Thread: U.S. Missile Shield Won't Work

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

"Moscow was (is) a very target rich environment, and the targets are very hardened. The large number of warheads aimed there had little to do with the ABM system. It was junk even in the 1980s. The only real option the Russians had was to blow off a few nukes over Moscow in hopes of screwing with the RVs terminal guidance."

The Soviets nuclear tipped interceptor missiles would no doubt play hell with the first wave of incoming US warheads, until they fried themselves and irradiated their own crews from low altitude detonations.

In 2002, Anatoliy Sokolov, former commander of Russia’s missile and space defense army, confirmed U.S. suspicions that the Gorgon and Gazelle interceptors had become obsolete: “It makes no sense to maintain a dying system, as the existing antimissile defense is unable to provide efficient protection of the area, let alone the entire country.”

Gorgon/Gazelle was the Soviet equivalent to Spartan/Sprint; Gorgon being exo-atmospheric, Gazelle being endo. Gorgon had a 1 megaton warhead compared to the 5 megaton warhead on Spartan (Spartan was damn big).

In any case, I doubt the Soviet system would have knocked out more than a few incomers, and that is only if the US decided to "go commando" (no countermeasures). The EMP and ionization effects would have rendered the Soviet radars blind to the follow-ons.

The US warheads in those days were extremely EMP-hard. They didn't even use semiconductor memories; they used dinosaur-era magnetic-core memories (which are EMP-insensitive). The newer US warheads use GPS and other sensors for terminal guidance, so they would lose accuracy in a nuclear firestorm over Moscow.

"In any case, I doubt the Soviet system would have knocked out more than a few incomers, and that is only if the US decided to "go commando" (no countermeasures). The EMP and ionization effects would have rendered the Soviet radars blind to the follow-ons."

That's what i said, the first wave of incoming warheads. Whether that wave was 10 or 100 it won't survive all those nuke exlplosions in it's path.

I would think after that, the nuke explosions from the interceptor missiles themselves would sufficiently muck things up that sensors would be pretty uselss, so i agree with the rest of what you said.

Can anyone letme know how the guidance system in NMD would work??
Unlike other missile defense systems, which use IR guidance to shoot down missiles, would NMD be guided through satellites, or IR, or a combination of both.
I really dont have much info about the same.

-bump-

The Rayhteon HTK exo-atmospheric interceptor uses IIR guidance.

Large Megatonne detonations in the upper atmosphere do not merely destroy the first wave but utterly destroy the guidance systems of those in transit and subsequent waves. Quite possibly detonating upper stages of vehicles in transit etc.

The ionesphereic "fog" would consequently/subsequently make ballistic rocketry an invalid response. For days if not weeks.

Don't be so light in dismissing a missile based nuclear deterent.

In terms of politics, at least, it makes governments think for a few hours as all C&C systems fritz.

Originally Posted by The Chap

Large Megatonne detonations in the upper atmosphere do not merely destroy the first wave but utterly destroy the guidance systems of those in transit and subsequent waves. Quite possibly detonating upper stages of vehicles in transit etc.

You have to consider that the waves are sufficiently staggered in time to prevent them all being wiped out together.

And again......that many dets right above moscov would EMP the living snot out of the whole area again and again, likely rendering all the defensive missiles useless anyway.

Seriously, our targeteers have certainly considered all this and MUCH more. In fact, i know for a fact they have, because i know one.(OOE also knows the same gentleman).

Originally Posted by M21Sniper

You have to consider that the waves are sufficiently staggered in time to prevent them all being wiped out together.

And again......that many dets right above moscov would EMP the living snot out of the whole area again and again, likely rendering all the defensive missiles useless anyway.

Seriously, our targeteers have certainly considered all this and MUCH more. In fact, i know for a fact they have, because i know one.(OOE also knows the same gentleman).

To add to this all modern U.S ICBM's as I understand can withstand the effects of EMP blasts specificly to prevent them from dudding each other.

If you read up on the Nike batteries the U.S shelved the nuclear tipped interceptors at the end of the cold war specificly because of the issues relating to fallout and radiation over their own terrirtory. There was also concerns about the EMP effect on U.S installations.

To put it bluntly with the inventories of the U.S and Russia neither country could effectively shield themselves from a major attack originating from the other. The current U.S system is aimed at small scale attacks which I beleive is something that can be done.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/sy...e-hercules.htm

Hi Guys,

This is a topic that I have been thinking about for a while and find quite interesting. Some of the stuff ya'll have already posted has been helpful for me to get a better grasp of this important technical, military and poliitical issue. Thanks.

Some thoughts on the subject at hand:

What is going to make or break NMD is good threat assesment intelligence and damn good counter espionage.

One of the problems I foresee looming is defining the threat. What does a North Korean ICBM look like? What does an Iranian ICBM look like?

All of the sensors and computer programming of the system will have to be geared to detect, track and intercept the threat. It would really suck to field a system and then find out that threat fell outside of the design parameters .

