

    - usually, it was expected, that the War Pact forces would start a tremendous campaign - regardless if with a complete surprise, deploying only forces already at hand, or after a prolongued preparations, which would certainly be recognized by the NATO - saturating the other side with very massive air and ground attacks;

    - there are several unknowns as about what the War Pact would first do to start such attack: usual theories talk about a drive along the "Fulda Gap", which was an area in central Western Germany along the River Fulde, which lead from East German border roughly from Erfurt, towards Frankfurt (a. M.), because this was the "shortest way" over Western Germany; some more modern versions explained that the Soviet "Schwerpunkt" of the attack would be in the more flat northern West Germany, where the movement of armoured formations would be easier; the newest version I heard, explained, that the Soviets would start the war with a massive amphibious attack somewhere in the Mecklenburger Bucht, probably in the Oldenburg area, and then attacking towards Hamburg, so to drag NATO forces from other parts of the front - and then start the main drive, either through the Fulda Gap, or towards Hannover.

    - there are additional unknowns regarding what the Czech and Eastern German Armies would do (with exception, that both would almost certainly be placed under the Soviet command), and also what would happen with Austria: would it be attacked as well or not (if yes, then the Hungarian Army, and the Soviet units stationed there planned a powerfull drive along two prongs: over Vienna, and Linz towards Mьnich, and over Wr. Neustadt, Graz, Villach towards Italy).

    Sure is, this will be the most complex "front" to describe, as it involved immense amounts of men and material.

    Let me, for the start, add some remarks:

    As on other threads for this project, so in this case too, I suggest we to jump over the question "why": there were so many scenarios why would the WWIII break out, and one might like to dispute if this would happen in 1988 (for example, I personally think late 1989, or early 1990 would be a much more likely period). Namely, the point here is to find out what forces were in the area, which whould arrive at which point and why, and what are the most probable circumstances under which these forces would fight.

    Therefore, we will problably first have to find out the exact Orders of Battle (usually shortened to "OrBat"s or "OOB"s), and what might have been the most probable targets of different air, ground, and sea operations. The outcomes, hkhm, well, that's a completely different story....

    For this reason, I'd like to suggest we first to try to put together a reasonable OrBat/OOB of the Soviet and NATO forces in the area for 1988....

    I hope many will take part in this and everybody will enjoy: certainly, everybody is more than wellcome with any constructive suggestions, ideas and data!

    Best wishes,
    Tom

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    Tomcat114
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    Posts: 3190
    (1/8/02 4:39:04 am)
    212.152.139.23
    Reply | Edit | Del Soviets in East Germany
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    So, here is a preliminary try to organize the matters with the Soviet Group of Forces stationed in East Germany. Once this is corrected, I suggest we to follow with more on Soviets in Czechoslovakia and Hungary (remember, that Poland will be dealed with in the thread about the Northern Front and Baltic), as well as the forces of these three countries.


    WESTERN GROUP OF FORCES (WGF) or
    GROUP OF SOVIET FORCES GERMANY (GSFG), 1988
    Tankoviye Voiska (Tank Army) and Army Aviation, HQ Zossen
    (I added also SSM- and SAM-units)

    - 34th Art.D., Potsdam (5 Art./How. Brigades)
    - 6th Mot.Rif.Brig., Berlin (T-80, BMP-2, SA-13)
    - SSM Brigade, Neubrandenburg, (18 SS-23)
    - SSM Brigade, Bautzen (18 SS-23)
    - 35th AirAssault.B., Cottbus
    - SAM Brigade, at various key installations (27 SA-4)
    - SAM Brigade, at Rostock and Rudelstadt (27 SA-5)
    - SAM Rgt., Rehagen (20 SA-15)
    - SPETSNAZ Brig., Fьrstenberg,
    - 239th ORAP, Oranienburg, 26 Mi-6, 38 Mi-8
    - 113th ORAE, Sperenberg, 2 Mi-6, 9 Mi-8, 3 Mi-9, 3 Mi-24
    - 292nd ORAE, Cochstedt, 16 Mi-8, 2 Mi-9

    1st Guards Tank Army, HQ Dresden
    - Air.Ass.Bn, and SPETSNAZ Bn
    - SSM Brigade, Meissen (18 SS-1C)
    - SAM Brig., ? (27 SA-4)
    - 9th T.D., Riesa (T-64, BMP-2, 4 SS-21, SA-8/13)
    - 11th Gv.T.D., Dresden-Klotzsche (T-64, BMP-2, 4 SS-21, SA-15)
    - 20th Gv.Mot.Rif.D., Grimma (T-64, BMP-2, 4 SS-21, SA-8/13)
    - 6th ORAE, at Dresden-Hellerau, 2 Mi-6, 10 Mi-8, 4 Mi-24
    - 225th ORAP, at Allstedt, 35 Mi-24, 10 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9
    - 485th ORAP, at Brandis and Merseburg, 36 Mi-24, 20 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9

    2nd Guards (Tank?) Army, HQ Furstenburg/Havel or Neubrandenburg
    - AirAssault.Bn, and SPETSNAZ Bn.
    - SSM Brigade (18 SS-1C)
    - SAM Brigade (27 SA-4)
    - 9th or 94th Gv.Mot.Rif.D., Schwerin (T-80, BMP-2, SA-15)
    - 16th Gv.T.D., Neustrelitz (T-64, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-8/15)
    - 21st Mot.Rif.D., Perleberg
    - 207th Mot.Rif.D., Stendal
    - 9th ORAE, Neuruppin, 2 Mi-6, 5 Mi-8, 2 Mi-9, 4 Mi-24
    - 172nd ORAP, Parchim, 40 Mi-24, 12 Mi-8
    - 439th ORAP, Parchim and Lдrz, 40 Mi-24, 16 Mi-8, 3 Mi-9

    3rd Shock Army, HQ Magdeburg
    - AirAssault.Bn. and SPETSNAZ Bn.
    - SSM Brigade, Burg (18 SS-1C)
    - SAM Brigade, (27 SA-4)
    - 7th Gv.T.D., Dessau-Rosslau (T-80, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-15, 4 SS-21)
    - 10th Gv.T.D., Altengrabow (T-80, BMP-2, BTR-80, and SA-15, 4 SS-21)
    - 12th Gv.T.D., Neuruppin (T-80, BMP-2, BTR-80, and SA-15)
    - 47th Gv.T.D., Hillersleben (T-80, BMP-2, BTR-80, and SA-15)
    - 296th ORAE, Mahlwinkel, 2 Mi-6, 6 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9
    - 178th ORAP, Stendal, 42 Mi-24, 10 Mi-8
    - 440th ORAP, Stendal, 40 Mi-24, 20 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9

    8th Guards Army, HQ Weimar-Nohra
    - SSM Brigade, Weissenfels (18 SS-1C)
    - Art.Brig., Weissenfels (54 BM-21)
    - SAM Brig., Armstadt, Meiningen, and Saalfeld (27 SA-4)
    - 27th Gv.Mot.Rif.D., Halle/Saale (T-80, BMP-2, SA-15, 4 SS-21, 6 Mi-24, 6 Mi-8, 6 Mi-2)
    - 39th Gv.Mot.Rif.D., Ohrdruf (T-80, BMP-2, SA-15, 4 SS-21, 6 Mi-24, 6 Mi-8, 6 Mi-2)
    - 57th Gv.Mot.Rif.D., Naumburg
    - 79th Gv.T.D., Jena, (T-80, BMP-2, SA-15, 4 SS-21, 6 Mi-24, 6 Mi-8, 6 Mi-2)
    - 47th T.B., Plauen, (T-64)
    - 298th ORAE, at HaЯleben, 1 Mi-6, 9 Mi-2, 3 Mi-8, 4 Mi-24
    - 336th ORAP, at Nohra, with 40 Mi-24, 16 Mi-8
    - 486th ORAP, at Altes Lager, 32 Mi-24, 12 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9

    20th Guards Army, HQ Eberswalde
    - AirAssault Bn., and SPETSNAZ Bn.
    - SSM Brigade, Juterborg, (18 SS-1C)
    - SAM Brigade, (27 SA-4)
    - 5th T.B., Guestrow, (T-80, 2S1, 2S6, SA-13)
    - 25th T.D., Vogelsang (T-64B, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-
    - 32nd Gv.T.D., Juterborg (T-64B, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-
    - 35th Mot.Rif.D., Dцberitz (T-64B, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-
    - 90th Gv.T.D., Bernau (T-64B, BMP-2, BTR-80, SA-
    - 41st ORAE, Finow, 2 Mi-6, 4 Mi-2, 3 Mi-8, 4 Mi-24
    - 337th ORAP, Mahlwinkel, 40 Mi-24, 16 Mi-8
    - 487th ORAP, Templin, 26 Mi-24, 18 Mi-8, 4 Mi-9

    16 Air Army, HQ Zossen
    direct reporting units
    - 357th SchAP, at Brandis, with 30 Su-25
    - 368th SchAP, at Demmin, with 31 Su-25
    - OBMAS, at Damgarten, 11 Su-25BM
    - 226th OSAP, at Sperenburg, with An-12s, An-24s, An-26s, Tu-134A-3
    - 390th ORAE, at Sperenburg, with An-12, An-16, Il-20s, Il-22s

    ? ORAD
    - 11th Vitebski ORAP, at Welzow, with 24 Su-24MP/MRs and 15 MiG-25R/RB/BM
    - 294th RAP at Allstedt, with ? Su-17M-3s
    - 931st ORAP at Werneuchen, with ? MiG-25R/RB/BMs

    60th/Northern Tactical Corps, HQ Potsdam
    16th Svirskaya Gvardeiskaya Istrebitelniyi Aviatsionnaya Diviziya (16th GvIAD), HQ Pьttnitz
    - 33rd IAP, at Wittstock, with 2 MiG-23UBs, 31 MiG-29Cs
    - 733rd IAP, at Damgarten, with ? MiG-23UBs, 30 MiG-29Cs
    - 787th IAP, at Eberswalde, with 4 MiG-23UBs, 30 MiG-29Cs

    125th Aviatsionnaya Diviziya Istrebitelei-Bombardirovchikov (125th ADIB), HQ Rechlin
    - 19th GvAPIB, at Mirow-Lдrz, with 7 MiG-23UBs, 31 MiG-27Ms
    - 20th APIB, at Grossdoln, with 39 Su-17M-3/UM
    - 730th APIB, at Neuruppin, with ? Su-17M-4

    61th/Southern Tactical Air Corps, HQ Wittenburg
    6th Donezkaya and Segedskaya GvIAD, HQ Merseburg
    - 31st Nilopolskiy IAP, at Falkenberg, with 4 MiG-23UB, 30 MiG-29A/Cs
    - 85th Sebastopolskiy IAP, at Merseburg, with ? MiG-23, ? MiG-29s
    - 968th IAP, at Nobitz or Altenburg, with 4 MiG-23UB, 30 MiG-29s

    126th IAD, HQ Zerbst
    - 35th IAP, at Zerbst, with 5 MiG-23UB, 30 MiG-29A/Cs
    - 73rd IAP, at Kцthen, with ? MiG-23UBs, 30 MiG-29A/Cs
    - 833rd IAP, at Altes Lager, 38 MiG-23MLDs

    105th GvADIB, HQ Grossenhain
    - 296th APIB, at Grossenhain, with 8 MiG-23UB, 31 MiG-27D/Ms
    - 559th APIB, at Finsterwalde, with ? MiG-23UBs, 32 MiG-27Ks
    - 911th APIB, at Brand, 10 MiG-23UBs, 32 MiG-27Ks

    Could somebody add the OrBat for the NVA/LSK (East German Air Force)? I have not much info about it, but will try to prepare something about the East German Army.

    Thanks in advance for any corrections, remarks, adds etc.

    Tom

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    ACIG Forum
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 19, 2002
    Posts: 1678 Posted: 2002-02-20 07:26
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    Lajes
    Standard Member
    Posts: 41
    (1/21/02 7:31:49 am)
    213.163.10.74
    Reply | Edit | Del Hungarian Defence Forces to Italy
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    Tom,

    I can assure you that the main direction of attack for the Nйphadsereg – Hungarian People's Army (overstrength armoured units with mainly T-55s, even T-34s, and a few T-72s) would have been Austria, and then Northern Italy. Officers who knew English, read for example Aviation Week were asked by the unit commissars as non-comformists, but at the same time, Italian-knowledge was welcomed, altough training was not widespread.
    The purpose of the Air Corps (after 56, there was no Air Force in Hungary, just Air Corps of the People's Army) would have been mainly air defence (MiG-21, -23), and (one-way) nuclear strike.
    The leadership realized in the late 70's, that for such an attack towards Italy, the Ground Forces needed air support and recce. Earlier recce force MiG-15s were replaced with an independent recce unit's L-29 Delfins which reported not to the Air Corps, but to the Ground Forces command. On this basis, in 1984 a new recce-attack unit was formed as the fourth squadron at Taszar airfield, but now the equipment was Su-22M3 Fitters Hs.
    A bit earlier, Mi-24Ds were acquired as part of this "supporting the ground forces" concept, from 1979.

    From the early 80's, following the succes of ACM training in the West, WP and also Hungary introduced more intense dogfight training, altough the Soviet's priority was still all-weather, rear-aspect intercept. With pilots doing 150 hours pro year, and RSBN ground units well maintained, very bad weather was not a problem. Countering Western advantages in ECM, the crews (pilots, GCI) were quite well trained to ID and deny jamming, and as always (even nowdays...) the Hungarian "Hussar" mentality for individualism led to good skills for such operations. Emphasis was put on fight against new threats: at Taszar airfield, folks even consturcted a 1:1 ALCM model and put it onto a pole next to the RWY. Pilots trained to acquire it visually, then go in for a GS23 shot.
    There's a lot more to tell about...

    I just add that during that period Hungarian People's Army operated two An-2s in civilian registration, altough with dark green scheme, out of Budaцrs (grass) airfield, near Budapest. They have flown COMINT missions along the Wester-Yugoslavian, Austrian borders, equipped with sensitive VHF,UHF,HF receivers. Civilians at the airfield – which at that time also housed liasion Z-43s – said that after the 5-6 hour missions nobody had seen any tapes removed so it is likely that the received info was relayed directly to intelligence units. It's suspected that the goal was to get a knowledge of Western air forces operations, unit callsigns, deployments, etc. Officials and even retired guys are still tight lipped about these ops, just like about the ops of two 'Mi-17PP' helicopters of the Szentkiralyszabadja unit, but that is an other part of the Hungarian electronic warfare story...

    Tschьss,

    Lajes

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    Tomcat114
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    Posts: 3298
    (1/22/02 2:01:55 am)
    212.152.143.148
    Reply | Edit | Del Re: WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
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    Lajes,
    thanks for another excellent post!

    Indeed, I saw the maps of Hungarian PA's planning for attacks into Austria. But, I must add, I also saw additional maps showing a main strategic thrust then to turn via Graz, Villach, Udine deep into northern Italy (targets: Milano, Firence, Genoa, French Border etc.). What's amazing me when talking about this is, that the PA was still equipped foremost with such obsolete material like T-55s, yet they indeed planned such drives with it....

    I found also your "short study" of the development of the Hungarian People's Army Air Corps (HPAAC) also highly interesting, especially because you really spiced it with some highly interesting details.

    Can you also say something more about the equipment standards and weapons of - for example - MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, Mi-24s, and Su-22s of the HPAAC? Were they as well equipped as East German AF planes?

    Thanks in advance,
    Tom

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    ACIG Forum
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 19, 2002
    Posts: 1678 Posted: 2002-02-20 07:27
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    Lajes
    Standard Member
    Posts: 42
    (1/23/02 7:35:58 am)
    213.163.10.74
    Reply | Edit | Del HuPA/Cold War equipment
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    Hi,

    Just some clarification. We did not have Fulcrums before 1993, because the Hungarian communist leadership contcentrated it's effort on "higher" life standards (preventing discontent) during the 80's, many times refusing therefore the newest equipment "offered" by Moscow. So Hungary missed the Fulcrum that time, which in '89 arrived to all other WP countries!
    Nearly the same thing is true for the already mentioned Su-22s and MiG-23s of which Hungary acquired just one squadron (16 a/c) both, despite much greater number of these types were delivered to Czeckoslovakia, Poland and East Germany and Bulgaria, while Rumania developed the Orao for nearly the same mission (I mean the Fitter).

    As of the equipment standard of these aircraft (I'm concentrating on the 80's):

    - MiG-23MFs and UBs arrived from 1979 to Papa AB. At first they were equipped with R-23R/T (AA-7A/B) and R-3S, R-13M (AA-2A,D), but around 1983-84 with the arrival of R-60M the latter missiles were replaced with the Aphid on double APU-60-II launchers on the fuselage pylons. Usual alert config from then on was 2xR-23 (of a single version, usually R) plus 4xR-60M and a 800l tank as required. An impressive load, altough some guys with access to Western literature knew it's real value post Bekaa Valley...The crew regularly trained rocket delivery with UB-16 pods and starfing with gun, once shoot R-23s against La-17 drones in the SU, several times shoot R-3S, R-13M, R-60 against flare tgts over the Ustka range in Poland and over the Black Sea in Rumania. Gun was never fired agains tgts in the air...
    The Floggers had H-23 (AS-7 "Bullpupsky") guided with a Delta NM pod, but Hungarian crews to my knowledge never had the opportunity to shot with it (a missile with such kinetic range cannot be fired on Hungary's ranges, altough there are some reports that Russian units fired H-29s over Hungary, and even Hungarian Rocket Artilerry units fired Luna-Ms over populated areas...)
    Hungarian MiG-23s to my knowledge never dropped bombs, altough as the H-23, they had them in the inventory

    - During these years the Air Corps had three MiG-21 combat variants: MF(three sq at Kecskemet), Bis(two squadron at Papa and two squadron at Taszar), and PF (one squadron at Taszar). (The PF has left the inventory in 1989, the MF in 1997 and the bis in 2000).
    Basically two squadron at each base was for air-to-air, while a third was a "bomber" squadron – supposedly the latter would have been used for "special stores", altough the electronics was installed on all MiG-21Bis and MiG-23MF with spec pylons in storage (The Bis would have a single spec on the centerline, while the MiG-23 a single spec on the left fuselage hardpoint – these pylons and the associated electronics was reportedly uninstalled and taken "home" by Soviet personnel in 90-91)
    Practically all stores cleared for the MiG-21s were in the air base inventory, usually enough to fully rearm two-three times.
    MiG-21MFs stood alert with 2xRS-2US (AA-1 Alkali) and 2xR-3S (AA-2A) plus a 490l tank. PFs with two R-3S and a tank, while there was several configs for the Bis (usually 2xR-60M, 2xR-3R, plus tank). Used to fire these missiles against flares (sometimes La drones) over SU, Poland, Rumania). It's very intresting to note that during industrial level maintenance (performed at Tцkцl AB with Pestvideki Gepgyar), when wea systems were aligned with test equipment for all missile types (high-level security was required), there were a test for the R-55 missile which was called the "super missile" reserved in so-called war(M)-storage, but which were never seen by anyone, nor trained to employ.
    All pilots used to train with UB-pods, GS-23 starfing, and "bomber" squadrons with 50-100kg bombs (interestingly not from dive, but from level flight – flying with a given speed and altitude, you started to count after the tgt disappeared below your nose, and released the bombs after a predetermined time ellapsed...).
    Once a year the MiG-21s deployed to grass-fields (Kenyeri, Balaton-Kiliti, etc.)
    Generally Taszar crews were the best, Papa was for the high leadership with good party relations (highest incident rate here..), while Kecskemet was the "second line".

    That is it for now. Next time our strike/recce aircraft, the Su-22M3

    Tschьss,

    Lajes

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    FerenceH
    Registered Member
    Posts: 4
    (2/18/02 4:04:09 am)
    145.29.7.11
    Reply | Edit | Del main strike
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    Where would the main Soviet land strike take place. For years people have said that the famous Fulda gap would be the place of Soviet main advance. But more recently I've read opinions that claim that the Northern part of Germany would be more logical. NATO defences of NORTHAG were not as strong there. General Hackett (author of the third world war) seems to support the latter idea.
    What do others think???

    Best regards,

    Ference.

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-08 15:33
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    I want now tell you what i know about the subject of a potential attack of the Warshaw Pact in late 80th.
    First you must understand, that in mid 80th a change of the strategy of the WP was made. Till this time the main object was by the smallest sign of western aggression to engage the enemy and annihilate him on its own territory, what means a strike to the altantic ocean. The GDR was only a area which must crossed be WP armed forces. In 1984 or 85 the change was made. The GDR was from now defence area. In the first time of war the WP forces had to defend and retreat up to a line of river Bug in worst case and then conter attack and reconquer the lost territory.
    A suprise attack was not planed. So the officals said, during my military time.

