Thread: US considering withdrawal timetable

Kurdistan is feasible if ethnic lines are to be the factor.

However, it will be a landlocked nation with no country (depending on what all areas will go to make this country) around its periphery, Turkey, Iraq, Armenia, Syria being actually overtly fond of it.

It will be another headache for the US and a potential flashpoint.

An US-backed independent Kurdistan would have a devastating impact on our relations with Turkey.

Now if we leave Iraq, Kurds declare independence without support, the Turks are moving in, in mass, likely in numbers greater than we ever had in Iraq (2003-).

After all, an independent Kurdistan is considered by the Turks an existential threat to Turkey.

I think a better solution would be for Turkey to reconcile the Kurds, somehow, if they can, giving them full rights, and occupy and annex Iraqi Kurdistan in the event of independence.

I'll argue that an independant Kurdistan surrounded by enemies and with the U.S. on it's soil as a guarantor of it's security changes the equation dramatically.

Part of the threat to do so by America is the leverage entailed with the Iraqi gov't. If the Iraqi gov't believes the threat to be credible then they will see that their nation becomes one of sunni and shia muslims only- and no counter-balance. Too, they see a nation reduced in size and with less oil to generate revenue.

Let's hope that they do. Let's say for the moment, though, that the Iraqi gov't doesn't. What happens? My guess is that the the U.S. would assume huge leverage with the Kurds. How much so? Enough to persuade the Kurds that if they wish to exist as a nation at all, and do so with our help, they'll eliminate the scourge that is the PKK.

Why should they do so? Without attacking and eliminating the PKK, the kurdish gov't encourages the notion that the KRG is NOT the homeland of the Kurdish diaspora. Further, the KRG would eliminate all chance of moving their oil to market. Finally, they create a permanent enemy of the two nations critical to their survival- America and Turkey.

With both, Kurdistan can not only survive but thrive. Without America, they won't move of their own accord against the PKK. Without that, they'll never garner the support of the Turkish gov't. Without that, they'll never move oil to market and, worse, face likely near-permanent occupation by Turkey, Syria, Iran, and what's left of Iraq.

The quid pro quo for the KRG's freedom is clear and the leverage accrued by the U.S. is compelling.

This can be done and the Iraqi gov't needs to know who's really in the driver's seat here. It's not them, that's for sure.

Does your scenario entail a failure of US efforts in the Sunni/Shi'ite Arab regions of Iraq, with US retrenchment in Kurdistan?

"...a failure of US efforts in the Sunni/Shi'ite Arab regions of Iraq, with US retrenchment in Kurdistan?"

I don't know what failure means except that if we can't operate as we need in Iraq, I suppose we'll be going home otherwise. Once out of the neighborhood, I fear for Kurdistan's well-being. I suspect that Kurdistan will share those fears. If so, we've leverage there.

If the Iraqi gov't fears that we could and would cut a separate deal with the KRG, if only to assure their survival in an otherwise hostile clime, they may see reason.

We've already said that without a SOFA in place that we'll order our troops to their kasernes. To what point? Hoping that if open rebellion breaks out we won't have to fly 6,000 mile back to Iraq? If we're not wanted we should go somewhere that we are or go home.

http://www.cool.mb.ca/~kakel/kurdistan.html

http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...kurdistan2.gif

Check the maps.

Kurdistan encompasses areas of Armenia, Iran and Syria too, apart from the areas of Turkey and Iraq.

Too many countries are involved.

Will the US support such a venture?

My apologies. I thought that my comments were clear that I was referencing the KRG- Kurdish Regional Gov't, not the greater Kurdistan offered by those seeking to incite trouble in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and here at WAB.

The KRG's best chance of survival, much less success, stems from actively suppressing these Kurdish rebellions in adjacent countries. The reasons should be clear to most. As a kurdish gov't in any modern form has n'er before existed, THIS particular entity- the KRG, represents a first toe-hold towards global legitimacy.

Should that be spoiled by the miscreant behavior of outliers whose actions can never hope to achieve their ambitions but can certainly bring the enmity if not active wrath of the aforementioned nations down upon them and their cherished dream? No, like Israel, the KRG must serve and PROTECT it's function as the torch-bearer for the Kurdish diaspora.

That means existing as a regional autonomous gov't of the Iraqi Federation or, conversely, a separate nation- but within the currently defined external borders. How the internal borders with Iraqi Sunniland and Shiaville are drawn remains to be defined, it would seem.

Therein lies a portion of the leverage held by the U.S. Equally, the KRG understands that it's long-term existance and well-being is tied to the United States as a guarantor of it's security, again as either a part of the Iraqi Federation or as a separate nation. However, the best guarantor of that security is our physical presence within the KRG.

Were we unable to achieve a satisfactory SOFA with the Iraqi gov't, it's entirely possible that we could negotiate something quite similar with the KRG until such time that the nat'l gov't saw the error of their ways. It would save us leaving and make available our forces should they be needed by the southern two-thirds of the government. Equally, until such time as agreement is reached, our presence protects the KRG from others-many un-named others.

It's possible that the KRG could find our presence overwhelmingly comforting. Given that sense of security, it's conceivable that the KRG may drive hard bargains at every turn with the nat'l gov't. Given their evident need for our protection, it's conceivable that the U.S. gov't, with forces stationed in the far north, could guide the PESHMERGA through the steps necessary to eliminate the PKK- a virulent threat to the grand Kurdish ambition of their own recognized homeland. That's a fair quid pro quo that opens the door to sound and mutually profitable relations with Turkey. With that, a way for Kurdistan to move it's oil to market without the shias, sunnis, or Persians stealing it.

Lots of leverage there if the U.S. wants to quietly play some serious hardball and solve a few regionally endemic problems in the process.

I like it.

My apologies. I thought that my comments were clear that I was referencing the KRG- Kurdish Regional Gov't, not the greater Kurdistan offered by those seeking to incite trouble in Syria, Turkey, Iran, and here at WAB.

)

You should be a foreign affairs adviser. You sure know how to put things in the correct perspective as you wish! )

Tell me as to why the Kurds should remain in a truncated Kurdistan?

And why have they taken their war into Turkey?