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03-19-2007, 13:33 PM
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#1 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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How to fuel up the out-of-gas US military machine
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Commentary > Opinion
from the March 19, 2007 edition
How to fuel up the out-of-gas US military machine
A poor state of readiness is hurting the world's finest fighting force. Congress must act to correct it.
By Neil Abercrombie and Solomon Ortiz
WASHINGTON - Earlier this month, the House Armed Services Committee got a classified briefing about US military readiness. Details were disturbing, but the implication was jaw-dropping: The US armed services are literally at the breaking point. This is not hyperbole or partisan rhetoric. It is stark reality – and it requires immediate attention.
That's why Congress must reassert its constitutional responsibility to provide for America's armed services. This begins with the Armed Services Committees, which have already begun hearings on the 2008 National Defense Authorization bill.
Consequences of equipment deficit
The readiness challenges facing the US military today are immense. Consider these facts supplied to Congress:
•Not one Army unit in the continental US – including the National Guard – has all the trained personnel and equipment needed to complete their missions today, either in combat or in response to domestic natural disasters or attacks.
•Roughly half of all the ground equipment the US Army owns is currently in Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the start of the war in Iraq, the Army has lost nearly 2,000 wheeled vehicles and more than 100 armored vehicles. Harsh climate and terrain, virtually continuous combat, and the weight of extra armor are wearing out equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan at up to nine times the normal rate.
•The situation is even worse for the National Guard. The regular Army has lost so much equipment that they're using Guard equipment as replacements. Combined with years of underfunding, Guard units are left with only about one-third of their own equipment.
These urgent equipment shortages, compounded by the Bush administration's financial mismanagement of the war effort, hurt the military's ability to fight and train. Both Guard and active Army units are forced to prepare and train for deployment with minimal equipment. That would be like preparing for a football game without ever practicing in pads.
he Iraq war has also badly damaged US military recruitment. In 2005, the Army missed its recruiting goal by more than 8 percent, or almost 6,700 soldiers. Army strength has been maintained by offering expensive reenlistment bonuses.
The Pentagon has resorted to a "backdoor draft" – extending combat deployments in Iraq – just to retain current force levels. The current escalation includes soldiers "backdoor drafted" for duty, and the use of National Guard and Reserve forces as de facto active duty units through multiple, continuous deployments.
Casualties, meanwhile, are coming home at the fastest rate since Vietnam. Media reports about life in outpatient care at Walter Reed, the "crown jewel" of the Army's medical system, have saddened or angered all who read them. This treatment of the men and women who come home from war traumatized in mind or decimated in body reflects badly on America.
Ensuring military readiness is a continuous effort that's been badly damaged by overextension in Iraq. We must shore up both short-term and long-term readiness. Short-term readiness addresses the needs of soldiers in the field today. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have been marked by shortages of basic equipment, from Kevlar vests and helmets to up-armored Humvees, which are better able to protect personnel from roadside bombs.
Long-term readiness encompasses everything from manpower, training, and equipment to pre-positioned stores of military equipment strategically located around the world in case of emergencies. (These stocks have been virtually drained for Iraq operations, the General Accountability Office reports.) It also includes "resetting" the force – restoring equipment to prewar condition – which will be costly.
Let us be clear: The United States has the finest fighting force in the world. But the Bush administration has supported this world-class force with second-class funding. The resulting low readiness levels put the entire country at risk. Lack of proper equipment makes it that much harder for US forces to succeed in Afghanistan or Iraq – or anywhere else.
How Congress can make a difference
Urgent congressional efforts to repair this damage must be part of a broader strategy of finding an exit from Iraq, improving US effectiveness in the real war on terrorists, and providing spending oversight to avoid crushing debt burdens.
President Bush has used Congress as a money spigot, funding military operations through a series of emergency budget requests with no oversight. The government has spent money it didn't have and paid for it with deficit spending – essentially raising taxes on America's children.
That's about to change.
We're committed to funding major recurring war costs through the regular budget process, while ensuring that real emergencies, real unforeseen expenses, and real battlefield needs are funded quickly. With Democrats in power, the American people can expect requests by the Pentagon and administration for "emergency" supplemental funds to be scrutinized much more closely.
We understand that wars always give rise to unforeseen circumstances and unexpected needs. However, there will be no more blank checks for Defense spending unrelated to battlefield needs. Everything must be prioritized so Congress can make the most informed choices.
