Thread: U.S. Spied on Iraqi Leaders

60 min just had an interview with Bob Woodward in which he credits the President's National Security Advisor, Stephen J. Hadley, for strongly pushing for a change in strategy over the objections of Casey, Shoomaker and Rumsfeld, who were determined to draw down US troops. Woodward states that the initial strategy for the Surge was conceived by Hadley's office at Bush's directive without the knowledge of the Pentagon. This is was also corroborated by Bing West, a prominent author and former marine who has traveled extensively to Iraq.

Bush executed the strategy he directed Hadley to develop, in the process firing Rumsfeld and replacing Casey with little forewarning.

The other interesting point from Woodward's interview was he asserts that the US military has developed highly effective covert capabilities to identify, locate, capture or kill insurgent leaders, that the capabilities are as revolutionary as the tank or the airplane in earlier wars. However, he has refused to specify the capabilities in the interest of national security. This seems to be corroborated by recent British press reports regarding SAS and Delta Force actions in Baghdad.

Excerpt from Woodward's 60 minutes interview:

But beyond all of that, Woodward reports, for the first time, that there is a secret behind the success of the surge: a sophisticated and lethal special operations program.

"This is very sensitive and very top secret, but there are secret operational capabilities that have been developed by the military to locate, target, and kill leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq, insurgent leaders, renegade militia leaders. That is one of the true breakthroughs," Woodward told Pelley.

"But what are we talking about here? It's some kind of surveillance? Some kind of targeted way of taking out just the people that you're looking for? The leadership of the enemy?" Pelley asked.

"I'd love to go through the details, but I'm not going to," Woodward replied.

The details, Woodward says, would compromise the program.

"For a reporter, you don’t allow much," Pelley remarked.

"Well no, it’s with reluctance. From what I know about it, it's one of those things that go back to any war, World War I, World War II, the role of the tank, and the airplane. And it is the stuff of which military novels are written," Woodward said.

"Do you mean to say that this special capability is such an advance in military technique and technology that it reminds you of the advent of the tank and the airplane?" Pelley asked.

"Yeah," Woodward said. "If you were an al Qaeda leader or part of the insurgency in Iraq, or one of these renegade militias, and you knew about what they were able to do, you'd get your ass outta town."

Part 2 of the article Ray posted earlier.

Outmaneuvered And Outranked, Military Chiefs Became Outsiders

By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 8, 2008; A01

At the Joint Chiefs of Staff in late November 2006, Gen. Peter Pace was facing every chairman's nightmare: a potential revolt of the other chiefs. Two months earlier, the JCS had convened a special team of colonels to recommend options for reversing the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Now, it appeared that the chiefs' and colonels' advice was being marginalized, if not ignored, by the White House.

During a JCS meeting with the colonels Nov. 20, Chairman Pace dropped a bomb: The White House was considering a "surge" of additional troops to quell the violence in Iraq. "Would it be a good idea?" Pace asked the group. "If so, what would you do with five more brigades?" That amounted to 20,000 to 30,000 more troops, depending on the number of support personnel.

Pace's question caught the chiefs and colonels off guard. The JCS hadn't recommended a surge, and Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Iraq commander, was opposed to one of that magnitude. Where had this come from? Was it a serious option? Was it already a done deal?

Pace said he had another White House meeting in two days. "I want to be able to give the president a recommendation on what's doable," he said.

A rift had been growing between the country's military and civilian leadership, and in several JCS meetings that November, the chiefs' frustrations burst into the open. They had all but dismissed the surge option, worried that the armed forces were already stretched to the breaking point. They favored a renewed effort to train and build up the Iraqi security forces so that U.S. troops could begin to leave.

"Why isn't this getting any traction over there, Pete?" Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief, asked at one session inside the "tank," the military's secure conference room for candid and secret debates. Was the president being briefed?

"I can only get part of it before him," Pace said, "and I'm not getting any feedback."