    After the change 1990 i had the chance to talk with an officer who studied on the military akademy of the GDR in Dresden. He was trained for "Rьckwдrtige Dienste", like we call it in german, the english translation may be "supply". In some exercices, he said, the task was to supply forces behind a big river ca 400 - 500km from GDR border on the 3. day of a war. Nobody said the name Rhine, but this river was obviesly the target.
    I was astonished and asked him how ower forces could reach the Rhine and he answered, that this would be not very difficult. The start of the war would be at the beginning of a weekend. Friday 16.00 the Bundeswehr closed its gates and the troops spent their weekend at home. The few alert units were allways know by GDR intelegency and would be prime targets of the attack. The attack would start in the late hours of the friday, because a lot of western soldiers spent their time in discos and would be drunken.
    The first strike would be made by cruise missiles fired by long range bombers and surface surface missiles. The target would be the airfields. For this mission the NVA and GSSD had missiles with "Kassettengefechtsteil", cluster bombing systems to block the runways and hold the fighters on the ground. A lot of anti radar missile equipped fighter bombers would now engage western SAM and radar sites and annihilate this danger. After this fighters would establish a short period of air dominance from GDR border to the river Rhine and soviet air assault divisions would make a landig to capture the bridges over the Rhine.
    The assault of the ground forces would have 4 directions. 1. direction Jutland. Target: open the Baltic Sea entrance 2. direction coast Hamburg - Bremen - Emden. Target: annihilation of US Forces in Bremen area. 3.direction Ruhrgebiet. Target: pushing enemy Forces to the west. 4.direction Fulda GAP. Target: 1. forming bridgeheads on the left bank of the river Rhine. 2. acting as trap for the US Forces in Bavaria. Lets explain this. It was predicted, that the US Forces would strike north to cut the supply ways of the 4. strike direction. After crossing the Thuringia Forrest mountains the US Forces would hit on the advancing forces of the 2. strategic wave which had the task to annihilate the US troops.

    It was intresting to hear, that US forces was to annihilate, what means to kill, while the forces of all other NATO contries were to push. It seems to be the plan to bring the US so much losses as possible, that the US people would be not willing to guide this war.

    The western defence plan was to defend the FRG in deep and strong defence positions, called in the east as the "Schild". The plan was similar to the soviet plan during the Kursk battle 1943. To break through the defence the first step was to achieve the air superiority by destruction of the west german, east french and Benelux air fields. After this only a few Harriers and planes from central FRance and GB would be there to influence the fights. The WP air forces would fly heavy CAS missions to hold the attack speed high. When ground forces arrived hard defended areas it was planed to engange this positions from air with fuel aerosol bombs. This weapon has a big shockwave and who survive the Shockwave would stiffle because this bomb burns all oxygen in the air.
    The surise attack would also bring the civilists to run away to west and to block on this way the marching routes of the NATO Forces. The NATO soldiers would had to make the way free by punishing its own civilists, waht would have a very bitter impuls on the moral of the forces.

    It was planed to reache the river Rhine on the 3. combat day, the atlantic ocean on the 7. day. When i heared this the first time, i tought this was crazy, but now i know the abilities of the Bundeswehr and i think, if the other NATO Forces would not be much better than the Bundeswehr, the WP Forces had reached the Rhine already on the second combat day.

    The question is, why this plan was never fullfilled. The answer was simple. it was predicted to loose the complete first strategic wave in this attack. The first strategic wave consist of the GSSD (soviet forces in the GDR), the NVA (east german army), the soviet forces in the czech part of the CSSR and the czechoslovakian forces in this part of CSSR, with more that 1.000.000 man. The predicted losses of civilist on our side was also 1 million. This was simply to much losses to make a panzer ralley to the atlantic ocean.

    Michael


    [ This Message was edited by: Michael on 2002-03-08 15:41 ]

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    Tom
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 20, 2002
    Posts: 3398
    From: Vienna, Austria
    Posted: 2002-03-08 16:14
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    Michael,
    as always an excellent contribution, exclusive statements and insights...errr, I must say this left me without any words....

    I'll give it two or three reads more before even trying to answer....

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-11 16:01
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    I see that you have doubts. Of course my statement sounds strange especially if you have the results of the Gulf War in mind. But dont make the mistake to set the iraqui forces in the desert on the same lavel like WP forces in central europe. Both battlegrounds are completly different.
    First: The climate conditions. the gulf war was fought in a desert. Combat ranges of 3, 4 and more kilometers were the average. No place to hide, no trees, no villages, nothing than a view hills. In Germany the average combat distance is below 2 kilometer, what menas always in the distance of the direct fire of tanks and Pak's (Anti Tank guns). We have here a high populatet area with a lot of vegetation. There is a lot of space to play hide and seek. And for this area the soviet weapons were made, but to this point later.

    Second: The quality of the soldiers of Iraq and WP you cant compare. We had well trained and good educated soldiers. And especially the Sergeants corps was not bad. It was the rule that a guy who wanted to study on a University had to serve as Sergeant or Officer in the Army. And we had a plenty of smart boys there (of course also a lot of crap).

    Third: The Weapons. This is a wide field. But you must remember, that the Iraquis had no first line weapons. They got always so called Export B weapons with downgraded equipment. And also when not they were inferior. Lets explane this.
    The group of motorized infantry of the Iraq had as weapons one BMP, 7 AK-47 Kalashnikow assault rifles, one RPK-47 light machine gun and one RPG-7 anti tank weapon. The group of motorized infantry of the NVA (east german army) had one BMP Tank, 6 AK-74N, which is much more efficent than the AK-47, 2 LMG K (RPK-47 of german production) and one RPG-7.

    Now let me explain the downgrading on the example of the T-72 tank. The iraqui T-72 had a armour of 280mm turret and 200 mm on the front. It had a optical range finder, no weapon computer etc. It was only a massive place of steel with a very good gun. All western anti tank weapons could penetrate the armour of iraqu T-72.
    The T-72M1 the NVA had a turret armour of 355 mm and a front armour of 221mm. The turret armour was increased by add on plates against ATGM shaped charge warheads. In german we say Kermamik-zusatzpanzerung, i dont know the english translation. This armour had an equivalent of 400mm protection, so that the most chaped charge warheads used end of the 80th were unable to penetrate it. Additional protection comes from a laser warning reciver, who warns the tank crew for laser guidance beams and give them the chance to react, like using smoke, maneuver or counterfire to avoid hits. The iraqui T-72 had not such equipment. Our T-72 had Laser range finder and weapon computers, so the could fire and hit in full moving, also a thing the iraquis not were able to do. And we had better ammo. The sub caliber darts of the T-72M1 was able to penetrate 390mm armours on 2000 meters distance. The iraqis got only 330mm.
    The soviet T-72 had additionaly to the armour of the T-72M1 an so called reactive armour with thick armour plates to break sub caliber darts. And it was said, that they had DU ammo with penetration power of 600 to 650 mm on 2000 m distance.
    And such downgrades all iraqi weapons had. Real first line weapons were never used in Iraq, but would be used in Europe.

    And finaly: The Gulf War can be not compared with a potential war in Europe in the end of the 80th, because all weapon systmes of the Iraq were known by the Allies. The unification of Germany gave them access to nearly all weapon systems the Iraq had. You will surely remember that Germany sent MiG-29, MiG-23ML, Su-22M-4 and lots of missiles, Tanks etc to the USA to find out their weak points.
    Such a comfort the NATO would have not in a 1988 war and bad surpises, like the deadly Shlem-R-73 system of the MiG-29, would apear.

    Last year i had the chance to speak with a westgerman officer and he told me, that in a potential end 80th war between NATO and WP, he believed that the NATO would have loose very fast the air superiority and would have a very hard stand to fight.

    Lets thank god, that it never happend. Otherwise germany would be history for ever.

    Michael

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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-15 03:30
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Well Michael let me give you some comments from a west german viewpoint. These informations come from sources I can not discuss in here.
    1. In 1988 the political situation was so that the thread from the east was viewed as reduced (perestroika) so the readiness of NATO forces was reduced.
    From now on I will pretend that the tension would have been as high as say in the 70ґs.

    2. The WarPac forces would have needed 3-7 days (minimum) to get into attack positions, NATO was certain that they could detect such moves within 24 hours, so that they would have 24 hours to prepare for the attack. An increased readiness of WarPac forces would have been answered with an increased readiness on the NATO side, so there would have been very view troops leaving for home before a weekend. If attacks would have seen possible Reforger would have started which would see the first US based troops arriving within 10 hours and taking over equipment already stored. They would be ready in 24 hours. The same would happen with troops from France, Spain and the UK. It was estimated that about one division could be readied every 12 hours. Meaining that NATO forces would have increased its forces with 4-6 divisions before the attack began. Furthermore the call for reservists would have happened, meaning that even the Bundeswehr could field more units.
    Additional airforce units would arrive from the US within the first 12 hours, deploying to France and Spain to avoid possible attacks by ballistic missiles. The other german and benelux based untis would disperse to highway strips and civilian airfields, while helo untis would disperse too. AWACS would keep a constant eye on the situation and monitor enemy activity.

    3. NATO defense postions have been surveyed before the war and units would move into these postions 20 hours after the plan started. It can be expected that german civilians would help prepare these positions.

    4. It was expected that the NATO forces would be able to defend at about the same time the WarPAc would be able to attack.

    5. Obvioulsly the WarPac forces were expected to advance 50-100 km befrore being halted.

    6. It was expected that the WarPac attack would start with a massive airattack on airdefence positions and airfields in germany and benelux. The plan was to destroy as many enemey plans as possible and start a counter attack with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in time to get the WarPac planes when they would return to their bases. (blocking runways and catching palnes in the open)

    7. after that it would all depend on who could control the North Atlantic and the question if hevy reenforments can reach the area in time. (Like WW II and the U-boats)

    _________________
    Donґt bother running- youґll onyl die tired

    [ This Message was edited by: seahawk on 2002-03-15 03:34 ]

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-15 15:27
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hallo Seahawk,

    the weakpoint of all what you wrote is the belive, that WP need 3-6 days for an attack.
    If this would be right all what you wrote is certanly correct. But, the abilities of the west to bring forces to the front was well known in the east. The Hauptverwaltung Aufklдrung of Markus Wolf, the foreign intellegency service of the GDR was pretty good, comparable with the israeli Mossad, if you remember spys like Gьnter Guillome, Topas etc. there was only few in the west what the east not know (Some weeks ago in the german TV a ex HVA man said proudly, that a lot of material of the NATO was earlier in Berlin than an the table of NATO officials)
    On this backround it was clear, that only a surprise attack, with no ongoing tensions would be successfull. The enemy must completly surprised, otherwise it would end as a disaster.
    The abilities of striking from stand i guess were pretty good. Heavy armed forces of the GSSD (Soviet Forces in Germany) stand only few kilometers from the border and the russians were really crazy guys. It was said, that from beginning of the alert to the leaving of the last tank from the barracks would be only 15 to 20 minutes. The T-72 had a marching speed of 50-60 km/h and when you gave full speed over 80 km/h was possible. That means that the soviet tank forces could stand very deep in western territory before the enemy could weak up. The planed attack deep of a day was 150km. This is not more than in the WW2 but much more the Amis also not get in the Gulf War.
    The problem is not the attack speed, the problem is the supply. If your forces running out of fuel the opponent need only a long fence to have a POW camp.

    Surprise was the key to success. The target was to achieve the air superiority by destroying the runways, than massive CAS to support the ground forces.
    Sea landing operations, like said somewhere above, could never bring such an surprise. The
    Baltic is to small and with Bornholm had a very good radar place.

    And by the way. I know relative few about the other western forces, but i know the Bundeswehr. And if they were not much better than the BW the WP had a good chance to win.
    Why i say this. The BW is a shame for the country. Of course there are some very good units (KSK etc.), but the majority is worth nothing. Outdatet and wrong equipped, low readiness status and the small but necessary things to survive you will not find on their equipment. (This is less a problem of the Troops more one of the politicians who know nothing about warfare)
    The Bundeswehr has a good name, but all people i know here in east Germany say, this is no army, this is something else. Only sound and smoke.

    Michael


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    Tom
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 20, 2002
    Posts: 3398
    From: Vienna, Austria
    Posted: 2002-03-15 17:12
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Michael,
    I haven't really had any doubts about what you said. To contrary.

    My opinion is still that any similar onslaught of the War Pact air forces would be very complicated - if possible at all - to stop.

    I have, however, certain doubts about some other remarks.

    For example, I know that the Iraqis used bombs filled with fuel-air-explosives over Faw, while trying to drive Iranians away from there, in Spring 1987. The effects were terrible, no discussion, and many casualties were caused. But not even the use of such weapons drove Iranians away from there.

    Then, despite all the capabilities of Soviet-built tanks (and the T-72s bulit in Poland and Czechoslovakia - as the East German Army was hardly using any Soviet-built examples), I doubt any version of the T-72 could seriously sustain NATO's defensive firepower. The T-72 was never a serious opponent for any NATO tanks except British Chieftains and Centurions (the last used also by the Danish Army), and French AMX-30s: I doubt that a troop of M-1s - even its eariler versions - and the Challengers would have much problems in slowing down drives by whole regiments of T-72s. The T-80 would be the actual problem, foremost as I doubt the then available NATO AFPSDS-rounds (foremost those caliber 105mm) could breach its armour at anything over 1.500m - which would bring NATO tanks into the lethal range of T-80's main armament.

    This is not based on the results of the battles from the II Gulf War, but on sientific research about the capabilities of NATO ammo and War Pact armor.

    Therefore, the NATO tankers driving M-1As and M-1IPMs, as well as Challengers, would foremost have to shot at the threads of their opponents (it's actually enough to stop the tank if you shot off its threads), while being hit repeatedly (all the time supported by all the available AT-firepower the NATO had, foremost ATGMs and artillery) and the battle on the ground would soon develop into something the NATO was much better at: a battle of attrition, in which the much better qualified NATO technical personnel would be far more capable in bringing damaged equipment back on-line.

    The NATO personnel certainly lived under much laxer conditions than you in the East Germany, but, you can trust me that the NATO forces were not a bunch of children - Bundeswehr closing its barracks at Friday afternooon or not - nor there to play. Their tactics was such, that it would enable the NATO to stem the War Pact drives, channel them in worst cases, and then cut the supply lines of forces which breached the front.

    Not only this; I think you slightly overestimate the firepower and the real capability of the War Pact to mount such a massive attack, without being confronted with immense problems of technical reliatility and training. Let me explain.

    IMHO, you expect that all the Soviet, Czech and Polish machinery was at the same standard of maintenance, and that their all troops were at the same standard of training - like East Germans.

    This was simply not the case. Remember, that in the whole history of the LSK not a single pilot defected with his plane to the West - despite all the mistrust. This was not so with other War Pact forces. Remember also, how often East Germans "won" in exercises over Russian and other War Pact forces. The others were simply not to the same standard and capabilities.

    Still, this was not the only problem. Another problem was, that the technical reliability of the Soviet-technology was not the same as at earlier times: two years ago I saw a TV-show "WWIII" in the German TV, based on research undertaken with the help of former leaders of the East German and Soviet forces too. Their own estimates were, that by the day two of any drive towards West, not only would the War Pact forces never go beyond a line of some 100km to the west from the East German and Czech borders, but also that 60% of remaining operational armored vechilles would meanwhile break down and be immobilized (this is not including combat-caused problems).

    This would be only one of the reasons for the War Pact forces not being able to drive as fast towards the West; in worst cases (for the NATO), the War Pact forces could not follow retreating NATO forces, which would simultaneously continue establishing new defensive lines in their rear.

    I indeed doubt if the 1st strategic wave of any such attack would survive for longer than the first three or four days of such intensive operations, just like you said. But, I also doubt they would cross even the 50% of the distance to the Rhine in any place. In order to achieve the pace of advance you described (from what I found in some Soviet plans, the actual advance rate they expected was around 40kms per day), they would have to drive almost blindly - without any recce - most likely frontally attacking one NATO-defence line after the other - and do this while their air forces would be engaged destroying NATO air power and therefore unable to help.

    I doubt you can really imagine the firepower the NATO could throw against any War Pact ground forces. The War Pact tank and APC-losses, Michael (just like NATO air force losses) would not be "terrible", or "dreadfull", but unbelievable and there would be no success for the War Pact nevertheless. You would be stopped on the ground, and very likely the NATO would be able to start a powerfull counterattack towards West Berlin at latest in the second week of the war.

    That's what I'm sure (and what most of the researchers about this topic agree).
    _________________
    Tom Cooper
    Editor, ACIG.org
    Iran-Iraq; War in the Air, 1980-1988
    Iranian F-4 Phantom IIs

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  3. #3
    Officer of Engineers
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    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
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    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-16 08:43
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Tom,
    i saw the WWIII thing in german TV too. It was the funny thing with the surprise landing in East Holstein. I have seldom laught so much.

    One statement was the soviet made equipment would break into 6 or so days. I believe it would not, and if i'm wrong, it would not have the time to break. The predictet losses were to high. The average livetime of a tank crew from entering the battle was less than a half hour. The loss rate for the air forces would be nearly 80%. After 3 days the first strategic wave of the WP would be history. But the western forces in Germany too. And this would be enough for the victory.


    You expected that NATO forces could use the very good street system of West Europe for fast advancing. The problem in West Europe is that mostly all people have cars and would try to runaway from the battle zone. This would cause the thickest traffic jam in history and a fast advancing of forces is not as easy. (Look to France 1940 were refugee tracks filled the streets)
    The other problem are the bridges. In West Europe all bridges are build to hold a minimum of 40 tons. But the NATO Tanks have much more than 40 tons weight. The big bridges would have no problems, but the smaller ones.

    You said after 2 weeks the NATO would start a massive counter offensive. I ask with what? The ammo and fuel stocks of the NATO were calculated for 7 days and the rate of calculation (what was neccessary for the troops) was only half of this what the WP expected, so that it could happen, that after 3 or 4 days the NATO run out of fuel and ammo.

    And finaly you said, that the NATO personal was better trained than their WP counterparts.
    Okay, if you believe it. And with the soldiers of the professional armys of GB and USA you may be right, but the mass of soldiers end the 80th came from countries with compulsory military service (Wehrpflicht). And in the comparison with such soldiers the WP soldiers were superior.
    Why, you will ask. It is simply a question of training. In the east was much more time for it. The first (covered) military training i got in the sport lessons during my schooltime. In the age of 12 we learned to throw a device called Keule. It was simply a dummy staffhandgranade. With 14 we learned to throw the F-1 dummy defencehandgranade. With 15 we came in a camp (Wehrlager), were we got a light military training including marching, orientation in the terrain, the most hated Sturmbahn, shooting with the KK-69 Kalashnikow training rifle etc. From 16 we had regulary premilitary training and when we came to the army with 18 or 19 the NVA could start their training on a much higher level than armies in west europe.
    The average soldier had to serve in the GDR 18 month in the FRG 15 month and the Wessis started on a much lower level than us. Do you still believe they were better?

    Better would be certainly the profi soldiers of GB and USA. But the problem of profi armies is, that you have not enough reservists. Maybe that the profis can shoot down 3 or 4 times more enemies till they were self shoot, when no reserve is in the back, the rest of the enemy will break trough your defence. The NVA was able to bring ca 1.000.000 soldiers to the front with another 1.3 mio man as trained and potential reserve. The Bundeswehr should on the end of 80th be able to bring up to 2.5 mio on the front after a while and ca 5 mio at maximum, how much can GB increase its manpower? With a profi army you has in peactime to much and in wartime to less soldiers.
    Thatswhy i still today believe, that a milizia army (like switzerland or israel)is for the defence of the homeland better than a profi army.

    I believe, we can discuss the potential WWIII in end 80th endless. I will not be able to convince you in the superiority of the WP and you will not be able to do in the other direction. Perhaps it is the proud of the soldier who always believe that he is one of the best. Let thank us god, that we never had to test who of us is wrong and who is right.

    Michael





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    Tom
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 20, 2002
    Posts: 3398
    From: Vienna, Austria
    Posted: 2002-03-16 17:17
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Michael,
    please, don't get offended by my opinions, they are in no way to be taken internaly. I - just like you - have my views about the situation at the time.

    Let me ask you something:
    can you explain more closely why do you disagree with the scenario from that show, i.e. that an eventual attack would come over the northern flank, by an amphibious attack from the Baltic Sea against East Holstein/northern West Germany? You seem to completely disagree with that idea; can you tell why?

    The reason I can't completely agree with your opinons about the situation on the ground is, that - while I can agree with something like 80% losses for the War Pact forces within two or three days - I simply don't see the possibility for the War Pact forces inflicting such massive damage to NATO forces. 50%, well, OK. But 80 or 100% - sorry, I can't comprehend that, nor can I imagine which other weapons than nuclear would cause such a carnage and destruction. That's why I say you might be overestimating the firepower of the War Pact forces.