Last year, we asked the administration to include recurring and foreseeable funding needs in the 2008 Defense budget request that goes through the normal authorization and appropriations cycle. Instead, we received Mr. Bush's request for three separate pots of money for military operations:
•An emergency supplemental request of $93.4 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan (the second such request in 2007).
•The regular 2008 Defense Budget request of $481.4 billion.
•Another emergency supplemental request of $141.7 billion for 2008 operations in both wars.
Supplemental appropriations are supposed to address emergencies that simply cannot wait for the regular process, replacing equipment lost or damaged in battle and other "war costs." How is it that an emergency supplemental request exists to pay for emergencies next year?
The president's 2007 emergency request includes billions of dollars in developmental spending under the guise of "emergency" replacement. Supplemental spending should address emergency needs, not future defense systems that won't help soldiers on the ground for years to come. That's why we're calling on the administration to end the practice of paying for war costs with "emergency" funds.
At this moment, US forces are conducting a war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and trying to referee a civil war in Iraq – both unconventional conflicts. Yet no one would suggest the US no longer needs forces ready to fight on a conventional battlefield. Nobody knows where the next enemy may emerge or how future wars will be fought. Clearly, the US must be ready for any eventuality.
Make no mistake: The US is not at war, the US military is. The burden of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is being carried by our soldiers and their families. The rest of us merely observe their sacrifice on TV.
Members of Congress can do their part by giving the US military the support and equipment it needs to win.
• Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D) of Hawaii is chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces. Rep. Solomon Ortiz (D) of Texas is chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness.
How to fuel up the out-of-gas US military machine | csmonitor.com
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Shek,
Could we have your comments?
__________________
"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."
I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.
HAKUNA MATATA
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03-19-2007, 14:54 PM
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#2 (permalink)
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Military Professional Moderator
Join Date: 02-23-05
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Ray
Shek,
Could we have your comments?
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Sir,
I'll post more later, but there is some truth found in this oped piece. However, it is heavily partisan in its alarmist tone, and misleading in some of the points it makes and doesn't make.
__________________
"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3
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03-19-2007, 17:35 PM
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#3 (permalink)
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Contributor
Join Date: 03-07-07
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The U.S spends more than half of the world's military spending yet they can't sustain a prolonged struggle like this even with that amount considering the need for money and troops outside of Iraq and Afganistan.
__________________
Those who can't change become extinct.
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03-19-2007, 17:53 PM
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#4 (permalink)
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Lord High Hullabalooster
Senior Contributor
Join Date: 11-23-04
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Quote:
Originally Posted by wkllaw
The U.S spends more than half of the world's military spending yet they can't sustain a prolonged struggle like this even with that amount considering the need for money and troops outside of Iraq and Afganistan.
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Who says we can't sustain it? A couple of whiney Democrats?
-dale
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03-19-2007, 19:17 PM
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#5 (permalink)
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Contributor
Join Date: 03-07-07
Location: New York City or Hainan, China
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Quote:
Originally Posted by dalem
Who says we can't sustain it? A couple of whiney Democrats?
-dale
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I didn't mean the U.S can't sustain it, I meant they can't sustain their military currently with the amount of money they spend on it, they will need to spend more.
Last edited by wkllaw : 03-19-2007 at 19:22 PM.
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03-19-2007, 22:43 PM
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#6 (permalink)
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Military Professional Moderator
Join Date: 02-23-05
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Sir,
Here's my cynical take on this piece. My commentary will include what I think are implied messages in the piece as well. Before I start, I've long argued that there is a material readiness issue that can be solved by budgeting properly. However, while there are some personnel readiness challenges posed, these are not at the breaking point. Material readiness is quickly fixed - it's the personnel readiness that defines whether we are at a "breaking point" IMO, and we're not there. So, there is much material to take issue with the administration and current readiness, I'm just not sold on this supposedly "non-partisan" oped written by two Democrats. I smell a political agenda, instead.
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WASHINGTON - Earlier this month, the House Armed Services Committee got a classified briefing about US military readiness. Details were disturbing, but the implication was jaw-dropping: The US armed services are literally at the breaking point.
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Reading between the lines, the message seems to be "Trust us, but we can't reveal everything and how bad it really is . . ."
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This is not hyperbole or partisan rhetoric. It is stark reality – and it requires immediate attention.
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There is hyperbole and misdirection in the message, but it does need to be fixed now.
