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08-22-2005, 12:55 PM
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#1 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
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Power play in Central Asia
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Power play in Central Asia
By Tariq Fatemi
WHILE most of the world, and especially local analysts like us, have remained focused (for understandable reasons) on the “formalization” of the Indo-US strategic ties during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Washington, important developments have been taking place elsewhere, especially in Central Asia, which deserve our close attention as well.
The Chinese, in conformity with the wisdom and experience acquired over the ages, have maintained a mature and detached attitude to the games their neighbour has been playing, in league with the Americans, to enhance its influence in the region. The Chinese have been “cool”, as the Americans would say. But this does not mean that they, or for that matter the Russians, have been oblivious to the momentous developments taking place in their neighbourhood.
It will be recalled that in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, its constituent provinces, known as republics, suddenly and unexpectedly found their umbilical cord to Moscow severed. Though there may have been no independence movement worth the name in any of these republics (except those in the Baltic, which had never accepted their forced incorporation into the Union in 1940), the local party chiefs lost no time in declaring their republics as independent states. But they continued to look towards Moscow for political guidance, as well as economic sustenance and military support. Caught in a struggle for its own bearings, Moscow presumed that these Central Asian republics — acquired through bloody military subjugation over the past centuries — would continue to rotate around the Russian “sun”.
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the situation in Central Asia, as with any other place, underwent a dramatic change. With American fury having been ignited in the smouldering flames of the Pentagon, Bush was on the warpath. Both Russian and Chinese leaders may have calculated that helping the US in its invasion of Afghanistan would not only bring an end to the much feared Taliban regime (which both loathed as well), it would also earn them important “brownie points” with Bush, that they could cash in later. Neither Beijing nor Moscow had calculated on the neo-cons in DC having a blueprint for a long and rapidly expanding presence in Central Asia.
The first fallout was the inevitable coming together of Russia and China, on a wide-ranging agenda. They then took the initiative to bring the Central Asians back to their fold as well. The first step was to transform the old talking shop known as the Shanghai Five, into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Apart from its original five, Uzbekistan joined it in 2001, while Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran have been recently accepted as observers. Others, including Japan, Australia and even the US have expressed a wish to join this organization, which they all recognize is likely to play an important role in determining the course of events in Central Asia.
The SCO’s primary aim is to preserve peace and stability in the region and this is to be achieved by promoting mutual trade and investment, the best possible use of regional resources and a gradual transition to free movement of goods, money, services and technology. Their most significant area of cooperation may, however, turn out to be energy. The leaders are already discussing implementation of major projects relating to pipelines from Central Asia to China’s Xinjiang province and another from Russia to China, which has already aroused considerable interest in the US. There are also plans for auto trains and motorways linking Europe to China — and some time in the future coming all the way to the Gulf.
The SCO claims, with some justification, to be a unique political opportunity and a fundamentally new model of geopolitical integration. Embracing almost two-thirds of mainland Eurasia, uniting countries with different civilizations, cultures and economic systems, its magnitude and trans-regional status make it an unprecedented experiment.
But what accelerated the coming together of Moscow and Beijing so rapidly and so overtly, was the impression in both capitals that the Bush administration was not satisfied with merely obtaining base facilities in Central Asian states to prosecute the war on terror in Afghanistan, but that Washington was now engaged in a concerted effort to bring about “regime change” in all of them.
First, it was the Rose Revolution in Georgia that brought into power an avowedly pro-American government. Then it was Ukraine, where the Orange Revolution ended Moscow’s influence in an area long considered part of the Russian heartland. When Moscow saw its ally being drummed out of the capital in Kyrgyzstan and an attempt being made to oust the Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, both Russia and China realized the frightening scale and dimension of America’s plans.
It was at this stage that Moscow stepped in. First, it managed to salvage the situation in Kyrgyzstan by engineering a compromise, which kept power in the hands of its friends. Then it came out strongly and publicly in support of the Uzbek leader, even though there were reports to the effect that hundreds of Uzbeks may have been killed in anti-government disturbances. It was at this stage that the July 2 Sino-Russian summit in Moscow became the setting for a major pronouncement by their leaders. In the declaration, significantly called the “World order in the 21st century”, Presidents Hu and Putin rejected attempts to “ignore objective processes of social development of sovereign states and impose on them alien models of social and political systems”.
This was a clear and categorical rejection of all that the Bush administration has been proclaiming as its goal in the coming years. The stage having been set for a clear delineation of competing philosophies, the SCO summit a couple of days later came out with a statement that was even tougher than what had emerged from Moscow.
In a ringing declaration, the summit rejected “attempts at monopoly and domination in international affairs” and warned that “concrete models of social development cannot be exported”. Even more significantly, the Shanghai Group called upon the US to set a deadline for the withdrawal of its bases from the region now that the anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan was coming to an end. More significantly, the signatories, while affirming their opposition to extremism and terrorism, declared their resolve to fight these evils “by their own forces”.
