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  • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post
    Shek, et al,

    That is because I don't understand the question.
    The Iraqi government has awarded contracts. Companies from what nations have won these contracts?
    "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

    Comment


    • Shek, et al,

      I don't see a connection.
      Originally posted by Shek View Post
      The Iraqi government has awarded contracts. Companies from what nations have won these contracts?
      (ANSWER)
      • KOGAS (South Korea) and KazMunaiGas (Kazakhstan) to develop the Akkas gas field in the western province of Anbar
      • Kuwait Energy and TPAO (Turkey) to develop the Siba gas field in southern Iraq
      • TPAO, Kuwait Energy and KOGAS to develop the Mansouriya field in Diyala province, near the Iranian border
      • Iraq awarded a dozen service contracts to international oil companies including Exxon and Shell as it aims to more than double its current crude output of 2.3 million barrels a day.
      • Royal Dutch Shell Plc, which won contracts to develop Iraqi crude deposits, is working to capture and use about 700 million cubic feet of gas that’s currently being burnt at oil fields in the country’s south.


      What is the correlation you are making?

      If you are suggesting that the US has lost it's influence over the events in Iraq, I tend to agree.

      Most Respectfully,
      R

      Comment


      • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post
        Shek, et al,

        I don't see a connection.
        (ANSWER)
        • KOGAS (South Korea) and KazMunaiGas (Kazakhstan) to develop the Akkas gas field in the western province of Anbar
        • Kuwait Energy and TPAO (Turkey) to develop the Siba gas field in southern Iraq
        • TPAO, Kuwait Energy and KOGAS to develop the Mansouriya field in Diyala province, near the Iranian border
        • Iraq awarded a dozen service contracts to international oil companies including Exxon and Shell as it aims to more than double its current crude output of 2.3 million barrels a day.
        • Royal Dutch Shell Plc, which won contracts to develop Iraqi crude deposits, is working to capture and use about 700 million cubic feet of gas that’s currently being burnt at oil fields in the country’s south.


        What is the correlation you are making?

        If you are suggesting that the US has lost it's influence over the events in Iraq, I tend to agree.

        Most Respectfully,
        R
        You made the comment over least three posts that the reason for the US attack of Iraq was profit. How is it that the US and especially those who profit from it's war with Iraq are so competent as to prosecute the war but so incompetent as to secure any of the lucrative post-war contracts? Are they machiavelian or hopeless? It seems odd that they could be both.....
        In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.

        Leibniz

        Comment


        • Parihaka, et al,

          No, I apologize if I gave that impression. In fact, I believe something entirely different. I believe that the Administration was pushing an agenda of a Hegemony over the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

          I don't recall making such a claim.
          Originally posted by Parihaka View Post
          You made the comment over least three posts that the reason for the US attack of Iraq was profit. How is it that the US and especially those who profit from it's war with Iraq are so competent as to prosecute the war but so incompetent as to secure any of the lucrative post-war contracts?
          (COMMENT - THUMBNAIL VIEW)

          I believe that US Forces, did an OK job in the conventional war aspect. I believe that the US, post-conflict Administration was exceptionally poor (militarily and politically).

          I do not believe that the US, given the hundreds of Billions of dollars, will receive any return on its investment in either peace, stability, or otherwise (politically, militarily, economically). In fact, I believe, even after the investment, that our military is now much weaker, our diplomacy, as a fair arbitrator and broker of peace is compromised; and I believe that as a result of what we've done, we will be economically hurt domestically.

          I do not believe that the Iraq intervention did anything to suppress terrorism. In fact instead of the anti-Saddam elements of Iraq helping to build a new nation, it actually ignited an anti-American and anti-GOI insurgency.

          If I have lead you to believe that we went into Iraq for "profit" motives, I apologize my poor communicative skills.

          Most Respectfully,
          R
          Last edited by RoccoR; 31 Oct 10,, 05:46.

          Comment


          • et al,

            Just as a side note, I heard this today.
            The National Alliance, Iraq's main Shia bloc, has turned down a Saudi offer to host all-party talks to resolve months of deadlock over forming a new Iraqi government.