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That's why Congress must reassert its constitutional responsibility to provide for America's armed services. This begins with the Armed Services Committees, which have already begun hearings on the 2008 National Defense Authorization bill.
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I love this type of grandstanding by Congress, especially given the levels of undesired projects funded by Congress as pork. It's a small total of the overall budget, but a moral farce that is shameful nonetheless. Neither here nor there on this topic, just the cynic in me coming out.
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Consequences of equipment deficit
The readiness challenges facing the US military today are immense. Consider these facts supplied to Congress:
•Not one Army unit in the continental US – including the National Guard – has all the trained personnel and equipment needed to complete their missions today, either in combat or in response to domestic natural disasters or attacks.
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The readiness standards are very strict. By design, a portion of stateside units will not be ready as you have to transfer people between units, send them to professional development schools, etc. For equipment, this could be referring to the fact that there is some specialized equipment that units will pick up in Iraq or Afghanistan. Also, does not all trained personnel mean that they are filled at 99.9%, or at 50%? A little unfair since they can't reveal these exact numbers (and I don't know any clue either), but nebulous enough as to not even address the above, either.
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•Roughly half of all the ground equipment the US Army owns is currently in Iraq or Afghanistan. Since the start of the war in Iraq, the Army has lost nearly 2,000 wheeled vehicles and more than 100 armored vehicles. Harsh climate and terrain, virtually continuous combat, and the weight of extra armor are wearing out equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan at up to nine times the normal rate.
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When a third of your force is deployed, and you've fielded tens of thousands of vehicles to units that never even had a vehicle before, I am not at all surprised that we have nearly half of our equipment deployed. Next, why are the numbers of destroyed vehicles important? If we are short that many, then it is an issue; however, destroyed vehicles that have been replaced are not a readiness issue.
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•The situation is even worse for the National Guard. The regular Army has lost so much equipment that they're using Guard equipment as replacements. Combined with years of underfunding, Guard units are left with only about one-third of their own equipment.
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True, and this is a situation that stretches back to the "peace dividend" era following the end of the Cold War and the drawdown then. When you start in the hole, it is not surprising to go further in the hole.
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These urgent equipment shortages, compounded by the Bush administration's financial mismanagement of the war effort, hurt the military's ability to fight and train. Both Guard and active Army units are forced to prepare and train for deployment with minimal equipment. That would be like preparing for a football game without ever practicing in pads.
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The blame also falls on the service leadership for failing to properly forecast and push back with DoD. The Army's finally been doing that in the past year and has been gaining ground. That isn't to say that the administration's rosy forecast for OIF hasn't played a huge role, but it is not solely a product of this.
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The Iraq war has also badly damaged US military recruitment. In 2005, the Army missed its recruiting goal by more than 8 percent, or almost 6,700 soldiers. Army strength has been maintained by offering expensive reenlistment bonuses.
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What kind of logic is this? Don't fight a war so it doesn't harm recruiting? Ridiculous. Also, they are relying on statistics from two fiscal years past without also mentioning record high retention statistics as well as meeting recruiting goals since 2005? Non-partisan my arse! You could fairly be critical of the need to reduce standards to meet some of the recruiting standards, but I haven't seen anything to suggest that this has had a large negative impact. I think that part of the problem in this area has been the failure of the administration to actively call for volunteers in the effort.
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The Pentagon has resorted to a "backdoor draft" – extending combat deployments in Iraq – just to retain current force levels. The current escalation includes soldiers "backdoor drafted" for duty, and the use of National Guard and Reserve forces as de facto active duty units through multiple, continuous deployments.
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The use of "backdoor draft" is a long-standing device used by the Democrats to invoke images of the draft and the inequities that it brought in Vietnam(although its role in terms of numbers has been greatly exaggerated for that conflict). The original use of the "backdoor draft" was because of the implementation of stop loss procedures to keep soldiers enlisted beyond their original contract expiration, a policy that if not completely gone, is minimally used now because of the revamping of personnel policy such that units are now manned for a lifecycle instead of through an individual personnel replacement policy.