Pace, Schoomaker and Casey found themselves badly out of sync with the White House in the fall of 2006, finally losing control of the war strategy altogether after the midterm elections. Schoomaker was outraged when he saw news coverage that retired Gen. Jack Keane, the former Army vice chief of staff, had briefed the president Dec. 11 about a new Iraq strategy being proposed by the American Enterprise Institute, the conservative think tank.

"When does AEI start trumping the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this stuff?" Schoomaker asked at the next chiefs' meeting.

Pace, normally given to concealing his opinions, let down the veil slightly and gave a little sigh. But he didn't answer. Schoomaker thought Pace was too much of a gentleman to be effective in a business where forcefulness and a willingness to get in people's faces were survival skills. "They weren't listening to what Pete [Pace] was saying," Schoomaker said later in private. "Or Pete wasn't carrying the mail, or he was carrying it incompletely."

In several tank meetings, Adm. Michael Mullen, chief of naval operations, voiced concern that the politicians were going to find a way to place the blame for Iraq on the military. "They're orchestrating this to dump in our laps," Mullen said. He raised the point so many times that Schoomaker thought the Navy leader sounded "almost paranoid."

* * *

The atmosphere in the tank was tense Monday, Nov. 27, 2006, as Pace briefed the chiefs and the colonels on a White House meeting about Iraq the day before. J.D. Crouch, a deputy to national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, had presented the results of a secret strategy review on how to respond to the escalating violence. "I walked out happy because I got my views on the table," Pace said, making it clear that this was not always the case.

The president, Pace told the group, is "leaning into announcing a new phase in the war that will help us achieve our original end state. . . . By April 1, 2007, we would have five more brigades in Iraq."

Schoomaker was dismayed. Suppose the surge didn't work? "What is our fallback plan?" he asked.

There was no fallback, Pace replied.

"Are people engaged on this," Schoomaker asked almost defiantly of the surge proponents, "or is this politics?"

"They are engaged," Pace replied. But if progress is still lacking "after we surge five brigades," Pace said, "then you are forced to conscription, which no one wants to talk about." To mention a draft was to invite the ghosts of Vietnam into the tank.

"Folks keep talking about the readiness of U.S. forces. Ready to do what?" Schoomaker growled. "We need to look at our strategic depth for handling other threats. How do we get bigger? And how do we make what we have today more ready? This is not just about Iraq!"

Part of the chiefs' job was to figure out how to accelerate the military's overall global readiness and capacity, Schoomaker said. "I sometimes feel like it is hope against hope," he said. "I feel like Nero did when Rome was burning. It just worries the hell out of me."

Several colonels wanted to applaud. It worried them, too. Others disagreed, feeling it was more important to focus on the current war. But they all maintained their poker faces.

"Look, no one is whistling 'Dixie' here," Pace told the group. "The president and the White House understand the resource constraints."

It was not clear that anyone believed what the chairman was saying, or whether even Pace believed it.

"We need to position ourselves properly for the decision likely to come," Pace said. "The sense of urgency is over Iraq, but not over the other issues."

Mullen said the all-volunteer force might break under the strain of extended and repeated deployments. "I am still searching for the grand strategy here," Mullen said. "How does a five-brigade surge over the next few months fit into the larger picture? We have so many other issues and challenges: Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea and places we are not even thinking about today."

* * *

In Baghdad, Gen. Casey realized that he had lost a basic, necessary ingredient for a commanding general in wartime. He had lost the confidence of the president, a stunning and devastating realization.

He wasn't alone. The president was not listening to Casey's boss, Gen. John P. Abizaid at Central Command, anymore, either.

"Yeah, I know," the president said to Abizaid at a National Security Council session in December, "you're going to tell me you're against the surge."

Yes, Abizaid replied, and then presented his argument that U.S. forces needed to get out of Iraq in order to win.

