WaltzingMatilda

Here's the latest from Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason:

http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs...Spring2008.pdf

From the intro:

Agnostic Muslim

I haven't read the entire article yet, but I would like to make some observations about the comments regarding the Pakistan Army campaign against the Baluch fighters in 1973 (pages 8 - 9).

I believe Selig Harrison's objectivity on this matter is suspect. In his book In Afghanistan's Shadow, Harrison concedes his close relationship and friendship with many of the Baluch Sardars involved in the militancy of 1973.

The accuracy of his accounts of the battle of Chamalang, where a majority of these casualties and alleged atrocities against non-combatant Baluch occurred, have been questioned by Robert Wirsing in his book Pakistan's Security Under Zia. Following is an excerpt:

Harrison's more current accounts of Chamalang are noticeably more "fantastic" in the language used to describe the atrocities, and their scale, compared to the accounts in Afghanistan's Shadow, written closer to the time of the events and therefore presumably more accurate in terms of recollecting details.

Conversations with some former Pakistan Army and Air force officers who recollect the Chamalang incident are also counter to what Harrison described.

Their recollections indicate that the Baloch camps and villages were not deliberately attacked, however small skirmishes were staged to draw the militants out from the mountains.

__________________
Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission - Jinnah

S-2

I'm about half-way myself and saw that section, wondering what your reaction might be.

It would seem that you've a bone of contention w/ Harrison, thus Johnson/Mason's veracity.

On a larger note, Waltzing Matilda (from his left coast perch in lovely S.F.) is keeping an eye on the good work being done in Monterey by the boys at NPS. Really nice find that's expanding my mind more than a little yet, sadly, seems headed in a bleak direction with it's conclusions.

I sense no 21st Century renaissance for Pashtunistan. Guess I'm not leaping far with that prediction.

__________________
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

S-2

"The Frontier Corps’ problems have little to do with weapons and training, and U.S. troops recruited largely from the inner cities and trained for conventional warfare have little to teach rugged Pashtun hillmen about fighting in their own mountains in any case."

I'm shocked by the ignorance displayed in the above comment. If Mr. Johnson shows up here I'd love to read an elaboration of this comment. I would expect a more nuanced and perceptive understanding of our forces stationed along that border and those most likely to be called upon to train the F.C., were that to happen.

That aside from the gross stereotypes on display that read terribly poorly and indefensibly. "Inner cities" reads as P.C. racist code. "trained for conventional warfare" is ignorant of light infantry operating behind seven years of continuous combat and multiple tours.

Those F.C. would be privileged to be trained by damn near any of those light infantrymen. Personally, I'll hope not. We owe the F.C. and I'd prefer U.S. infantry to shoot the worthless fcuks on sight.

Stunningly weak.

Agnostic Muslim

S2:

I wouldn't go so far as to dismiss the veracity of Johnson/Mason's entire article.

I am however extremely skeptical of any analysis on Pakistan offered by Selig Harrison for the reasons I mentioned.

That section I referred to ( I still haven't finished the entire article), used Harrison's work to offer background history rather than any analysis I thought, and my post was to point out the historical inaccuracy, IMO, in that presentation.

I am not sure yet whether Johnson/Mason have used Harrison's works as a basis of further analysis in the article.

I would have to agree with that - I also disagree on that with many of my compatriots, when they indicate that "US forces have nothing to teach us".

For some reason they focus only on US combat experience in Iraq, ignoring the even longer presence in Afghanistan, and using the difference in terrain between Iraq and FATA to validate their opinion.

I believe there is a wealth of COIN experience gained in Afghanistan that the US can share with both the PA and the FC, which will be useful in Baluchistan as well.

S-2

You found cause to question credibility. So too I. On two unrelated topics.

That worries me despite really enjoying the presentation up to then. Here's the problem. The topic is complex to a western novice. It demands acquiescence to knowledgable authority, i.e. Johnson/Mason. Naturally, questionable phrases and inaccurate topical depictions detract from essential credibility.

You get the picture.

Johnson's Shabnamah article was illuminating. So too this presentation in many respects. I don't know much about the Baluchi insurgency of 1973-77 but I'm fairly acquainted w/ what's happening today along Afghanistan/Pakistan's border.

Just now, some of the most proficient practicioners of COIN-craft in the U.S. Army have been plying their trade along that border- and doing so by every account I've recently seen VERY effectively (see Shek's recent Kilcullen posting from SWJ in the Staff College). We've lacked numbers and money but there's been no lack of skill by those "inner city" conventional warriors. Johnson's comments are almost embarassingly crude and certainly have disturbed if not fully distracted me from his larger message.