The SCO declaration was surely the product of the close coordination between the Chinese and Russian leaderships. It was reflective of their conviction that now was the time to remind the Americans that Central Asia was in their backyard (not in America’s), and that these two would henceforth be taking the initiative to ensure peace and security in this region.
More importantly, Beijing and Moscow wanted to give a clear signal to the world that they had a better and more equitable alternative to the unilateralism of the Bush Administration. The “new security architecture” that they proposed would promote “a just and rational world order based on the respect of the right of all countries to equal security”. In other words, Russia and China are opposed to foreign inspired attempts to trigger changes in these countries, while espousing their belief that the “evolutionary path to development” was the only legitimate and acceptable available option to the region.
The SCO declaration was not mere rhetoric. It was followed by Uzbekistan’s demand that the Americans vacate within six months the military base that they have been occupying since 9/11. Surprised and discomfited by this public demand, US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had to engage in a quick damage-limitation exercise, while also refraining from criticizing Karimov. His trip was however, only partly successful, in that he got only Kyrgyzstan — where the US also maintains a base — to allow continued use of the Ganci base but after he had to cough up over $ 200 million. Incidentally, the Chinese, too, are keen to establish their military presence in Kyrgyzstan.
China has made it clear that it now recognizes that the US is engaged in a bitter struggle for influence in Central Asia. That Washington’s plan is to spin a web of interlocking arrangements with the small but strategically important states of the region, so as to keep Beijing off balance and at the same time, deny China the hydrocarbon riches of the region, is no longer a secret. This is also what explains Washington’s sudden interest in Mongolia, a truly lost continent, were I had the good fortune of spending over a week in 1972. A huge country, with 20 times more sheep than humans, it may also have major oil deposits.
No less significantly, Mongolia is geographically sandwiched between Russia and China, which have always vied for influence in Ulaan Bator. But now it is the Americans who are talking in terms of “a new era of comprehensive partnership with Mongolia. Surely, China could not be unaware of the fact that virtually all of its neighbours, other than North Korea and Burma, and to some extent Pakistan, are now part of what Russell Mead of the Council on Foreign Relations of New York, calls “the strategic net” being woven by the US in Asia, to persuade China to keep its ambitions within reason.
What do all these developments mean? One, that though the Chinese and the Russians have been rivals for centuries for influence in Central Asia, both appear to have reached the conclusion that their differences are minor, compared to the common challenge they face from America’s growing ambitions in the region. (This is also the view of a Chicago-based think tank). Two, America’s aggressive support for democratic revolutions has unnerved Central Asian rulers.
Three, Russia is therefore being welcomed back and has accordingly decided to come out more forcefully in defence of its interests in the region. Four, China will continue to expand its influence in the region, especially in the less developed states, but do so with greater subtlety and sensitivity to local views. Five, China’s energy requirement is so great and growing so rapidly that it has no option but to enter into long-term arrangements with Russia and the Central Asian republics, to secure guaranteed oil and gas supplies from the region. Six, Iran must have been greatly relieved to see the US being challenged, even if gingerly, by a powerful regional coalition.
Seven, India’s role will be critical in the success of this arrangement. While it has joined the SCO, it is too big and too clever to be tied down to any one option, especially at a time when it is being courted assiduously by the US, China and Russia. It will want to keep its options open, to draw maximum advantage from all.
Can Pakistan play a similar game? It can, if it is able to resolve its internal contradictions, and learns to maximize its human, economic and geographical advantages in a manner that they acquire a strategic dimension, that can then be brought into play with skill and acumen. The coming years are one of great challenges, but equally great opportunities, for Pakistan and the region.
The writer is a former ambassador.
http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/22/op.htm
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This article brings out an interesting viewpoint that is surely worth analysis. It is from a Pakistani or even an Asian viewpoint however and may not quite be in consonance with viewpoints elsewhere.
However, do not lost sight of the article because of the digression of mine to address Troung and Bluesman below.
Troung and Bluesman,
Note the article starts with Manmohan Singh the India Prime Minister but has nothing beyond to state. This may help you to understand Indo Pak equation. The viewpoints and attitude in the so called "craphole" is a reflection of the attitude that is prevalent in the countries iteself! 
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08-22-2005, 14:54 PM
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#2 (permalink)
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Senior Contributor
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Aw Ray, you are going to have to make me add China to my in depth "Sucks, Rocks" debate analysis 
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08-22-2005, 22:06 PM
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#3 (permalink)
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Ray, what are the chances of the Indo-Pakistan pipeline going ahead?
__________________
In the realm of spirit, seek clarity; in the material world, seek utility.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
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08-22-2005, 22:29 PM
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#4 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
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CAR is the focal point of today's geo-strategic realities.
That as the focal issue, the overall strategic interplay does indicate that to maintain the US superpower position in perpetuity, it becomes essential to emasculate Russia and China (the two nations that are capable of independently challenging the US and as a bloc can seriously challenge the US).
