xinhui

Friend of my send this to me this morning.
PIREP - Chinese Servicemen’s Views of USAF Airmen and Education

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Document created: 1 December 2007
Air & Space Power Journal - Winter 2007

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PIREP
Editor’s Note: In 2006 a delegation from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) visited US Air Force (USAF) facilities, including the USAF Academy in Colorado; Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and Bolling AFB, Washington, DC. China Air Force magazine subsequently published three commentaries written by delegation members and graciously permitted Air and Space Power Journal to translate and republish them.
Chinese Servicemen’s Views of
USAF Airmen and Education
“Understanding US Airmen from Small Details”

Sr Col Wang Qigui, PLAAF
Political Commissar

What combat-training objectives, officer-development structure, and military-base culture does the USAF adopt? Some details that I noticed during our visit to the United States may provide answers.

The US military promotes the notion of joint operations, pursuing the vision of “global reach, global awareness, global power” and training its soldiers in real combat environments. One lasting impression that I had from our US trip was that the US military pays great attention to developing capabilities for joint operations. It believes that war is not the business of any single service, theater, force, or soldier; instead, winning a war requires the joint operation of all people in all dimensions. Each theater has a unified command made up of all the US services. A mixture of students from these services attends training in military schools. For major operations, all services join to form the centralized command. Even in logistics and deployments of armaments within a theater, the US military uses joint supply methods. The USAF designs training with combat requirements and effects in mind. For example, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, we watched a number of C-130 cargo planes frequently taking off and landing. An officer explained that they were sharpening their skills at landing on short runways in order to strengthen capabilities to project forces and supplies quickly in complex situations.

US armed forces do not have political units or political officers. Instead, each organic unit has one chaplain. Yet, political education and moral mentoring successfully merge into the service members’ daily work and lives. In every location, we saw the national flag, service ensigns, and unit banners flying. From the Department of Defense in the Pentagon to a wing on a base—indeed everywhere—we found museums and heritage offices. Meeting rooms, hallways, and lobbies serve as halls of fame, decorated with photos of previous leaders, war heroes, trophies, and all kinds of souvenirs. At Air University in Alabama, a museum dedicated to the heritage of enlisted members displays war heroes and their brave deeds, creating a full image of heroism. Some of the US military bases we visited, such as Maxwell AFB and Bolling AFB, are named after war heroes. But we did not see many slogans posted on the walls of their buildings, except perhaps one that read “Integrity, Service, Excellence.”

The US military has a clear vision for personal development. No later than 18 months after their promotion, company-grade officers must go to junior-officer schools to take a six-week course. Then, for every step up, they must attend military schools, some as long as 12 weeks, some as short as two to three weeks. Field-grade officers also must attend military schools for strategic courses as a prerequisite for promotion. Even general officers must go back to school to take more advanced courses and participate in joint-operation war games. A second lieutenant needs to attend at least 10 trainings at different times before he or she reaches the rank of brigadier general. During the past few years, the US military has added a good deal of curriculum about information-warfare theory and the art of command. The schools invite high-ranking officers with combat experience and renowned specialists to give lectures and speeches. In order to increase their joint-operation capabilities, officers rotate every two to three years, either dispatched to operational forces at the front or assigned to military schools or back offices. Currently, most USAF field-grade officers have had experience in two to three weapon systems and professional positions. The development of noncommissioned officers (NCO) is equally systematic. To progress from the lowest rank to the highest, sergeants must complete a training cycle every five years, on average. Course length ranges from eight days to 18 weeks each time.