            The offer was turned down on Sunday after some politicians voiced fears over foreign interference. Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah had a day earlier volunteered to host the talks in November.

            The National Alliance, a coalition of Shia blocs, including that of incumbent prime minister,
            Nouri al-Maliki's coalition, said that a deal in Baghdad was close after the highest court ordered parliament to resume sessions last week.

            "Though we express our appreciation to Saudi Arabia for its concern about the situation in Iraq and its
            willingness to provide support, we would like to confirm Iraqi leaders are continuing their meetings to reach a national consensus," a statement issued by the alliance, said.

            A senior member of al-Maliki's bloc said that the Kurdish Alliance also supports this statement.

            The Kurdish alliance has 57 seats in parliament and al-Maliki's camp is working closely with them to form a coalition government

            Iraqi Shia bloc rejects Saudi offer - Middle East - Al Jazeera English
            .

            (COMMENT)

            This is one of those case that makes you wonder. Do the Iraqis really want a solution? Or do they want a manipulated outcome?

            Most Respectfully,
            R
            Last edited by RoccoR; 31 Oct 10,, 15:35.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post
              Parihaka, et al,

              No, I apologize if I gave that impression. In fact, I believe something entirely different. I believe that the Administration was pushing an agenda of a Hegemony over the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

              I don't recall making such a claim.
              (COMMENT - THUMBNAIL VIEW)

              I believe that US Forces, did an OK job in the conventional war aspect. I believe that the US, post-conflict Administration was exceptionally poor (militarily and politically).

              I do not believe that the US, given the hundreds of Billions of dollars, will receive any return on its investment in either peace, stability, or otherwise (politically, militarily, economically). In fact, I believe, even after the investment, that our military is now much weaker, our diplomacy, as a fair arbitrator and broker of peace is compromised; and I believe that as a result of what we've done, we will be economically hurt domestically.

              I do not believe that the Iraq intervention did anything to suppress terrorism. In fact instead of the anti-Saddam elements of Iraq helping to build a new nation, it actually ignited an anti-American and anti-GOI insurgency.

              If I have lead you to believe that we went into Iraq for "profit" motives, I apologize my poor communicative skills.

              Most Respectfully,
              R
              no indeed, it's me who must apologise, I mistook your approval for CC's witticism 'prophets of profit' as agreement.

              Lets then replace the word 'profit' with 'hegemony' in my original post and try again.
              In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.

              Leibniz

              Comment


              • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post
                I believe that US Forces, did an OK job in the conventional war aspect. I believe that the US, post-conflict Administration was exceptionally poor (militarily and politically).
                Agreed.

                I do not believe that the US, given the hundreds of Billions of dollars, will receive any return on its investment in either peace, stability, or otherwise (politically, militarily, economically). In fact, I believe, even after the investment, that our military is now much weaker, our diplomacy, as a fair arbitrator and broker of peace is compromised; and I believe that as a result of what we've done, we will be economically hurt domestically.[/quote]

                The military is much stronger, in terms of equipment, training, and experience. Where it is weaker is in domestic political will to use it. I think too that our international standing has waned, but believe that that aspect is overstated. As far as being hurt economically, that has nothing to do with Iraq and everything to do with the 1930s and 1960s.

                Originally posted by RoccoR
                I do not believe that the Iraq intervention did anything to suppress terrorism. In fact instead of the anti-Saddam elements of Iraq helping to build a new nation, it actually ignited an anti-American and anti-GOI insurgency.
                Yes and no. Did it spawn some additional terrorist movements? Yes. Has it resulted in increased terrorist activity against the homeland? Not anything effective. As to the anti-GOI insurgency, that was a result of Shia ascendancy initially and then a intra-Shia power play. Even if the US had got it right during "Phase IV," I'm not sure if you wouldn't have still seen the elements of insurgency, although probably without the long slide into 2006 like we did.
                "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                Comment


                • Originally posted by RoccoR View Post
                  et al,

                  Just as a side note, I heard this today.
                  .

                  (COMMENT)

                  This is one of those case that makes you wonder. Do the Iraqis really want a solution? Or do they want a manipulated outcome?