Therefore, the US interest displayed in peripheral states of Russia and China i.e. CAR, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, India are no knee jerk reactions of a country in picque!
Russia and China are the only two nations in the world that can challenge and stymie the US persuasion of consolidating her position as the world's sole superpower. They can do so independently and together they become a serious obstacle.
Therefore, it is not unusual to observe that the US is encircling both Russia and China and attempting to install friendly govts in such peripheral nations.
Therefore, the Velvet and the Orange Revolutions or the uprisings in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan are no instant coffee.
It would be too naive to believe that the Iraq War was to bring "Freedom and Democracy" to the groaning millions of Iraqis. There are many countries in Africa and Asia which are more repressive and reprehensible than Iraq and yet they have missed this panacea.
Thus, Freedom and Democracy is a mere smokescreen or obfuscation to pursue greater goals of furthering US national and strategic interests and ensuring that its newly acquired status of the sole superpower is not disturbed in perpetuity.
The US interest to have a foothold in the Middle East preferably adjacent to the oil rich CAR (the largest untapped reserve of hydrocarbons in the world) and hence the war on Iraq was no knee jerk reaction by men seized with dementia. It was a deliberate actions with costs being ho holds barred.
To believe that the US is perturbed with the current imbroglio would also be an error of judgement. Shorn of emotions and merely from a strategic point of view, the turbulence in Iraq or even Afghanistan is ideal since it ensures the US presence in both these countries and thereby influencing the govts to ensure the protection of US interests. Yet, given the US public opinion and impatience, such an eventuality has come to an end. However, it will not be before institutions, mindsets of those who matter in Iraq, the Constitution and the govts are so engineered that the US interests are protected for some time to come.
The entrenching of the US is clearly visible in that the US Army is reorganising itself in Iraq and relocating into bases that are merely not only in the interest of addressing the insurgency cognitively, but also for a considerable time thereafter.
Last edited by Ray : 08-22-2005 at 22:37 PM.
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08-22-2005, 22:49 PM
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#5 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
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Parihaka,
Oil is very important to India owing to her increasing demand spurred on by "liberalisation" (change from socialism to a market driven economy responsive to globalisation).
The pipeline from Iran and Burma is thus of paramount importance.
The stumbling blocks are Pakistan and Bangladesh since these two countries have not been what could be termed "extremely friendly" - a factor that is essential to ensure uninterrupted flow. Yet, currently, the picture is rosy.
However, now enters the "Big Brother". Who can upset Big Brother? Therefore, my personal view is that the pipeline from Iran is a non starter. Right now, there has been rumblings that the cost has escalated! Avenues to abandon the project? Read it in conjucntion that the US has suddenly discovered India as a long lost bosom friend and is ready to given the latest nuclear know how so as to meet India's energy need!
It is in India's interest to be with the US and hence the mutual interests of both these nations i.e. India and the US have to be accomodated; more so the US'!
QED.
Will Pakistan feel peeved?
No.
Ah, it is all politics.
Last edited by Ray : 08-22-2005 at 22:51 PM.
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08-22-2005, 23:06 PM
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#6 (permalink)
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I found this a while ago, it makes interesting reading
Quote:
Apr 22, 2005
A troubled triangle: Iran, India and Pakistan
By Iason Athanasiadis
TEHRAN - The formation of a critical triangular relationship among regional powers Iran, India and Pakistan - both cooperative and adversarial - has accelerated in the past months. Iran is trying to shore up alliances with its neighbors in the face of escalating tension with the United States, even as Pakistan and India seek to disengage from the increasingly tight control that Washington exerts over the region by engaging in fence-mending. At the same time, Pakistan and India are attempting to extract further benefits from US patronage, namely advanced weapons systems.
After the relative policy success of a Shi'ite-majority government coming to power in Iran's Arab neighbor Iraq, Tehran is now looking east, keen to normalize relations with its neighbors in the hope that their support will blunt the edge of the US military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, Iran is strengthening its relations with regional superpowers China and Russia.
This month Washington justified its growing involvement in the region when it identified Iran, India and Pakistan as a "troubled triangle": "Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are a troubled triangle and the US strategy is to involve the US government in the region to reduce the troubled nature," said the US Army War College's Larry Goodson. "The US faces ... a real conundrum in that we have to stay in order to achieve [our] strategic interest of stabilizing and transforming these troubled regions but our very presence there is going to continue to attract some of the more militant jihadists who want to challenge their conception of the US project for the world. Anti-American attitudes are at an all-time high in some areas. We really can't stay and yet we dare not go."
Washington, meanwhile, is utilizing a carrots-and-sticks policy as it tries to disrupt the rapprochement between Iran and its neighbors that would end Tehran's international isolation. The Bush administration's carrot is an offer to sell India and Pakistan advanced F-16 fighter jets capable of dispatching nuclear payloads. India has yet to accept the offer and is making noises that it might approach Russia and the European Union as alternative arms suppliers. As for Pakistan, given Iran's close cooperation with arch-foe India, it has steered a more ambivalent course, welcoming a permanent US presence in Afghanistan even as it offers to act as an intermediary between Washington and Tehran on the nuclear dispute.