During our 15-day stay in the United States, we also observed that the beautifully landscaped military bases attract highly talented people. The USAF bases, military academies, and flying-wing camps that we visited were all very well laid out, with buildings dotted neatly with trees and flowers. The people we met, whether the commandant, a sergeant, or a student, all appeared motivated, proud, and self-confident. Individuals with whom we talked expressed their willingness to deploy to the most dangerous battlefields for the most treacherous taskings and to die for their country. Maj Gen Stephen J. Miller, commandant of the USAF Air War College, told us that in the United States, servicemen and women all voluntarily join the military. Cadets who have finished two years of studies may choose to leave the armed forces or sign an agreement to continue their careers in the military. After voluntarily entering the service, they must unconditionally obey orders, strictly follow rules and discipline, and fulfill personal commitments. No matter where, in what position, or in which profession or stage of personal development they may be, as servicemen, they have no reason whatsoever to compromise their commitment. While visiting the USAF Senior NCO Academy, I asked a chief master sergeant (who appeared close to 50 years of age), “Having served in the military for so many years and all the time staying with soldiers on the grassroots level, have you ever thought about changing careers or seeking positions with better benefits?” “Well,” responded the chief, “this is the job that fits me and that I enjoy. I must do it the best I can.”

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“Selected Thoughts from a Brief Look at the USAF”

Sr Col Wang Ximin, PLAAF
Political Commissar
Guilin Air Force College

As a military-school staff member, I naturally paid more attention to USAF educational institutions during our visit to the United States. Understanding the USAF’s modern educational policy, teaching models, and school structures will bring new ideas to our own education and training.

The US armed forces believe that military training must interface with war. As such, the US military often makes its war-gaming environments more complicated than real battlefields. It has adopted a mind-set of joint operations, the concepts of which are reflected fully in system structure as well as command and coordination, all the way down to the tactical level. US servicemen and women understand that they will train to fight for the overall strategic objectives of their country and have an obligation to do so. Soldiers must prepare themselves to win; otherwise, they are fated to lose. Putting aside the justification for launching wars, we can learn something from these service members, who have such a strong sense of mission, dedication, and obligation.

The USAF not only possesses sophisticated weaponry but also heavily emphasizes the human role in high-tech wars. Indeed, that service invests substantially in the development of high-quality Airmen. During our visit, I was deeply impressed with their military competence, technical capability, and physical as well as mental fitness. Both officers and enlisted members demonstrated a high level of education. Most of the latter have finished high school, and a fairly high percentage of them hold undergraduate or associate degrees. More than 95 percent of USAF officers hold bachelor’s degrees.* Officers of field-grade rank and above often have two to three different degrees. Faculties of the military schools consist mostly of professionals with master’s and PhD degrees. The US military also stresses the importance of total development. Through situational teaching, role rotation, field training, battlefield deployment, and many other ways, the US armed forces equip their servicemen and women with total capabilities and competencies. Students entering military schools must meet strict requirements. Company-grade officers must graduate from command and staff college to qualify for promotion to field-grade rank.† Field-grade officers normally possess experience in two or three career fields or weapon systems.

Political units and political commissar positions do not exist in the US armed forces, but political and moral education has some distinctive features. During our tour, I asked our host, “How do you educate your soldiers about loyalty to the country, dedication to the national defense, and commitment to duty?” He answered, “Such education starts from high school. When students enter the military schools, they are taught to understand why they serve in the military, how to dedicate themselves to the country, and how to contribute to military development.”

The US military holds the national interest above all else and regards serving the country as its sacred obligation. US servicemen and women may attend different military schools multiple times. In fact, education in military duty and responsibility permeates one’s entire military career. Despite the absence of dedicated ideological educators, such education is reflected in performing missions and fulfilling obligations. We also noted the compassion and attentiveness to soldiers’ actual needs. For example, the military takes care of many necessities for the families of soldiers deployed overseas. On the other hand, people who refuse to fulfill their military service agreements, desert, or break rules may face harsh punishment. My most vivid impression was of the cultural environment of USAF bases. Every unit and school has its own decorated room of honor and hall of fame. Certainly, all of these efforts imperceptibly influence the psyche of USAF officers and enlisted members, nurturing them to develop and grow.

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“A Glimpse at the Cultivation of Airmen’s
Core Values in USAF Schools””

Sr Col Hao Chengming, PLAAF
Air Force Aviation University

The US military attaches no less importance to moral education than to weapons and equipment. It holds that patriotism, a sense of national superiority, and dedication to national interests are important elements of a soldier’s character. These represent the highest personal values, serve as the true foundation of military morale, and are essential to winning future wars. During this study tour, I paid special attention to the US military’s cultivation of its soldiers’ core values.