                  Most Respectfully,
                  R
                  Face is very important, and politics is very much in play. Why would a Shia element turn to Sunni Saudis to help with their own domestic disputes?
                  "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                  Comment


                  • Parihaka, et al,

                    Yes, well - now that I know the point of confusion, maybe I can explain a little better.
                    Originally posted by Parihaka View Post
                    no indeed, it's me who must apologise, I mistook your approval for CC's witticism 'prophets of profit' as agreement.

                    Lets then replace the word 'profit' with 'hegemony' in my original post and try again.
                    (COMMENT)
                    (THUMBNAIL): From a political point-of-view, there were very strong elements (within the Administration) that came together, as a "Ruling Elite," that was interested in establishing US leadership to exercise diplomatic influence over the complex region of the Middle East & Persian Gulf. This was the hegemonic piece; predominance in the regional affairs to create an environment that was both politically stable and economically prosperous. The idea was to clear away the anti-American Saddam influence Iraq (a country that was strategically located in the middle), and install a very US-friendly institution that would would invite a US-Military base. This was to be the stick to match the carrot. And in helping to re-order the stability, the US diplomacy would be persuasive, with a credible military force right in the middle of the belligerents.

                    (THUMBNAIL) I loved the 'prophets of profit' comment, but from an entirely different view. With every war/conflict that comes along - there is a necessary evil. Wars cost money. And in the huge exchanges of money, comes war profiteers. The US was not the only country in the region to have war profiteers speculating on arsenal sales. In addition to the above ground military-industrial complex, Baghdad happens to be the crossroads for that region in the underground dealing in arms; and has been for hundreds of years. And there are plenty of non-state actors in the mix, dealing in arms. When you see in the news, pictures of weapons caches with the weapons in parts, this is the indicator that you are looking as supplies received outside state sponsored activity. When a state sponsor (either Iran or the US) covertly supplies weapons, they generally don't do it on the "some assembly required" basis. I was sitting in the Palace a couple of years ago, when I saw a picture of "EFPs" in parts, from a weapons cache. MNF-I gave it to the press as evidence of Iranian involvement. In every good piece of propaganda, there is some truth. The truth was, the EFPs were Iranian. The unspoken catch was, that even in Iran there are arms dealers operating and corrupt official out to make a dime. Weapons, when the are QA'd and counted are counted after they are assembled and serialized. These were parts taken from the assembly line, and not a final product shipped to the state sponsor. In this way, the manufacturer sells some to the arms dealers for retail sales. Covertly making a little extra money themselves. Hence the phrase 'prophets of profit' had so much more meaning to me when it comes to the threat analysis of the actual number of non-state actors engaged in the various insurgencies aspect angles.

                    Most US military and diplomatic officials, in an attempt to simplify the equation, tend to discuss the various activities (armed actions) in an US 'vs' THEM on the state level. That is, they seldom discuss the hidden mechanism behind the curtain that actually effects the transfer and sale of arms (supplies, weapons and ammunition) to the non-state actor insurgent, terrorist and para-military forces. But none of it is free and it just doesn't magically appear on the battlefield.

                    It is also the case that US military and diplomatic officials, in an attempt to simplify the equation, would never suggest that some of the events that were attributed to re-igniting conflict, were actually accomplished by arms dealers, and not the belligerents themselves. When arms dealers want to to escalate fighting, to spur sales, they were not beyond making a significant emotional event occur.

                    But this is a completely different discussion and I apologize in deviating from the thread.

                    Most Respectfully,
                    R

                    Comment


                    • Shek, et al,

                      We agree to an extent. In the limited space here, I will try to outline my opinion.
                      Originally posted by Shek View Post
                      The military is much stronger, in terms of equipment, training, and experience. Where it is weaker is in domestic political will to use it. I think too that our international standing has waned, but believe that that aspect is overstated. As far as being hurt economically, that has nothing to do with Iraq and everything to do with the 1930s and 1960s.
                      (COMMENT)

                      The economics is one debate, deferred for the moment.