The governing circles in Tehran know that their Sunni Muslim nuclear neighbor could well use its US-supplied weapons against them one day, a fear that Washington is implicitly encouraging in its bid to further contain Iran. But the Bush administration's strategy could well backfire by hastening Tehran's scramble toward a nuclear safeguard.
Last month, Pakistani officials said the proposed sale of F-16 jets to Islamabad had no links with the US-Iran standoff. They were responding to reports in the media insinuating that, in return for the F-16s, Pakistan agreed to cooperate with Washington's efforts to undo the Iranian nuclear program. Pakistan has admitted that one of its top nuclear scientists, Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplied Iran with centrifuges used to enrich uranium for atomic warheads and some officials have criticized Iran for cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency so fully on the issue. Tensions between Pakistan and Iran have been further raised by accusations that Tehran is sponsoring an ethnic-led insurgency in the Balochistan province that connects the two countries.
To complicate matters further, India has rapidly developed its relationship with China, prompting Islamabad to scramble in its bid to keep Beijing's affections. Pakistan and China signed a friendship treaty last month and started negotiations on establishing a joint free-trade zone. But the relationship lacks a strategic dimension, unlike ties between India and China, which are focused on this regard. The two countries upgraded their ties to "strategic relations" after the first-ever such dialogue between them in New Delhi in January. Two weeks ago, they moved to resolve their long-running border dispute to a backdrop of flourishing trade, which touched an all-time high of US$13.6 billion last year.
Iran has also been improving relations with China. Beijing secures 13.6% of its annual energy needs from Tehran and looks set to receive more after a huge deal signed recently. Buttressing their alliance, Beijing and Tehran signed a preliminary accord worth $70 billion to $100 billion by which China will buy Iranian oil and gas, while helping develop the Yadavaran oilfield close to the Iraqi border. Earlier this year, China pledged to buy $20 billion in liquefied natural gas from Iran over the next 25 years. In return, it sends manufactured goods to Iran, including computer systems, household appliances and cars. China is a particularly valuable ally for Iran because it holds veto power at the UN Security Council and could shield Tehran from hostile diplomatic action by Washington and London.
As part of Tehran's eastern charm offensive, it has built solid trade relations with India and is pursuing a common policy in Central Asia, a key strategic region. In January, the state-run Indian Oil Corp reached an agreement with the Iranian firm Petropars to develop a gas block in the gigantic South Pars gas field, home to the world's largest reserves. At the same time, India is cooperating with Iran on securing Persian Gulf sea lanes and is helping develop Iran's Chahbabar port. This is partly aimed at frustrating Pakistan's ambitions to make its own port of Gwadar, just a few kilometers to the east, into a regional hub.
At the same time, there has been a rapid expansion in energy ties. Iran and India are currently engaged in a joint project to build a gas pipeline that would also cross Pakistan. Dubbed the "peace pipeline", the $4.5 billion project could cement relations among its three participants through creating financial incentives for peaceful coexistence. But Washington signaled its displeasure with India's collaboration with Iran when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that Washington had concerns over the pipeline deal. In a rare snub to Washington, India responded by saying that long-term energy security would dictate its energy policy, not politics.
"I think that there are a number of companies working in Iran, including a large number of European companies," Indian Petroleum Secretary S C Tripathi said. "A large number of countries are having economic relations with Iran, therefore it should be possible for us also to work out a reasonable and well-drafted and well-crafted hydrocarbon agreement with Iran. I think it should be possible."
But to Pakistan's consternation, aside from signing a significant trade pact, India and Iran have also cultivated limited military relations, conducting a joint naval exercise in March 2003 that was possibly motivated on Tehran's part by the US naval presence in the Persian Gulf. Iran is also seeking India's help for servicing its naval and air-force equipment, including its MiG-29 jets. According to a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, Tehran sought India's help in developing batteries for submarines, which are more suitable for the warm waters of the gulf than those supplied by Russia. At the same time, Iran is buying more military hardware, in particular missile technologies, from China.
Aside from worrying Islamabad, friendly ties between Tehran and New Delhi are also causing concern in Tel Aviv. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made a point of voicing his concerns about the alliance to his Indian hosts in a 2003 visit. Israeli officials are concerned that their weapon deals with India will be compromised should New Delhi decide to pass on classified Israeli military technology to Tehran. Keen not to antagonize Washington, New Delhi has been cautious in keeping its distance from Iran on the nuclear issue, although it has claimed to have helped Tehran with generating nuclear energy.
From Islamabad, Tehran is seen as almost as much of a threat as New Delhi. Ayesha Siddiqa, an ex-Pakistani government director of naval research, said that "strategically it will be positive for Pakistan to support a hostile policy towards Iran".