"The U.S. presence helps to keep a lid on," Bush responded. There were other benefits. A surge would "also help here at home, since for many the measure of success is reduction in violence," Bush said. "And it'll help [Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki to get control of the situation. A heavier presence will buy time for his government."

The rest of Iraq wasn't as tenuous as Baghdad, Abizaid said. "But it's the capital city that looks chaotic," Bush said. "And when your capital city looks chaotic, it's hard to sustain your position, whether at home or abroad."

* * *

The chiefs' frustration grew so intense that Pace told Bush, "You need to sit down with them, Mr. President, and hear from them directly."

Hadley saw it as an opportunity. He arranged for Bush and Vice President Cheney to visit the JCS in the tank Dec. 13, 2006. The president would come armed with what Hadley called "sweeteners" -- more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps. It would also be a symbolic visit, important to the chiefs because the president would be on their territory.

"Mr. President," Schoomaker began, "you know that five brigades is really 15."

Schoomaker was in charge of generating the force for the Army. Sending five new brigades to Iraq meant another five would have to take their place in line, and to sustain the surge, another five behind them. This could not be done, Schoomaker said, without either calling up the National Guard and Reserves or extending the 12-month tours in Iraq. The Army had hoped to go in the other direction and cut tours to nine months.

Would a surge transform the situation? Schoomaker asked. If not, why do it? "I don't think that you have the time to surge and generate enough forces for this thing to continue to go," he said.

"Pete, I'm the president," Bush said. "And I've got the time."

"Fine, Mr. President," Schoomaker said. "You're the president."

Several of the chiefs noted that the five brigades were effectively the strategic reserve of the U.S. military, the forces on hand in case of flare-ups elsewhere in the world. Surprise was a way of international life, the chiefs were saying. For years, Bush had been making the point that it was a dangerous world. Did he want to leave the United States in the position of not being able to deal with the next manifestation of that danger?

Bush told the chiefs that they had to win the war at hand. He turned again to Schoomaker. "Pete, you don't agree with me, do you?"

"No," Schoomaker said. "I just don't see it. I just don't. But I know right now that it's going to be 15 brigades. And how we're going to get those 15 brigades, I don't know. This is going to require more than we can generate. You're stressing the force, Mr. President, and these kids just see deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan for the indefinite future."

* * *

"The tank meeting was a very important meeting," Bush told me during a May 2008 interview. "In my own mind, I'm sure I didn't want to walk in with my mind made up and not give these military leaders the benefit of a discussion about a big decision."

The president said that if he were just pretending to be open-minded, "you get sniffed out. . . . I might have been leaning, but my mind was open enough to be able to absorb their advice."

I told him that, based on my reporting, some of the chiefs thought he had already decided, that they had sniffed him out.

"They may have thought I was leaning, and I probably was," Bush said, noting that the chiefs had felt free to express themselves. "But the door wasn't shut."

Still, Bush fully understood the power of his office.

"Generally," he said, "when the commander-in-chief walks in and says, done deal, they say, 'Yes sir, Mr. President.' "

* * *

Just after Christmas, while in the United States, Casey got an e-mail from one of his contacts. "Hey, you need to know that the White House is throwing you under the bus," it read.

A couple of days later, Abizaid phoned Casey with a warning. "Look," Abizaid said, "the surge is coming. Get out of the way." Casey was soon offered a promotion to Army chief of staff, and in February 2007, he left Iraq, replaced by Gen. David H. Petraeus.

The president said later in an interview, "The military, I can remember well, said, 'Okay, fine. More troops. Two brigades.' And I turned to Steve [Hadley] and said, 'Steve, from your analysis, what do you think?' He, being the cautious and thorough man he is, went back, checked, came back to me and said, 'Mr. President, I would recommend that you consider five. Not two.' And I said, 'Why?' He said, 'Because it is the considered judgment of people who I trust and you trust that we need five in order to be able to clear, hold and build.' "

The views of those trusted people came largely through back channels, rather than through the president's established set of military advisers -- Casey's deputy saying that a surge wouldn't work with fewer than five brigades and Jack Keane making the same case to Hadley and Vice President Cheney.

