Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive

troung · 04-05-2008, 17:42 PM

Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive

The Jamestown Foundation

04/03/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Monitor, April 3) - Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Bradar Muhammad Akhand announced “a new series of operations” under the code name “Operation Ebrat” (Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban’s spring offensive is “aimed at giving the enemy a lesson through directing powerful strikes at it, which it can never expect, until it is forced to end the occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the occupier soldiers… We will add to the tactics and experiences of the past years new types of operations. The operations will also be expanded to cover all locations of the country, in order for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere” (Sawt al-Jihad, March 28). There are indications that a main target of the offensive will be the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass. Citing an improvement in the skills and capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the announcement as “a psychological campaign and not a reality which could be implemented on the ground" (AFP, March 25). In reality the situation along the border is extremely precarious and threatens the ability of Coalition forces to operate within Afghanistan.

Joint Intelligence Centers on the Border

The first in a planned series of six joint intelligence centers along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border was opened at the Afghanistan border town of Torkham on March 29. When the plan is fully implemented there will be three such centers on each side of the border at a cost of $3 million each. There are high hopes for the centers, which have been described by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan as “the cornerstone upon which future cooperative efforts will grow” (Daily Times [Lahore], March 30). According to U.S. Brigadier General Joe Votel, “The macro view is to disrupt insurgents from going back and forth, going into Afghanistan and back into Pakistan, too. This is not going to instantly stop the infiltration problem, but it’s a good step forward” (Daily Times, March 30).

The centers are designed to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is an outgrowth of the earlier Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) established in Kabul in January 2007. This center, comprising 12 ISAF, six Afghan and six Pakistani intelligence officers, was initiated by the Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group, a subcommittee of the Tripartite Plenary Commission of military commanders that meets on a bimonthly basis (American Forces Press Service, January 30, 2007). The JIOC is designed to facilitate intelligence sharing, joint operations planning and an exchange of information on improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The working languages are English, Dari and Pashto, aided by a number of translators.

The new border centers will each be manned by 15 to 20 intelligence agents. One of the main innovations is the ability to view real-time video feeds from U.S. surveillance aircraft. The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, described the centers as “a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination” (The News [Karachi], March 29). Despite such glowing descriptions, there remains one hitch—Pakistan’s military has yet to make a full commitment to the project. According to Major General Athar Abbas, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, a military information organization, “At this time this proposal is being analyzed and evaluated by the concerned officials. But Pakistan has not yet come to a decision on this matter" (The News, March 30). General Abbas and other officials have declined to discuss Pakistan’s reservations or even to commit to a deadline for a decision. It is possible that the failure to sign on as full partners in the project may have something to do with the stated intention of Pakistan’s new prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, to pursue a greater focus on negotiation than military action in dealing with the Taliban and other frontier militants. There may also be reservations on the part of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to share intelligence on their clients within the Taliban.

Actual intelligence cooperation along the border is hampered by a number of factors, not least of which is a basic inability to agree on exactly where the border lies. In the past, Pakistan has responded to complaints from Afghanistan of Taliban fighters infiltrating across the border by threatening to fence or even mine the frontier, a shocking proposal to the Pashtun clans that straddle the artificial divide. Afghanistan’s long-standing policy is simply to refuse recognition of the colonial-era Durand Line, which it claims was forced on it by British imperialists in 1893. Pakistan accepts the Durand Line, but the two nations are frequently unable to agree on exactly where the 1,500-mile line is drawn.

U.S. Intervention in the Frontier Region?

The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to increase security and diminish the influence of the Taliban in the frontier regions of Pakistan, including a massive economic aid program, counter-insurgency training for the Frontier Corps and enhancement of the CIA’s monitoring and surveillance abilities in the area (Dawn [Karachi], February 26). The CIA already gathers information on the region from over-flights of its unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft, which can also deliver precisely targeted missiles on suspected Taliban safe-houses. Complicating efforts to increase security in the border region is a belief within Pakistan that the United States is preparing to intervene militarily in Pakistan’s frontier region (The Nation [Islamabad], March 24).

In a March 30 interview, CIA Director Michael Hayden declared that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region would be the most probable source for new terrorist attacks on the United States: “If there is another terrorist attack, it will originate there.” The CIA chief warned that the situation along the border “presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general and to the United States in particular.” Hayden also suggested that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were present in the Pakistan tribal frontier, where they were training “operatives who look Western” (NBC, March 30; Dawn, March 31).

A spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry responded angrily to the CIA director’s comments, stating that if the United States has information about the whereabouts of the al-Qaeda leadership, it should share it with Pakistan so it can take action. “Such a statement does not help trace alleged hideouts… Terrorists have threatened Pakistan and targeted our people. We are, therefore, combating terrorism in our own interest" (Daily Times, April 3). Syed Munawar Hasan, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, suggested that Hayden’s statements were “white lies,” similar to Washington’s allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Munawar urged the new government to stand fast in the face of what he described as U.S. threats to invade Pakistan despite the establishment of a democratic government (The News, April 2). The provincial assembly of the North-West Frontier Province issued a unanimous condemnation of Hayden’s remarks (The Post [Lahore], April 2; Geo TV News, April 1).