    Besides, even if, with the 100% loss of the 1st strategic wave of the War Pact forces within two or three days the Communists would not have enough time to bring forward the 2nd strategic wave to hold the captured areas, and the situation would be so fluid, that the War Pact would be completely unable to establish and secure positions, that a slightest NATO counterattack would already cause grevious problems (if the doctrine of "flexible response" wouldn't imply the use of the nukes by that time). I can't see this as a victory for anybody - regardless of the road system and millions of refugees. BTW, most of the West German population centres were in the west of the country, so the roads and highways wouldn't be "that" clogged with the civilian traffic. Also, the plan of the West German gov was not to permit any civilian traffic along the main routes for NATO troops the moment the hostilities would be declared for "likely" and the REFORGER started. Of course, in panic, everybody would try to get as further west as possible, but such movments would not only hamper the NATO but also somebody who would be in an even greater hurry....

    At best I see War Pact forces eventually breaching around the best defended areas in West Germany and then driving deeper behind them. But, the problem would be to really take such areas and destroy NATO units holding them (something highly unlikely to happen in such a short war), otherwise War Pact forces which breached deeper behind the front would soon be confronted with a very unpleasant situation on their flanks and the back.

    Re. "grunt quality": I completely agree with you, that the average "Wessy" eventually couldn"t be better trained than East German soldier; but I again doubt that any average Soviet soldier was as good trained as any German soldier (regardless West or East) - that's my point, and there is nothing like a "pride" I would need to defend here.

    In summary, I agree with you that it's good that war never happened and that we can all be
    glad about that. As you concluded, however, I simply have some points regarding which I can't completely agree with you. Nothing personal.

    For the end, I'd like to ask you about something else:
    a) my picture of the LSK is not completely clear; I know it had a wing each of main fighter-bombers (MiG-23BN and SU-22s), and three wings of MiG-21s; can you help with a short oversight of its complete power around 1988?

    b) what can you - if at all - tell about potential targets of the LSK in West Germany? Would the East German AF attack rather enemy ground troops or supply lines, or airfields, or other targets?

    [ This Message was edited by: Tom on 2002-03-16 17:20 ]

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-17 06:55
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Tom,
    you ask why i completly disagree with the idea of a surprise sea landing in East Holstein.
    This is simply a question of geography. The NATO had a very good radar post on the danish island of Bornholm in the center of the western Baltic. This radar picket would detect nearly all ship traffic in the area so that a big fleet of landing ships would be detected very soon. Also there were always NATO ships on patrol on the Baltic, recce planes etc. Nobody could be so blind not to see a big landing fleet.
    And the reaction of the NATO would be fast. Danish and german fast missile boats would engage the fleet, der U-Bot fleet would come out frome their Base in Kiel and of course there where the Marineflieger of Schleswig Jagel and from other places. I doubt, that a fleet could come close to the coast of East Holstein without heavy losses.
    Surprise was always the key for a successfull war start. But surprise would be wasted with a sea landing. It is not fast enough.

    Now to the LSK. 1988 the LSK had 6 fighter squadrons. JG-1 and 2 with MiG-21SPS, M and MF, JG-3 with MiG-29 and MiG-21MF,JG-7 with MiG-21M, JG-8 with MiG-21bis, JG-9 with MiG-23MF and ML.
    2 training squadrons. ***-15 with MiG-21SPS, ***-25 with L-39.
    2 fighter bomber squadrons. JBG-73 with MiG-23BN and JBG-77 with Su-22M4. A third fighter bomber squadron was the MFG-28 with Su-22M4, what belongs to the Navy.
    168 MiG-21, 40 MiG-23, 20 MiG-29, 18 MiG-23BN, 46 Su-22M4 (Data from 1989).

    The targets of the LSK i dont know. The fighters surely in the defence role, the fighter bombers in the attack role, but dont ask me what exactly.

    Michael.


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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-18 02:20
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Well Michael,

    I donґt agree with your assesment of the bundeswehr in the 80ґs. Today the Bundeswehr is nothing more then a hollow shell, but then the equipment was top of the line and better then many NATO allies. Let me give you some details, Leopard 2 had the most advanced fire control system of this days. Marder APC and updated Leopard 1 tanks where still a threat to be dealt with. The Bundeswehr had lots of ATGMs (HOT, TOW, etc.) and these weapons were modern in the 80ґs and able to defeat nearly every armor then used.
    And furthermore let me tell you mobilisation of NATO forces would not have started when the russian tanks would start moving, it would have started much earlier. The first indication would be an increased readiness by russain forces and then a series of large scale manouvers. If this is followd by an stand down and maintance period, during which suplly stocks are further increased,this would have been seen as a sign for a possible attack and would have been met with increased readiness by NATO troops.
    During the early 80ґs the Russain / WarPac did a manouver which showed many of the signs mentioned and 4 days later (4 days after russians started to increase their stocks to a level NATO considered they would need for war) a "unplaned" Reforger kicked in. Officaly it was said that this excercise was planed, but I have info that NATO feared an attack and did a unplaned "Reforger".
    What you said about the eastern spies is quite true, but they had the greatest success on the political level. I can asure you that NATO was very well informed about the on-goings in the GDR.

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-18 12:54
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Seahawk,
    with the big exercise in early 80th you mean surely the Waffenbrьderschaft 80 large scale exercise. This was really a very big thing. Nearly the completly GDR territory was used by all 7 allied armies and it was offically trained the reconquest of the GDR after a NATO attack and stoping on the GDR FRG border. Under the hand it was said, that it was trained to go to the Nortsea Baltic canal.
    After this exercise a lot of changes was made including tactic changes for the tank forces, strategy changes from strategic attack to strategic defence etc.
    One change was the decison to strike from stand if neccessary, what means to start with the stocks available to the units. The NVA units was so on stocks that spareparts for one week was always available and since the early 60th all combat vehicles were fully armed and had full ammo load.

    If you want, let us compare the armament of the BW with this of the NVA in the late 80th.

    Infantry: rifle: BW G3 NVA AK-74N, KMS-72
    you can ask who you want, the NVA weapon was better.
    Machine gun: the MG of both sides were equivalent in firepower with advanteges of maintanance and interchangablility for the NVA weapon.
    Handheld SAM: BW Redeye, Stinger NVA Strela 2M, Igla both weapon systems were comparable but BW had more modern units. Only few iglas the NVA had.
    Tanks: Leo1 versus T-55. better fireguidance, higher speed for Leo, better armor for T-55, especially in version T-55AM2 with addon armor. Firepower of the guns was nearly equal. vo of Leo1 gun 1375 m/s, T-55gun 1315 m/s. But T-55AM2 had gun started ATGM Bastion.
    T-72 versus Leo2
    nearly the same like T-55 versus Leo1. The Leo2 had an excellent fireguidance system, thatswhy 2 Leo2 were aquired (stolen) by the GDR intellegency service. A second attempt to get 2 more modern Leo2 was not successfull.
    The armor of the Leo2 was to weak and when he was tested in 1990 against T-72 the decision to build the Leo2A5 version came faster. In this version the Leo2 is surely the best tank of the world which is now in active service. (Better than the M1 Abrams, i guess, it must have a reason why the Turkey want the Leo and not the Abrams)
    AFV (Schьtzenpanzer) Marder versus BMP, better armor for the Marder, better firepower, speed etc for the BMP, especially for BMP-2 and improved BMP1
    motorized artillery: 155mm versus 122 and 152mm comparable systems
    drawn artillery: 100mm Pak, 122mm howitzer, 152mm howitzer, 130 long barrel guns of NVA side, i dont know which systems the BW had.
    SAM: Patriot versus S-300 Angara nearly the same and on older systems the NVA had a much wider range of SAM including lots of which could follow the motorized forces. Only the Roland was in the BW able to follow the troops.
    ATGM: Milan, HOT, TOW for BW, Matjulka, Fagott, Bastion for the NVA. Systems nearly equal. BW had more units, but tank hunting was in the NVA also a job for the 100mm Pak.
    On the ground the NVA had better systems in the most fields only the BW Tanks and ATGM would be a better.
    Ammo stocks: NVA reserves for 4 weeks, BW reserve for 1 week.

    In the air: fighters: F-4F (poor mans aircraft) versus MiG-21M, MF, bis, MiG-23MF,ML and MiG-29A. more and more modern units for the NVA. (ICE upgrade for the F-4 came in the early 90th)
    fighter bombers: Alpha jet, Tornado IDS and Tornado ECR versus MiG-23BN and Su-22M4.
    much more units for the BW, but BW lacks the laser guided weapons.

    Navy: no doubt, that the BW had more and better systems. Only the handfull Tarantula of the NVA were modern.

    Conclusion: Advanteges for NVA on the ground and in the air. Advanteges for the BW on the sea.

    Michael

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    Samster049
    Charter Member

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 1196
    From: Cairo, Egypt
    Posted: 2002-03-18 15:03
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    I must admit, the discussion on this thread is really quite fascinating. I do have a question for Michael:

    I have read that very often in the Soviet Air Force, many of their training missions were very rigid, and pilots who maneuvered outside very strict limits were reprimanded. An example I read was that when a squadron commander and his fighter pilots started practicing a maneuver that they thought might defeat enemy air-to-air missiles in combat when this maneuver was not part of the mission plan during the exercise, a high-ranking officer observing it immediately came over the intercome and said, "I demand you cease this aerial hooliganism immediately!" (Aerial hooliganism is the Soviet description for indiscipline in the air and not adhering to the official flight plan.) Also, I read that there was very little air combat maneuver training in the Soviet air force. What was the situation with the LSK? Were there similar restrictions? I would like to know...

    Yours,

    Samster

    PS: I read these examples in a book called "Russia's Air Power in Crisis". The information for the book is:

    ISBN: 1560989912 Author: Lambeth, Benjamin S. Publisher: Smithsonian Institution Press Subject: Chechnia (russia) Subject: Air power Subject: Russia (pre & post Soviet Union) Subject: Military - Aviation Subject: History Subject: Chechnлiмa Series: Smithsonian history of aviation series Publication Date: c1999 Binding: Trade Cloth Language: English Illustrations: Yes Pages: x, 233 p. Dimensions: 9.22x6.25x.90 in. 1.00 lbs.

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-20 14:16
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Samster,
    the training in the soviet air force, especially in the MiG-23 units followed striked rules. But this rules came because the soviets know the inferiority of their MiG-23 in close air combats with F-15 and F-16. If i have understand it correct, the soviets planed to fight against this planes from distance and to try to avoid close combat. (That it wont work the Libanon war was the proof.)
    After this lesson the voices of veterans of the war of attrition between Egypt and Isreal, and veterans from Vietnam was herad and a special air combat training center was formed somewhere in the southern USSR (Kasachstan, Turkenia, Kirgisia, i dont know exactly where)
    With the more maneuverable MiG-23MLD and later the new generation MiG-29 and Su-27 the training of close air combat had a much higher ranking. And i heard from different sources, that the training in the air combat training center was really hard and realistic. I dont know wheter it was on the level of Red Flag or Top Gun, but i think in such kind.

    The LSK followed the soviet rules and the really hard combat training, including live missile firing was made in Kasachstan. For such things the airspace of the GDR was to small. 4 big international air traffic corridors and the safety distance from the border made big air combat maneuvers nearly impossible. If i remember right was the only remarkable spce for dog fight training the area southern of the island of Rьgen.

    Michael

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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-21 02:06
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Michael,

    I talked to some friends about the topic and here are some points they gave me.

    1. They all agreed that a surprise attack by WarPac forces would have been impossible. (They told tme that western intelligence knew exactly the stocks for most troops in East Germany) Any increase in stocks or other signs for a higher state of readiness would have been met with a increased readiness by NATO forces.
    2. They agreed that NATO would have needed 3 days to be fully combat ready. The prepositioned equipment of the US Army would have been taken by at elast 2 divisions coming from the US using all available aircraft. (civilian and military)
    3. The Russians planed to use the NVA in the first wave as canon fodder, cause they wanted to use these troops instead of getting there own destroyed. My friends told me that this was known to the NVA leadership and there have been strong doubts about the willingness of the NVA to go in with the first wave.
    4. The Bundeswehr was trained for exactly this war. Furthermore they said that they expected the Bundeswehr to fight fiercely, simply because most soldiers would fight for their homes and the escape of their families. And as WW II proved german troops do fight hard to defend their homeland.
    5. French had 3 divisions stationed close to the german border who would be ready to join the defence in less then 48 hours.
    6. Spanish troops would be arriving within 72 hours.

    All agreed that the greatest dange for NATO was in the North Atlantic and in the question if the supplies woud get through from the US.


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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-21 11:26
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Seahawk,
    it seems to be that some of your opinions are influenced by Tom Clancys book "Red Storm Rising". I know it too and it is an interessting thriller, but it is fiction. Fiction in the kind of underestimation of the WP and overestimation of NATO abilities. If i remember right the main idea was, like your friends said too, that the battle for the atlantic would be the most important and losing this battle would be the most danger for the NATO.
    I think the most danger for the NATO were their low war stocks of ammo and fuel and so the real danger was to run out of fuel.
    Another danger was to lose the air superiority by losing the airfields trough bombing. While the most (not all) WP tactical war planes were able to operate from gras stripes, the NATO planes lacked this ability.

    And finaly to the abilities of the west german intelegency. They were not even able to detect all weapon systems we had in the NVA. They believed the only surface surface weapon of the NVA was the R-14 Scud. But we had the Oka and Totschka system too (NATO code should be spider and scarab if i remember right). S-300 Angara (SA-10), Igla (SA-16) were succesfully hidden. The same was with the Anti Radar missiles of The Su-22 and their laser guided missiles. The west germans believed, that the 22 would be only a dump bomb dropper.
    In the same way, the overestimated our economy the underestimated our military.

    One nice sentences i will never forget. 1993 one of my (west german) study colleges on the Leipzig University said: "Your SPW (BTR-70) were able to swimm on the water, in my MTW (M113)i could swimm when it was raining."
    Nice isn't it.

    Michael

  4. #4
    Officer of Engineers
    Guest
    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Goto page ( Previous Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Next Page )
    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-22 03:05
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I know that what Iґm writing sounds like Red Storm Rising, but I talked to a friend who has his information not from a Tom Clancy book. Let me put it he was in military service from the late 70ґs to the early 90ґs in a major NATO power. He spent some time in the 80ґs in intelligence.
    The capabilities of the NVA were well known to NATO, but not weel known to the west german public. The main reason was that giving away that information would have leaked the sources the West gained that info. The capabilities of the SU-22 nevertheless were published in books in the 80ґs, with ARM and PGM capabilities.
    On the resources thing. You are right in the lates 80ґs the war reserve of the West was reduced, simply cause of the reduced tension between east and west. If we take a look at the early 80ґs readiness and war reserves of the Bundeswehr were much higher.
    And finaly the NVA was equal or better to the Bundeswehr in many points, but in the given scenario the Bundeswehr would be the defender and normaly the defender has the advantage.
    Furthermore I agree that both sides would have taken extremly heavy casualities, with the first wave of both sides destroyed within 4 (east) to 6 (west) days. The question would be who could field the second wave and the third wave first. I thing that the second wave would not be the problem, as the WarPac would use troops from Poland and the western USSR, while the West would use available british, french, spanish and first US troops.
    The third wave would decide the war imo. On the WarPac side these were troops from the USSR, like reserve devisions and troops from deeper within the USSR. For the West it would be troops from continental US. So if the Warpac could field itґs 3rd wave before the West can field itґs then the WarPac would win. If not the West would win, cause their 3rd wave would be better equipped.
    So it all comes to the control of the sea lanes to europe.

    Iґm really enjoying this discussion.

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-22 14:32
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Seahawk,
    you say the defender has always an advantage. This was correct in former times, but in the time of modern warfare, i think, the task of the defender is much more difficult.
    The attacker has the initiative. he decides when and where he strikes and when and where to fight. When he is able to break trough the frontline he brings panic and turmoil in the enemy backland, he cuts the supply lines of the defender while he can life from the conquered fuel reserves of the enemy.
    The NATO had not had the chance to play the old russian game to change soil against time. The strategic deep was not enough for it. So the NATO forces had to fight where they stand with the risk of a Kesselschlacht, like we call it in german.

    The problem the FRG and today the united Germany had is that the political system is not good for the military. The ranking of the military is low and so the BW is seen as a neccessary evil. The result is, that the politics give the BW not the neccessary material, so that the small but live safing equipment often is not available. For example: F-4F, called poor mans aircraft, lacked the Sparrow missile and air to ground capability. Result cost intensive updates. It had been better to wait 5 years and to buy the F-15 or the F-16 or the Mirage F1. Next example panzers: the Leo's had no laser warning recievers. Or another example Navy: one type of frigates was bought without missile armament or example Eurofighter: no DASH and no IR sensor in german EFA 2000. endless story, but how to change it when politicians decide who not served.

    Michael


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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-24 13:03
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I totally agree on that. Today the Bundeswehr is in a sorry state. But until the mid 80ґs defence was of a greater importance then today.
    But donґt get me starting about the Bundeswehr of today. Or as I like to call it the Deutsche Museumstruppe.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-25 13:54
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Seahawk,
    i agree with you, today the BW is in a very bad status.

    Michael

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-25 14:06
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Yep it is so sad, once germany had two powerful armies (NVA and Bundeswehr) now we have none.
    The helos are 20 years old, the tanks and APCґs are mostly worn, the F-4 is a museum piece, the tornado got no real upgrade, etc. etc.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-27 13:38
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is a lot gone wrong. Some of our Mi-24P were delivered in 1988. The BW gift them to Hungary who had no spareparts to use it.
    The BW themself used old UH-1D with addon armor in Somalia. This Helis were nearly unable to start, so heavy the were.
    It had been better to hold the Mi-24 in service and scrap the UH-1. With the Mi-24 it had been the chance to train the pilots for the Tiger Helicopter.
    And this is only one thing, what is gone wrong.
    I believe the BW need not more money, it need more brain.

    Michael

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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-03-27 15:10
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It needs both and an able defence minister

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    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-03-29 10:35
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If any like it i have now a 16VA orbat for the 1990 (note 1990 exact period) if everyone is interesed:

    Here is:

    Actually only 2 errors:

    is APIB not ABIP
    the polk with Fulcrum 9.13S its the 73 not the 85 IAP...

    1990
    Western Group of Soviet Forces
    16 Air Red Banner Army
    HQ – Wundsdorf, DDR


    6th Guards Fighter Aviation Donetsk Szeged Red Banner Order of Suvorov Division - (Merseburg)
    Notes: I’m with you guys, I’m also HATE honorius names L

    139th Aviation Technical Regiment (Merseburg)
    Notes: At HQ level, with some An-2, this was classical of practical every division in the DDR.

    31st Guards Fighter Nikopol’skiy Red Banner Order of Suvorov Regiment (31GvIAP) - Falkenberg
    MiG-23 (4), MiG-29 (30)

    85th Guards Fighter Aviation Sevastopol’ Red Banner Order of B. Khmel’nitskiy Regiment (85GvIAP)– Merseburg
    MiG-23UB (4) MiG-29 (30?)
    Notes: This regiment of partially only C Fulcrum receives in the 1994 an update to the 9.13S standar, with 16 aircraft with Topaz N-019M radar. Aviatsiya and Kosmonauvtica Nє8 1997

    968. IAP - Altenburg (soviet name Nobitsz)
    MiG-23 (4), MiG-29
    Notes: (30 much of these “C”, with some “A” with ventral fins those carried a unit badge with a very nice swept red star, superimposed on a blue wing)

    GENERAL NOTES:
    Nobitsz was traditionally a reconossaince and fighter-bomber base, transferring to the fighter role in 1989, when the 16th Air Army gained a less overtly offensive posture. The based MiG-27D and MiG-27M of the 296 ABIP moved to Grosenhain to replace departing Su-24s, and were themselves replaced by the 968th IAP wich moved from the USSR.

    During some part of the 1988, the 296 ABIP was part of this IAD!!!, yes an ABIP (fighter-bomber regiment) in a Fighter Division!
    -------------
    16th Guards Fighter Aviation Svir’ Red Banner Division (Damgarten soviet, name Putnitsz)

    33. IAP - Wittstock
    MiG-23UB (2?), MiG-29 (31)
    Notes: The 33rd IAP applied a badge to some of it’s a/c consisting of an Imperial Russian Type roundel, on wich were superimposed a red Byelorussian bison, a stylized red shark (or a dolphin!) and a blue MiG-29 with the marks 33 in the top and IAP in the buttom.

    733. IAP - Damgarten (also known as Putnitsz)
    MiG-23 (?), MiG-29 (30)
    Notes: By 1990 773 IAP had largely re-equiped with the Fulcrum-C 9.13 but eight a/c remained on charge, two still with ventral fins. 773 IAP was the second Fulcrum Polk in 16 VA and the fifth in the VVS FA.

    787. IAP – Finow (Eberswalde in the West)
    MiG-23 (4), MiG-29 (30)
    Notes: Finow, in the west know as Eberswalde, north-east from Berlin just 30km or maybe some more...also lots of 9.13…Eberswalde had a mixture os Soviet and Nazi buildings too!