                      The military is exceptionally weaker is several regards.
                      • First is the persuasiveness of the Armed Forces in a conventional format. Much of the hardware associated with US strike capabilities is depleted and needs either a tremendous maintenance effort to be brought back online or replaced.
                        • Heavy Weapons are not in a location or condition to rapidly deploy.
                        • Aircraft have reach significant flight hours thresholds.
                        • Deployment schedules for human forces are overextended.
                        • Contingency supplies nearly exhausted.

                      • Second, C3I systems are totally compromised. There are a significant number of allied forces that have seen our C3I capabilities in close proximity, from the inside. Granted, a certain number of these countries already had a certain amount of significant access as to how the US operates inside the command, control and intelligence structure. But now, our entire method of operation and decision making processes are compromised. There are no SECRETS left in the toolbox. All points of vulnerability are known.
                        • United Kingdom
                        • South Korea
                        • Australia
                        • Poland
                        • Romania
                        • Denmark
                        • El Salvador
                        • Georgia
                        • Azerbaijan
                        • Bulgaria
                        • Latvia
                        • Albania
                        • Czech Republic
                        • Mongolia
                        • Lithuania
                        • Armenia
                        • Bosnia & Herzegovina
                        • Estonia
                        • Macedonia
                        • Kazakhstan
                        • Moldova

                      • Third, critical pathways are comprised. nearly everyone understands that is certain communication networks go down, it will cripple the C3I for entire force sectors. Nearly everyone knows how the intelligence systems work and what their capabilities and resolutions are.
                      Originally posted by Shek View Post

                      Did it spawn some additional terrorist movements? Yes.

                      Has it resulted in increased terrorist activity against the homeland? Not anything effective.

                      As to the anti-GOI insurgency, that was a result of Shia ascendancy initially and then a intra-Shia power play. Even if the US had got it right during "Phase IV," I'm not sure if you wouldn't have still seen the elements of insurgency, although probably without the long slide into 2006 like we did.
                      (COMMENT)

                      The "Homeland" was never under any real threat from Iraq. But that is all perception and it will be judged in history.

                      While we had a Phase VI Plan, it was never really activated as intended. We were dead reckoning both militarily and diplomatically. Today, the illogical outcomes we see in the transfer under the elections is a predictable result in our poor leadership; given the nature of those being lead.

                      The true nature of the mistakes made and the unintended consequences realized are in the forensics of the National Security Decision Making Processes (NSDMPs) that were corrupted by internal manipulation of the "Ruling Elite" and the latent follow-on contamination of the Military Decision Making Processes (MDMPs).
                      Originally posted by President George W. Bush, June 28, 2003 -- VICTORY IN IRAQ DEFINED
                      • In the short term:
                        • An Iraq that is making steady progress in fighting terrorists and neutralizing the insurgency, meeting political milestones; building democratic institutions; standing up robust security forces to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security; and tackling key economic reforms to lay the foundation for a sound economy.
                      • In the medium term:
                        • An Iraq that is in the lead defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing its own security, with a constitutional, elected government in place, providing an inspiring example to reformers in the region, and well on its way to achieving its economic potential.
                      • In the longer term:
                        • An Iraq that has defeated the terrorists and neutralized the insurgency.
                        • An Iraq that is peaceful, united, stable, democratic, and secure, where Iraqis have the institutions and resources they need to govern themselves justly and provide security for their country.
                        • An Iraq that is a partner in the global war on terror and the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, integrated into the international community, an engine for regional economic growth, and proving the fruits of democratic governance to the region.
                      The corruption and contamination of the Decision Making Processes (NSDMP & MDMP) lead to the inability of the US to attain even a Short-Term victor under the National Strategy --- to date.

                      Most Respectfully,
                      R

                      Comment


                      • Shek, et al,

                        Yes, everyone seems to be worried about saving face.
                        Originally posted by Shek View Post
                        Face is very important, and politics is very much in play. Why would a Shia element turn to Sunni Saudis to help with their own domestic disputes?
                        (COMMENT)

                        This was an unfortunate event.
                        In a statement posted on a Web site operated by militants late on Sunday, the Islamic State of Iraq took responsibility for the attack, calling the church “ the dirty den of idolatry.” The posting said its actions had been prompted in part by the behavior of the Coptic Church in Egypt, which it accused of detaining two women who converted to Islam. It added that the fuse of a campaign against Iraqi Christians had been lit.