Next, how extended units in theater maintain force levels, I'm not sure how this argument plays out in accordance with reality - it's true that our force structure is too small to have much flexibility in deliberately preparing units for deploying for OIF/OEF, and so extensions are the most effective manner in increasing force levels in Iraq in the near-term. However, this is not the same as maintaining endstrength force levels. Lastly, the use of ARNG and Reserce units is exactly what should be happening, especially given the OPTEMPO of the active force. This is the deliberate design and function of the "Total Force" concept developed post-Vietnam. If they want to blame somebody, blame the decisions in the 90s by Bush and Clinton to reduce the Army to 10 active divisions (and then blame Rumsfeld for refusing to increase the force structure come 2003/2004).
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Casualties, meanwhile, are coming home at the fastest rate since Vietnam.
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Wow, what a surprise. It's the most intense fighting since Vietnam. I guess they needed to explicitly work in Vietnam somewhere, even if it's not that relevant.
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Media reports about life in outpatient care at Walter Reed, the "crown jewel" of the Army's medical system, have saddened or angered all who read them. This treatment of the men and women who come home from war traumatized in mind or decimated in body reflects badly on America.
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It is poor; however, I can tell you that the treatment of wounded soldiers far exceeds some of the stories that I've heard of times past. So, we're not meeting what the standard should be, but we're easily exceeding past standards. Fix the problem, but don't use it as a prop for a political position.
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Ensuring military readiness is a continuous effort that's been badly damaged by overextension in Iraq. We must shore up both short-term and long-term readiness. Short-term readiness addresses the needs of soldiers in the field today. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have been marked by shortages of basic equipment, from Kevlar vests and helmets to up-armored Humvees, which are better able to protect personnel from roadside bombs.
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Kevlar vests were not the main issue (everyone had these, although some were an older version) - it was a shortage of ceramic plates for the kevlar vests. I would think that these armed services committee members would get the basic facts like this straight  I'm not sure where they get the idea that we were short on helmets. We've upgraded helmets, and so maybe that's what they are talking about, but it wasn't an issue. The up-armored HMMWVs was an issue, but this one falls more heavily on the uniformed leadership who were asleep at the switch in not requesting enough of these and not making it a priority until it became a political issue. There were some administration gaffes in not managing the effort better once it became a political issue, but the lion's share of the blame falls of uniformed leadership here. Frankly, I'm not sure why we haven't changed platforms from the HMMWV to something that is designed from the ground up to be an "anti-IED" platform instead of adapting a utility vehicle for a combat role.
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Long-term readiness encompasses everything from manpower, training, and equipment to pre-positioned stores of military equipment strategically located around the world in case of emergencies. (These stocks have been virtually drained for Iraq operations, the General Accountability Office reports.) It also includes "resetting" the force – restoring equipment to prewar condition – which will be costly.
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Is cost the primary issue, or is winning the war? It's not a bad thing that we are draining stocks since that equipment is becoming outdated everyday that it sits in storage. Use it while it's still relevant. However, it is an issue if it's not getting replaced, but that's just a money fix.
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Let us be clear: The United States has the finest fighting force in the world. But the Bush administration has supported this world-class force with second-class funding. The resulting low readiness levels put the entire country at risk. Lack of proper equipment makes it that much harder for US forces to succeed in Afghanistan or Iraq – or anywhere else.
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A marginal impact if you ask me in terms of fighting. It hasn't be the lack of technological solutions for prosecuting OIF that has hampered us - it's been our doctrine and knowledge of the human terrain of the battlefield that has been our biggest hang up. If anything, $20 billion more in 2003 towards reconstruction and a solid post-war plan would have gotten us he most mileage. Water under the bridge now, but the implied conclusions seem somewhat hyperbolic to me.
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How Congress can make a difference
Urgent congressional efforts to repair this damage must be part of a broader strategy of finding an exit from Iraq
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Exit is priority number 1, not victory (define it as anything other than exit, which seems to be the main Democratic definition of victory).
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or improving US effectiveness in the real war on terrorists, and providing spending oversight to avoid crushing debt burdens.
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So Iraq isn't a real war now? The Sunni Salafist tendencies in Anbar aren't a potential incubator for future transnational terrorism? Fight America, they'll run isn't a potential lesson to be learned from 'exit'? Sorry, but the "exit" strategies that I see espoused by the majority of Democrats do not submit themselves to the reality of the situation when it is inconvenient.
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President Bush has used Congress as a money spigot, funding military operations through a series of emergency budget requests with no oversight.
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Whose fault is that, Congress? GOP congressmen are complicit in this, but Democratic only hearings amounted to mostly political grandstanding IMO.