Talat Massod, a retired Pakistani lieutenant general, told Voice of America radio that Pakistan would welcome a permanent US military presence. He said that officials in Islamabad would be happy to see a permanent US presence, believing that it would provide support in the event of hostilities with its neighbors.
"Pakistan, to be honest with you, I think they will not mind that," he said, "because they may think that it is a good way to countervail India, provided they themselves have good relations with the US."
The comments were indicative of Pakistan's sense of insecurity, which Washington is hoping to exploit in its drive to attain a full-time presence in the region. Christopher Candland, an American academic currently conducting field research in Peshawar on the politics of Southeast Asia, told Asia Times Online that India feels that "the more menacing Pakistan is made to appear, the more Washington will strengthen its relationship with New Delhi".
"In other words," Candland said, "the Pakistani military is said to be using the religious political parties to frighten Washington into more military aid. In my view, it's a dangerous confluence of opposing forces."
Washington also appears to be increasingly tilting toward Delhi. While it has offered to sell F-16 fighter planes capable of delivering nuclear bombs to both New Delhi and Islamabad, the US has allowed India the option to buy the more advanced F-18s. The offer to India also includes licenses for technology transfer and for local production, something that Pakistan was not granted.
"Understandably, this disparity gives rise to the perceptions in Islamabad and in New Delhi that Washington has made a long-term commitment to India's security but is only interested in supporting Pakistan's security as long as it continues its operations in Pakistan against suspected al-Qaeda agents," Candland said.
From Iran's standpoint, the increasing militarization of the region, coupled with US attempts to build alliances with India and Pakistan, can only be interpreted as a growing threat. Tehran has responded to the threat by boosting its relations with Russia and emerging superpower China. A high-level Iranian delegation visited China early this month to discuss expanding trade ties, while Moscow has been the primary supporter of Iran's nuclear program. Despite a long-standing history of Russian meddling in Iran, bilateral ties today are at their highest level since World War II.
As things stand, future trends may include Iran gravitating toward China, Russia and India, even as a pro-Western Pakistani government continues to build close ties to Washington. In an intelligence estimate published in February, the National Intelligence Council - on which the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence agencies are represented - warned that India and China would emerge as major global players by 2020.
It is certain that "Asia is particularly important as an engine for change over the next 15 years", the estimate said, noting that "one could envisage a range of possibilities from the US enhancing its role as a regional balancer between contending forces to Washington being seen as increasingly irrelevant".
Seemingly worried over such a scenario, the US has moved to maintain its relevance in the region through seeking to spark off a regional arms race and heighten tensions between India and Pakistan. Concurrently, Washington has asked Israel to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty in an unprecedented move that could go some way toward ironing out the perceived tilt in US foreign policy toward Tel Aviv.
As Afghanistan is increasingly pacified, Pakistan may become more and more irrelevant. Iran's stock is likely to rise, both in South Asia and in the Arab world. As an energy-rich country, Iran is certain to figure in great power calculations and alliances - whether these powers be the US, China or India - to a greater extent than Pakistan. Tehran's fate depends on several factors, not least how quickly Central Asia's energy resources come on tap and what policy the EU and Russia decide to follow in the region.
At the moment, the view from Tehran is ever more agreeable. To the west, the US remains bogged down in Iraq, where a friendly Shi'ite government is governing. To the east, a solidifying network of alliances promises greater security for Tehran. For the time being, Iran appears to be well on top of the waves sweeping over the region.
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from here
The other piece I found was just a month ago, confirming the go-ahead for an Iranian Oil Bourse
Quote:
Wednesday, July 27, 2005 - ©2005 IranMania.com
Related Pictures
LONDON, July 27 (IranMania) - A senior stock market official has said that the Stock Exchange Council has agreed in principle to the establishment of the much-publicized oil bourse.
Heydar Mostakhdemin-Hosseini, who heads the board of directors of the council, told Fars news agency that the council, also tasked the Oil Ministry to formulate necessary mechanisms for the establishment of the oil bourse in line with the country's general stock market policies, Iran Daily reported.
"The issue of setting up the oil bourse will be finalized once the Oil Ministry presents the outcome of its studies on the organization and articles of association of brokerage firms," he said, adding that stock market software would be created in partnership with foreign parties.
Once established, petrochemicals, crude oil and oil and gas products will be traded at the petroleum exchange, known as oil bourse.
The oil exchange would strive to make Iran the main hub for oil deals in the region as most deals will be conducted via the Internet.
Iran announced in September its petroleum exchange will be operational by March 2006.
Experts from International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) and the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) have reportedly confirmed the feasibility of the project.
Experts say the petroleum exchange can help create further transparency in the Oil Ministry's performance and help attract more foreign investments in national energy industries.
The proposal was first put forward in the beginning of the Third Development Plan (2000-2005) and became a national project in 2003. Relevant technical studies are still underway.
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What's not stated is whether they still intend using the Euro as the medium of exchange, although given the current administrations hard-line approach to the US, I guess this is a given.