Hadley maintained that the number "comes out of my discussions with Pete Pace."

"Okay, I don't know this," Bush said, interrupting. "I'm not in these meetings, you'll be happy to hear, because I got other things to do."

So the president did not know what his principal military adviser, Gen. Pace, had recommended. Pace, however, had told the chiefs Nov. 20, 2006, that the White House had asked what could be done with five extra brigades.

* * *

The president announced the surge decision Jan. 10, 2007. Five more brigades would go to Baghdad; 4,000 Marines would head to Anbar province.

The next morning, he went to Fort Benning, Ga., to address military personnel and their families. His decision had been opposed by Casey and Abizaid, his military commanders in Iraq. Pace and the Joint Chiefs, his top military advisers, had suggested a smaller increase, if any at all. Schoomaker, the Army chief, had made it clear that the five brigades didn't really exist under the Army's current policy of 12-month rotations. But on this morning, the president delivered his own version of history.

"The commanders on the ground in Iraq, people who I listen to -- by the way, that's what you want your commander-in-chief to do. You don't want decisions being made based upon politics or focus groups or political polls. You want your military decisions being made by military experts. They analyzed the plan, and they said to me and to the Iraqi government: 'This won't work unless we help them. There needs to be a bigger presence.' "

Bush went on, "And so our commanders looked at the plan and said, 'Mr. President, it's not going to work until -- unless we support -- provide more troops.' "

Brady Dennis and Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.

U.S. Spied on Iraqi Leaders, Book Says

Dog bites man, too!

I am, however, surprised that the idea of troop surge did not originate from the Pentagon. What does the JCS's reluctance to accept the plan imply? Does this information reflect poorly on the JCS, or the plan?

"Does this information reflect poorly on the JCS, or the plan?"

IMHO, the JCS.

Both risk and reward were present. Which dominates the current narrative?

Originally Posted by S-2

"Does this information reflect poorly on the JCS, or the plan?"

IMHO, the JCS.

Both risk and reward were present. Which dominates the current narrative?

Good point. What's left out of this are the other factors that contributed to the success of the Surge, as noted by Woodward. The Surge was successful for these reasons:

1. The Anbar Awakening, which started long before the Surge.
2. New (old: 2003, Mosul) Petraeus strategy; cleaning out the FOBs and getting units down to the platoon level to live and work in the neighborhoods and villages they were responsible for, i.e., the anti "commuter COIN" strategy that Casey utilized, per Rumsfeld's guidance of "light footprint".
3. The troop increase to control Baghdad (with new COIN strategy).
4. SOF precision targeting to "cut off the heads" of the insurgent and terrorist leaders.
5. Al-Sadr cease-fire. He literally has influence down to the neighborhoods, from what my sources tell me.

Gen Petraeus notes the gains and success is "fragile". Here is what could undo all of it:

1. COIN strategy reverses back to FOB mentality.
2. Shia led government turns on the Sons of Iraq and Awakening Coucils (i.e., quits funding them and allows Shia militias to fight them)
3. Al-Sadr uprising
4. Provinces prematurely turned over to ISF
5. SOF quits aggresive targeting of HVT

The bottom line is that the Pre-Surge conversations by the JCS, White House and Combatant Commanders was too focused on the troop levels, not the strategy. It was the elephant in the room that no one wanted to discuss. Getting Rumsfeld out of there was the key; he wasn't going to admit his "light footprint" strategy was wrong. Replacing Casey with Petraeus was also critical, arguably as important as firing Rummy, if not more.

Originally Posted by osage18

4. SOF precision targeting to "cut off the heads" of the insurgent and terrorist leaders.

This is the part that fascinates me and, up to now, has been largely unknown in the public. What is the "new capability" that Woodward is talking about? Then again, not something any one in the know person should discuss on a public forum for sure.

