Quote Originally Posted by Politico
Politico.com
April 21, 2009

Pentagon Preps For Years In Afghanistan

By David S. Cloud

The Pentagon’s senior military leaders are worried that the security situation in Afghanistan is stalemated or deteriorating, and now are preparing a far-reaching plan that would prepare the U.S. military for a war that could last three to five more years, officials said.

The effort, which is being coordinated by the Joint Staff and is still in its early stages, is designed to create an experienced cadre of officers and senior enlisted soldiers, who would rotate between assignments in Afghanistan and at their home stations until the end of hostilities.

By doing so, the Pentagon hopes to end a problem that has plagued the effort in Afghanistan—the lack of familiarity with local conditions by U.S. forces who rotate in and then depart after a year, just when they are beginning to understand the area or the mission where they are assigned.

“These would be small groups who would deploy together for shorter periods, going back and forth to the same place and the same mission again and again, so they would know the culture and the terrain,” said a senior Pentagon official briefed on the plan, who said the teams could be asked to conduct training or other specialized counterinsurgency missions.

Until now, officers involved say, the Afghanistan war has been a secondary concern for the Pentagon, which has tended to view it as a short-term mission that took a back seat to the war in Iraq. “This is about finding an alternative scheme that allows us to provide continuity in Afghanistan without burning people out,” said the senior military official.

The plan envisions adding hundreds of personnel to the effort – on top of the 21,000 additional troops that President Barack Obama has ordered to Afghanistan.

But the Joint Staff ideas may conflict to some degree with Obama’s timetable. He has seemed reluctant about getting involved in a long-term effort in Afghanistan, though he not yet to made explicit his own timetable for the war. In announcing his strategy last month, he made clear his desire for turning over the lead combat role as quickly as possible to Afghan Army and police units.

When the plan was briefed to military services and combatant commands earlier this month, senior Joint Staff officers bluntly declared that the security situation across Afghanistan is “poor, stalemated, or deteriorating,” according to an official who was present. They also warned that the military ought to prepare for the conflict to last another three to five years.

That message—that winning in Afghanistan will require a long-term commitment—was intentionally blunt and meant to make clear to the hidebound Pentagon that changes in the way it has conducted the war will be required, officers involved said.

The idea of using shorter tours and returning to the same places repeatedly has been used for years by Marines and Special Forces units operated in Iraq. But the Joint Staff plan would clash with longstanding practices in the Army and other services, disrupting promotion schedules and normal deployment practices.

In the Army, for example, most officers do a tour in a combat unit, and then are reassigned to a new unit in an entirely different job. The Joint staff plan would change those practices, at least for the officers and enlisted soldiers chosen as members of these new teams.

One of the issues still to be resolved is how to restructure promotion system so that top-flight officers would not worry their careers could suffer if they spend multiple years in the same assignment, officials said.

“If we don’t do this, it will show we’re still not serious,” about the war in Afghanistan, said a Pentagon official briefed on the plan.

The architect of the new approach is General Stan McCrystal, who commanded the Special Forces effort in Iraq and now is the head of the Joint Staff, officials said. The concept is also supported by Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,

Mullen returned recently from a trip to the region in which he heard repeated complaints that U.S. officers assigned to the war finish their tours and rotate out just as they are finally becoming familiar enough with Afghanistan to be truly effective.

One of the factors driving the Pentagon to step up its effort is concern that public support for the war both in the U.S. and Europe could wane, forcing a withdrawal before the security situation has stabilized, officials said. Obama has also called for greater civilian effort in Afghanistan, but the Pentagon, with its massive resources, is in some ways in a better position to expand its effort than the State Departtment and other civilian agencies.

Until now, officers involved say, the Afghanistan war has been a secondary concern for the Pentagon, which has tended to view it as a short-term mission that took a back seat to the war in Iraq. “This is about finding an alternative scheme that allows us to provide continuity in Afghanistan without burning people out,” said the senior military official.

Quote Originally Posted by Boston Globe
Boston Globe
April 22, 2009

Military Situation In Afghanistan Will Get Worse, Petraeus Says

Sees need for US to adapt strategy

By Brian MacQuarrie, Globe Staff

CAMBRIDGE - General David Petraeus, architect of the US military surge credited with dramatically reducing violence in Iraq, told a forum at the John F. Kennedy School of Government yesterday that the military situation in Afghanistan will probably deteriorate in the near term.

"We do believe we can achieve progress, but it's going to get worse before it gets better," said Petraeus, the leader of US Central Command, which oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"When you go into the enemy's sanctuaries, they will fight you for it. There will be tough months ahead, without question," he said.

US strategy will have to be adapted for Afghanistan, where a buildup of more than 20,000 additional troops will have to be accompanied by a subtle cultural understanding of on-the-ground differences between Iraq and Afghanistan, Petraeus said.

"You have to apply it in a way that's culturally appropriate," he said. "You don't move into the villages; you have to move to the edge of it."

By contrast, one of the components of the Iraqi surge's success was a US move away from garrisoning troops at big military bases outside population centers and seeking more direct contact with the enemy and with the people of Iraq.