    They are only 3 Polks in this Divissaya., 77 IAP doesn’t exist!
    With a Comunication and Liason unit in Damgarten at HQ level with some An-2 and Mi-9
    ------

    126th Fighter Aviation Red Banner Division (126th IAD) - Zerbst

    35 IAP – Zerbst
    MiG-23UB (5), MiG-29 (30?)

    833. IAP – Juterborg (also know as Altees-Lager)
    MiG-23UB (8), MiG-23MLD (29 )
    Notes: This bases was schudeled for re-equiping with Fulcrums, but the Fall of the USSR impeded. The unit replaced a Su 24 unit that was pulled back in 1988.

    73 GvIAP – Kothen
    MiG-23UB (4?) MiG-29(30?)
    With a Comunication and Liason unit in Zerbst at HQ level with some An-2 and Mi-9
    -------
    And with these we ended the Fighter Assets of the 16VA
    Now to the Fighter Bombers

    105 ABID – Grosenhain

    With a liason unit with some An-2 and Mi-9 at HQ level (just like every polk

    296th ABIP – Grossenhain
    MiG-23UB (8) MiG-27D/M (31)
    Notes: For some time in Nobitz in the 1988, replace departing Fencers

    559th ABIP - Finstewalde
    MiG-23UB (?) MiG-27M/K (more than 30)
    Notes: No much info about these, sadly L, some Floggers K G-2…cool!!

    911th ABIP – Brand
    MiG-23UB (10), MiG-27K (32)
    -------------
    125th IBAD – Rechlin
    With An-2 at HQ level for liason

    19 GvABIP – Mirrow-Laerz
    Mig-23UB(7), MiG-27M(31)

    20th APIB – Grossdoln
    39 Su-17M3/3UM
    Notes: The history of this polk is interesant…begins in 1944-1948, with MiG-15, late MiG-17 and later with only Sukhoi birds, first Su-7BM, Su-17, Su-17M, M2, M3, M4….and later with the defensive posture of the 16 VA, returns to the M3 and 3UM, for reconnaissance…the polk leaves Germany the 5/4/1994 and maybe disbanded in 1998, sadly L

    730 ABIP – Neuruppin
    more than 30 Su-17M4
    Notes: Some very beautiful Su-17M4 here, some with Guards Badge…relocated to Tagnarong the 28 May of 1991.
    -------

    Now to the “Wild Weasels” and reconnaissance polks

    During the 1989 all reconossaince and ELINT assests were Direc Reporting to the HQ in Wundsdorf

    39th ORAD – Sperenberg
    With An-12, Il-20 and Il-22 in ELINT and SIGINT roles at HQ level…maybe this could be the 390th ORAE
    In the 1992 (August if I remind) was visited by a Soviet Su-27 polk!!

    11 ORAP – Neu Welzow
    11th Separate Reconnaissance Aviation Vitebsk Red Banner Order of Kutuzov Regiment
    Su-24MP, Su-24MR = 24
    Notes: The only polk with Su-24MP a/c, with some 12 or maybe 20, who knows...withdrawal in July 1991 during a two day period. Maybe no one Foxbat here…

    931 ORAP - Werneuchen
    With MiG-25BM

    294th ORAP – Allstedt
    ? Su-17M3
    Notes: A formation at polk level, not only one eskadrelniya here!! With Su-17M-3

    Direct Report Units:

    226th OSAP – Sperenburg
    An-12, An-24, An-26, and Tu-134A-3, for SIGNT and ELINT porpouses??

    239th ORAP??? - Oranienburg
    Some Mi-6 and MI-8

    390 ORAE – Sperenburg ????
    Maybe the same HQ unit of the 39th ORAD in Sperenburg, with the same a/c

    OBMAS – Damgarten
    11 Su-25BM
    Notes: Speciazed units for target selection and laser illumination for other Su-25. Uniquely!


    Assault and Sturmovhich Units

    357. SchAP - Brandis
    Su-25/UB (30) L-39(somes?)

    368. SchAP - Demmin
    Su-25 (31), L-39 (ї)

    WELL!!!…..any suggestion is welcome
    Later I will make IA-PVO orbats and other Eastern Europe Assets

    Some notes:
    The ORBATs of the ground forces is pretty erroneuos (only one opinion off course) if comes of Mr Johnson ORBAT (this huge orbat that also have warpact countries) is erroneus in several means...

    Only one example, the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade, IS NOT a direct reporting unit, is subordinated to the 20th Guards Army...

    They are also at least 4 Sam Brigades, and lots of other assets, i have make it one (in spanish) detailed to regimental level but with some batallions assets isn't perefect but i think that could bring a better perception, i have use it some Leu Frentz (sorry if the name have errors) books, and several russian sources...

    If anyone is intereted, please talk

    Regards People

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sunburn
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 24, 2002
    Posts: 44
    From: Greece
    Posted: 2002-03-29 16:41
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prowler, I for one would be very interesting in any SAM/radar OOBs you have. I have been searching for such information for years, as these are much harder to come by than the "flashier" and certainly more popular aircraft OOBs. In the case of the GSFG/WGF I have good information on mobile SAM units and the complete EW/GCI network, but I still lack thorough information on static (PVO) SAM sites (with the exception of those assigned to airbase-guard duty). I also need some more information on the SAM networks of the rest of the Warsaw Pact as well the USSR proper. Any information you're able to share would be particularly welcome.

    _________________
    The Europe-88 Project: World War III in Europe
    www.harpoonhq.com/Europe88/

    [ This Message was edited by: Sunburn on 2002-03-29 16:45 ]

  5. #5
    Officer of Engineers
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    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Goto page ( Previous Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Next Page )
    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-03-31 19:53
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sunburn i will hel p you give me some days !!

    Hi guys

    What the hell!, what thread so amazing!!, i'm very happy to know that there is an ex-DDR!!!

    Hello Michael!! very happy to know about you and your extraordinary and interesant histories...

    Well i have some doubts that maybe you can respond me:

    1) Why 3 MRD from the NVA would be subjected to DIRECT Soviet Administration in case of war?...i know that at least ALL the NVA is subordinated "literally" to the Soviet Command...but this info is really interesting to me!.

    2) The exercises that you talk about are "Comrades in Arms-80"...i have lot of info about this and other exercises... i will posting here at the buttom.

    3) What is exactly an "Angara" is a downgraded S-300, a S-300P, PM...what???

    4) The Stassi controlled the NVA and others Armed assets of the DDR (and were hated) in the same manner like the KGB with the soviet army?

    5) And by last, wich you think that could be the targets of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in such war???, reach the atlantic??, support the troops??

    And also why and HOW HOW an army of more than 1.000.000(first strategic wave of the WP) of soldiers could be exterminated in only 3 days!!, and make a similar destruction in NATO forces!!! 3 days is nothing!!, are you spekeaded with the Nuclear Weapons factor??

    About the "Caucasic Program" (soviet agressor unit in Turkmenistan, Mary-1)


    In 1960s Soviet AF instructors gained precious, sometimes bitter, experience from air combats over Middle East and Vietnam. Just like theirs US colleagues they realized that air intercept concept with beyond visual range attack failed and air combat maneuvering was en vogue again.

    In early 1970s at Mari-1 airbase in Turkmenistan 1521 Fighter Airbase was established (very designation rather unusual to Soviet AF; not to be confused with Mari-2 airbase which is ordinary one). Weather there was good 360 days per year. “Caucasus Program” or “Exercise 500” was intensive, often dangerous training with MiG-21 – ACM alone and in different formations, at all altitudes and speeds. The Center was designed for advanced pilots that would train foreign “brothers in arms” and would face the enemy themselves. It paid immediate dividends in 1973 Middle East War.

    Further Center moved to a concept, similar to USAF “Aggressors” or USN “Top Gun”. In 1974 two squadrons with MiG-21 were established, manned by veterans. Subsequently young talented and aggressive pilots, passed “Caucasus Program”, replaced them. Pilots from regular AF units often visited the base to face the aces. That significantly promoted soviet AF skills.

    In fall 1975 2 Sqn got MiG-23M/UB. In 1984 same squadron moved to latest MiG-23MLD. In 1987 1 Sqn got MiG-29. 2 Sqn was expected to receive Su-27 in 1989, but plans failed under financing heavily curtailed. Second trial failed in 1991 because of coup attempt that led to the USSR collapse.

    To identify aces` planes, take a closer look. Both MiG-29 and MiG-23MLD have desert camouflage according to Turkmenistan landscape: sand-brown, bright brown and green spots with random shape. MiG-29 of 1 Sqn have winged yellow “1” with red arrow in background. Squadron’s herald is white jumping leopard with black spots, painted on the starboard below the canopy. MiG-23MLD of 2 Sqn have caricature of Viking with “2” on the slam, painted on port air intake. The planes have yellow strip with a few stars for shotdown La-17 drones. For MiG-29 – on the back; for MiG-23MLD – on the fin. When the base was declassified, AM letters were painted on the fins of some Fulcrums at least, for Airbase Mari.

    The planes occasionally got into action in 1988, escorting Tu-16 bombers over Northern Afghanistan. There escort was taken by MiG-23MLD of 120 Fighter Air Regiment, based at Bagram (home base Domna).

    Today 1521 Fighter Airbase is Russian military facility in Turkmenistan. It still exists and sustains certain activity, adequate to financing. Plans for withdrawal in Russia suspended. Information for status after 1998 is virtually non-existent.

    from orbat.com.

    And also:

    "Before the collapse of the Soviet Union the most important air combat center was the Mary training area in the Kara Kum desert in Turkmenistan, near the Caspian Sea. Air force units used to come there regularly to joint exercises and firings. There were two airbases in the area: the Mary 2 was the fighter airbase of the Soviet Air Defence Force and the Mary 1 had depots and ordnance for several different types of aircraft (19).

    When the exercise began, the whole air force regiment - the pilots, maintenance, officials, canteen personnel, drivers, even the waiters of the officers' canteen - were moved to the Mary. The objective was to simulate pre-war transfer of forces to advanced Warsaw Pact positions. The exercise began with a briefing to all regiment pilots and evaluation center staff. During the exercise each unit could expect to get an order, without a preliminary warning, to fulfil one of its most important wartime tasks. The satisfactory evaluations in the regiment readiness inspection in the Mary were 5/5 (excellent) and 4/5 (good) (19).

    By the end of the two-week exercise, each squadron flew as part of a full regiment against an equally sized target detachment. Still, the experiences gained during the exercise did not have any effect on post-exercise training in the home base. Besides, during the exercise in the Mary the participating units had hardly any contacts between them (19)."

    I don't remind the link...the page is called The actual state of the russian air Forces...i don't remind...

    Abbout the WARPACT exercises:


    Before the entry of the former GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany, the National People's Army (NVA) systematically destroyed classified records from which the strategic and operational war planning of the Warsaw Pact (WP) could be deduced.
    Even so, 25,000 sealed documents came into the possession of the Federal Defense Ministry after reunification. Essentially, these involved transcripts of meetings of the NVA's highest political and military leadership, directives, orders, reports and records of every kind, maneuver and training materials, situation reports on the enemy, and mobilization plans.
    The maneuver and training documents focused above all on the preparation and duties of troops and staffs in the event of war. From these one can deduce, with a high degree of accuracy, the operational plans and military preparations of the Warsaw Pact.
    The documents clearly reveal the offensive nature of the WP's war plans against NATO in Central Europe. These plans were not modified at all until the latter half of the 1980s, when it was deemed that strategic offensive operations would begin only after an initial defense. In conjunction with what has already been known, the documents present and clarify a reliable picture: to wit, that the preliminary and advanced training of the military leadership, the training of troops and staffs, and the infrastructure, personnel and communications of the WP were all aimed at preparing for a rapid attack deep into France.
    This finding will be discussed under the following headings:
    * Operational Planning of the WP;
    * Planning for the Use of Nuclear Weapons; and
    * Efforts to Deceive the Military and the Public About NATO's Intentions and Defense Preparations.
    Supporting references will be provided in the appendix.
    1. Operational Planning of the Warsaw Pact
    Under Soviet guidance, Warsaw Pact planning envisaged an attack by a total of five Fronts (a Front corresponds to a full-strength NATO army group) against NATO forces in Northern and Central Europe.A The ground forces for these five Fronts were to consist of:
    * Soviet military forces in the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia;
    * the NVA, the Czechoslovak People's Army, and the Polish People's Army; and
    * Soviet military forces from Belorussia and the Ukraine.
    The Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Polish Navy, and the People's Navy of the GDR, as well as the air forces of numerous countries, were also included within the plan.
    The NVA documents show that this deployment of forces served as the basis for many command exercises and staff exercises in the WP and NVA. The chronicle of the GDR Defense Ministry for 1977/781 lists, among other things, the following theme of the General Officers' Training Course: "Preparation and Conduct of Offensive Operations Along the Front with and without Nuclear Weapons." Additional tasks were stipulated for "Offensive Operations in the Direction of the Coast" in the Northern-Lower Saxony/Schleswig-Holstein area.
    In 1978 the same chronicle describes a staff exercise under the leadership of the then Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ogarkov, in which a five-Front "attack in the western and southwestern military theaters" was to be rehearsed.B
    In 1980 the NVA hosted the Warsaw Pact's "Comrades-in-Arms-80" maneuvers.2 The aim of the exercises was formulated in the following way by the WP High Command:
    1. Conduct of operations at the outset of a war:
    * Breaking through a prepared defense by overwhelming a security sector.
    * Prevention of a counter-attack.
    2. Conduct of operations in the depth of the enemy's defense, in conjunction with naval and amphibious forces.
    3. Completion of the subsequent duties of the first-echelon armies.
    Corresponding to each of these points were training exercises that convincingly showed how NATO's defense-in-depth could be ruptured. The penetration was to occur in three stages at the operational and tactical levels (Army, Division), as can be seen in the briefing materials prepared for high-ranking political and military visitors:
    * Stage One: Breaking through the defense,
    * Stage Two: Overcoming the defensive
    sector, deployment of the second echelon,
    * Stage Three: Paratroop landings, deep attacks over water, and offensives in combination with the paratroopers.
    The aims and conduct of the exercise are but one example among many of how the Warsaw Pact was poised for offensive operations from the very beginning of a military conflict with NATO. Except for a few exercises in the late 1980s, defense against a NATO attack was not practiced because such an attack obviously was considered implausible.
    Planning for military operations at the operational and strategic levels of the Front (known in the West as army groups) also reflected this general set of aims. After the WP exercise "Soyuz-83," the GDR defense minister at the time presented the whole concept in the following way, according to the sealed minutes of the National Defense Council:3
    The strategic groupings of troops and naval forces of the armed forces of the USSR, the Poland People's Republic, the GDR, and the CSSR have the following mission:
    The principal aim of the first strategic operation with troops on four Fronts is a rapid advance, reaching the frontiers of France by the 13th or 15th day, and thereby:
    * taking the territories of Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium;
    * forcing the withdrawal of these West European countries from the war; and
    * continuing the strategic operation by establishing two additional Fronts inside France, shattering the strategic reserves on French territory, and reaching Vizcaya and the Spanish border by day 30 or 35, thus accomplishing the final aims of the first strategic operation by removing France from the war.
    These examples and the above-mentioned documents clearly show how dominant the offensive was in the operational and strategic thinking of both the NVA and the WP. This offensive orientation persisted until the end of the 1980s despite the intervening political changes in the Soviet Union. Even in 1988-89 there was an advanced course for the senior officer corps of the NVA in which the "instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact's Joint Armed Forces regarding the operational mission of troops and naval forces" set forth the following aims:
    The goal of the operation is to liberate the territories of the GDR and CSSR, to occupy the economically important regions of the FRG east of the Rhine, and to create the right circumstances for a transition to a general offensive aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of the European NATO states from the war.4
    Formulated in this way, the goals of the exercise remained in a long tradition of earlier exercises. As a general justification for the Warsaw Pact's attack plans and as a way of quelling any possible criticism, the scenario for the exercise was based on the assumption that NATO had committed prior aggression. This assumption was a standard one within the ideological framework of the WP. From the documents, however, it is clear that the prospect of an attack by NATO could not possibly have been taken seriously.
    A sure sign of the hypothetical character of the assumptions in this and other exercises is that the supposed starting conditions were not actually reflected in the course of the exercise. Normally, only mobilization and counterattacks were practiced. The preparation and conduct of a defense against an attack, which was the principal aim and central feature of all NATO exercises, was certainly not of comparable importance as an exercise topic for the NVA and WP.
    In 1984, when Czechoslovakia was hosting the Warsaw Pact's "Shield" exercise, one of the five parts of the exercise was, for the first time, devoted to the practice of defensive operations. The remaining parts of the exercise were then dominated, as in the past, by rehearsals for a massive offensive against the West. In the treatment of this new exercise goal, and in the subsequent discussions that Gorbachev obviously inspired among military specialists about a defensive military doctrine, the Czechoslovak People's Army played a distinct leadership role within the Warsaw Pact, while the NVA acted as a braking force.C
    The changes in security policy that followed Gorbachev's rise to power were accompanied, albeit hesitantly, by similar revisions in military-strategic thinking. The first serious proposals for the development of joint defensive options for the Warsaw Pact came in 1985 when, for the first time, a joint staff training exercise was held at the highest levels of the WP on the theme of "Strategic Deployments and Preparations to Defend Against Aggression."5 The basic principles laid down in that exercise were tested in subsequent staff exercises; and in September 1989 they were incorporated into revised orders on defense, as the chronicle of the NVA reveals. The offensive components of planning and exercises clearly remained, but they came only after the initial defensive phases of operational and strategic counterattack.
    2. Aspects of Nuclear Weapons
    Employment
    The use of tactical nuclear weapons was an integral part of the Warsaw Pact's training of personnel at army command level and higher. As conceived by the military leadership, these weapons were to serve above all as a means of breaking through the enemy's defenses. In 1979, for example, a staff training exercise was held to prepare WP forces for "Attacks Along the Front with or without Nuclear Weapons." In 1981, the command staff training exercise "Soyuz-81," led by the then Commander-in-Chief of the WP, Marshal Kulikov, included, as one of its main objectives, "The Conduct of Strategic Attack Operations Involving the Use of Nuclear Weapons."
    Two years later, at the "Soyuz-83" exercise, the same marshal declared that "a future war will be carried out relentlessly until the total defeat of the enemy is achieved. This compels us to take into account the entire arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, with the uncontrollable dimensions of strategic actions."6 The conceptual mindset that lies behind this businesslike discussion need not be further explored here.
    In accord with such ideas, the use of nuclear weapons was treated either as a surprise first strike or as a response/counterstrike in numerous WP exercises led by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Union's Western Group of Forces (in the GDR) or by the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Central and West European military theater, as well as in NVA staff exercises.D In some exercises there was also a follow-on nuclear strike against reserves and any remaining forces.
    The "Comrades-in-Arms-80" exercise, which was hosted by the NVA, is an illuminating example of the Warsaw Pact's intention of resorting to the comprehensive use of nuclear weapons. In this exercise, a Soviet, a Polish, and a German Army commander each had to report on his decision regarding the conduct of nuclear war. These reports, and the plans that were based on them, were depicted by the defense minister of the GDR, in the presence of all his WP colleagues, as the main purpose of the exercise. The following scenario emerged from these discussions:
    The Warsaw Pact's first Front, consisting of the Soviet Union's Western Group of Forces and the NVA, would have had some 840 tactical nuclear weapons at its disposal, consisting of 205 operational-tactical missiles (Scuds) for the armies; 380 tactical missiles (FROGs) for the divisions; and 255 nuclear bombs.E
    Of these, the first-echelon armies were to be equipped with some 20 operational-tactical missiles, 55 tactical missiles, and 10 nuclear bombs. In addition, the air forces on the Front, and their missile brigades, were to have 125 nuclear bombs, 60 operational-tactical missiles, and 50 tactical missiles.
    The targets in a Warsaw Pact nuclear offensive would have been primarily as follows:
    * NATO nuclear installations and equipment;
    * air force and air defense installations;
    * war command posts at the divisional level, and communications facilities;
    * troops either in position or on the move; and
    * naval detachments and bases of the Federal navy.
    Given the quantity and effect of the designated warheads, nuclear target planning at the army- and Front-level was aimed at subduing any resistance on the part of the defenders by achieving wide destruction of installations and troops, and by allowing for intermediate targets to be taken, along with the final objectives, within a certain timetable. To support the initial nuclear strikes along the Front, four fighter divisions stood ready. In addition, substantial nuclear forces were to be held in reserve.
    For some time after 1981 the exercise documents contained no other operational plans regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Not until 1988, in exercises of the NVA's military districts (the level of command corresponding to a Bundeswehr corps), do we again find the use of nuclear weapons in an offensive and--what is new--defensive role, as can be seen in numerous official exercise documents and in the private notes of NVA officers who took part in several of the exercises.7
    The new defensive role of nuclear weapons was limited solely to tasks conducted at the army level of command. However, divisions also were now partly responsible for the actual use of the weapons. Although the extent, target distribution, and depth of nuclear strikes still corresponded to the usual picture of a massive attack, a new development in 1988 was the planned massive use of operational-tactical and tactical missiles equipped with conventional cassette-warheads (i.e., reentry vehicles carrying a number of smaller, non-nuclear munitions).
    Not until 1990 did the political changes in the GDR appear to have affected the training and exercise postures of the NVA. By then, the use of nuclear weapons was no longer an integral part of the NVA's exercises; instead, nuclear operations were left for procedural exercises geared toward specialists.
    This kind of exercise on the planning and release of nuclear arms, as seen, for example, in parts of the staff exercise "Staff Training- 89," provided for the devastation of border areas in Schleswig- Holstein by 76 nuclear weapons, including some of high destructive yield. Although there is very extensive information about the operational-tactical planning and military-technical aspects of nuclear weapons use, there is no documentation regarding the political decision-making process involved. In particular, there are no indications of the exact release provisions for the use of nuclear weapons, other than the well-known fact that the basic decision on when to "go nuclear" lay in the hands of the CPSU General Secretary.F
    The participation of other Warsaw Pact states in nuclear planning also remains obscure. As former officials of the ex-Defense Ministry of the GDR have indicated, non-Soviet members of the WP did not learn anything about real Soviet planning outside the exercises.G
    3. Deception of the Military and the Public About the Intentions, Military Strength and Defense Preparations of NATO
    To conform with the Warsaw Pact's fundamental assumptions about the enemy, the operational planning of the Pact had to depict the intentions and capabilities of NATO's armed forces in an extremely exaggerated and false way. This campaign of falsification included statements and assertions about:
    * NATO's defense system;
    * NATO's planning for nuclear use; and
    * assessments of NATO's strength and intentions to attack.
    Depiction of NATO's Defense System
    NATO long ago prepared an in-depth defense system along the borders of the Warsaw Pact. For many years, this system barely figured at all in the exercises and staff planning documents of the NVA intelligence director. The system was kept secret from the participants in exercises, and therefore had no influence on the Warsaw Pact's offensive operations. Not until 1987 did the first general references to NATO's system appear in NVA documents, and the system was not fully described until 1990.
    In earlier years, indications of NATO's defense planning would already have been apparent to a patient and thorough reader of the military- geographical descriptions and specialized maps prepared by NVA scouts. These documents, however, were available to only a very small and restricted group of people.
    In 1986 a colonel at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy departed from earlier treatments of the subject when he wrote about the so-called "Luxembourg Operational Direction" (sic!):
    NATO has devoted great attention to the preparation and construction of defenses and barriers. . . . A high concentration of defenses . . . is in place at a depth of some 50 to 70 km just west of the borders of the GDR and CSSR.8
    These defenses could be found in specialized maps as early as 1982--that is, at the high-point of the Warsaw Pact's offensive wargames. But all such maps, along with the statement cited above and any documents on this theme, were classified as top secret, and were therefore available to only an exclusive circle of people.
    It is clear, however, that the NVA's so-called Intelligence Directorate did not subscribe to its own obvious falsifications. Intelligence chiefs at senior levels of command possessed a "Catalog of Intelligence Features," which was based on the NVA's assessment of NATO's mobilization and alert plans.9 Among other things, the catalog provided a meticulous list of known indicators of an attack and the corresponding warning times.
    For example, the catalog accurately reported that at Alert Level II (4-6 days before war would start), the depth of NATO's frontier defenses might extend up to 100 kilometers. Such information would be crucial for preparations to destroy and disable those defenses.
    This detailed catalog, prepared as of 1982, had only one drawback: It was intended for only a very restricted group of officers in certain high-level command positions; and, on security grounds, it was not to be circulated further. A footnote on the very first page explicitly prohibited readers from relying on or quoting from the catalog because the material was so highly classified.
    Depiction of NATO's Plans for the Use of Nuclear Weapons
    At least as early as 1973, the GDR political leadership was well aware of NATO's approach to the use of nuclear weapons.10 That year, the NVA's intelligence director wrote, on the basis of his knowledge of the WINTEX-73 exercise, the following assessment: "WINTEX-73: . . . a further gradation of nuclear weapons use, even at the latest possible moment after a 100-km invading depth was achieved by Warsaw Pact troops . . . ."
    An internal report prepared by the deputy director of intelligence, General Gottwald, for the defense minister in 1988 confirms that he had a completely accurate understanding of the policy that NATO had long maintained regarding the possible selective use of nuclear weapons.11 An attentive reader of the report would note that "NATO's military strategy [is] oriented more strongly toward a selective use of nuclear weapons ..."H
    Briefing documents on "Probable Groupings and Activities of NATO's Armed Forces," prepared for troops in an instructional exercise, presented the following data:12
    * A massive first strike by NATO with nuclear weapons in the Western Theater of War
    * a total of 2,714 strikes (without France)
    * a total of 2,874 strikes (with France) Follow-on nuclear strikes by NATO
    * a total of 1,528 strikes (without France)
    * a total of 1,624 strikes (with France)
    It is illustrative of the climate of deception, secrecy, and obfuscation in the NVA regarding the intentions and capabilities of NATO that despite information to the contrary provided by the NVA intelligence director, a then-deputy Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact could declare at the GDR Defense Ministry in 1983 that "if operational targets are not met, NATO plans to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons with a total of over 5,000 nuclear warheads, of which 2,800 would be used in the first nuclear strike."13
    Depiction of NATO's Forces and Intentions
    This ideological depiction of an aggressive NATO and Bundeswehr was maintained--despite military evidence to the contrary--via the propagation of a falsely menacing image of both entities throughout the NVA. For example, to convey the supposedly offensive nature of NATO's military planning, a standard assumption in the plans and exercises of both the NVA and the Warsaw Pact was that NATO intended to attack in the direction of Berlin with four attack groups.14
    The fact that NATO did not have sufficient forces for such an attack posed no problem at all for NVA planners. On paper, for example, the Bundeswehr (without its territorial forces) could simply be increased by 2 corps with a total of 12 divisions. By supplementing this with other deliberately false information, NVA planners could create the illusion of a 6-to-1 NATO force advantage in the "Berlin Direction," which certainly appeared to be an alarming threat. Considering that such manipulations went on for many years, it is not surprising that as late as August 1990 (!), at a command training session of a military district, NATO was depicted as harboring far-reaching aggressive intentions.
    Naturally, the NVA's intelligence directors at the time did individually have, in their spheres of responsibility, an accurate assessment of NATO's force strength. Their assessments were based on intelligence findings and judgments derived by the Ministry for State Security and the military intelligence organs of the NVA from original NATO and Bundeswehr documents, which included such items as data from the logistics command of the West German army during 1984 and all the WINTEX materials since 1983.15 These assessments, however, were simply disregarded during the NVA's exercises.
    Evidence from the time attests to frequent disagreements between the directors of intelligence and the officers on the NVA's Main Staff responsible for military operations, who found that the enemy numbers were insufficient for their planning. Under orders from the Main Staff, extra NATO forces were ingeniously "located," so that, for example, in addition to the 12 Bundeswehr divisions there were now 17 (!) French divisions. Even the Spanish armed forces were factored in as a source of additional offensive potential in Central Europe.
    There is no doubt that the highest-ranking commanders of the NVA were fully aware of the true situation. It is possible, however, that even the National Defense Council of the GDR was not kept accurately informed by the defense minister at the time. There are documents from briefings given by defense ministers to the National Defense Council that contain descriptions of the enemy similar to those discussed above.16 The documents give no indication that there were any critical questions or demands for evidence at these sessions, either about the depiction of the force balance between NATO and the WP or about concrete indications of NATO's offensive intent.
    Only a few insiders could see through this mechanism of falsification. Normal staffers and NVA troops, as well as the broader population, had no correct information at their disposal that would have enabled them to challenge the official figures when negotiations began on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). The convincing way that these assessments of the enemy were presented gave them even greater credibility.
    In the three examples cited above it is clear that in the GDR, and within the NVA itself, all information about NATO's armed forces and operational plans was suppressed or kept secret if it in any way revealed the defensive orientation of the Western alliance or raised questions about the Warsaw Pact's offensive plans. Moreover, NATO's forces and operational plans were systematically misrepresented to conform with an ideologically-grounded, aggressive image of the enemy, which in turn served as a rationale for the Warsaw Pact's own offensive military doctrine and planning.
    APPENDIX (ENDNOTES)
    Unless otherwise indicated, original documents cited in this report can be found in the Document Division of the Seventh Regional Administration of the Armed Forces.
    1. Over the years, the GDR Defense Ministry maintained a very detailed chronicle of the most important results of all training exercises. The chronicle, which is relatively free of political overtones, offers a clear view of the activities and status of the NVA. The chronicle will remain a basic source for scholarly research on the NVA for many years to come, even though some portions of the text, unfortunately, have been destroyed or are missing.
    2. There are some 30 cartons of detailed NVA documents on the "Comrades-in-Arms-80" exercises. This material makes a good source for both historical research and operational-tactical matters.
    3. The Soyuz-83 exercise is the only one of the Soyuz maneuvers in which all documents were not destroyed at the end of the exercise in accordance with standard orders. It thus provides outstanding insights into the Warsaw Pact's operational and strategic thinking as of the early 1980s. A longer version of the Defense Minister's speaking notes is also located in the documents on Soyuz-83. A summary can be found in the minutes of the National Defense Council meetings.
    4. Because of the aim of "Staff Training-88/89" (advanced training of commanders and staff officers), the restricted number of participants, and the high degree of security and secrecy (with no radio traffic), the contents of this staff training exercise reveal much more than other exercises do about the real plans and intentions at the time.
    5. The joint "Staff Training-85" exercise of the Warsaw Pact, as discussed by the NVA, was a turning point in the WP's approach to the serious investigation of ways of conducting defensive operations. The training exercise is fully documented, and includes even the results of the participants.
    6. Chief of the NVA's Main Staff, Colonel-General Streletz, in a report to his minister in follow-up briefings to Soyuz-83. From the exercise documents of Soyuz-83.
    7. The following have been analyzed: "Staff Training-79" (see also note 4); "Comrades-in-Arms-80" (see also note 2); "Staff-Training-89" and "-90" of the Neubrandenburg (5th) Military District; the service book of a staff officer at the information directorate for "88/89"; the "Barricade-90" exercise of the heads of missile and artillery forces of the 5th Military District; and the command staff exercise "Sever-88" of the 5th Military District. Overall, they present a constant picture of nuclear planning in the 5th Military District.
    8. Copies and originals of military-geographical depictions of operational directions (used as training material at the Friedrich Engels Military Academy) are at the Office for Information Sources of the Bundeswehr (ANBw). These pertain specifically to the "Jutland Operational Direction" and the "Coasts and Luxembourg Operational Direction" for 1986-88, from which the section on "Military-Political Significance" was cited.
    9. An original copy of the "Catalog of Intelligence Features" is available at the ANBw. This catalog was intended only for senior officers of the Intelligence Directorate, and thus permits excellent comparisons with what was available to personnel outside the directorate and at lower levels of command.
    10. The following are from minutes of GDR National Defense Council meetings.
    11. These documents, from the ANBw publishing house, provide an overview of NATO strategy from 1967 on, with predictions through the year 2000. Starting in August 1988, NATO's nuclear policy was depicted relatively accurately, but the specter of a short-warning attack by NATO was preserved.
    12. This document, from the ANBw's Documents of the NVA Intelligence Directorate, is entirely dedicated to the presentation of figures supporting the notion that NATO's activities and intentions were aggressive. By means of frequent "arithmetical adjustments," it gives an absolutely false assessment of NATO's force strength.
    13. In the Soyuz-83 documents. See note 3.
    14. This scenario is found in all documents on the enemy's status. The force estimates were corrected in 1988-89, but the assumption that NATO's intentions were aggressive was maintained until the final exercise, planned for September 1990 ("North Wind-90" in the 5th Military District; the documents on "North Wind-90" are at the ANBw).
    15. Speechnotes of the head of military intelligence in the NVA, for a meeting of the heads of WP military intelligence in 1983.
    16. Soyuz-83 is an example of this point. Senior members of the National Defense Council (such as E. Honecker) must have recalled that analyses of earlier WINTEX maneuvers (e.g., the 1973 exercises at the Council's 43rd Session, the 1977 exercises at the 51st Session) yielded an entirely different picture, with NATO inferior by a ratio of 2-to-3 vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Honecker also received unembellished reports about the status and force levels of NATO and the Bundeswehr from the State Security Ministry; these provided him with a timely military assessment independent of the Ministry of National Defense.
    TRANSLATOR'S NOTES
    A. In Soviet military parlance, a Front was defined as "an operational-strategic formation of the armed forces ... which is designated to carry out operational-strategic missions along a single strategic direction or along several operational directions in a continental theater of military operations." See S.F. Akhromeev, ed., Voennyl entsiklopedicheskii slover, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1986), 787. The size of a Front would vary considerably depending on its specific mission, but it could include as many as 200,000-300,000 troops. For further information about Soviet levels of command, see Christopher W. Donnelly, Red Banner; The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (London: Jane's Information Group, 1988), 213-18.
    B. There is a small inaccuracy here. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov had been commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact until 1976, when he was appointed chief of the Soviet General Staff. At the time of this exercises ("Soyuz-78," held in Romania), Marshal Viktor Kulikov was commander-in-chief of the Pact. The exercise was under Kulikov's, not Ogarkov's command.
    C. For a broader discussion of the Czechoslovak army's role before 1989, see Christopher D. Jones, "The Czechoslovak Armed Forces," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988), 205-44. For a discussion by the same author of the post-1989 climate, see "Czechoslovakia and the New International System," in Jeffrey Simon, ed., European Security Policy After the Revolution of 1989 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), 307-30.
    D. Until 1989 the USSR's Western Group of Forces was known as the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), an indication of its special status in Soviet military planning. The change of name was intended to put the former GSFG on an equal level with the Southern Group of Forces (in Hungary), the Northern Group of Forces (in Poland), and the Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia). Unlike the other three Groups of Forces, however, the Western Group of Forces was still headed by a full "commander-in-chief," rather than by a mere "commander."
    E. The distinction here between "operational-tactical" missiles comes originally from the Soviet military lexicon, and has no direct equivalent in the West. The difference can be easily understood, however, by considering the range of the Scud-B (320 km) versus the FROG (70 km).
    F. This statement about the CPSU General Secretary's powers was true until March 1990, when the new office of the "President of the USSR" was created. (See "Zakon SSSR ob uchrezhdenii posta Prezidenta SSSR i vnesenii sootvetstvuyushchikh izmenenii i dopolnenff v Konstitutsiyu (Osnovnoi Zakon) SSSR," Izvestiya, 5 March 1990, 1-2.) The president was endowed with the title of "Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces," and in that capacity would have been the only official empowered to "make decisions and transmit orders to the Armed Forces regarding the conduct of military operations and the use of nuclear weapons." (On this point, see "... l o tom, kto nazhimaet na knopku: Zakanchivaetaya rabota nad proektom Zakone SSSR ob oborone," Krasnaya zvezda, 29 April 1990, 2.) Even after becoming President, however, Gorbachev retained his post as CPSU General Secretary; thus, the "transfer" of nuclear-release authority from the top party office to the head-of-state did not bring about any immediate concrete change, but was merely a reflection of the CPSU's sharp decline.
    G. Western analysts have long assumed that the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states would not have taken part in (and perhaps would not even have been consulted about) decisions to use nuclear weapons based in Eastern Europe. This hypothesis obviously is strengthened by the lack of any references in the East German documents to the political decision-making process.
    H. It should be noted, however, that in Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) military doctrine, the graduated or selective use of nuclear weapons in Europe was not particularly meaningful--or at least not as meaningful as the basic distinction between conventional and nuclear warfare. This would have been especially true if the fighting had extended to Soviet territory. See Stephen M. Mayer, Soviet Theater Nuclear Forces (Part 1); Development of Doctrine and Objectives, Adelphi Paper No. 187 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1983/4), 21-25.



    What do you think about???

    regards



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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-04-03 10:23
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    Hi Prowler,
    it is very intresting, what you wrote, some of this i knew already, some other thingswere new.

    But let me begin with the term "ex-DDR". The DDR (in german) GDR (in english and russian) RDA (in french), NDR (in czech and other slawic languages) is history. There is no ex- neccessary. the using of ex- means that there will be a future GDR. (An idea which i dont want to discuss, but i think a lot of people in east AND west germany would love it.)

    Now to your questions. I dont know, what you mean with MRD. I guess motorized rifle division (mot-Schьtzen Division).
    The things i have heared about NVA in potential war were different. Some soures said, that the two NVA military districts (MB3 and MB5) would form a front in soviet army style and would fight (of course under soviet high command order) side by side with the soviet fronts.
    Other people said, that MB3 and MB5 would be part of different soviet fronts. What would mean, that the NVA forces were under the command of soviet front commands.
    Which opinion is right, i dont know.

    The Angara. Angara was the camouflage name of the S-300 (SA-10), like Vega stands for the S-200 (SA-5), Newa for the SA-3 and Dwina and Wolchow for the SA-2.
    Which version of S-300 the NVA got i dont know. The missiles were delivered in 1987 or 1988 under perfect secret. Still today you will find only few information about their use in the LSK/LV. Mostly this weapon system is not mentioned.
    Personaly i think that it would be the first version of the S-300, perhaps the S-300P.

    Now to the Stasi. The Stasi was like an octopus. It influenced nearly all areas in the live in the GDR. But, the normal citizen was not their target. I had the chance some years ago to look in my Stasi file. There was not much in it. Today my inchurance company know more about me than the Stasi to its time.
    In the NVA the Stasi was present in the form of the V2000. In my unit it was 1 man with the rank of a captain (Hauptmann). I have never seen much of him, i knew that he was there and this was all. No problems. But surely there were also guys who had more trouble with the Stasi than me. The only thing what was a little bit uncomfortable for me was during my seargant school time when a guy of my company was sleeping on the watch and a handfull drunken soviet officers drove with their UAZ jeep trough the barracks fence and when they realized, that they were wrong here drove out of the gate of the barrack complex. I had luck, i was on the other side of the complex when it happend and so i got only few question, but this was not funny.


    Finaly to the fleets target. Sorry i know nothing about it. The only thing i heared was that it was planed to break troug the danish islands and to support the Jьtland strike direction. Would make sense, because we had some landing ships and one MSD was trained for sea landing operations.

    To the strategic thinking of the NATO was told us, that the defence structure of the NATO was only on the paper. This was profed on exyample with the different structure of the two german armies. The BW was told an aggressive attack force. The relation between attack and defence planes in the LW was said to be 4 to 1 and the same was said about the ground formations. The NVA had a 3 to 1 ratio in favor of the defence planes and the defensive ground forces.
    That was told to us and we believed it. The other thing always was said was the NATO strategy of Vorneverteidigung (forward defence if i translate it word by word). Of course, our officers said, the NATO want only the defence. But they want to defend themself betwenn the rivers Weichsel and Bug, also in easter poland, and how they want to get their?
    This i heard during my army time in 1988 and 1989.

    Michael

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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-04-04 01:03
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    Let me jump in again. The idea of forwar defence was to defend every meter of german soil and try to bring much of the fight into the WarPac area (GDR), but surely not to fight in Poalnd. The "offensive" structure of NATO should be explained to me. If you look at the Luftwaffe they had much more strike aircraft then then NVA, but you sure do need strike aircraft to stop an armored assault. Furthermore the Bundeswehr believed in the art of aggressive defence meaning to conduct limited counter attacks whenever possible. Which fits into the idea of forward defence, cause it helps to stop the advance of the WarPac when you drive them back with counter attacks.
    It is obvious that the NVA told there recruits that they are a defensive army (which they were imo), but the Russain armies stationed in the GDR were far from a defensive force.
    _________________
    Donґt bother running- youґll only die tired


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    Matt Wiser
    Commander

    Joined: Mar 28, 2002
    Posts: 152
    From: Auberry, CA USA
    Posted: 2002-04-04 18:13
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Very interesting! IIRC when this all came out in 1991-92, and the article in the NYT, Washington Post, and WSJ mentioned how all detailed the planning was. Any of your info confirm what the articles said-i.e. new road signs for occupied territories, occupation currency, streets renamed, even hints at a
    Stasi/KGB list of "enemies of the state"
    to be arrested and either liquidated or sent to the GULAG. That list was destroyed, but there are hints at its existence. Also, everything I've seen on this indicates that
    the inital attack by the WARPAC would have been conventional-for political reasons-the Soviets would have wanted the industry of the FRG reasonably intact for their own use and the inevitable politcal fallout (pardon the pun) internationally if the do go nuclear first.