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08-22-2005, 23:09 PM
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#7 (permalink)
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I know I should know this, but what is the current size of the US Army in Iraq?
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08-23-2005, 01:06 AM
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#8 (permalink)
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Quote:
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Originally Posted by parihaka
I know I should know this, but what is the current size of the US Army in Iraq?
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never mind, I've found out already
I also found this
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Azerbaijan: U.S. Forces Already on the Ground
By Stratfor 15/4/05
Apr 16, 2005, 07:27
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Though U.S. officials deny plans to send American forces to Azerbaijan -- as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno Harnish did April 14 -- some U.S. troops and materiel are already in the country, and more forces and aircraft will be deployed there later this year, multiple sources in Azerbaijan say. Among the sources are Azerbaijani government sources, members of parliament, opposition members and ordinary citizens throughout the country who say they have seen U.S. troops and aircraft arriving.
Locals reported seeing American troops at the headquarters and other facilities of the Caspian Guard -- members of which were trained by U.S. military instructors in Baku -- and near the towns of Kurdamir, Nasosnyy and Gyulakh. Azerbaijani media, including the Zerkalo newspaper, have started posting articles about the current and future U.S. military presence in the country. Also, Russian intelligence and Georgian and Armenian government sources say their respective governments are aware of the existing U.S. military presence in Azerbaijan and of the agreement for more forces to come.
Azerbaijani government sources confirmed that the agreement between Baku and Washington on locating U.S. "temporarily deployed mobile forces" was indeed finalized during U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's stealth visit to Azerbaijan on April 12. Rumsfeld and Azerbaijani Prime Minister Artur Rasizade and Defense Minister Safar Abiyev -- acting on behalf of Aliyev -- struck the agreement right at Baku's international airport. The sources said that Rumsfeld, not satisfied with Baku's initial agreement, pressured the officials to set a quick fixed date to begin major deployments of U.S. forces to Azerbaijan. Aliyev, however, wants to delay the major U.S. forces' arrival -- or at least the formal announcement of it -- until later this year.
Aliyev has two reasons for wanting to wait. First, he wants to make sure Washington keeps its promise not to support a pro-U.S. "revolution" that would coincide with Azerbaijan's November parliamentary elections when -- as was the case in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan -- the current government would be accused of election fraud and treated accordingly by the West and Western-encouraged opposition. Second, Aliyev ideally wants to see the results of secret U.S.-Russian discussions about the U.S. military deployment to Azerbaijan, in hopes of escaping a wrathful response from Russia.
Washington and Moscow have indeed had quiet contacts on this issue, Russian government sources say. They added that Moscow initiated the contacts some time ago because initially, Washington just pushed for its military presence in Azerbaijan without mentioning it to Russia. Then, the Kremlin let Washington know its displeasure and hinted it would go public on the matter. Washington then agreed to talk with the Russians about the issue. True to his current strategy of avoiding confrontation with the United States -- perhaps in order to win time for the weakened Russia -- Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a conciliatory approach on the issue, sources in the Kremlin say.
The only concern Putin has expressed to Washington is that the deployment of U.S. forces in Azerbaijan should not lead to the destruction of a Russian strategic radar and radio electronic reconnaissance base in the northern Azerbaijani town of Qabala. Washington privately told the Russians that there should be no problem with both nations having bases in Azerbaijan at the same time, but it is reluctant to agree to never raise the issue of the Russians' withdrawing their base -- an issue that Baku will decide, the sources say. But the Russians know too well that Washington would have no problem letting Baku know it is unhappy with the Qabala base, and Azerbaijan would be happy to oblige.
Mindful of these problems, Aliyev deliberately arranged for his visit to Pakistan to coincide with Rumsfeld's arrival, Azerbaijani government sources say. The two missed each other by mere hours. In Aliyev's absence, his deputies relayed his agreement to U.S. bases in Azerbaijan but, much to Rumsfeld's frustration, did not commit to a specific date of the beginning of major U.S. deployments -- they said only that Baku will accommodate the deployment this year and that the government wants to postpone a formal announcement on the matter. If the sources are right, the deal is indeed sealed, and the only remaining issue is when more U.S. forces will arrive in Azerbaijan.
As for the U.S. military presence already in Azerbaijan, it likely consists of 250-300 troops on various missions and a few aircraft, logistic and special operations forces. Among them are:
U.S. military instructors from the U.S. European Command training the Caspian Guard, a large command that will be under direct U.S. supervision and largely made up of Azerbaijani troops;
U.S. logistic personnel building or upgrading facilities to be used for the major deployment later this year;
U.S. inspection teams surveying and checking the progress and completion of work done by local personnel under U.S. military and civilian managers to get designated bases and other facilities fully ready for the arrival of major U.S. contingents;
U.S. special operations forces units providing security and protection of the facilities being prepared for U.S. troops and aircraft; and
Several U.S. military cargo planes and special operations forces aircraft with their crews and technicians -- though they shuttle back and forth, there are a few of these aircraft in Azerbaijan at any given time.