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The government has spent money it didn't have and paid for it with deficit spending – essentially raising taxes on America's children.
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Assumes facts not in existence. We ran budget surpluses in the 1990s without raising taxes to do so and paid down debt. Can this never happen again? I guess not since these two Congressmen deem it not to be possible. Furthermore, it requires one to prioritize OIF as less essential as other spending. An intractable debate, but the point should be clear to all that depending on how you approach the problem, it can potentially be seen as not being the spending that "broke the bank." The more important fact is that these are sunk costs anyways. To bring them is moot, because you can't unspend. Nonetheless, an easy red herring to bring up.
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That's about to change.
We're committed to funding major recurring war costs through the regular budget process, while ensuring that real emergencies, real unforeseen expenses, and real battlefield needs are funded quickly. With Democrats in power, the American people can expect requests by the Pentagon and administration for "emergency" supplemental funds to be scrutinized much more closely.
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I agree that many of the recurring costs should be rolled into the actual budget, although watch for the bait and switch that will soon occur in this oped.
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We understand that wars always give rise to unforeseen circumstances and unexpected needs. However, there will be no more blank checks for Defense spending unrelated to battlefield needs. Everything must be prioritized so Congress can make the most informed choices.
Last year, we asked the administration to include recurring and foreseeable funding needs in the 2008 Defense budget request that goes through the normal authorization and appropriations cycle. Instead, we received Mr. Bush's request for three separate pots of money for military operations:
•An emergency supplemental request of $93.4 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan (the second such request in 2007).
•The regular 2008 Defense Budget request of $481.4 billion.
•Another emergency supplemental request of $141.7 billion for 2008 operations in both wars.
Supplemental appropriations are supposed to address emergencies that simply cannot wait for the regular process, replacing equipment lost or damaged in battle and other "war costs." How is it that an emergency supplemental request exists to pay for emergencies next year?
The president's 2007 emergency request includes billions of dollars in developmental spending under the guise of "emergency" replacement.
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So funding requests for vehicles that are destroyed can't be submitted until they are destroyed. So, instead of having the funding ready to go, it now requires a Congressional act ex post facto. They want the troops to have the equipment they need, but replacement equipment funding can't be requested until after it is destroyed/damaged?
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Supplemental spending should address emergency needs, not future defense systems that won't help soldiers on the ground for years to come. That's why we're calling on the administration to end the practice of paying for war costs with "emergency" funds.
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If they actually listened to the Chief of Staff of the Army, then they would know that any equipment that is being researched for the FCS that becomes ripe for fielding will be spun off into producting for immediate fielding. It's called a development sprial. Of course, I would hope that they know this as members of the House Armed Services Committee. They do want what's best for our troops, right?
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At this moment, US forces are conducting a war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and trying to referee a civil war in Iraq – both unconventional conflicts. Yet no one would suggest the US no longer needs forces ready to fight on a conventional battlefield. Nobody knows where the next enemy may emerge or how future wars will be fought. Clearly, the US must be ready for any eventuality.
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We're not fighting AQI, we're not trying to develop a stable government or fight the COIN fight, either. Nope, only being a referee in the civil war that exists.  Partisan to the core here.
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Make no mistake: The US is not at war, the US military is. The burden of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is being carried by our soldiers and their families. The rest of us merely observe their sacrifice on TV.
Members of Congress can do their part by giving the US military the support and equipment it needs to win.
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They're correct that only the US military and select intel agencies are at war. The government's not. Some in the State Department are, but Congress isn't funding them to sustain required wartime efforts.
I love the ending message - we must provide them the equipment to win (despite not funding replacements until after the originals are destroyed. LOL!) but not the time or moral support. This is window washing here. Another pathetic Democratic oped. Let's see what comes out next week.
Last edited by Shek : 03-19-2007 at 23:00 PM.
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03-20-2007, 03:32 AM
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#7 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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Shek,
Thanks a lot.
I do appreciate the point by point analysis given by you. Just the type that one is looking for.
It does clear the air.
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03-20-2007, 09:12 AM
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#8 (permalink)
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Military Professional Moderator
Join Date: 02-23-05
Location: Krblachistan
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Sir,
I've found a few things that provide a little more depth on the issue of readiness.
Quote:
New York Times
March 20, 2007
Pg. 1
Army Brigade Finds Itself Stretched Thin
By David S. Cloud
FORT POLK, La., March 14 — For decades, the Army has kept a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division on round-the-clock alert, poised to respond to a crisis anywhere in 18 to 72 hours.
