lemontree

Neo,
These ops were tried before too, in 1965 many battle were fought Oct/Nov much after the war had ended on 22 Sept 65. After the cease fire. Many features were similarly occupied by PA right from Akhnur-Sundarbani to Kargil along the LOC.

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Cheers!...on the rocks!!

lemontree

Sameer/Anoop C,
The reason why the Op Badr of PA is tactically brilliant is because it had the potential to paralize an enemy commander. Had this operation been conducted in conjunction with a major operation of attack it would have collapsed Leh/Ladhak sector defences.
This plan became a strategic failure because it was carried out in isolation.
- There was no air support for PA.
- There were no corresponding operations to tie up Indian troops. This left the Indian army to deal with each sector in a piece meal manner, without concern in other sectors.
- The PA weaknesses in air defence were highlighted to great extent.
- Op Badr would have resulted in a war had the US not intervened, which would have been disasterous for Pakistan. They did not have the economic means to sustain a war.

This plan is also though to have been the personal ambition of Gen. Musharraf to become a hero of Pakistan, if he succeeded in altering the LOC in favour of Pakistan.

bull

see we have experienced people onour side,who educates us.

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What's the difference between people who pray in church and those who pray in casinos?
The ones in the casinos are serious.

raj

one question to u guys, would u think that this kind of plan would have worked wonders for Pureland govt had it been done in coldwar time(I mean as and how it is, no PAF involvement and no crossing of borders from either side apart from PA and terrorists crossing the LOC at kargil)

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saw this in some site dont remember the name tough

Anoop C

Captain,

Thank you for the reply. I understand where you're coming from (the tactical aspect as the last piece of the strategic and operational puzzle, the most geographically and temporally limited aspect), but my objections remain. The tactical plan had value only in the larger context of the prevailing strategic and operational scenario; divorced from it, it was meaningless.

Pakistan had no necessity to launch Op Badr; they didn't have their backs to the wall. If that had been the case, I would have been less critical of trying to put a tactical plan into motion when the strategic and operational aspects were missing!! However, in 1999, the gap between the tactical plan and the strategic plan was that of night and day. In essence the strategic plan revolved around the hope that after the nuclear explosions, the world would prevent India from escalating - more of a hope than a strategy. Didn't it occur to GHQ that the world could more easily press Pakistan into not responding to an Indian escalation? A very facile assumption.

lemontree

Annop C,
The reason India has won in most wars is not because we are supermen, but because the enemy committed many blunders at the planning stage.
We are all aware of the Battle of Longewal and the IAF Hunters and 23 Punjab standing tall in the deserts. But few are aware that the armoured units of Pak 18 Div had tanks whose engines were oiled up and needed replacement. These units did not have enough time to replace their engines and were pushed into battle.

As long as PA rules Pakistan, we will win every war (because instead of learning their trade, they are busy making money).

indianguy4u

But how can they[gen] be so irresponsible. Being the army mens they should know whats imp for making an effective army. [1971, 65, kargil the amry generals were in power]

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Hala Madrid!!

Ray

Lemontree,

The Kargil operation planned by Pakistan was not really brilliant.

It was a brilliant plan so far as the sand model discussions are concerned. The operational plan was audacious, but as we all forget, we do not look at the nitty gritties. Be it Indian or Pakistani Sand Model discussions.

As is wont to be in Sand Models, the Logistic aspect is always glossed over and so was it in the case of Pakistan and hence it was not brilliant at all. A brilliant plan is a plan that can be executed. The Pakistani plans had inherent logistic booboos.

To sit on Tiger Hill or Tololing requires logistics. Logistic means not only food. but it means ammunition, radio spares, weapon spares, material to build bunkers and shelters including cement, CGI sheets etc Obviously, in the snow at those height to survive out in the open is suicidal. Even artic tents if carried requires manpower and that too at the expense of other important loads. And artic tents have a tendency to fly away in the hgh winds at those heights.

Calculate how much of tonnage would be required to sustain a platoon since most of their post were a platoon worth. Note the food would be as required in the high altitude! Calculated the number of first line, second line and WWR would be required if they were to sustain themselves for two to three months or four if they wanted the routes opened because then summer would come. One first line would sustain just one attack.

Then take the water required. At those heights there was no water. What about the mdical back up?