The core values of the US military services include “loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage” (Army); “integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do” (USAF); “honor, courage, and commitment” (Marine Corps), and so on. In addition, every college and academy of the USAF has its own core values: “integrity, service, and excellence” (USAF Academy) and “institutionalization, service to the country, and excellent dedication” (USAF Senior NCO Academy), for example. The USAF Academy consistently sets as its first educational priority the cultivation of US military ethics and values in every cadet. Both the Center for Character Development and the Cadet Counseling and Leadership Development Center establish the curriculum for the moral development of cadets. The academy emphasizes such core values as “integrity first,” “service to the country first,” “the supreme honor of sacrifice to the country,” and “excellence in all we do.” The USAF Academy has summarized and expressed such core values in highly concise words and has embodied these concepts in a variety of patriotic, inherited, religious, situational, moral, and legal forms so that they guide the behavior of all cadets, who internalize them as moral pursuits. All of these educational efforts and their obvious effects left profound impressions on members of our PLAAF study delegation.

USAF colleges and academies do an outstanding job of creating an environment that subconsciously facilitates the education of students through pleasant sights and sounds. At the USAF Academy and each college of Air University, one can see that the meticulous landscaping and displays on campus, on the training grounds, along the corridors, and in every exterior setting all reflect the distinct educational principles and concepts of different schools, conveying an atmosphere of culture, knowledge, and education. On the walls of almost every office, teaching venue, and meeting room at Air University, one can also see pictures and descriptions demonstrating the history of the service and of the school. Important events relevant to the development of the USAF and the school, as well as famous individuals educated by the school, are all on display, offering a rich and colorful historical lesson that influences, inspires, and educates people. Static displays of various types of airplanes are placed at prominent locations as a means of stimulating the students’ patriotic feelings as well as their love of and devotion to the USAF. The inscription on the statue of an eagle and fledglings at the USAF Academy serves as a reminder to cadets of the importance of learning: “Man’s flight through life is sustained by the power of his knowledge.”

The USAF colleges and academies also attach special importance to the development of students’ and cadets’ leadership and management capabilities as an extension of the cultivation of core values. At Air University’s Officer Training School and at the USAF Academy, the cadet wing—responsible for managing, educating, and developing USAF cadets—forges and develops their leadership skills and command and management capabilities. Organized much like an Air Force combat unit, the cadet wing includes various command and staff positions that provide each cadet the opportunity to experience leadership and learn how to manage a military institution. In the wing, seniors serve as cadet officers, and both juniors and sophomores serve as cadet NCOs. Freshmen, however, who have no cadet rank, must respect senior cadets and obey their commands—requirements that cultivate the Airman mentality and an attitude of obedience. Sophomores are held to somewhat less stringent requirements and assume limited leadership responsibilities in the cadet wing, with an emphasis on developing speech skills and communications capabilities. Juniors and seniors focus on developing a sense of responsibility as leaders and learning the various functions of the USAF. Senior cadets serve as instructors for most of the glider and parachute training courses at the USAF Academy; additionally, they must assume at least one leadership position in the summer training program for junior cadets. This model of education and management not only inspires the cadets’ initiative regarding self-education and self-management, but also facilitates their acquisition of professional knowledge and command skills necessary for promotion to higher rank. It also enhances their management capabilities and gives consideration to the development of their personality.

* This percentage reflects the author’s understanding, based on his US tour. In fact, a bachelor’s degree is a commissioning prerequisite for all USAF officers.

† This comment reflects the author’s understanding, but the promotion system actually works somewhat differently.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University

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Officer of Engineers

The article tells more about the PLAAF NDUs than the USAF MAs.

__________________
Chimo

S-2

Interesting read. Thank you.

The considered comments of foreign military professionals is always so revealing about the observer and the observed. I was impressed with their focus on our development of human material as a critical component to our war-fighting posture. The stock, dismissive comment typically includes something about a technological reliance. Not here.