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-04-05 03:23
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The use of nukes or other kind of mass annihilation weapons on german soil was the most feared factor of a war netween NATO and Warshaw Treaty contries. Maybee, that americans and russians saw that different, they are both far away from us, especially the amis, but the people in central europe were very uncomfortable with the strategy of using of nukes.
    You should not forget, that the WP declared never to use nuclear weapons first. The NATO never made such a statement.
    A conventional war was, from eastern view, always possible and with a good strategy also to win. A nuclear war was impossible and would end in a destruction of the world. American ideas to reduce the size of the war on central europe were unacceptable, especially for the people who lived there and surely the first use of nukes in central europe would force the massive use of strategic weapons.
    This was the reason because the peace movement in germany was very strong in the west and in the GDR the word "peace" had a very high ranking everywhere, especially from official side. Maybe that it was overstreched to hear everywhere and everywhen, that we must fight for peace, protect the peace on all costs etc, but the reason for it was the idea, that nobody could live on german soil anymore after a war with nukes, and this understood the normal man on the street. The results of the Tschernobyl desaster were also the last eye opener for madniks who believed in the possibility of an nuclear war in central europe.

    One other aspect of using nuclear weapons is the question who has the right to give the order. In American it is the president who has always a so called "Football" case not far away. If this one man becomes mad he can destroy the world. The soviet system was a little bit different. The order must give from a 3 man council. One of the members was the chief of the communist party, the ohter was the defence minister and number 3 ... sorry, i have forgotten. The advantage was that the chance that 3 persons becom mad at one time is not as big as in the american model. The disadvantage was, that the chance of a head killing strike of the opponent was much higher.

  6. #6
    Officer of Engineers
    Guest
    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-13 22:59
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Mr. Michael

    Well, I have a question:

    I have read this:

    "Initially the newly assimilated East German MiG-29 Wing (JG.3 changed later to JG.73), at Preschen still manned by its original cadre, proved unsatisfactory according to NATO standards, in both airmanship and tactical know-how. Only after existing Luftwaffe F-4, Tornado, and F-15 exchange pilots re-built the squadron, did a more realistic use of the MiG-29 occur.

    To say that the communist trained East Germans were innovatively hampered by their own dielectric approach to training and operationally shackled by Russian authority as to "when" and "how much" to fly, would be a gross understatement. NATO pilots were quite amazed and confused over the fact that most of these East German "elite" pilots appeared not "care" about flying and had little interest in doing anything innovative with their training once they did get a chance to fly.

    At the NATO F-16 Fighter Weapons Instructor's (FWIT-89) symposium, with a select gathering of Instructor Pilots (IP's), not just from NATO, but all over the world, the first face-to-face discussions were made with the Commander and tactical flight leaders of the Preschen Wing. The results were heart-breaking for those US & European trained pilots who sacrificed so much to stay on the razor's edge, although it was a relief to realize that clearly the Western approach to training was far superior. The average NATO pilot in that room had a far greater comprehension of the MiG-29's capabilities than did any of the MiG pilot's themselves. Almost all of the visitors spoke German and more than half Russian. There were no communication gaps, it was a straight forward pilot-to-pilot talk. The results were simple, the MiG pilot's perceived their flying tasks as a second or third priority to their personal agendas, which were first and foremost.

    This must have impressed the Luftwaffe enough to be concerned about their security reliability. Soon after that, the decision was made to release almost all of the ex-East German pilots from the service and the units were re-organized or disbanded. But once the political decision was made to keep the MiG-29's in the German Air Force, the pressure from the Russian military and aerospace industry became intense as they tried to find any data that would support their claims of parallel or better suitability of the MiG-29 to NATO aircraft. In fact, what they are trying to do, was to take western experience with the MiG-29 and leverage it in the export marketplace. Fortunately, but not surprisingly, it has not been believed."

    What you can say me about this??

    How many hours flew in the LSK?, VVS?

    Or any other WARPACT Air Force??

    Also, i will be very happy if you can say me about web-sites about the 16VA and LSK, doesn't import if is in english, deutch, german...please

    Well guys..

    regards

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    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-04-14 06:11
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Tja, what should i answer? I know the arrogant behavior of the West germans. In the first years after the reunification of Germany, you should better say the unfriendly take over of the GDR, it was a very bad time. Always you heared, from western side, that they are better, more skilled, better trained etc. And when you took a closer look you realisied that West Germans were cooking also only with water, what after a while changed the feeling in east germany very much from inferior to superior.

    Now to the GDR MiG's. The first planes came in end 1987 or early 1988. What means, that till to the unification were only 2 years . The transistion to a new plane has always problems and it is quite normal that the MiG-29 squadron was not fully operational at this time. The pilots were still in the learning phase. In the first time the flying of the MiG-29 was hamperd by some engine problems, so that the readiness status of 80% was often not achieved.

    On the other side i'm not astonished to hear that western pilots feel superior. They were trained to feel so and they not really understod the eastern air defence strategy. It is a statistical reality that 80 % of all shot down pilots never saw the enemy. To maximise this 80% was the eastern way of warfare. Bring the MiG in the back of the enemy and lets open the fire. If it wont work break away and return to base.
    The western way was to train for the dogfight. This is spectaculer and good for the self confidence of the pilots. But only 20% of shot down pilots were victims of dogfights and dogfights are dangerous, also for good trained pilots.
    Better to get a big share unspectacular than a small amout, but a good publicity.

    And that the west germans wipped out our guys. This was not only in the military so. It was the arrogant behavior of the Wessis to believe, that every west german blockhead is better than a east german smart guy. The result you can see today. The BW is mainly crap, Germany has the last place in europe and in the international PISA study (education) Germany has only few contries behind.

    Michael

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    Seahawk
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Mar 04, 2002
    Posts: 778
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-04-14 06:22
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Well let me fill too,

    the NVA pilots that joined the Luftwaffe, where mostly of lower rank and training, as the best rained and senior pilots, were not intergrated into the Bundeswehr, because of their direct links to the old political system of the GDR. (Stasi) The personal integrated into the Bundeswehr, therfore was worse then the average of the NVA. On the other hand, only hte elite of the Bundeswehr went for the MiG-29. So you compare the below average of the NVA with the best of the Bundeswehr, no wonder that the Bundeswehr looked so good. In reality I believe that the NVA had a much better standard the the Bundeswehr.And that the NVA pilots would have kicked the Bundeswehr in their asses in time of a conflict. Furthermore the NVA was trained to defend their country, while NATO trains their pilots for offensive operations and attacks on other countries, so it is obvious that the NVA pilots were not trained to NATO standard.

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    Arthur
    Contributor

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 421
    From: The Netherlands
    Posted: 2002-04-17 08:42
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prowler,
    Excellent you put that 16VA OrBat finally up here! Only a few minor comments:

    - The Su-25BM's at Ribnitz-Damgarten were there as target tugs. In 1991 or so, these aircraft were transferred to the 368 OShAP at Demmin (IIRC, the Shturmovik units were OShAP rather than ShAP as they would fall directly under Army command in case of conflict).
    - Werneuchen didn't have any MiG-25BM's, at least not after 1989. The 931ORAP did have a whole array of MiG-25RBx'es, and two MiG-25RU's.
    - When Werneuchen was closed, one of the MiG-25 eskadrilya's moved to Welzow to join the 11 ORAP for a few more months.

    The Soviet helicopter units in the GDR are:

    6 OVE (Dresden-Hellerau) Mi-6VKP,-8,-24
    9 OVE (Neuruppin) Mi-6,-8,-9,-24
    41 OVE (Werneuchen) Mi-6,-8,-24
    113 OVE (Sperenberg) Mi-6,-8,-24
    292 OVE(REB) (Cochstedt) Mi-8SMV,-PPA
    296 OVE (Mahlwinkel) Mi-6VKP,-8PPA,-9,-24
    298 OVE (Hassleben) Mi-2,-6VKP,-8,-24

    239th OVP Belgorod Red Banner (Oranienburg) - Mi-6,-8
    225 OVE (Allstedt) Mi-8,-24
    485 OVP (Brandis) Mi-8,-9,-24
    172 OVP (Parchim-Damm) Mi-8,-24
    439 OVP (Parchim-Damm) Mi-8,-24
    178 OVP (Stendal-Borstel) Mi-8,-24 (incl. D!)
    440 OVP (Stendal-Borstel) Mi-8,-24
    336 OVP (Weimar-Nohra) Mi-8,-24
    486 OVP (Juterbog-Altes Lager) Mi-8,-24
    337 OVP (Mahlwinkel) Mi-8,-24
    487 OVP (Preslau) Mi-8,-24

    This is from http://www.modely.cz/airshow/vvsger.htm which seems to be pretty good. Sunburn, you should be able to find a whole lot more at http://www.usmlm.org/home/soviets/GSFGOB.htm which also has a ground forces OrBat.
    _________________
    Regards,
    <img src="http://www.keypublishing.com/forum/avatar.php?userid=620&dateline=1048413240">

    Arthur

  7. #7
    Officer of Engineers
    Guest
    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Goto page ( Previous Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Next Page )
    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Arthur
    Contributor

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 421
    From: The Netherlands
    Posted: 2002-04-17 08:50
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Now I'm at it, here's the flying OrBat of the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia from the source mentioned above:

    MILOVICE-MLADБ
    (Boћн Dar)
    114 IAP MiG-29
    ?? OVP Mi-6,-8-24
    ?? OSAE An-12,-26, Tu-135
    131 SAD Mi-8

    HRADИANY
    236 APIB MiG-27
    ?? OVP Mi-8,-24
    ?? OVE Mi-6,-8,-24

    OLOMOUC-NEШEDНN
    ?? OVP Mi-8,-24

    SLIAИ-HБJNIKY
    100 ORAE Su-17M3
    ?? OVP Mi-8,-24
    ?? ??E Il-28 for EW purposes

    This, and some extremely rare pics, can be found at http://www.modely.cz/airshow/rusarmy.htm
    _____________________
    _________________
    Regards,
    <img src="http://www.keypublishing.com/forum/avatar.php?userid=620&dateline=1048413240">

    Arthur

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    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-20 12:24
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi guys

    Thanks a lot for your answers Michael and Seahawk regarding about the LSK pilots, i have a similar perspective...

    But following to this conversation, why not post the Chekozlovaquian's People Army Orbat and Airforce???

    I also think that the PVA, the Poland Army would act in this theatre, just because the PVA along with the soviet troops in Poland and the Soviet Forces in Belarus and Western Ukraine are the second echelon of the soviet attack in the German direction (and also the Danmark, Luxemburg, Belgium and the netherlands)...Why not post the PVA Orbat here??

    Thanks a LOT artur for your info!! that chez page is awesome!!, but i have a question...

    WHY there are Soviet A-Cat units in Chekoslovaquia with T-72M1 tanks? BTR-60/70 APC? but with Toshka SSM (SS-21) and other advanced equiment???, also can you tell me about a Chekoslovaquian-to english translator??

    In other words the CGF and the Chek Army would attack Austria, or direct support the WGF and the NVA in Germany?

    There are Soviet based units in Bulgary or Rumania??

    Some other questions:

    1) What is exactly a target-tug??, please can you explain me i don't speak english so good, and don't understand such termine

    2) Anyone have a 4VA Orbat for the 1989?, i have one for 1992, but i know that in the 88 or 89' there was a MiG-25BM unit in Poland i have readed it in some site but don't remind ...

    3) Can some one sayme about the training of the others WARPACT air forces?? not only the LSK/LV...there were transferences of for example Poland Pilots or Hungarian Pilots to the USSR for training? or someone like it?

    4) Can some one say me with some acurate the exact types of T-80 tanks in the WFG, NGF and SGF (just like that the CGF doesn't have T-80) i know that the 8 Guards Army have primarly the T-80BV and the advanced T-80U (due that this would be the Army that will engage US troops) but i don't know about the other tank equipment...

    5) Can some one say me about HOW is a Tank or Army Barrack? i have seen Air Bases all my life but my interest in tanks and ground warfare is recent...anyone have a pic of a soviet or warpact Tank Barrack?


    Well hehehe there are some questions, enjoy ...


    Thanks a lot guys

    In other questions, arthur can you say me about other sites just like you have post it recently???
    Very Interesting

    Regards

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    Keshel
    Charter Member

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 767
    From: Poland
    Posted: 2002-04-20 12:38
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PVA - what kind of formation is it? What does the abbreviation stand for? Is it supposed to be in Polish? I don't think so, we don't have a single word starting with "v" (I can't remember any that would fit)

    _________________
    Comrade Leszek,
    "It is always better to loose 'an engine' than 'the engine'."
    <img src="http://www.interplay.com/bgate/images/monsters/basilisk.gif">
    Basilisk

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    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-20 13:56
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Keshel:
    I don't know also what the hell mind PVA but in a lot of sites appears that PVA is the Poland Army...mayve in Russian Polskaya Voiska A???...

    Who knows!!!

    In another point:

    Hi guys J

    Russian Speakers!! I need your help!!

    During some travels around the WEB searching info about the Soviet Group of Western Forces (until the 1992) I have find these info:

    In Russian can someone help me to translate???

    There is


    Военные миссии связи в послевоенных политических отношениях имеют свою сорокалетнюю историю. Они были созданы в соответствии со статьей 2 Соглашения СССР, США, Великобритании и временного правительства Франции "О контрольном механизме в Германии".
    После капитуляции Германия была разделена на четыре оккупационные зоны: сoвeтскую, американскую, британскую и французскую, и при каждом главнокомандующем в его зоне оккупации состояли военные, военно-морские и военно-воздушные представители трех других главнокомандующих для выполнения функций связи.
    Позже при главнокомандующих и штабах советских, американских, британских и французских оккупационных войск в Германии начали действовать отделы внешних сношений и военные миссии связи. Их главной задачей являлось поддерживать постоянную связь между соответствующими военачальниками и штабами, представлять свои командования в группировках союзнических войск, первыми приступать к разрешению спорных проблем между союзниками.
    Правовой статус военных миссий связи, их состав определялись в течение двух лет, с 1945 по 1947 г. включительно. 16 сентября 1946 г. первое официальное соглашение по этому поводу подписали генерал-полковник Малинин, заместитель главнокомандующего, начальник штаба группы советских оккупационных войск в Германии и генерал-лейтенант Робертсон, заместитель военного губернатора (ранг заместителя главнокомандующего британскими оккупационными войсками).
    Советская и британская военные миссии связи имели в своем составе 11 офицеров и 20 человек технического персонала, конторских служащих и других специалистов, включая персонал для обслуживания радиостанции.
    Глава советской военной миссии имел аккредитацию в британской зоне при главнокомандующем - маршале воздушных сил Шолто Дугласе, глава британской военной миссии связи - при главнокомандующем советскими оккупационными войсками, маршале Советского Союза Соколовском.
    Через семь месяцев генерал-полковник Малинин подписал аналогичное соглашение по обмену военными миссиями связи с заместителем главнокомандующего Европейской группой американских войск генерал-лейтенантом Хюбнером и заместителем главнокомандующего во французской группе контрольного совета генерал-лейтенантом Науре.
    Начальники военных миссий связи напрямую общались с заместителями начальников штабов оккупационных войск или старшими офицерами штабов. А также пользовались возможностью представляться и встречаться с главнокомандующими.
    Все члены миссий имели постоянные пропуска на двух языках, свободно передвигались по территории зоны оккупации. Исключение составляли места расположения войсковых частей. Для посещения штабов, отделов военной администрации, соединений, частей, военных школ, заводов или предприятий в зоне оккупации союзников представитель миссии направлял просьбу начальнику или старшему офицеру штаба группировки оккупационных войск, где он был аккредитован. Такие просьбы и обращения рассматривались в течение 24-72 часов.
    КРУГ ЗАБОТ
    Каждая военная миссия связи пользовалась собственной радиостанцией для связи со своим главнокомандующим. В случае необходимости начальник миссии направлял курьера или посыльного в штаб своего главнокомандующего со срочным сообщением или с ценной информацией. При этом курьеры и посыльные пользовались иммунитетом дипломатических курьеров. Помимо этого каждая военная миссия связи использовала телефонную связь центральной станции при штабе оккупационных войск. Им также предоставлялась возможность отправлять сообщения по местной почте, телефону, телеграфу при поездках по зоне оккупации союзников.
    Каждая администрация союзной оккупационной зоны обеспечивала военные миссии продовольствием, горючим и канцелярскими принадлежностями за плату в рейхсмарках. А позднее, после проведения в 1948 г. в западных зонах оккупации сепаратной денежной реформы, - в западногерманских марках.
    Военным миссиям связи предоставлялись здания и помещения, которые имели cтaтуc полной неприкосновенности.
    Британская военная миссия связи прибыла в Потсдам и приступила к работе еще до подписания официального соглашения 25 августа 1946 г. Первым начальником британской военной миссии связи в советской зоне оккупации стал бригадный генерал Хью Пертис.
    Американская военная миссия начала свою работу в Потсдаме 12 апреля 1947 г. Она по количеству сотрудников была меньше британской, возглавил ее бригадный генерал Вальтер Хесс.
    Позже всех по времени, 21 апреля 1947 г. приступила к работе французская военная миссия связи во главе с полковником Андре Бриняски.
    В каждой зоне оккупации члены военных миссий связи активно участвовали в выполнении решений Ялтинской и Потсдамской конференций. В Германии активно шел процесс демилитаризации и денацификации. Осуществлялось разоружение Германии как страны-агрессора, шла повседневная работа с бывшими военнослужащими вермахта, задерживались нацистские преступники, решались вопросы репатриации и вывоза материальных ценностей, военного и гражданского оборудования. По всем этим направлениям деятельности главнокомандующие союзных оккупационных войск постоянно взаимодействовали и должны были предоставлять друг другу соответствующую информацию. Военные миссии связи при этом испытывали значительную нагрузку.
    В зоне оккупации союзников члены миссии имели право заниматься защитой интересов соотечественников. Они также имели право оказывать помощь гражданам своих стран, посещавших зону оккупации союзников. В лагерях для перемещенных лиц, на частных квартирах находились тысячи советских граждан. Их перемещение и репатриация шли несколько лет.
    Информация о ситуации в Германии поступала не только командованию оккупационных войск великих держав СССР, США, Великобритании и Франции. При Союзном контрольном Совете по Германии в Западном Берлине получили аккредитацию и активно работали военные миссии 11 государств: Австрии, Бельгии, Канады, Дании, Греции, Индии, Люксембурга, Голландии, Норвегии, Южно-Африканского Союза и Югославии.
    ХОЛОДНАЯ ВОЙНА ВНОСИТ КОРРЕКТИВЫ
    Холодная война, а затем создание НАТО внесли коррективы в деятельность военных миссий связи. В их служебной деятельности стало заметно повышаться внимание к группировкам войск недавних союзников. В докладах командованию и штабам оккупационных войск вырос удельный вес разведывательной информации.
    Резко возросла интенсивность передвижения военных миссий на автотранспорте по оккупационным зонам вблизи штабов, воинских частей, в районы учений и военных полигонов. Об этом свидетельствовал рост потребления бензина, выделяемого для автомобилей миссий. В 1952 г. три военных миссии (американская, британская и французская) ежемесячно запрашивали и получали у советского оккупационного командования в Германии 7900 литров бензина и 200 кг технического масла.
    В Германии встретились не только четыре группировки союзных войск, здесь столкнулись две враждебные идеологии, два разных мира и разные образы жизни. Было существенным различие в материальном и продовольственном обеспечении. Одним из примеров этого может служить различие в нормах продовольствия для сотрудников миссии. Для сравнения. Сотруднику советской военной миссии в день полагалось 400 г хлеба (британскому - 666), муки - 10 (британскому - 105), мяса - 173,3 (британскому - 177 г мяса и бекона плюс 71 г рыбы), масла сливочного 38,4 г (британскому - 145 г плюс 29,3 сала или маргарина), фрукты консервированные - 73 г (британскому фруктов свежих - 128 г плюс 18 г сухофруктов), картофеля - 300 (британскому - 388). Правда, сотруднику советской военной миссии ежедневно полагалось 300 г свежего молока, а британскому 110,8 г консервированного. В советских военных миссиях связи шутили, что им выдают такую норму свежего молока за вредность работы в оккупационных зонах союзников.
    Естественным стало и противодействие поездкам военных миссий связи в разведывательных целях. Широкое распространение получило нарушение иммунитета членов миссий как в западных, так и в советской зоне оккупации. Военных миссионеров задерживали повсеместно у военных объектов и вдали от них.
    ЗОНЫ НЕДОСТУПНОСТИ
    В докладах главнокомандующему группой советских оккупационных войск отмечалось, что "члены американской военной миссии особенно, больше, чем другие миссии, активизировали свои разъезды и шпионаж. За период с 1948 по 1949 г. включительно состоялось 38 задержаний членов американской военной миссии.
    В советской зоне оккупации значительно ужесточился контроль за военными миссиями союзников на всей подконтрольной территории. На каждого члена военной миссии велся персональный учет. Например, на нового члена британской военной миссии в 1950 г. была подготовлена справка по следующей форме: фамилия, имя - Роуз Рихард Генри, год рождения - 14 февраля 1927, место рождения - Лондон, звание - сержант, должность - строевой командир, рост - 175 см, цвет волос - блондин и цвет глаз - карие.
    В западных зонах также принимались серьезные меры к ограничению деятельности советских военных миссий связи. Во французской оккупационной зоне заявку от советских военных миссионеров на проезд трех оккупационных зон принимали за 3-4 дня. На весь период поездки за членами советской военной миссии устанавливалось наблюдение. Всех посетителей советской военной миссии во Франфурте-на-Майне по инструкции начальника 21-го отделения полиции Бодевинга с 27 июня 1952 г. стали регистрировать. В американской зоне у советской военной миссии велось круглосуточное дежурство военной полиции и сопровождение во всех поездках с фотографированием и записью маршрутов. Сотрудников советской военной миссии неоднократно задерживали и избивали. (Это происходило и с представителями западных военных миссий в советской зоне оккупации.)
    Командование американских и британских войск неоднократно вводило дополнительное количество запретных районов для посещений. Американские власти в сентябре 1952 г. ввели для членов советской военной миссии запретные районы, которые охватывали почти всю зону оккупации Германии.
    С самого начала деятельности военных миссий американские власти на время военных учений вводили временные (на 10-25 дней) запретные районы. С 1952 г. все западные оккупационные державы ввели постоянные запретные районы.
    Штаб Группы оккупационных войск в Германии с 1950 г. на время учений для всех западных миссий ввел временные запретные районы. В октябре 1951 г. были введены четыре постоянные запретные зоны, а также запрет на въезд в 10-километровую пограничную полосу вдоль границы ГДР.
    Кроме того, в начале декабря 1952 г. главком Группы советских оккупационных войск в Германии генерал армии Чуйков приказал считать запретным районом остров Рюген. Об этом решении западным миссиям не объявлялось. Но у Штральзундского моста и населенного пункта Цудора были выставлены охранные посты, не позволявшие иностранным военным миссиям проезд на остров Рюген.
    НЕСМОТРЯ НА ЗАПУГИВАНИЯ
    На территорию советских военных миссий в начале 50-х годов постоянно забрасывались листовки, камни, предпринимались попытки запугивания. Особенно любопытен такой инцидент. В американской зоне оккупации 6 июля 1953 г. на территорию советской военной миссии вместе с листовками был заброшен живой поросенок с надписью "СССР" и нарисованным серпом и молотом. Начальник советской военной миссии Степаненко потребовал задержать провокаторов, а поросенка оприходовать по книге учета и включить в качестве дополнительного питания в рацион персонала.
    В 50-60-е гг. неоднократно обострялась международная обстановка. В эти периоды значительного военно-политического напряжения были моменты, когда прекращались почти все контакты в военной области. И тогда действовали только военные миссии связи, выполнявшие свою основную задачу. А это был вполне определенный вклад в предотвращение полномасштабной войны между бывшими союзниками.
    В истории военных миссий связи наряду с продолжительным периодом холодной войны и недолгой оттепелью было время жесткого противостояния в 60-е гг. и военно-политической разрядки в 70-е, подписание соглашений в Хельсинки, Вене и Стокгольме по обеспечению военной безопасности в Европе.
    Свою значимую роль военные миссии связи сыграли в контактах между военачальниками, возглавлявшими группировки советских, американских, английских и французских войск в Германии в период перестройки международных отношений во второй половине 80-х гг. Наглядным примером утвердившейся открытости того времени стали совместные учения Группы советских войск в Германии и Немецкой национальной армии 17-20 апреля 1989 г. На них присутствовали наблюдатели НАТО и других стран Запада, 25 информационных агентств и 46 западных журналистов из США, ФРГ, Великобритании, Японии, Нидерландов, Франции и Швейцарии.
    Прекратили свою деятельность военные миссии связи в 1990 г. после знаменательного события - объединения Германии, которое окончательно подвело черту под выполнением решений Потсдамской конференции 1945 г. великих держав.