"You can't commute to the fight," Petraeus said at the forum moderated by David Gergen, director of the Center for Public Leadership at the Kennedy School.

Petraeus, who served as the top US general in Iraq for 19 months before assuming leadership of Central Command in October, said Americans will need to reach out to Taliban moderates.

"The question is how to do that," the general said. "You have to do that certainly at local levels. You have to find out who are the really hard-core folks and get them out of there."

The armed forces and intelligence officials must determine "who are the reconcilables and the irreconcilables," he said.

One danger, Petraeus cautioned, is that empowering provincial governments throughout Afghanistan could risk forming a fractious alternative to a strong, central national authority.

In any event, he added, the eventual form of the Afghan power structure "is up to them at the end of the day."

The American presence in Afghanistan is fundamentally different from its history in Iraq, Petraeus said.

"I think we know why we went to Afghanistan. There is actually no debate about where the 9/11 attackers came from," the general said. "The strategy has to be to keep conditions from returning to those that allowed Al Qaeda and transnational extremists from finding sanctuaries."

In addition to Afghanistan, Petraeus voiced concerns about instability in neighboring Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state under increasing attack from internal Islamic extremists.

Pakistan's leaders need to realize that their biggest threat is from those militants and not from India, their traditional archenemy.

"It's an intellectually dislocating idea for the institutions of Pakistan," said Petraeus, referring to the country's military and political establishment. The terrorist attack on Mumbai, in which more than 160 people were killed last November by a Pakistan-based extremist group, "was a big setback," he said.
Quote Originally Posted by Boston Globe
Boston Globe
April 21, 2009

Leadership, Petraeus Style

By Paula D. Broadwell

WITH A FALTERING economy, soaring unemployment, and overseas military commitments consuming more each day than the gross domestic product of many small nations, the United States urgently needs adaptive and transformational leaders. In paying tribute to Harvard veterans at a Kennedy School Forum tonight, General David H. Petraeus will underline the importance of adaptive leaders in today's complex national security environment.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called Petraeus the "preeminent soldier, scholar, and statesman" of his generation - roles that he transitions among as the commander of US Central Command.

Is his leadership unique? And if so, in what way? In more than 100 hours of interviews with Petraeus, his mentors, peers, and subordinates, I have elicited numerous perspectives on his style of leadership and approach to juggling the responsibilities of "soldier, scholar, and statesman." A common theme is that Petraeus models the very principles of adaptive leadership that he advocates.

Adaptive leadership is a set of strategies and practices that can help organizations and the people in them break through gridlocks, accomplish change, and develop the adaptability to thrive in complex, competitive, and challenging environments. It differs from many leadership perspectives in its core premise that one can learn good leadership. Yet, in hierarchical institutions like the military, enabling creative decision making and encouraging young leaders to challenge assumptions can prove difficult.

An organization's adaptability depends on having widespread leadership that can come from anywhere within. Petraeus recognizes this, as has become clear in my interviews. Through operations in Iraq, his influence at the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, and the military's new counterinsurgency doctrine, he has relentlessly promoted a "flatter" hierarchical structure that empowers subordinate leaders to think outside the box, take initiative, challenge assumptions, and even question authority.

Hierarchy and respect for authority are obviously critical components of military bearing and unit cohesion. However, the current asymmetric threat environment increasingly requires unprecedented initiative, judgment, and creative thinking. In Petraeus's words, "we must continually think about the relatively junior officer who has to make a huge decision, often with life or death consequences, in the blink of an eye. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders. The key to all that we did in Iraq was leaders - especially young leaders - who repeatedly rose to the occasion and took on tasks for which they'd had little or no training."

Whether dealing with friend or foe, adaptive leaders must also deploy nuanced interpersonal skills. Interestingly, Petraeus seems to take a thematic approach to influencing others, an explicit task in military leadership doctrine. Whether focused on generals or diplomats in Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan, or his "army of mentor-ees," Petraeus's enthusiasm for engaging with others helps build their ownership as stakeholders in outcomes. A positive cycle ensues: multiple stakeholders are empowered, and Petraeus gets a more robust strategic assessment of the complex challenges he must confront.

Yet, because adaptive leadership can generate resistance, exercising leadership can be both difficult and dangerous. Still, Petraeus states that a critical leadership task is to be willing to take prudent, calculated risks to achieve the vision and meet the commander's intent. Petraeus offers what he feels is most important in adaptive leadership through simple but salient points. In his mind, the fundamental task of strategic leadership is getting the big ideas right and setting the appropriate tone and energy level. When dealing with the uncertainty of virulent insurgencies or economic downturns, it is critical that leaders manage expectations and be first with the truth. In other words, under-promise but over-deliver.

The sheer quantity of issues and uncertain nature of our current threat environment requires innovative thinkers who can manage and lead adaptively. Petraeus advocates for leaders who learn and adapt, are willing to take risks, encourage initiative in others, and empower their subordinates to follow suit an argument well received from a "soldier, scholar and statesman."

Paula D. Broadwell, a major in the US Army, is a pre-doctoral research associate at the Harvard Kennedy School's Center for Public Leadership.
Coming from Gen. Petraeus, it seems more relevant than it otherwise would be...