The carefully inculcated position of the political officer was visibly challenged in the minds of these officers. If their comments are to be believed then it's fair to assume that these officers recognize the quality of our airmen/women absent sloganeerism and political mobilization.

I really don't think that others understand just how extensively developed is our military education system.

__________________
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Officer of Engineers

Does this not tell you a lot about their education system?

xinhui

one thing for sure, both sides are looking beyond hardware counts.

Once a noted PLA watcher within the US military told me. "My paper was based their work and they translated my work back to Chinese and analyze what I think. It is damn funny if it was not so serious."

Officer of Engineers

S-2,

One thing I would like to add is that Political Commissar is an Appointment, not a branch. These Officers usually passes through their own branch (ie, artillery, infantry, logistics, engineers, armour) before assuming the Political Commissar title. It is akin to the Operations Officer postings in our system and they have to assume the Political Commissar posting before advancing further in their careers.

S-2

Colonel,

"Does this not tell you a lot about their education system?"

Indeed sir. I hope that it's quietly, gently, thoughtfully intimidating.

"These Officers usually passes through their own branch (ie, artillery, infantry, logistics, engineers, armour) before assuming the Political Commissar title."

Yes sir. IIRC, this was also the case in the Red Army from late in W.W.II on. Too many political officers found command dissolve to them by de facto circumstance early against the Germans.

However, I understand your point that this is not a party posting. Instead, it seems a special staff function routinely filled by career officers as part of their professional path.

Blademaster

Sirs,

How useful are those political commissars? and does NATO have any equivalent of political commissars officially or unofficially, such as wink wink Information debriefing officers or such?

Officer of Engineers

It's a 2IC position. The role is akin to our Sgt-Majs. Primary responsibility is the welfare and morale of the men, ie making sure that they have their pay and a good night sleep and food. One major difference is their reliance on slogans as a means of steeling group discipline.

xinhui

As a side note, ROC military has PC system too and that pisses off Taiwan independence folks to no end

Taipei Times - archives



To this day, the ROC military retains its political commissar system, the Political Warfare Department.

Military training has always included political indoctrination. Starting during the Kaohsiung Incident trials in the early 1980s, the official theme of this program was "three enemies in one" (三合一敵人), which equated communism, Taiwan independence, and "separatism" (including such ideas as "state-to-state relations").

Walking Dead

Sir, in light of your comments. I wonder why they are drawing a parallel between the political officers and our chaplains? Could this be because of the state's inacceptance of religion (denial of the usefulness of spiritual and moral counseling), or maybe they just did not understand the chaplains' role in the US military?

__________________
Elwood: It's 106 miles to Chicago, we got a full tank of gas, half a pack of cigarettes, it's dark, and we're wearing sunglasses.
Jake: Hit it.

Bluesman

One of the greatest ways to gain understanding of your own service and that of a foreign observer's service is to study THEIR study. What is important to them? What do they emphasize? What were the impressions they took away?

One story I always found instructive happened during a REFORGER exercise in Germany, circa 1985. A Red Army colonel, accompanied by a lieutenant, was shadowing a US Army unit during the field portion of the exercise (as each side had the right to do, so that we - and THEY - could not use an exercise as cover to launch a surprise attack).

The Soviet colonel, apparently trying to needle an American NCO a bit, asked a sergeant what his mission was, and how did he plan to carry it out. The sergeant got out a map, and proceeded to describe how 'we're HERE, and we're going to road-march down to THERE', and gave the details of the movement, and the purpose of doing it. The colonel thanked him.

One of the US officers that was detailed to 'observe the observers' spoke Russian, and overheard the colonel marvelling to the lieutenant: 'Did you see THAT? The sergeant had a MAP! SERGEANTS don't have maps! COLONELS have maps!'

I think the story has impact, because the Russians have such a radically different vision of what an NCO is, and what he's supposed to do. We have a completely different idea than they do.