    And this image:

    http://www.airforce.ru/16va/request.htm

    Also is someone is interested there is a GREAT history about the 35 IAP in this URL:

    http://www.airforce.ru/history/modern/35iap/index.htm

    And info about the Tu-22/22M3 series (also in Russian)

    http://www.airforce.ru/aircraft/tu22&tu22m3/main.htm

    It could be great if the Russian speaker community help us in the translate of tall this valuable info J!! Please!!

    Regards

    P.S: About the WGF info you can visit the following URL in Russian :

    www.genstab.ru

    But most of the ORBAT info I have it in English and Spanish if someone is interested…

    regards


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sunburn
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 24, 2002
    Posts: 44
    From: Greece
    Posted: 2002-04-21 09:07
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Arthur, that was some _very_ interesting piece of information! Particularly the OOB section.

    Does anyone have good information on Warsaw Pact ground-based ELINT posts?
    _________________
    --------------------------------------------
    The Harpoon Headquarters: The premier Harpoon site on the net
    www.harpoonhq.com

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Arthur
    Contributor

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 421
    From: The Netherlands
    Posted: 2002-04-23 09:39
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prowler,
    a target tug is an aircraft that drags a target for gunnery practice. You know, suspend a cable of a few hundred metres from the fuselage or wings of an aircraft, put a flag, kite or dart on the other end, and shoot at the target. The Su-25BM essentially took this role over from the Il-28... (damn, i would definately have preferred to see Beagles over yet more Frogfeet).

    It's not that weird that Czechoslovakia held so many A-class units in the Cold War era - not only was this because of the border from that country with Germany (the 'Czech' forces would at least be needed to cover the GSFG's left flank in case of war), but also because the Soviets felt it necessary to keep a pretty obvious presence in the country after the Prague Spring uprising of 1968.

    The MiG-25BM's stationed in Poland were part of the 164 OGvRAP at Osla-Krzywa. Romania and Bulgaria did not have Soviet troops stationed there, although i'd expect Soviet aircraft from either the Black Sea Fleet/AV-MF (mostly from bases in the Crimea) and aircraft from the Odessa MD to move to Bulgaria should the need arise. Bulgaria had quite a few of pretty well-equipped highway strips, including revetments and the like.

    Now, to continue the slow filling of OrBats, here is the something resembling the Czechoslovak AF OrBat of late 1991, before the breakup of the country. It hardly differs from the 1989/1990 OrBat though. It's a bit of a mess because i compiled it from an overview on www.scramble.nl which was a bit chaotic in itself, and i'm not the kind of person to clear that up. Hope it makes some sense though...

    Bechyne:
    9 SBoLP MiG-21MF-75(31)
    31 SmLtVPz Mi-2, Mi-8, Mi-8PPA(3), Mi-9(1)

    Hradec Kralove:
    47PzLP Su-22M-4R(14), Su-22UM-3K(2), MiG-21R(20)

    Ostrava-Mosnov
    82 SSLt MiG-21MA(17), -MF
    1 SmDLP An-12(1), An-26, L410, Mi-17

    Caslav
    28SBoLP MiG-21, MiG-23BN(28)
    FLS various

    Zatec
    11 SLP MiG-29A(18), -UB(2), (MiG-21PFM until summer 1991).

    Ceske Budejovice
    1 SLP MiG-23MF(12), -ML(17), -UB(7?)

    Plzen-Bory
    11 VRP Mi-2, -8, -24

    Kosice
    2 LSP L29, L39

    Piestany
    3 LSP L29, L39

    Namest nad Oslavou
    20 SBoLP Su-22M-4

    Prostejov
    51 VRP Mi-2, -8, -24

    Praha-Kbely
    3 DLP Mi-2, An-24, An-26, L410, Tu-134(1), Tu-154(1), Il-14FG(1)

    Pardubice
    30 BiLP Su-25(36)

    Check the Czech www.modely.cz site for a more complete OrBat of the 4VA in Poland, those guys there definately deserve all the credit.
    _________________
    Regards,
    <img src="http://www.keypublishing.com/forum/avatar.php?userid=620&dateline=1048413240">

    Arthur

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-25 12:13
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thanks a lot Artur for your help!

    DAMN DAMN DAMN!!!!

    I have spent more than 2 days in the elaboration of a LSK/LV orbat...i have it partially finished lots an lots of great info and...i have missed in my house!!! the fu*** diskete that i have bring with me is the wrong

    Bad luck...i will try to post it at least at the end of the week...if anyone is also interested in a NVA or DDR Navu ORBAT...please talkme!!!

    regards

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-25 12:21
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I finded i finded!!!

    here is not totally complete but better than nothing

    --------------------------------
    1 LVD - HQ Cottbus
    --------------------------------

    The 1 Luftverteidigungsdivision (1є Air Defense Division) protected the southern part of the GDR and was formed the 1 July of 1956 (the date when the whole NVA Army was funded in the reaction against the Western German "heer" or Bundeswheer..in the cadre of the 1. Aeorklubs of the Kasernierten people police and its first name was 1є Fighter Pilot Division.
    At the begining of december, 1962 the LVD tooks its "actual" name. For such date its CINC was the Major Kurt Rapmann until the 28-02-1959...

    Its begining dates from 1952 when the GDR (or DDR in deutsche) form its first "armed forces"...better to be called a "people police" under the command of the Litenant Colonel (Oberstleutnant) Paul Wilpert, also called the "VP Oberrat"...my german it's so bad that i don't have the minimun idea what means

    At the end of 1952, the "division" begins its tasks withWhen the division "begins" in the 1952 they with 510 officers, 287 NCOS and 1154 people in other areas used the Yak-18, tecnician be avalaible from Soviet Training Regiments. Some La-9 were used for formation, and 5 MiG-15 served with Priority.


    Now, well nice history its continues but if i continue i will never end

    In the ends of the 80's the 1 LVD belongs:


    - JG-1 "Fritz Schmenkel" - Holzdorf bei Jessen

    Under the command of:

    1988/1990: Oberstleutnant Wilfried Kernchen
    1990: Oberstleutnant Helmut Seehaus

    Aircrafts:

    35 MiG-21MF, 07 MiG-21SPS/K and 09 MiG-21UM.
    I don't know the exact equipment of each squadron of this JG, sorry

    Other Units belonged to the JG-1:

    Flugplatzbasis 31 - Holzdorf bei Jessen
    (Airfield Base-31)

    Feldflugplatzkommando 1 - Holzdorf bei Jessen
    (Combat air base command 1)

    Fliegertechnisches Bataillon 1 - Alteno/Luckau
    Flier-technical battalion 1)

    More info soon avalaible (TIME TIME TIME!!!)

    -----------------

    - JG-3 "Wladimir Komarov" - Preschen bei Forst

    This was always the top of the line unit of ALL the LSK/LV and off course the first in recieving the MiG-29 9.12A

    Under the command of:

    1987 to 30,09,1990 - Oberstleutnant Kilian (With honor for the DDR until the end!)

    Equipment (30-9-1990):

    03 MiG-21UM, 12 MiG-21MF, 04 MiG-29UB, 20 MiG-29
    Fying the Following Squadrons:

    1 Squadron:
    Under the command of the Oberstleutnant Schroeder with MiG-29 9.12A and 9.51
    School machines: 179, 181 (UBs), Combat machines:604, 607, 615, 628, 669, 670 , 676, 677, 785, 786 TOTAL=12

    2 Squadron:
    Under the command of the Oberstleutnant Flichte with MiG-29 9.12A and 9.51
    School machines: 148, 185(UBs) Combat machines: 635, 661, 668, 679, 684, 693, 699, 745, 777, 778 TOTAL=12

    3 Squadron:
    Under the command of the Oberstleutnant Udo Sauder with MiG-21MF/UB
    School machines: 212, 229, 233 (MiG-21UM), Combat machines: 658, 681, 687, 767, 772, 774, 775, 776, 779, 781, 782, 784 TOTAL=15


    History Tip:
    12.05 - 28.07.1987:
    Re-education of the first eight pilots and technical officers in the USSR.
    The training took place at two places. First station lay close Frunze, capital of Kirgisi CSSR, the actual training took place in Lugowaja.

    1987/88:
    The 1. Flighter pilot relay receives MiG-29, the MiG-21MF of this relay was sendend to the Jg-1.

    04.01.-25.02.1988:
    Re-education of further officers of the JGs in Preschen on the MiG-29. Altogether 3 re-education took place on the MiG-29 in the GDR.

    1988: The 2. Flighter pilot relay receives MiG-29, their MiG-21MF go to the Jg-1.
    End of the History Tip

    Another units belonged to the JG-1:

    Flugplatzbasis 41 - Preschen bei Forst
    (Airfield Base-41)


    -------------------------

    JG-7 "Wilhelm Pieck" - Drewitz bei Guben

    Under the command of:
    01.12.1988 - 23.10.1989: Oberstleutnant Lutsz Kleine

    Equipment (not exact) for the 1986:
    40 MiG-21M, 06 MiG-21U

    I don't have info about the exact squadrons, sorry

    Lots of info about this Fishbed Regiment, but if you liked i can written later

    --------------------------

    JG-8 "Hermann Matern" - Marxwalde

    Under the Command of:
    02.12.1987 - 30.09.1990: Oberstleutnant Siegfried Lahmer

    Equipment for 30.9.1990:

    14 MiG-21bisLasur, 27 MiG-21bisSAU, 08 MiG-21UM

    Other Units Belonged to the JG-8:

    Flugplatzbasis 51 - Marxwalde bei Seelow
    (Airfield Base-51)

    Feldflugplatzkommando 8
    Combat air base command 8

    Fliegertechnisches Bataillon 8 - Mьncheberg
    Flier-technical battalion

    --------------------------
    (Guys be prepared...)
    Traductions at the end...

    - Fla-Raketenregiment 31 (FRR-31) - StraЯgrдbchen bei Kamenz
    Missile System S-75M "Wolchow"

    Technische Abteilung 310 - StraЯgrдbchen bei Kamenz
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 311 - GroЯ Dцbbern bei Cottbus
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 312 - GroЯrдschen bei Cottbus
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 313 - Kroppen bei Senftenberg
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 314 - GroЯrцhrsdorf bei Bischofswerda



    - 51. Fla-Raketenbrigade (51. FRB)- Sprцtau bei Sцmmerda
    Fla-Raketenabteilungsgruppe 511 Eckolstдdt bei Apolda
    Missile System "S-200 Vega" -

    Technische Abteilung 5120 - Sprцtau bei Sцmmerda
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5121 - Dietersdorf bei Sangerhausen
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5122 - Blankenburg bei Langensalza
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5123 - Seebergen bei Gotha
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5124 - Remda bei Rudolstadt
    Lager-Fla-Raketentechnik 21 - Lindhardt bei Grimma


    - Technische Abteilung 5140 (TA-5140) - Rathendorf bei Geithain

    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5141 - Reichenwerda bei WeiЯenfels
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5142 - Breitenbach bei Zeitz
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5143 - Langenbernsdorf bei Werdau
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 5144 - Gablenz bei Stollberg


    - Technische Abteilung 4140 (TA-4140) - Bochow und Saarmund bei Potsdam

    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4141 - Luckow bei Nauen
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4142 - Bochow bei Potsdam
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4143 - Saarmund bei Potsdam
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4144 - Schenkendorf-Krummsee bei Kцnigs Wusterhausen


    - 41. Fla-Raketenbrigade (41. FRB) Ladeburg bei Bernau
    4 batallions with S-75M Volchow and four systems with the S-125 Neva


    - Fla-Raketenabteilungsgruppe 411 Badingen-Osterne bei Gransee
    Missile System S-200 "Vega"

    Technische Abteilung 4120 - Ladeburg bei Bernau
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4121 - Markgraf-Pieske bei Fьrstenwalde (Spree)
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4122 - Prцtzel bei Strausberg
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4123 - Klosterfalde bei Bernau
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4124 - Sommerfald bei Oranienburg
    Funktechnische Abteilung 4101 - Ladeburg bei Bernau
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4131 - Schцnermark bei Gransee
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4132 - Fehrbellin bei Neuruppin
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4133 - Zachow bei Nauen
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 4134 - Reichenwalde bei Fьrstenwalde



    - Funktechnisches Bataillon 31 (FuTB-31) Dцbern bei Forst

    Funktechnische Kompanie 311 - Dцbern bei Forst
    Funktechnische Kompanie 312 - Gleina bei Altenburg (Outguard approx. 15 km von Gleina removes (DOBRA - there was one of the goessten 08, the stationary antenna had 30 meters of span)
    Funktechnische Kompanie 313 - Neustadt bei Falkenstein
    Funktechnische Kompanie 314 - Scharfenberg-Naustadt bei MeiЯen
    Ausbildungsobjekt FuTB-31 - Briesnig bei Forst


    - Funktechnisches Bataillon 41 (FuTB-41) Holzdorf bei Jessen

    Funktechnische Kompanie 411 - Holzdorf bei Jessen
    Funktechnische Kompanie 412 - Hinsdorf bei Kцthen
    Funktechnische Kompanie 413 - Drewitz bei Guben
    Ausbildungsobjekt FuTB-41 - Dahme (Mark) bei Luckau


    - Funktechnisches Bataillon 51 (FuTB-51) Sprцtau bei Sцmmerda

    Funktechnische Kompanie 511 - Sprцtau bei Sцmmerda
    Funktechnische Kompanie 512 - Steinheid bei Neuhaus a.R.
    Funktechnische Kompanie 513 - Breitungen (Werra) bei Schmalkalden
    Funktechnische Kompanie 514 - Kreuzebra bei Worbis
    Funktechnische Kompanie 515 - Lehesten bei Lobenstein


    - Funktechnisches Bataillon 61 (FuTB-61) Mьncheberg (Mark) bei Strausberg

    Funktechnische Kompanie 611 - Mьncheberg (Mark) bei Strausberg
    Funktechnische Kompanie 612 - Wusterwitz bei Brandenburg
    Funktechnische Kompanie 613 - Athenstedt bei Halberstadt
    Funktechnische Kompanie 614 - Altensalzwedel bei Salzwedel



    Other units belonged to the LV-1:

    Funktechnische Stцrkompanie 31 - GroЯrдschen bei Senftenberg
    Funktechnische Ausbildungskompanie31
    Kurier- und Feldpostzentrale - Cottbus
    Nachrichtenbataillon 31 - Cottbus
    Verbindungsfliegerkette 31 - Cottbus
    Stabskompanie 31 - Cottbus
    Transportzug 31 - Cottbus
    Zug der Chemischen Abwehr 312 - Cottbus
    Auswerte-, Rechen- und Informationsgruppe 31 - Cottbus
    Nachrichten- und Flugsicherungswerkstatt/Lager 31- Cottbus
    Kfz-Instandsetzungswerkstatt 312 - Cottbus
    Fla-Raketenwerkstatt 31 - Cottbus
    Chemische und Pioniergerдtelager 31 - Cottbus
    Fliegertechnische Lager 31 - Cottbus
    Medizinische Versorgungslager 31 - Cottbus
    FunkmeЯwerkstatt 31 - Eisenhьttenstadt
    Waffenwerkstatt/Lager 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Kfz-Gerдtelager 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Versorgungslager 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Sauerstoffgewinnungs- und Versorgungseinheit 31 - Preschen
    Munistionslager 31 - Bronkow bei Calau
    Fla-Raketentechnisches Lager 31 - Lindhardt bei Naunhof

    Translation:

    Radio breakdown company 31 - GroЯrдschen bei Senftenberg
    Radio Ausbildungskompanie31
    Courier and army postal service head office - Cottbus
    Message battalion 31 - Cottbus
    Connecting flier chain 31 - Cottbus
    Staff company 31 - Cottbus
    Feed course 31 - Cottbus
    Course of the chemical defense 312 - Cottbus
    Analyse -, computing and group of information of 31 - Cottbus
    Realigning and air traffic control workshop/stocks 31 - Cottbus
    Kfz Instandsetzungswerkstatt 312??? - Cottbus
    Fla Raketenwerkstatt 31 - Cottbus
    Chemical one and engineering equipment stocks 31 - Cottbus
    Flier-technical stocks 31 - Cottbus
    Medical supply stocks 31 - Cottbus
    Radar workshop 31 - Eisenhьttenstadt
    Weapon workshop/stocks 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Kfz equipment store 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Supply stocks 31 - WeiЯwasser
    Oxygen production and tender unit 31 - Preschen
    Munistionslager 31 - Bronkow bei Calau
    Fla Fla-Raketentechni stocks 31 - Lindhardt bei Naunhof



    --------------------------------
    3 LVD - HQ Neubrandenburg
    --------------------------------

    The Third Air Defense Division, protected the northern air space of the GDR and originated in the basis of existing units of the 2.Aeorklubs of the Kasernierten people police, at 26. September of 1956, as the 3. Air division. The location of the staff was originally situated in Drewitz with Guben. The division 3 became later, the 3 Fighter pilot division and at the beginning of of December 1961 as 3. LVD how now its defines.
    Since 20 October 1961 the staff was in Trollenhagen , the command post ( GS-33 ) in Coelpin, both places close to Neubrandenburg

    (I have pics of the GS-33 damn it place so big!!)
    The 3 LVD had the following units:

    - JG-2 " Yuri Gagarin"- Trollenhagen bei Neubrandenburg
    Under the command of:
    1987-1990: Oberstleutnant Robert Finke
    Equipment:
    31 MiG-21M, 12 MiG-21SPS/K, 08 MiG-21UM
    Other Units belonged to the JG-2
    Flugplatzbasis 33
    Airfield base 33
    Flugplatzkommando - Trollenhagen
    Airfield command - Trollenhagen
    Feldflugplatzkommando 2
    Combat air base command 2
    Fliegertechnisches Bataillon 2
    Flier-technical battalion 2 - Werbelow / Teterow
    This would be the second unit with the MiG-29A Fulcrum, but you guys know the history L

    -------------------------
    JG-9 "Heinrich Rau" - Peenemьnde ("Peenemьnde 54063")

    Under the command of:
    1985-1989: Oberst Wukasch
    30.10.1989 - 30.09.1990: Oberstleutnant Dietze

    Equipment:
    (1990) 10 MiG-23MF, 29 MiG-23ML, 05 MiG-23UB(UM?)