                        In the same event, the MOI suggests that the terrorists are affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq, a militant organization connected to al-Qaeda-in-Mesopotamia.

                        The question here, is there a new front opening between one ideology and another, in a violent fashion?

                        Most Respectfully,
                        R

                        Comment


                        • Rocco,

                          To find the kind of experience that the military has right now, you'd have to go back to Vietnam. However, that experience had a half-life of a draft enlistment. The current experience has a much greater half-life since it has been retained through reenlistments. No other nation-state has that kind of experience right now. At the battalion level and below, there's no dullness to the edge. Where there's rust is at the brigade level and higher in having to conduct high intensity operations not from a hard stand. However, the optempo has just now slowed to where units are starting to return to training across the full spectrum of operations.

                          As to the decision making process, based on what you've written, I don't think you really understand it at either level (whether at the national level or within the military). Bottomline, few administrations do it well, and in fact, it's almost something that's hardwired into our democracy. As to the MDMP, your confusing that with JOPP, and even then you're missing the boat.
                          "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                          Comment


                          • Shek, et al,

                            It is possible that I don't agree. But I doubt that I don't understand.
                            Originally posted by Shek View Post
                            As to the decision making process, based on what you've written, I don't think you really understand it at either level (whether at the national level or within the military). Bottomline, few administrations do it well, and in fact, it's almost something that's hardwired into our democracy. As to the MDMP, your confusing that with JOPP, and even then you're missing the boat.
                            (COMMENT)

                            Oh, I think I understand it alright. I'm just not satisfied with the idea that the NSDP has to be done so poorly. Just because one administration has corrupted it, does not mean that every administration has to be mediocre at one of the most important processes there is for our nation, or any nation. A dysfunctional NSDMP puts the nation at risk. I am not alone on this thought, but I think the reformation process is in questionable. Securing the State: Reforming the National Security Decisionmaking Process at the Civil-Military Nexus | Military Review | Find Articles at BNET

                            As for the MDMP 'v' JOPP, I understand the processes and don't have them confused. I'm just applying the principles at echelons above SECDEF; connecting to The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making.
                            • This monograph examines the need to retool the military decision making process (MDMP) as the U.S. Army transforms to the future force. Although the MDMP is the current doctrinal framework to decision making and planning at the tactical levels, it represents an analytical approach to problem solving with the concerted efforts of a commander and his staff. This monograph compares the current MDMP as an analytical process with the emerging science and theory of naturalistic decision making (NDM).
                              http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/...ion_vowell.pdf
                            • An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action against criteria of success and each other; select the best course of action; and produce a joint operation plan or order. Also called JOPP. See also joint operation planning; Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. (JP 5-0)


                            I am talking about processes that allowed the Iraq Campaign to get out of hand. How it was that the advices of CSA was dismissed, how the decision was made to allow the Iraq Army to be disbanded, how it was that decision was made to allow a secular Constitution to be adopted. All these things are decisions (plus many more), were all claimed by the Administration to have been sound and valid. Although in the minority, I believe that the Military Leadership abdicated its role in the decision making process.
                            NOTE: Dr Rice claimed only that the decision to invade Iraq was only valid (not sound).

                            While I do think the Armed Forces had forgotten many of the lessons learned out of Vietnam, I believe that the military could have avoided many of the post-combat phase mistakes though a critical thinking process (part of the MDMP).

                            I believe you think I'm addressing military (joint forces or otherwise) dogma; but, I'm not. I'm talking about focused and clear reason exercised up and down the entire decision line.

                            Most Respectfully,
                            R

                            Comment


                            • Rocco,

                              The MDMP (JOPP on the joint side) is geared towards creating a plan when you have a well defined mission statement. Breaking Iraq and putting it back together is not a well defined mission statement. You need to frame the environment and problem first before even developing a mission statement. In the case of OIF, this required the civilian leadership to do this and get it right. Because they didn't, the military was boxed in with the odds stacked against them (but I would agree that we then played that hand badly). However, the bottom line is that you can't compare policy decision making with MDMP. They get at two different things.