I understand that there was a plan to send a radar trailer from the THAAD program to Japan to track DPRK test launches in the late 90's but nobody wanted to spend the $20 mil. to do so. This is the type of information that needs to be available in abundance to properly develop any ABM system.

A good illustration of my point is one of the problems that the PAC1 had in ODS. AFAIK, the software for the Patriot was written using data gathered by tracking Eastern European (German? Polish?) SCUD launches. The problem was that the Al-Hussayn modifcations produced a different flight profile than the computer was programmed to handle which caused the system to shoot behind the target in some instances. IIRC, it was the Israeilis who first caught the problem.

Any reasonably robust NMD system is going to require thousands to tens of thousands of workers in multiple states as part of a network of dozens or possibly hundreds of contractors. Each and every one of these people and entities is going to have to be thourougly vetted and secured. This will be a daunitng task in its own right and require significant resources.

Counter intelligence and counter espionage are absolutely critical to NMD as an enterprising actor bent on rendering the system less effective can change a specification on a blueprint, insert a bad line of programming, change a heat treatment requirement or any one of thousands of possibilities to retard or hamper US efforts. This is of even greater import when one considers that the NMD system will probably be untestable in its final configuration.

Given the problems with security in the National labs and the defense industry in general, I suspect this could be problematical.

A good, multi tiered systems architecture is going to probably be the most advanced thing ever built by man. It will involve a diverse array of largely automated components on the sea, on land, in the air and suspended in the Heavens above. It will probably have more than one million lines of programming code.

I support the development of ABM capability but feel that robust TABM capaility should be the order of the day at this point as the threat is proven and US soldiers have already been killed by them. NMD should have the backseat in development until the threat is better defined and the lessons and techniques of TABM can be scaled accordingly.

Streamlining the system would not be a bad idea for starters. Desirable as BPI is, I would be tempted to nix the ABL and pour the resources into more mature technologies at this point.

I would also tackle the SBI component last as the last thing the US needs is an arms race in orbit as this is where we are exceptionally vulnerable. I would tend to favor development of orbital KKVs over lasers as an orbital bombardment capability might be piggybacked which would allow for the termination of several other programs and systems. We could really use orbital bombardment capability right about now so we ought to get on it.

A multi layered, missle based ABM system is essentially available off the shelf at this point with the proper integration. HAWK3, PAC3/ERINT, THAAD and SM3 could be layered to provide mobile, flexible missle defense with midcourse, exo atmospheric, long terminal and short terminal defense. If we would were to work up a very fast burn GBI, say based on the Arrow II, and base them with radar assets near potential launch sites (Turkey, Afghanistan, South Korea and Japan come to mind) it would amount to a very credible BPI capability.

Combined with limited NMD at Fort Greeley, the US could have 5 layers of missle defense on very short order with 3 or 4 of them already in inventory.

As a final note, we should never lose track of the fact that the only combat proven missle defense tactic extant is to overrun the bases from which they are launched .

Good topic; I look forward to your continued input.

William

Originally Posted by Swift Sword

...A good illustration of my point is one of the problems that the PAC1 had in ODS. AFAIK, the software for the Patriot was written using data gathered by tracking Eastern European (German? Polish?) SCUD launches. The problem was that the Al-Hussayn modifcations produced a different flight profile than the computer was programmed to handle which caused the system to shoot behind the target in some instances. IIRC, it was the Israeilis who first caught the problem.

The synchronization problem wasn't caused by trying to shoot at a different type of scud, but due to differences in clock cycles between the interceptor and the guidance computer. The longer the PAC was up and running between reboots, the greater the synchronization error became.

When you have a closure rate that high, a millisecond translates to a 50+ foot miss. So some Patriots detonated late. Obviously this has been corrected, but even in ODS, it only became a factor when the Patriot Battery had been active for several days without shutting down and restarting.

Originally Posted by highsea

The synchronization problem wasn't caused by trying to shoot at a different type of scud, but due to differences in clock cycles between the interceptor and the guidance computer. The longer the PAC was up and running between reboots, the greater the synchronization error became.

When you have a closure rate that high, a millisecond translates to a 50+ foot miss. So some Patriots detonated late. Obviously this has been corrected, but even in ODS, it only became a factor when the Patriot Battery had been active for several days without shutting down and restarting.

Highsea,

That would explain things, too.

The software development I mentioned was highlighted in a GAO report for which I have no citation for off the top of my head.

It seemed like a reasonable story so I have been running with it.

Your explanation makes perfect sense, too.

Perhaps it was a combination of factors or perhaps I have been unintentionally propagating bad information .

Thanks for the insight; hope you have a nice weekend.

William

I think the U.S. could defend itself very well against incoming missles using various systems that are already deployed in the field.

Quite.

My plan to defend North Dakota from MIRV's:

Upon hearing the warning siren all us rednecks step out into the back yard with binocs' and our deer rifles. When we spot a mirv we start shooting.

Defiance has to count for something.