There are also an unidentified number of employees of several American private firms -- security, logistic and construction -- that serve as subcontractors to the Pentagon to help prepare the facilities for the U.S. forces' arrival.
Azerbaijani sources also say the following facilities are being prepared for use by U.S. forces in Azerbaijan:
Three air "lily pad" bases in central Azerbaijan -- Kurdamir, Nasosnyy and Gyulakh -- which used to be Soviet air bases. Kurdamir was a strategic base, with Tu-22M "Backfire" bombers located there. The base's upgrade, including its runway, already is completed, local sources say. This means the air base can receive U.S. strategic bombers or other heavy air transport. The Nasosnyy base used to host Soviet heavy transport Il-76es for Soviet airborne forces and other troops. With the Nasosnyy upgrade soon to be completed, U.S. strategic transport planes should be able to use it too, making the air base a major point in the Caspian air corridor from Western Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia, where U.S. troops and aircraft are located. Initially, the United States probably will deploy some special operations forces aircraft, military transport planes, air surveillance and other spy planes (including drones) and perhaps F-16s.
The Caspian Guard Command Center in Baku, where U.S. officers hold supervisory positions. A few U.S. special operations troops also will be assigned to protect the facility.
The radar facility adjacent to the Caspian Guard Command Center. The facility will have U.S. specialists serving it. The radar's range and surveillance/detection capability will cover not only Azerbaijan but also border areas of Iran and Russia, including the war-torn Chechnya, and the Caspian Sea with its heavy oil traffic.
Military training bases in Baku and Salyany. U.S. military instructors there will train Azerbaijani troops within the framework of the Caspian Border Peace Initiative, with the main goal of protecting the European-bound Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
The Apsheron Peninsula near Baku would be home to the rapid reaction/deployment force made up of U.S. Marines and special operations troops. Washington and Baku are still discussing this longer-run deployment
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from here
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08-23-2005, 12:54 PM
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#9 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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Pakistan sees pipeline work beginning next year
By Our Reporter
ISLAMABAD, Aug 22: Pakistan said on Monday it expected work on the $7.2 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline to start early next year while it was also pursuing plans for similar pipelines from Turkmenistan and Qatar.
Pakistan foreign ministry spokesman said he thought the discussion about the project was “on track” as he referred to various recent ministerial and other contacts among the three countries.
“In our view a project structure should be in position by the end of November, should pave the way for a bilateral framework agreement by the end of December, and the construction of the pipeline should commence in early 2006,” spokesman Mohammad Naeem Khan told journalists in his briefing.
He said Islamabad believed the project envisaging a 2,670-km pipeline would be an “important economic CBM” (confidence- building measure) between Pakistan and India. “And, therefore, this is an important development and it will also meet the energy requirements of the two sides,” he added.
He told a questioner that Pakistan would go ahead with the project in any case “because we need this energy for our own requirements” to sustain a high level of economic growth achieved over the last few years.
“We are also exploring the possibility of TAP — Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan — gas pipeline,” he said about the project that had previously been conceived in the 1990s but abandoned because of the civil war in Afghanistan. “Actually the negotiations are taking place on that,” the spokesman said about TAP pipeline and added: “We will also be looking at the possibility of having a gas pipeline from Qatar.”
http://www.dawn.com/2005/08/23/top14.htm
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This is the latest on the subject as reported in this Pakistani newspaper.
I wonder why India is keeping silent.
The trip by the Indian PM to the US has a whole lot of issues that have not yet surfaced and there are great hints that issues are being given a rethink.
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08-23-2005, 12:57 PM
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#10 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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And this the Editorial from the same newspaper.
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What chance IPI?
REPORTS emanating from Islamabad suggest that Pakistan, Iran and India are expected to start trilateral negotiations on the IPI gas pipeline by November. Given the uncertainty surrounding the fate of the project after the Americans expressed their reservations about it very vocally and India temporized for a while, one will have to wait to see if the talks are back on track. The 2,670-kilometre pipeline project has been on the cards since 1995. Initially it was stalled by the confrontationist nature of India-Pakistan relations in the ’90s which made a project of this kind difficult to implement. Now that the relations between the two neighbours have taken a turn for the better and they are cooperating in trade and economic ventures, the IPI pipeline prospects seem brighter. For Pakistan, the pipeline would facilitate the import of gas from Iran at a relatively low cost. It will also get substantial royalty on the gas which flows to India across its territory. The negotiations which were going quite smoothly until the first meeting of the India-Pakistan joint working group took place in July and agreed to set a timeframe for the project despite the US objections.