Lastly, there were no routes to the areas they held along the spine of the mountains and those spines were razor thin. Animal transport could not ply and so all these logistic would be porter based. Now when you calculate you will find that such huge requirements of porter would be a dead giveaway!

If you read the Pakistani officer's diary, they were fed pn a high dose of Islam being the sustaining elixir. That is OK, but in reality it is not enough as was seen in the last entries of the poor boy where his morale was in the boots and he wondered why God has forsaken him when the cause was so just (as per him, that is).

Therefore, I am not too impressed with the spin.

BTW, I have served in these height (in the same area) as a Commanding Officer (where I was also in combat) and as the Deputy GOC in the kargil Operations too!

Logistics is a nightmare.

The Paper tigers (for others it means those who excel by good English and gloss over cleverly the issue and yet appear brilliant and also do well) unfortuantely plan the operations!

The above is just my hurried thoughts at 2.01 AM.

lemontree

Sir,
When I say the plan was good. I mean the aim, the fact that their logistics and strategy was flawed is an issue that lead to the failure of the PA. I am looking at the plan in isolation and what potential it had.

Sir I know the glossing over of logistical issues. A small example I use to be sent on LRPs in militant infested areas, with each johny carrying 30-40 kgs load. It was very difficult to make our BM and Cdr (armd chaps) under stand that if we got caught in an ambush none of us would survive carrying such heavy loads. They use to mark my route as they would mark a tank patrol route in a desert, straight lines without reading the contours. I never followed their routes, and always established a patrol base in the approx centre of the area to be patroled. There after I left the base before first light with a section of the ghataks (I would leave the remaining section at the patrol base for adm duties and patrol base security) and would cover more area and meet more people and gather more info.

giggs88

Is LoC the accepted international border or something?

Ray

I would term the plan as "audacious" but unexecutable.

If one looks at even Op Gibralter, conceptually it was very very interesting.

But again, it banked on too many imponderables to be in their favour. The unfortunate part for the Pakistanis, given their psyche, they do not look at the worst case scenario. They always plan on the best case scenario or so it appears. Obviously, things go wrong. I also wonder if they have contingency plans in case of a problem or reverse.

indianguy4u

Though there is a resolution in parliament to the effect that the whole of kashmir should be brought under indian control, but there seems to be a reality check upon both NDA & UPA that current status quo isnt so much unfavourable to India. But the stated position hasnt being changed.

Neo

Not yet, but it seems to be the ideal solution as neither side will loose face.
But we should not forget that in the first place its up to the Kashmiri's from both sides to decide if they want to be independent or to join India/Pakistan or stay seperated by recognising LoC as international border.
Kashmiri interest comes first.

Neo

Ray,

I don't have a military background and I don't understand strategies as good as you or Lemmonji do.
But looking at the maps and accessability from Pak side of Kargill even I see that the concept was good. If the road to Leh is controlled by PA, India could come under pressure to negitiate.

What are the chances that a modernised and better equipped PA will succeed with such strategy in a future conflict and gets full support of PAF?
They must have learned from their mistakes, atleast I hope they have.
Tactics may change on both sides but the geographical advantages will still be there.

Sameer

Neo as per CLinton memoirs and globalsecurity, nawaz, and a mmillitary coup which generally folloows defeats, India won, the NLI was almost wiped out and surely there are two sides of the story but you seem to forget one thing in your argument

1) India was not the one who attacked and was not the one who wanted to change the border, Pakistan was.

All India wanted to do was to kick Pakistan out of its territory, as per CLinton and Shariff, again get the memoirs and read it or go to any Janes, ACIG, globalsecurity etc and you will quickly find that India was quite victorious in acheaving its goals, ie kicking Pakistan out.

India played smart, it was gaining the advantage by capturing important peaks such as Tiger Hill and company and it had acheaved a complete diplomatic victory.Ever since then, the Americans have been on Pakistan's back and have gone much closer to India. It surely helped deflect world condemnation of the 98 tests.


Lemontree ji

You are absolutely right, as long as PA runs the country, we have nothing to fear, all these generals do is buy their kids S-500s in London and a nice Oxford streeet apt, i knew a son of a millitary man from Pakistan, a good son but filthy rich and i heard some very ncie sotires as well.