The fact that the Chinese observers were impressed with the pride and sense of purpose that seemed to be coming from INSIDE those airmen, instead of some attempt to instill it through indoctrination, is a HUGE factor that we simply must understand. Their organization is BRITTLE, if their human material does not feel personally invested in the success of their organization's endeavors. I'm not saying they're not tough, because they obviously ARE. But I put a USAF airman against his Chinese counterpart, and I'll win, because of what brought each of 'em into their force in the first place. One's a free-born patriot that is there because he wants to be; the other's probably a draftee.

__________________
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it, and if one finds the prospect of a long war intolerable, it is natural to disbelieve in the possibility of victory."
- George Orwell

Officer of Engineers

More because that they're Chinese. Religion as a Divine Law was never part of the Chinese culture. The best that could be thought of is that the Heavens might give you permission to do something but you're on your own as doing the thing right as opposed to it is the right thing to do.

2ndly, these are also soldiers with a soldier's view of the battlefield. They cry just as much as we do when we lose people. I've got photos of PLA soldiers just breaking down in tears over the graves of his comrades years and decades after the war. You would not be able to tell the difference when compared to those who goes to the Vietnam Memorial everyday.

So, who do you turn to in those times of need and comfort. In our armies, it is the Chaplin. In theirs, it is the Political Officer.

The PLAAF is a volunteer force but for most airmen, it is a job more than a career. Most are still supporting airplanes designed before they were borned. There is more than enough sense of pride in their top units, the late Commander Wang Wei is testament to that but when you're working on a MiG-21/J-7 that stayed on the ground more often than not and when they are in the air, they just circle the airfield, it's hard to be proud of that when you can do better on JANE's Flight Simulators.

xinhui

Each PLA major unit has a Physiologist (Tom Cruise will not be too pleased) and they have to pass a physiological test before being accepted into armed force. not sure that answer the chaplains question.

xinhui

Other item PLA copied directly from the US is the ROTC system, there are number of articles written on that topic.


The Jamestown Foundation

ROTC WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS: TRAINING THE PLA IN CIVILIAN UNIVERSITIES

By Roy D. Kamphausen

China is nearly a decade into a program to commission up to half of the new People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers from its finest universities. In the near-term, this initiative will take advantage of civilian institutions of higher education to train large numbers of technologically proficient military leaders better able to function on the high-tech battlefields of the 21st century. Over the longer term, relying on civilian education may well increase the level of PLA officers’ professionalism and potentially even alter the dynamic of elite interaction in the formulation of Chinese security policy. The pace of growth and the future impact of the program will shed important light on the quality of PLA leaders, while also contributing to an enhanced understanding of overall PLA military modernization programs.

Program Origins

In early 1999, the PLA leadership came to the realization that its military education system was ill-prepared to groom officers with the technical expertise necessary to master the demands of high-technology warfare. The existing military academy structure, styled after the old Soviet system, maintained more than 100 academies—many redundant—and kept nearly a quarter of the PLA’s force structure tied up in military schools. Moreover, the sheer size of the PLA military-academic complex prevented the capital upgrades in computers and other equipment necessary for systematically training cadets to address looming technological challenges.

In response, the Chinese leadership undertook two important efforts. The first was to downsize the bloated PLA military academy organization by one-third, either by closing redundant academies outright, or by consolidating campuses on a functional or geographical basis [1]. By 2006, the PLA had just 67 military academies, including both commissioning academies as well as basic military specialty schools (Defense White Paper: China’s National Defense in 2006).

In a second, and perhaps more far-reaching initiative, the PLA also decided to “take advantage of the civilian education system” (yituo guomin jiaoyu) to commission military officers for service in China’s military—a PLA-style Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).