Today, the so-called ready brigade is no longer so ready. Its soldiers are not fully trained, much of its equipment is elsewhere, and for the past two weeks the unit has been far from the cargo aircraft it would need in an emergency.
Instead of waiting on standby, the First Brigade of the 82nd Airborne is deep in the swampy backwoods of this vast Army training installation, preparing to go to Iraq. Army officials concede that the unit is not capable of getting at least an initial force of several hundred to a war zone within 18 hours, a standard once considered inviolate.
The declining readiness of the brigade is just one measure of the toll that four years in Iraq — and more than five years in Afghanistan — have taken on the United States military. Since President Bush ordered reinforcements to Iraq and Afghanistan in January, roughly half of the Army’s 43 active-duty combat brigades are now deployed overseas, Army officials said. A brigade has about 3,500 soldiers.
Pentagon officials worry that among the just over 20 Army brigades left in the United States or at Army bases in Europe and Asia, none has enough equipment and manpower to be sent quickly into combat, except for an armored unit stationed permanently in South Korea, several senior Army officers said.
“We are fully committed right now,” said Col. Charles Hardy of the Forces Command, which oversees Army training and equipping of troops to be sent overseas. “If we had a fully trained-up brigade, hell, it’d be the next one to deploy.”
The 82nd recently canceled its annual Memorial Day parade because most of its 17,000 soldiers are overseas. When the First Brigade, which got the rotating assignment as the ready brigade in December, leaves for Iraq over the summer, the 101st Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, Ky., will take over responsibility for the ready brigade. But its soldiers are preparing to go to Iraq this year as well.
[Gen. Richard Cody, the Army vice chief of staff, told Congress in testimony on March 15 that with the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army does not have the time or the resources to prepare for most of the other missions it could potentially face.]
Military officials say that the United States, which has more than two million personnel in active and reserve armed forces, has a combat-tested force that could still emerge victorious if another major conflict arose. But the response would be slower, with more casualties, and would have to rely heavily on the Navy and Air Force, they said.
Despite tensions with Iran and North Korea, another crisis requiring troops does not appear imminent.
If ground forces were needed urgently, Army commanders said they could draw units quickly from Iraq and send them wherever they might be needed, rather than relying solely on the ready brigade to provide a fast reaction force.
The Pentagon can also draw on 28 combat brigades in the reserves, several of which the military is making plans to mobilize later this year or early next to relieve some of the strain. But those units face even deeper problems than the active duty brigades because of equipment and training shortfalls.
Altogether, Army officials said 23 brigades, including one National Guard brigade, are now deployed overseas. Once the reinforcements called for by the White House are in place, 17 Army combat brigades will be in Iraq and two in Afghanistan, Army officials said, along with four more deployed in various locations, including as peacekeepers in the Sinai desert.
In effect, the Army has become a “just in time” organization: every combat brigade that finishes training is sent back to Iraq or Afghanistan almost immediately. Equipment vital for protecting troops, like armored vehicles, roadside bomb jammers and night vision goggles, is rushed to Iraq as quickly as it is made, officials say.
The 2007 Pentagon budget includes $17.1 billion to reset Army equipment, with a separate fund of $13.9 billion in emergency funds to replace or repair gear damaged in combat. Even so, units at home preparing to deploy are facing equipment shortages and have all but given up preparing for anything other than their next tour in Iraq or Afghanistan.
[“We do have shortages in the nondeployed forces,” General Cody conceded in his unusually candid testimony to Congress. There were not enough vehicles, radios and night vision gear, and there are “spot shortages” in weapons, he said, noting that those units constituted the nation’s strategic reserve.]
Later this year, the Army will probably be forced to send its first brigades back to Iraq with less than a year at home resting and training, senior Pentagon officials said. Another alternative, they said, would be to lengthen the tours in Iraq to 18 months from a year.
Army officials said no soldiers were sent overseas without adequate training and equipment. And they point to continued strong recruiting and retention numbers as proof that morale remains high.
But after insisting for years that one year at home is a minimum amount of time necessary to prepare a unit to conduct counterinsurgency operations, commanders now say that, by speeding up equipment overhauls and compressing training, they can do the job in 10 months or less.
Over time, the shortened training schedules will inevitably begin to affect the performance of troops in the field, some officers said.