Originally Posted by Ray

An interesting, though alarming account of the machinations that go in governance and the confusion that it creates.

One wonders if Woodward is indeed true or is he sensationalising!

Woodward is one of two reporters who broke the story on Watergate through their source, Deep Throat. He's probably the most respected voice in American political journalism.

Originally Posted by S-2

"Does this information reflect poorly on the JCS, or the plan?"

IMHO, the JCS.

Both risk and reward were present. Which dominates the current narrative?

That's what I felt it to be. It is disappointing that the JCS is outgeneraled by civillians in a think-tank.

Originally Posted by Triple C

That's what I felt it to be. It is disappointing that the JCS is outgeneraled by civillians in a think-tank.

Jack Keane is a former Ranger and four-star who retired in 2003. Hadley was a high ranking Pentagon official for many years. Probably developed a network of like minded contacts in the officer corps.

New information regarding the "special capabilities" described in Woodward's book has come out. Apparently, Predators now have a magical ability to see and identify enemy targets behind walls.

Higher-tech Predators targeting Pakistan - Los Angeles Times


Higher-tech Predators targeting Pakistan
The U.S. drone aircraft involved in strikes against Taliban and Al Qaeda militants across the border have enhanced tracking ability.
By Greg Miller and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times Staff Writers
September 12, 2008
WASHINGTON -- As part of an escalating offensive against extremist targets in Pakistan, the United States is deploying Predator aircraft equipped with sophisticated new surveillance systems that were instrumental in crippling the insurgency in Iraq, according to U.S. military and intelligence officials.

The use of the specially equipped drones comes amid a fundamental shift in U.S. strategy in the area. After years of deferring to Pakistani authorities, the Bush administration is turning toward unilateral American military operations -- a gambit that could increase pressure on Islamic militants but risks alienating a country that has been a key counter-terrorism ally.


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In an indication of the priority being given to the Pakistan campaign, U.S. officials said the specially equipped aircraft were being pulled from other theaters to augment aerial patrols above the tribal belt along Afghanistan's eastern border.

Pakistan's government has found itself caught between Washington's demands for action and the unpopularity of the U.S. campaign, which has included half a dozen Predator strikes and a ground raid in the last few weeks.

This morning, witnesses said, at least eight people were believed killed in what appeared to be a Predator strike in North Waziristan, near the Afghan border.

Pakistanis complain that U.S. raids frequently kill civilians in addition to militants.

Pakistani forces also are carrying out their own campaign against the militants, and say they have killed hundreds in the last month, making the U.S. raids unnecessary.

American officials requested that details of the new technology not be disclosed out of concern that doing so might enable militants to evade U.S. detection. But officials said the previously unacknowledged devices have become a powerful part of the American arsenal, allowing the tracking of human targets even when they are inside buildings or otherwise hidden from Predator surveillance cameras.

Equally important, officials said, the systems have significantly speeded up decisions on when to strike. The technology gives remote pilots a means beyond images from the Predator's lens of confirming a target's identity and precise location.

A military official familiar with the systems said they had a profound effect, both militarily and psychologically, on the Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq.

"It is like they are living with a red dot on their head," said a former U.S. military official familiar with the technology who, like others, spoke on condition of anonymity because it has been secret. "With the quietness of the Predator, you never knew when a Hellfire [missile] would come through your window."

The new Predator capabilities are a key ingredient in an emerging U.S. military offensive against Taliban strongholds and Al Qaeda havens in Pakistan.

Previously, the United States' main focus in Pakistan's tribal territory was gathering intelligence that could be used to direct raids by the Pakistani military, or occasional missile strikes from CIA-operated Predator planes.

Intelligence activities will increasingly be geared now toward enabling U.S. Special Forces units -- backed by AC-130 gunships and other aircraft -- to carry out operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, officials said.