PLA officers had attended civilian universities in China since as early as 1991 (Jiefangjun Bao, April 2, 1999). Indeed, from 1996 to 1999 in the Beijing Military Region alone, more than one thousand officers were drawn from civilian universities, usually with majors in computers, engineering, electronics and other technical fields, and also in foreign language (Jiefangjun Bao, June 16, 1999). Nonetheless, in early 1999, China’s military leadership decided to turn the previous ad hoc practices into a more systematic arrangement, and in the process, fundamentally changed the way in which junior officers are recruited for the PLA. Employing a name for the plan quite similar to the U.S. program from which it drew its core characteristics, the PLA Reserve Officer Selection and Training Unit (houbei junguan xuanba xunlian tuan) was conceived [2]. The Reserve Officer Selection and Training Unit would serve to commission a portion of the officer corps from dynamic civilian universities in order to establish a leading edge capability that would result in important army-wide effects.

The initiative was launched from experimental status into a full-fledged PLA program by China’s Central Military Commission in March 1999. At the “All-PLA Cadre Training Work Meeting” in March 1999, orders were passed to the major PLA danwei (units) to establish feeder relationships with prominent Chinese universities, with the goal of improving the educational level of the Chinese officer corps and better preparing them for the requirements of 21st century warfare (Jiefangjun Bao, April 2, 1999).

In the months that followed, the “big 14 units”—the General Staff, General Political, General Logistics, General Armaments Departments; the seven Military Region Headquarters; the PLA Air Force, PLA Navy, and Second Artillery plus the People’s Armed Police—all established exclusive relationships with civilian universities to carry out this mandate. Examples included: Fudan University with the People’s Armed Police; Beijing Polytechnic and the General Staff Department; and Wuhan University in partnership with the Guangzhou Military Region, among others. Meanwhile, the elite Beijing and Qinghua University programs continued their direct reporting relationships with the General Political Department’s Cadre Department, the program’s bureaucratic patron.

Program Characteristics

From the outset, program implementation has incorporated all phases of officer accession. Cadets are recruited from the ranks of active duty soldiers, high school seniors and already-matriculated college or graduate school students and selection is made on the basis of an application, a physical exam and, importantly, a political reliability check (Guofang Bao, December 8, 1999). These “national defense scholars” (guofang sheng) then obligate themselves, after completion of their studies, to serve with the PLA unit which recruited them. In return, they receive scholarship assistance of 5,000-10,000 yuan per year.

While enrolled, the cadets have a military curriculum at their civilian universities in addition to their normal academic load. Military classes are taught by active duty officers assigned to the various university campuses, and while the curriculum notably includes political training, the cadets receive much less instruction in this category than their counterparts at military academies. In addition to their military education classes, the cadets also take part in other required cadet functions, such as providing support to the broader national defense education activities required of all university students (Jiefangjun Bao, November 19, 2003).

Upon graduation, officers serve in the units that sponsored them. This usually means that the officers will be assigned to the general department or military region headquarters units (Jiefangjun Bao, October 9, 2000). So, for example, a cadet who studies at Beijing Polytechnic University will, upon graduation, work at the headquarters of the General Staff Department.

The PLA Air Force and Navy intend to assign ROTC graduates on a nationwide basis. Army officers have also gained coveted assignments to troop units, and besides being assigned to technical staff positions, some ROTC graduates are moving into leadership or command positions. According to Chinese observers, entry into platoon and company level leadership positions by civilian university graduates has led to increases in training levels (Jiefangjun Bao, June 16, 1999).

ROTC Today

Despite its modest beginnings, the Chinese ROTC system has developed in ways that were unlikely to have been imagined by the Political Department cadres who had first conceived of it. From the original dozen-plus civilian universities in 1999 with exclusive relationships with PLA units, the total number of ROTC programs on Chinese university campuses had grown more than six-fold in seven years; by the time of the release of the 2006 Defense White Paper, 112 universities were commissioning officers for the PLA (China’s National Defense in 2006) [3].

According to PLA statistics, the program appears to have become an important, if not leading, source of new officers for the PLA. From 2000-2005, more than 8,800 students were enrolled in the program, and in 2004 alone, 1,800 graduates of civilian universities joined military units (Jiefangjun Bao, July 14, 2004).