    The following MiG-23MF/ML have gone to the USA: 338, 339, 467, 567 and 606.

    Other Units belonged to the JG-9
    Flugplatz 43
    Airfield base 43
    Feldflugplatzkommando 9 - Garz
    Airfield command
    Feldflugplatzkommando 19 - GroЯ Mohrsdorf bei Stralsund
    Combat air base command 2
    -----------------
    For some time there were also a unit caled ZDK-33 that use the Ik-28…I don't know what version or which was the role, I will search in this day later use 5 L-39…how know L

    Before 1961, the JG-7 was also part of this LVD based in Drewitz bei Guben

    SAM ASSETS:

    Michael please could you say us how many launchers had a batallion?


    - Fla-Raketenregiment 13 (FRR-13) - Parchim
    Missile System S-75M Vokhov

    Technische Abteilung 130 - Parchim
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 131 - Warin bei Sternberg
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 132 - Tramm bei Schwerin
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 133 - Ziegendorf bei Parchim
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 134 - Steffenshagen bei Pritzwalk

    Fla-Raketenregiment 23 (FRR-23) - Stallberg bei Pasewalk
    Missile System S-75M Vokhov
    Technische Abteilung 230 - Stallberg bei Pasewalk
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 231 - Altwarp bei Ьckermьnde
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 232 - Eichdorf bei Ьckermьnde
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 233 - Stargard/Kreuzbruchhof/Neubrandenburg
    Fla-Raketenabteilung 234 - Weggun bei Prenzlau


    43. Fla-Raktenbrigade (43. FRBr) Sanitz bei Rostock

    Under the command of:
    1989: Oberst Spakowski

    Technische Abteilung 4320 - Sanitz bei Rostock
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4321 - Abtshagen bei Grimmen
    S-75M Vokhow
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4322 - Barth bei Ribnitz-Damgarten
    S-75M Vokhow
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4323 - Hinrichshagenbei Rostock
    S-75M Vokhow
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4325 - Retschow bei Bad Doberan
    S-75M Vokhow
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4324/4351 - Neuenkirchen / Rьgen
    S-75M Vokhow this was the System that used the S-300PMU "Angara" later removed of service by the soviets in the 1989 or 1990…
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4331 - Barhцft bei Stralsund
    S-125 Neva
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4332 - Nienhagen bei Bad Doberan
    S-125 Neva
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4333 - Bastorf Bad Doberan
    S-125 Neva
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4334 - Insel Poel / Kirchdorf / Wismar
    S-125 Neva
    Fla-Raktenabteilung 4335 - Dranske / Rьgen
    S-125 Neva
    Funktechnische Abteilung 4301 - Rцvershagen bei Rostock

    Fla-Raketenabteilungsgruppe 431 Prangendorf / Cammin
    - Missile System S-200 "Wega" -

    Funktechnisches Bataillon 23 (FuTB-23) - Pragsdorf bei Neubrandenburg
    Funktechnische Kompanie 231 - Pragsdorf bei Neubrandenburg
    Funktechnische Kompanie 232 - Rohlsdorf bei Pritzwalk
    Funktechnische Kompanie 233 - Elmenhorst bei Grevesmьhlen


    Funktechnisches Bataillon 33 (FuTB-33) - Pudagla bei Wolgast
    Funktechnische Kompanie 331 - Pudagla bei Wolgast
    Funktechnische Kompanie 332 - Saal bei Ribnitz-Damgarten
    Funktechnische Kompanie 333 - Putgarten / Rьgen


    Funktechnisches Bataillon 43 (FuTB-43) - Parchim
    Funktechnische Kompanie 431 - Parchim-Dargelьtz
    Funktechnische Kompanie 432 - GroЯ Molzan bei Gardebusch
    Funktechnische Kompanie 433 - Banzin bei Hagenow
    Funktechnische Kompanie 434 - Karenz bei Ludwigslust


    This will continue later with the FO FMTFK and some other units, see ya!!!



    Traductions later!!

    regard!

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Sunburn
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 24, 2002
    Posts: 44
    From: Greece
    Posted: 2002-04-26 09:39
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prowler, it seems we've been reading the same web pages

    Most of this info is from a web site dedicated to the NVA air defence, right? It lists the assets and organisation of the two air defence divisions of the GDR (1st & 3rd LVD).

    Whta I am _still_ looking for, however, is the OOB of _Soviet-controlled_ (NOT E.German!) PVO-assigned (non-army) SAMs. I already have the SA-3s and SA-8s assigned to airfields, but I am quite certain that the Soviets had a plethora of SAM sites guarding other important installations (SA-2/3/5/6/11s and possibly SA-10s). Do you have any information on this specific section?
    _________________
    --------------------------------------------
    The Harpoon Headquarters: The premier Harpoon site on the net
    www.harpoonhq.com

  8. #8
    Officer of Engineers
    Guest
    Air Combat Information Group Forum Index » » Hot Spots » » WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Goto page ( Previous Page 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Next Page )
    Author WWWIII/E-88; Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Austria?)
    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-04-26 16:25
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi

    I will srch around...i really don't know if there are PVO units in DDR...at least i know that there are a SAM Brigade with S-300V in the DDR...controled by soviets of course...also somes with S-200 and S-125 Neva...i will search and try to say you some things..

    P.S: Do you can send me a list with your datalist of targets??

    I will make a fanfic (or maybe a novel) about the WWIII in the 1989 and much of my research i was used the info here posted...maybe my project could have similitudes with your one

    Regards

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prowler
    1st Lieutenant

    Joined: Mar 27, 2002
    Posts: 45 Posted: 2002-05-17 16:26
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi guys

    Hey!! Don’t let die this wonderful thread please!!!!!!

    Well, for Sunburn this is the material that I have about the SAMs in the WGF:

    All the armies used the Buk SA-11

    163 SAM Brigade: SA 3/5 – Taucha
    202 SAM Brigade: SA-12- Magdeburg
    133 SAM Brigade: SA-4 – Juteborg
    252 SAM Brigade SA-4 – Gera
    175 SAM Brigade SA-3 – Guestrow

    SAM Posts near airbases:

    Nobitsz: SAM site at Greipzig / Heiligenleichnahm

    Brand: SAM site near Rietzneuendorf-Friedrichshof (NE Rietzneuendorf)

    Brandis: SAM site near Beucha.

    Finsterwalde: SAM site at Lugau (Finsterwalder Berg, 25 ha)

    Larz: SAM site near Friedrichshof (Blohmberg)

    Templin: SAM site near Storkow

    WittstocK: SAM site near Wernikow

    This is all what I know in the matter, hope that this help you if not…we can try another time

    Arthur: In the past you have say me that in a chez page (www.modely.cz or something similar) is a 4VA Orbat…I have search in the page and definititvaly doesn’t find anything…can you say me the exact link to the page? And if is possible another interesant sections in that page?

    Thanks a lot!
    Well guys, come on!!! Continue the discussion!, please I think that there is a lot of other points regarding this wonderful theme….

    Regards.

    By the way searching about the theme I have finded the fact that the soviets considered 5 Attack directions towards central Europe, there are:

    I Kьste, II Ruhrgebiet, III Luxemburg, IV Bayern, V Alpen, VI Jьtland


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paul Lakowski
    Lt. Cdr.

    Joined: May 22, 2002
    Posts: 94
    From: Canada
    Posted: 2002-05-23 00:04
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    On 2002-03-18 12:54, Michael wrote:


    If you want, let us compare the armament of the BW with this of the NVA in the late 80th.

    Tanks: Leo1 versus T-55. better fireguidance, higher speed for Leo, better armor for T-55, especially in version T-55AM2 with addon armor. Firepower of the guns was nearly equal. vo of Leo1 gun 1375 m/s, T-55gun 1315 m/s. But T-55AM2 had gun started ATGM Bastion.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    Ehhh LEO-1A1A1 front turret armor offered a KE resistance of about 35cm ,This was ~ 4cm steel plate on shock absorbers.Thats 18-22cm base armor plus 4cm @ 50° + 2d [steel penetrator] or [62mm + 2d (38mm-44mm =]18-22cm plus 14-15cm . Total of 32-37cm, enough to stop 125mm BM15 @ 1000m range. The 100mm BM-22 [10:1 Steel/WC APFSDS] could only do ~ 30cm @ muzzle and should have no chance of penetrating the front turret armor of the LEO-1A1A1.

    Research into HEAT armors is less detailed but it seems this Blohm & Voss appligue should add ~10cm resistance to HEAT warheads @ 60-70° boosting the heavy front turret armor resistance to 45-48cm. Enough to stop Sagger C & AT-4 but not enough for AT-5 & Bastion, mind you the overmatch is not great ~ 10-20% kill for AT-5/AT-10 through this heavy armor.

    True the hull was only ~ 15cm effective resistance but the plan was to use the LEO-1s in PzGrd brigades and fight hull down /turret down. While the 35-40cm front armor of the T-55AMB2 is indeed impressive it only covers half the profile [like the LEO-1A1A1] . But where as the BM-25 can't penetrate the LEO-1A1A1 heavy front turret armor at any range, the 105mm DM-23 APFSDS could penetrate 35-40cm @ 1-2km [1km (156 x 2.3 = 36-40cm) & 2km (151.5 x 2.3 = 35-38cm)]so the advantage is solidly in the LEO-1 court...especially when you realise LEO-1 can out shoot T-55 2-3:1.

    In fact this level of penetration could handle most of the T-64 armor @ the same range.

    By mid 80s LEO-1s where being upgraded to the LEO-1A5 model with digital FCS similar to LEO-2 a simplified TI sight and new ammo and armor. The DM-33 could penetrate [152.2 x 2.97=] 45-47cm @ 2km range so it could handle the T-72M1/T-80B as well as T-55AMB2.

    The upgraded Deisenroth turret appligue featured perforated plate wraped in a rubber fibre material mounted on shock absorbers that severly yawed APFSDS projectiles and erodes shaped charge jets.So the additional armor against any improve DU or WHA penetrators would have been the same amount or more.

    I still have to digest a new paper on NERA effects but at first glance the figures for energetic armor should reduce the shaped charge by 3-4 cone diameters depending on the slope of impact...so thats rougly 50-60cm front turret resistance to shaped charge for the LEO-1A5 enough to stop Bastion and AT-5.

    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    T-72 versus Leo2
    nearly the same like T-55 versus Leo1. The Leo2 had an excellent fireguidance system, thatswhy 2 Leo2 were aquired (stolen) by the GDR intellegency service. A second attempt to get 2 more modern Leo2 was not successfull.
    The armor of the Leo2 was to weak and when he was tested in 1990 against T-72 the decision to build the Leo2A5 version came faster.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    I've heard of many tests of EG T-72 being fired on by LEO-2, but there are no reports of test of T-72 shooting @ LEO-2s.MOst sources that I've seen rate the LEO-2A4 front turret armor @ 700mm KE & 1000mm HEAT. Thats enough to deal with any WARPAC threat in the late 80s.
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    AFV (Schьtzenpanzer) Marder versus BMP, better armor for the Marder, better firepower, speed etc for the BMP, especially for BMP-2 and improved BMP1.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Again we have a problem, since the Marder-1A2 entered service in the early 80s and featured a Ti sight giving the Germans a critical fighting advantage over the WARPAC during this period [ along with LEO-1 & 2 & Jaguar AT].
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Conclusion: Advanteges for NVA on the ground and in the air.
    Michael


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    My conclusion would be that WG had advantage over EG on the Ground....but thats just my opinion.

    Question : Where NVA trained to fight like Soviets or did they have there own strategy? Would East germans follow Soviet attack doctrine?

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Jason
    Lt. Cdr.

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 97
    From: Massachusetts, USA
    Posted: 2002-05-23 07:08
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Great post as usual Paul.

    BTW, it's great to see you over here!

    We need some more of the tank experts from Tank-net.org to come over here and help some of these flyboy types out with AFV's methinks.....

    _________________
    Regards,

    Jason

    [ This Message was edited by: Jason on 2002-05-23 09:41 ]

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    E L Palmer
    ACIG Team

    Joined: Jan 20, 2002
    Posts: 2306
    From: U.S.
    Posted: 2002-05-23 09:40
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Actually some of us are well versed on armor but relize that the best way to prepare the battlefield for the ground forces is by using airpower.


    _________________
    E L Palmer
    Site Admin

    "There’s a lot of bleeding hearts around who just don’t like to see people with helmets and guns, All I can say is, go bleed"
    Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Jason
    Lt. Cdr.

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 97
    From: Massachusetts, USA
    Posted: 2002-05-23 09:45
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    On 2002-05-23 09:40, E L Palmer wrote:
    Actually some of us are well versed on armor but relize that the best way to prepare the battlefield for the ground forces is by using airpower.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certainly, I can agree completely with that.

    I would feel better rolling up to an objective knowing the AF pounded the h#ll out of it, and the enemy are either demoralized or retreating.

    Makes my job easier.....




    _________________
    Regards,

    Jason

    [ This Message was edited by: Jason on 2002-05-23 09:46 ]

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FerenceH
    Charter Member

    Joined: Mar 01, 2002
    Posts: 63
    From: Netherlands
    Posted: 2002-05-24 07:52
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    "Question : Where NVA trained to fight like Soviets or did they have there own strategy? Would East germans follow Soviet attack doctrine?"

    Prbably some minor differences in strategy, but mainly the NVA followed Soviet doctrine.

    Best regards,

    Ference.


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Michael
    Honourable Member

    Joined: Mar 06, 2002
    Posts: 167
    From: Germany
    Posted: 2002-06-04 14:39
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Hi Paul,
    it was an interessting posting and i see, that you are good in panzer stuff. I guess it is your hobby and you have a lot of books and other stuff about it, full of interessting material and calculated data. But with calculated data it is a certain thing, they are not always correct. For instance should a T-55 be unable to kill a T-72M at a range of 800 meters. You can read it in a lot of books, but in reality it was able to do the job. Our guy were very astonished when they found out this fact.
    Okay Paul, in knowledge Panzers you may be better than me. You have the datas, the books and i have only the rememberance on some enemy weapon training lessons in 1988 and 1989. In the first lessons i learned to use a NATO small arms, assault rifles, machine guns up to the Stinger, some of them were rubbish, some were fair and a handfull were really good. In one of the last lessons they showed us the strong and weak points of NATO APC and panzers. British, french and most american technic was shown in films, pictures and the "SchieЯtafel" i dont know the english term for it. It is a 3 side view drawing of the panzer with marked areas where to kill and to damage.
    But the lessons on the american M-60 and M-113 and the west german Leo-1, Leo-2 and Marder were hold on real hardware. Dont ask me from where the panzers originaly come from. I can only guess. The M-60, M-113 perhaps from Vietnam, or Near East and the West german, i dont know, i think when our intelegency service was able to get secret NATO memos faster than the NATO general secretary, then they were surely able to get an Leo or two.
    But this is not the topic. Our trainers showed us the strong and the weak points of all constructions and explained where to hit. I remember that all panzers were penetrated by a lot of holes. Some went trough the armor some not. All holes were marked with colors and small digits and the trainers explained, that a color stands for a weapon system and the digits for the range of firing.
    And Paul, you will be astonished. The Leo-1 front armour and the front turret armor where pierced by MT-12 100mm Pak, T-55 and T-72 rounds. Leo-2 was better, the most shaped charge projectiles of first generation, like RPG-7 were unable to penetrate, but the sub caliber darts made a fine job.
    5 years later a friend of me served out his time by the Panzertechnische Dienst of the Bundeswehr (Panzer mechanic). With his unit he visited a panzer factory were Leo-2A5 updates were under way. And there he learned that the Leo-2A4 front turret armor was not efficient enough against T-72 subcaliber darts.
    Okay, Paul, i'm not a panzer specialist, i know only what i have seen. And i know, that he Leo's were good panzers, but the T-55 and T-72 too. All systems have advantages and weaknesses and a system is more than the sum of all datas. In my eyes the quality of the crew is the main factor because the differences of abilities of soviet and west german tanks were not so much as the most people think today.

    Michael

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Paul Lakowski
    Lt. Cdr.

    Joined: May 22, 2002
    Posts: 94
    From: Canada
    Posted: 2002-06-04 23:49
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    On 2002-06-04 14:39, Michael wrote:
    Hi Paul,
    it was an interessting posting and i see, that you are good in panzer stuff. I guess it is your hobby and you have a lot of books and other stuff about it, full of interessting material and calculated data. But with calculated data it is a certain thing, they are not always correct. For instance should a T-55 be unable to kill a T-72M at a range of 800 meters. You can read it in a lot of books, but in reality it was able to do the job. Our guy were very astonished when they found out this fact.



    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    I could have told you that!
    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Okay Paul, in knowledge Panzers you may be better than me. You have the datas, the books and i have only the rememberance on some enemy weapon training lessons in 1988 and 1989. In the first lessons i learned to use a NATO small arms, assault rifles, machine guns up to the Stinger, some of them were rubbish, some were fair and a handfull were really good. In one of the last lessons they showed us the strong and weak points of NATO APC and panzers. British, french and most american technic was shown in films, pictures and the "SchieЯtafel" i dont know the english term for it. It is a 3 side view drawing of the panzer with marked areas where to kill and to damage.
    But the lessons on the american M-60 and M-113 and the west german Leo-1, Leo-2 and Marder were hold on real hardware. Dont ask me from where the panzers originaly come from. I can only guess. The M-60, M-113 perhaps from Vietnam, or Near East and the West german, i dont know, i think when our intelegency service was able to get secret NATO memos faster than the NATO general secretary, then they were surely able to get an Leo or two.
    But this is not the topic. Our trainers showed us the strong and the weak points of all constructions and explained where to hit. I remember that all panzers were penetrated by a lot of holes. Some went trough the armor some not. All holes were marked with colors and small digits and the trainers explained, that a color stands for a weapon system and the digits for the range of firing.
    And Paul, you will be astonished. The Leo-1 front armour and the front turret armor where pierced by MT-12 100mm Pak, T-55 and T-72 rounds. Leo-2 was better, the most shaped charge projectiles of first generation, like RPG-7 were unable to penetrate, but the sub caliber darts made a fine job.



    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Well not actually, there is a basic rule in ballistics tests that one shot one target. Why do they have this rule? because every penetration after the first leads to weakened plate which can turn penetration into perforation. This was evident in test shots of captured Panther tanks in WW-II...first few shots scooped and failed to penetrate but given enough hits the glacis would crack and or perforation would occure.

    Its a good show and does mean that if you shoot enough shots any armor can be eventually penetrated. But you have to ask your self...how many shermans/T-34s died finding this out?

    How many T-55/72 would die finding this out?

    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    5 years later a friend of me served out his time by the Panzertechnische Dienst of the Bundeswehr (Panzer mechanic). With his unit he visited a panzer factory were Leo-2A5 updates were under way. And there he learned that the Leo-2A4 front turret armor was not efficient enough against T-72 subcaliber darts.



    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Thats no surprise either, the front turret resistance is 70cm Vs 2cm diameter APFSDS but, 57cm Vs 4cm diameter APFSDS.From a 30° off angle these LOS thickness is reduced to 61cm & 49cm respectively....and every school boy knows that all perforations have a ± 15% shot to shot variations between shots.

    Quote:
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    Okay, Paul, i'm not a panzer specialist, i know only what i have seen. And i know, that he Leo's were good panzers, but the T-55 and T-72 too. All systems have advantages and weaknesses and a system is more than the sum of all datas. In my eyes the quality of the crew is the main factor because the differences of abilities of soviet and west german tanks were not so much as the most people think today.

    Michael


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------



    Well you show me any tank and I can tell you where to shoot and get a kill too. .....Don't worry your entitled to you opinion , just as I am too.

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