                              As to corrupting the NSDM process, while the Bush 43 Administration didn't run a smooth oiled machine, your rarely find that among administrations. You can look to the Eisenhower Administration as a example, but after that, I'd challenge you to show me one that wasn't dysfunctional. In fact, by the very nature of war and the American republic, you expect it to be somewhat dysfunction as opposed to developing "pure" strategy without the constraints of domestic politics. It wasn't that voices weren't able to be heard - the problem was that the wrong voices won out and they made the wrong decisions.

                              Next, the NDM is crap. As an approach, it opens up military decision making to errors due to systemic biases. It relies on the fallacy of "expert" decision making. The list of social psychology/behavioral economics/etc. literature is long on this topic. As a only when time is constrained and any decision is better than no decision, then it simply describes what happens in an abbreviated MDMP anyways.

                              Finally, your attributing failure to military leaders for decisions that are clearly those that the civilian leadership should make. Non-starter. Furthermore, if you look at the disbanding the Iraqi military and cutting deep into Baath Party membership, read the books that show that Petraeus pretty much calls Bremer an idiot for doing this (along with some other military members).

                              I'm happy to criticize the folks for making poor decision, to include the military, but don't blame process when it's the people, and blame the people who actually have the authority to make the decision.
                              "So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3

                              Comment


                              • I see the genie is out of the bottle and we've resurrected this thread-if somewhat morphed.

                                Defining the environment and problem would seem relatively easy WRT Iraq in 2002/2003. If that is the point-of-departure for development of the Iraq Intervention Mission Statement then that portion seems easily framed. What should follow would seem the prescription to the problem which recognizes the temporal conditions specifically imposed by Iraq's particular environment, the near and long-term desirable end state, and the set of requirements to be accomplished between elimination of the problem and achieving that end-state.

                                Powell's maxim--"If you break it, you own it" deserved examination prior to initiating hostilities. Is it true? What if we'd simply "broke it" and left? Could anybody stop us from doing so? Naturally, we'd have likely issued the admonishment for Iraqis to fix it in a manner to our liking lest we break it again, and again...and again under this assumption.

                                Let's presume our underlying intent was to establish hegemony throughout the Persian gulf. Wouldn't this demonstration of will and means have been sufficient to establish our dominance? How did remaining in Iraq help us given the Coalition Authority's subsequent dithering? In preference, wouldn't the memory of our latest visit instead left our image untarnished?

                                Reconstruction aid? What did we really destroy in the march up that Iraqis couldn't repair versus what was subsequently destroyed in the following years of conflict? Let Iraq do so sans our help and money. Part of the price for wandering astray as a nation.

                                Would we not have achieved our goals-removal of the baathist regime, neutering of its armed forces, removal of any actual or latent WMD threat, removal of Saddam from power, etc? We wish for more from Iraq such as establishing a democratic political system? Dangle the carrot of heretofore undelivered help/aid if they show the requisite eagerness to do so.

                                A slide back to more of the same? Beat on them again. Maybe with our army (in Kuwait or Kurdistan). Maybe simply by our air force and navy at levels far beyond tit-for-tat no-fly-zone slap on the hands.

                                Perhaps it's the process. Maybe the people. Perhaps both but we've demonstrated an abject inability to project our power through to acceptable political/social end-states.

                                Let's be fair. We're not the first nation proved incapable of accomplishing such nuanced outcomes. Only the first hyper-power to show this vulnerability. With the brightest minds and most coherant thinking, however, we're still only half the equation. There are other players possibly acting as wild-cards.

                                If part of victory includes choosing the battlefield and form of combat, should we not recognize our flaw as an element to be avoided and simply stick to what we do exceedingly well-breaking things? Do we, alternatively, simply avoid conflict altogether since we've demonstrated an inability to execute the processes correctly or identify a leadership mix able to formulate coherant strategy?
                                Last edited by S2; 06 Nov 10,, 10:12.
                                "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski
                                "The only true currency in this bankrupt world is what you share with someone else when you're uncool." Lester Bangs

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