The project could be in the doldrums if the three partners do not assert themselves forcefully. When the Indian prime minister visited Washington last month, President Bush offered him advanced nuclear technology and soon thereafter Mr Manmohan Singh spoke of the pipeline project being “fraught with risks”. However, his petroleum minister dispelled the doubts that were created and though the project has not been scuttled, its pace has definitely been slowed down. Iran and Pakistan have said that they will proceed with their side of the project, but India’s enthusiasm appears to have been somewhat dampened. Thus, the joint working group’s meeting scheduled for end August has not been announced. Neither is India willing to sign an MoU with Iran. The trilateral meeting which is supposed to expedite matters does not ensure India’s participation since it is still waiting for a report from its consultants on transaction structure, selected risks and risk mitigation measures. This foot dragging on New Delhi’s part is a bit disappointing. More so now that the United States has stepped up its dabbling in oil and gas politics. The latest warning it issued was directed at Pakistan when the World Bank chief told leaders in Islamabad that the bank would not allow any international financial institution to finance the project.
Washington has also threatened to apply the ILSA of 1996 to impose sanctions against any country which invests more than $20 million in Iranian oil business. The only positive feature of this struggle for oil and gas is that Russia has also entered this area and has expressed its interest in the IPI pipeline project. This may prove to be a balancing factor and provide the smaller powers the counterweight they need in such a situation. There are several multilateral agreements on oil and gas — Qatar-Pakistan-Iran, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India and, of course, IPI — on the cards. With their need for energy growing as their economies grow, it is not advisable to restrict the South Asian countries in their quest for oil and gas. Politically, too, this approach which America has adopted is not a rational one. Hence, one hopes that India will give priority to its regional ties rather than allow itself to be browbeaten by American chauvinism.
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08-23-2005, 18:35 PM
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#11 (permalink)
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Moderator
Join Date: 11-10-04
Location: Te Ika a Maui
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Quote:
The latest warning it issued was directed at Pakistan when the World Bank chief told leaders in Islamabad that the bank would not allow any international financial institution to finance the project.
Washington has also threatened to apply the ILSA of 1996 to impose sanctions against any country which invests more than $20 million in Iranian oil business. The only positive feature of this struggle for oil and gas is that Russia has also entered this area and has expressed its interest in the IPI pipeline project. This may prove to be a balancing factor and provide the smaller powers the counterweight they need in such a situation. There are several multilateral agreements on oil and gas — Qatar-Pakistan-Iran, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India and, of course, IPI — on the cards. With their need for energy growing as their economies grow, it is not advisable to restrict the South Asian countries in their quest for oil and gas. Politically, too, this approach which America has adopted is not a rational one. Hence, one hopes that India will give priority to its regional ties rather than allow itself to be browbeaten by American chauvinism.
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I think they might find that China has large amounts of $US to lend at bargain basement prices to offset the "World Bank chief's" reluctance. As to whether this is expedient in the long term, who can say. It is however becoming increasingly obvious that relying on the US for long term energy needs will come with some fairly stringent 'conditions'.
As regards companies doing business with Iran, I wonder if this will include
Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Smith International et al, who along with 20 odd other American companies happy to do business in Iran through foreign subsidiaries.
Last edited by Parihaka : 08-23-2005 at 18:45 PM.
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08-27-2005, 08:32 AM
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#12 (permalink)
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Contributor
Join Date: 06-05-05
Location: EU
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Uzbek lawmakers back US eviction
Uzbekistan's Senate has approved the government's decision to evict US forces from a key base which Washington uses for operations in Afghanistan.
Last month the government reportedly gave the US six months to leave Karshi-Khanabad air base.
Relations with Washington were strained over the Uzbek authorities' bloody suppression of a protest in May.
Neighbouring Kyrgyzstan has also told the US it can no longer use one of its bases if the Afghan situation improves.
Washington's rivals for regional dominance, Russia and China, have made it clear they do not want to see US forces in the region on a permanent basis.
The Washington Post reported in July that the US had been given six months to move aircraft, personnel and military equipment from the base in southern Uzbekistan.
The eviction notice came days after US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld returned from a visit to Uzbekistan's neighbours Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Mr Rumsfeld said he did not believe US operations in Afghanistan would be hurt if Tashkent denied continued use of its airbase, because there were other options in the region.
Andijan dispute
Flights into the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) base had already been reduced at the request of the Uzbek authorities, after the US criticised the government over events in Andijan.
Earlier this month, the US signalled that it might withhold $22m of aid to Uzbekistan, unless it allowed a full inquiry into the incident.
There are still disputed versions of exactly what happened on 13 May, when troops fired on a crowd of people.
Leading human rights groups say many hundreds of civilians were killed, with Human Rights Watch describing the incident as a "massacre".
link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asi...ic/4186770.stm
I know this loss of the base won’t hurt the US military. I think this is also a result of Russian pressure on Uzbek government and payback for US “interference” in Ukraine.
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08-31-2005, 14:20 PM
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#13 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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I know I should know this, but what is the current size of the US Army in Iraq?
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Parihaka,
1,70,000 is the current size of the US troops. It will be cut back to 70,000 as per BBC Hard Talk today with the ex Provincial Governor of Basra.
British will come down to 3,000.
However the ex Governor was sceptical.
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08-31-2005, 14 | |