Senior Pentagon officials worry about those deepening strains. Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent a secret report to Congress last month that upgraded from “moderate” to “significant” the risk of failing in its mission that the military faces this year in carrying out tasks in Iraq, Afghanistan and any other hot spots that might emerge.
[“We have the best counterinsurgency army in the world, but they’re not trained for full-spectrum operations,” General Cody said in his testimony.]
The Marines, which are also heavily engaged in Iraq, are facing similar strains.
Fort Polk is one of the last stops many combat units make before deploying to Iraq. During the cold war, the installation trained soldiers to fight the Soviets in Europe. The 82nd, based in Fort Bragg, N. C., used to parachute into Louisiana to keep its airborne skills sharp, but that tradition has been abandoned.
Now, even though the terrain bears little resemblance to Iraq’s desertlike conditions, the emphasis is solely on preparing infantry units to handle the chaotic sectarian conflict and random violence they are likely to encounter there.
Within the 82nd’s current First Brigade, about 4 soldiers in 10 have done previous tours in Iraq, making preparations to go back easier, said Col. Charles Flynn, the brigade commander. Last week, the brigade was spread out throughout the wooded training area at Fort Polk, in an exercise that featured simulations of the kind of Iraqi villages and roadside bomb attacks that many soldiers had actually experienced in previous deployments.
But almost all are in new jobs. Lt. Col. Michael Iacobucci, now a battalion commander, had served as a battalion executive officer in the 82nd when it was in Iraq in 2003. After coming home, Colonel Iacobucci, who is from Albany, had moved with his family to Australia as part of a three-year military exchange program.
He rejoined the 82nd in August, eager to go back to Iraq, he said while driving in a Humvee through the mock Iraqi villages. Before units were actually preparing to go into combat, their performance at Fort Polk would be graded only when the two-week exercise was over, said Lt. Col. Arthur Kandarian, a trainer. Now, the lessons are frequently spelled out as they happen, to get soldiers ready faster.
“It was treated as more of a test, and it was a closed-book test,” he explained. “Now it’s a coaching situation because we’re in a war.”
Training is being compressed at almost every stage, Army officers said. Soldiers who before 2003 spent months in specialized courses and on firing ranges now take compressed classes taught by so-called mobile training teams and hone their weapons proficiency on simulators, Army officers said.
“The biggest problem I’m seeing is unfamiliarity with equipment,” said Capt. Christian Durham, an instructor at Fort Polk, who sees all the units that rotate through before heading to Iraq.
Meanwhile, the Army is struggling just to keep up with current troop demands. The five additional combat brigades ordered by President Bush in January will raise the total American force level in Iraq to 160,000 troops, including combat and support troops, by June. That has forced the Army to take steps to supply troops faster to maintain the higher force levels.
Two Army brigades, one at Fort Riley, Kan., and another at Ft. Hood, Tex., that were not scheduled to return to the combat rotation until 2008 were ordered in December to speed up preparations so they will be ready to deploy by October, said Lt. Col. Christian Kubik, a spokesman for the First Infantry Division.
The Pentagon also informed the 172nd Stryker Brigade, which returned in December from a 16-month tour in Iraq, that it had to be ready for possible deployment between October and December, according to Maj. Michael Blankartz, a brigade spokesman.
Normally, a brigade is given half a year to overhaul its equipment, but the Alaska brigade, now part of the 25th Infantry Division, has only four months, he said. The timetable for preparing its troops is even more accelerated.
Roughly two-thirds of the brigade’s 3,300 soldiers are rotating to other units around the Army, as is customary after a deployment, Major Blankartz said. Their replacements are not scheduled to arrive until July and August, he said, leaving only one or two months before the Army wants the brigade prepared.
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The fact that the "ready brigade" is no longer on standby shows the depth of units being stretched. However, is the "ready brigade," a Cold War creation, a necessity still given that we have already forces by the bushel in the Middle East, the spot of primary US concern right now? Would a brigade of airborne infantry make a difference in South Korea? So, I don't think that it has a strategic impact to have them training, although it certainly does highlight that our ability to maintain a "marathon" pace with the current force structure is not doable, which is why I'm thankful that the administration has finally come around on increasing the size of the active force. BTW, I disagree with GEN Cody's statement that we are the "best" COIN army in the world - I think that his statement is born out of the fact that he's a product of the Cold War and that our switch to adapt to the war we are in makes him uncomfortable given his perception of the need of the US Army to be able to always fight "the big one," which I don't see being a necessity anytime soon.