Extrapolating from the published plans of the PLA Navy and the Shenyang Military Region to the larger PLA suggests that the number of officers graduating from civilian universities will grow several more times, perhaps to as many as 10,000 officers a year by 2010, or between 40-50 percent of the new officers commissioned annually [4]. Interestingly, this estimate is consistent with a PLA Navy announcement that more than 40 percent of its officers will come from civilian schools by 2010 (Xinhua, August 17, 1999).

Calculations and Implications

The PLA was determined to implement a civilian university commissioning program for a number of reasons despite the fact that its sheer size made the fundamental reform of China’s military academy system a daunting challenge. It was unclear to PLA leaders that the existing system could ever produce the quality of officers required to fight wars under modern high-tech conditions at the price the PLA was willing to pay. Establishing an ROTC program allowed for military leaders to ensure excellent academic training for its rising officers, but at a modest cost and without significant capital investments. Moreover, despite the reduced political training received by cadets relative to their military academy counterparts, the establishment of a formal program had the added benefit of providing more political control in universities than had previously been the case.

It is perhaps premature to assess the long-term impact of the program, since the first cadets only graduated in 2004. Nonetheless, as these new graduates will soon assume company-level command, some preliminary judgments appear to be in order. First, the programs’ rate of growth and the diverse fields into which graduates are assigned, including leadership and command slots, suggest that the initiative has moved from the novel into the mainstream and will continue to grow in significance over time.

Second, with as many as 50 percent of its new officers commissioned by civilian universities within the next five years, the PLA almost certainly will enjoy a more highly technologically adept junior officer corps. This could result in an even greater integration of advanced weapons platforms and related command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems coming online. The PLA leadership recognizes that without talented personnel, its modernization efforts—including the assimilation of these new systems into coherent operational structures—will not be as effective, and so the ROTC program will help realize the dramatic capability improvements offered by these new systems.

Third, the significance of the PLA ROTC program goes well beyond simply the high-tech training of future officers and touches on national-level defense initiatives. The ROTC program itself is part of a broad national defense education effort—codified in the 2001 National Defense Education Law—to strengthen the concept of national defense in Chinese citizens by mastering national defense knowledge as well as necessary military skills, developing a patriotic spirit and creating a willingness to fulfill national defense duties in students from pre-school through college (Jiefangjun Bao, November 19, 2003). Moreover, the use of civilian universities to train military cadres—“taking advantage of civilian education to train military officers”—is a fundamental principle of the national defense mobilization effort, which seeks to build peacetime capacity in preparation for a range of crisis contingencies.

The program may have some unintended consequences, however. PLA leaders may mistakenly discount the liberalizing effect of a university education, even (or especially) in China, despite efforts to vet the political reliability of cadets in the recruitment process. Moreover, despite the potential benefits to the officer corps, the fact that the program assignments of graduates are heavily weighted to headquarters billets risks marginalizing the program’s potential benefit to an increased operational integration of high-tech systems.

Nonetheless, the program bears further attention. While many questions loom, two seem most critical: Will the PLA become a more effective military force as an increasing number of its officers graduate from China’s most prestigious universities? And, in the formulation of national security policy, how will the role of the PLA change as the once-backward educational background of senior military leaders increasingly converges with that of the country’s diplomatic and economic leaders? All these, and many other questions, bear close scrutiny as the PLA continues to implement its “ROTC Program with Chinese Characteristics”.

Notes

1. For instance, the Information Engineering University in Zhengzhou was formed from the original Information Engineering, Electronics Technical, and Measurements Academies, all of Zhengzhou, thereby creating a new “comprehensive” university (Jiefangjun Bao. July 3, 1999).
2. A PLA delegation led by Major General Dong Wancai was invited to the United States to conduct an "investigation" of the U.S. ROTC system in November and December 1998.
3. By comparison, the U.S. Army has more than 250 ROTC detachments.
4. From 2001 on, Shenyang Military Region intended to recruit approximately eight hundred graduates per year from civilian universities around China for military service. (Jiefangjun Bao, December 6, 2000) From 1999 on, the PLA Navy planned to access six hundred students in civilian universities for military service. Jiefangjun Bao, July 7, 1999.