The change in strategy reflects frustration within the Bush administration over Pakistan's failure to root out insurgent groups or disrupt the flow of militants who launch attacks in Afghanistan and then retreat to Pakistan.

After years of building alliances with local tribes, Al Qaeda and Taliban groups now have a "mature" haven in Pakistan from which to operate, said a senior administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The New York Times reported Thursday that President Bush signed an order in July authorizing U.S. special operations forces to conduct missions in Pakistan without asking for its permission.

A former senior CIA official said similar proposals had been in circulation as early as 2003. A Pentagon proposal to make wider use of special operations forces in Pakistan was debated for months by the National Security Council, said a government official.

But until this summer, Bush was reluctant to authorize the action in part out of loyalty to former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who was forced from office last month.

At the same time, rising numbers of American troops being killed in Afghanistan caused a shift in thinking among many in the Pentagon. A total of 113 U.S. troops have been killed in the country this year.

In response, the United States has stepped up Predator strikes. But the clearest signal of a new strategy came last week when about 20 people were killed in a raid on the village of Musa Nika by U.S. special operations forces flown by helicopter from Afghanistan.

That operation, and the turn in Bush administration policy, has been condemned by senior Pakistani officials, including the army chief of staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani.

Kayani's statement was his first public criticism of the U.S. military, and his stance on such raids was regarded in Pakistan as a watershed because he had steered clear of politics during his nine months on the job.

Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani issued a statement Thursday saying that government policy forbids American military incursions into Pakistan.

Pentagon officials said they hoped that Kayani's anger was mainly for domestic consumption, and would not lead to curtailed cooperation with the U.S. military, which depends on access to Pakistani ports to supply operations in Afghanistan.

The new surveillance technology being deployed on the Predators was developed as part of a special project within the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology, according to current and former officials familiar with the matter.

The CIA has been responsible for Predator flights over Pakistan but is now being pressured to cede some authority to the U.S. military. The agency declined to discuss details of the program.

"It's a poor idea, with American forces engaged in conflicts overseas, to speculate publicly about things like battlefield reconnaissance capabilities," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said.

Predator strikes were used in attacks that killed Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef in Afghanistan in 2001 and Qaed Sinan Harithi, a suspected mastermind of the bombing of the U.S. destroyer Cole, in Yemen in 2002.

However, Predators have also frequently missed their targets, including a high-profile attempt to attack Al Qaeda No. 2 Ayman Zawahiri in 2006. They have been blamed for the deaths of dozens of civilians in Pakistan, fueling resentment there toward the United States.

The new system now being deployed was first used on aircraft in Afghanistan, then was installed on Predators in Iraq starting about a year ago. Officials said introduction of the devices coincided with the 2007 U.S. troop buildup in Iraq, and was an important, but hitherto unknown, factor in the subsequent drop in violence in that country.

The technology allows suspects to be identified quickly. "All I have to do is point the sensor at him," said a military officer familiar with the system, "and a missile can be off the rail in seconds."

The devices are roughly the size of an automobile battery, but are heavy enough that outfitted Predators in some cases carry only one Hellfire missile instead of two. At times, the systems also have been in short supply, requiring that crews move the devices from one Predator to another as they land and take off.

The unique capabilities have prompted competition among U.S. forces for access to specially equipped Predators, military officials said. The fleet being assembled for use in Pakistan has been assigned to the CIA and U.S. Special Operations Command, meaning fewer of the aircraft are available for conventional forces.

Military officials noted that Predators' effectiveness declines as the winter months approach. Bad weather, especially in the high altitudes of the Afghan and Pakistani mountains, means that many days Predators and other drones cannot fly.

greg.miller@latimes.com

julian.barnes@latimes.com

Times staff writer Laura King in Istanbul, Turkey, contributed to this report.

i wish they didn't reveal the details at all- even knowing the basic capabilities will allow insurgents to modify their tactics.