This next piece is a presentation given by COL(R) Andrew Krepinevich last month:
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publicati...terinsurge.pdf
He's a very well respected COIN expert who wrote "The Army and Vietnam," an excellent book on the finger drilling done by the Army during Vietnam in stating that they were pursuing a COIN strategy. I think that his slide on personnel #s gets at what I was saying about the quality of recruits coming in - what I don't know is the impact of this, and the numbers alone can't tell the story. Also, the active duty officer shortage is an indicator, but once again, this doesn't have an impact until the field grade level, and even then, the shortages can be carried within the institutional side of the Army and not impact those units deployed (however, I can't comment on whether the shortages are due to quality officers leaving, or due to marginal officers leaving, and the numbers don't tell this story either).
Last edited by Shek : 03-20-2007 at 09:17 AM.
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03-20-2007, 10:35 AM
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#9 (permalink)
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Postmaster General
Military Professional
Join Date: 08-20-03
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Shek,
Thanks.
How many Brigades/ Divisions are operationally ready with the US to move out in an emergency.
How many such formations are operationally ready outside the US?
Do you have the strategic airlift from such a move?
Do you not have a WWR (War Wastage Reserve) for your Armed Forces?
If so, why is this talk about shortages, when the Iraq War is not a full blown war as one categorises war. It is COIN where the wastage is far less than a full blown war.
Last edited by Ray : 03-20-2007 at 10:37 AM.
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03-20-2007, 10:50 AM
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#10 (permalink)
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Military Professional Moderator
Join Date: 02-23-05
Location: Krblachistan
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Ray
Shek,
Thanks.
How many Brigades/ Divisions are operationally ready with the US to move out in an emergency.
How many such formations are operationally ready outside the US?
Do you have the strategic airlift from such a move?
Do you not have a WWR (War Wastage Reserve) for your Armed Forces?
If so, why is this talk about shortages, when the Iraq War is not a full blown war as one categorises war. It is COIN where the wastage is far less than a full blown war.
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Sir,
I'm not sure of the specifics on many of your questions, and so I won't venture a guess as to the specifics. However, with a good portion of our armed forces committed to OIF/OEF, any additional commitment would require prioritization of which theater should get the most assets.
One thing that is interesting is that much of the concern is based on the ability to meet the one-year rotation schedules, which are actually less than optimal for the COIN environment. This was an artificial constraint that stems from the decision in Vietnam to rotate units (and eventually it just became a personnel shuffle) in order to gain experience. This paradigm still exists and drives some of the concern (vs. WWII, where you were in for the duration). I'm not for a WWII type paradigm, but I think that there is some happy medium solution that takes the best of both worlds without bringing all the baggage of both worlds.
In the end, much of these constraints are based on the Rumsfeld decision to "revolutinize" how wars are fought while forgetting that the enemy has a vote in how they are fought. With the administration fighting on the cheap, we are now paying for their investment in technology over men (and women).
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06-17-2007, 00:54 AM
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#11 (permalink)
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Contributor
Join Date: 02-12-05
Location: Texas, USA
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Easy. Have the American people get their heads out of their butts. Thats the key.
__________________
"Acquire a peaceful spirit, and around you thousands will be saved." - Saint Seraphim of Sarov
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06-29-2007, 20:16 PM
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#12 (permalink)
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Banished
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the usa should pull out of iraq and afghanistan other wise you will be broke. the usa should pull all troops out of afghanistan pull and iraq. nuke baghdad then send in a million us troops to occupy and rebuild iraq just like germany in ww2
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06-29-2007, 20:52 PM
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#13 (permalink)
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Lord High Hullabalooster
Senior Contributor
Join Date: 11-23-04
Location: Columbia Heights, MN
Country:
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Quote:
Originally Posted by danny
the usa should pull out of iraq and afghanistan other wise you will be broke. the usa should pull all troops out of afghanistan pull and iraq. nuke baghdad then send in a million us troops to occupy and rebuild iraq just like germany in ww2
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the usa should push into danny and send a million rainbow surfing garden gnomes to spelunk through his digestive tract. then the usa should nuke proxima iv because thats where the sneaky alien bustards always come from. and then the usa should make a baby eat a space shuttle with a wooden spoon.
-dale
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06-29-2007, 20:55 PM
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#14 ( | |