The Torkham Gate

The location of the first joint intelligence center at Torkham reflects the strategic importance of this border town at the Afghanistan end of the fabled Khyber Pass. It is the main gateway for supplies to U.S. and ISAF forces within Afghanistan and is believed to be one of the main targets for the forthcoming Taliban spring offensive (The Nation, April 2). Linking Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province and Pakistan’s Khyber Agency, Torkham is traditionally the busiest commercial border post between the two countries. A new round of attacks on Torkham may have already begun—as many as 40 oil tankers destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed in a series of explosions in a Torkham parking lot on March 20 (Dawn, March 24). There were 70 to 100 tankers awaiting clearance to cross into Afghanistan at the time.

Only a day before the attack on the tankers, an effort by a U.S. Army colonel to expedite border clearances for military transports at Torkham failed when the chief Pakistani customs official refused to meet with her (Daily Times, March 19). Vehicles typically wait in parking lots at Torkham for up to 20 days awaiting clearance to proceed. Part of the problem is due to delays in permits faxed to Torkham from the U.S. base in Bagram—until these are received the vehicles are forbidden to cross into Afghanistan (Daily Times, March 27). There are also accusations that some tanker operators may be selling their fuel along the road in Pakistan before deliberately torching their vehicles at Torkham to claim the insurance on the missing load.

Torkham has also become a nearly unregulated transit point for legal and illegal migrants since the demolition of the border gate by the National Highway Authority of Pakistan two years ago. A series of meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials—attended as well by NATO officials—have been unable to agree on the design and other details of a replacement gate. Smuggling and illegal crossings have spun out of control while tensions between the respective border authorities nearly erupted into open fighting in September 2006 (Daily Times, April 2).

Conclusion

Pakistan’s reluctance to make a full commitment to intelligence sharing raises a number of difficult questions: Is the ISI still cooperating or even aiding the Afghan Taliban? Do the military and the intelligence services operate outside of political control? Is it possible to collaborate with the Taliban and not the Taliban’s allies, al-Qaeda? Why do the better-armed and -trained regular forces frequently relinquish their security role in the frontier regions to the poorly-equipped Pashtun Frontier Corps?

After a meeting on security and terrorism issues with Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani on April 3, a spokesman for Prime Minister Gillani stated that the prime minister was formulating a comprehensive terrorism strategy “based on political engagement, economic development and backed by a credible military element” (Daily Times, April 3). Many within the new government believe that Musharraf’s aggressive military approach to the frontier crisis is responsible for the recent rash of suicide bombings and other attacks that have taken scores of lives across the country.

In the meantime there is a dangerous lack of coordination on border issues in which all parties bear responsibility. There is every indication that the Taliban have identified Torkham as a crucial weak point in the supply and logistics system that maintains the international military presence in Afghanistan. The failure to share intelligence combined with bureaucratic delays and infighting along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier threatens the entire Coalition mission in Afghanistan.

Dr. Andrew McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada.

Posted By: Jamestown

Ray · 04-06-2008, 03:58 AM

Quote:

Border Complicates War in Afghanistan

Insurgents Are Straddling Pakistani Line

Video
Stopping Insurgents at Afghanistan's Border
U.S. troops have been establishing new command posts along the Pakistan - Afghanistan border to stem the flow of insurgents. An increase in IED and suicide attacks, combined with tenuous alliances with Pakistani and Afghan troops, has made their work difficult.
» LAUNCH VIDEO PLAYER

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 4, 2008; Page A01

SPERA DISTRICT, Afghanistan -- As a cold darkness enveloped the tiny U.S. military camp just inside Afghanistan's border with Pakistan, word spread that Taliban fighters were on the move nearby, planning an attack.

Capt. Chris Hammonds expected it. In a mud-brick command center, the 32-year-old Army Ranger pivoted between a radio and a map, tracking reports of approaching Taliban. Several explosions soon ripped through the night as U.S. forces hit the suspected Taliban positions, including a cross-border guided-munitions strike on a compound about a mile inside Pakistan where senior associates of Siraj Haqqani -- considered one of the most dangerous Taliban commanders -- were thought to be meeting.

The U.S. military usually strikes across the border only when taking accurate fire from Pakistan, and standard practice calls for informing the Pakistani military about threats from its side. But Hammonds argued that the Pakistani military checkpoint was "under siege" from the Taliban and that Pakistani officers -- fearful of retaliation -- could tip off the insurgents.

The rare strike averted an imminent Taliban attack, Hammonds said, but across the border a starkly different account emerged. "Two women and two children got killed, so whatever was assessed was not correct," said Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, a spokesman for the Pakistani army. No Taliban were meeting in the family compound, he said. The Pakistani government issued a protest, and demonstrations erupted. "We were never informed about the strike," Abbas said. "This has serious implications for operations."

The March 12 incident highlights how, more than six years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, efforts to stabilize the country increasingly focus on the rugged frontier area straddling the border with Pakistan. Over the past 18 months, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters have exploited peace deals by Pakistan's government to create an unprecedented haven in the region, U.S. officials said. From there, insurgents have escalated attacks in Pakistan and in eastern Afghanistan, leading the United States last year to double its troop presence along more than 600 miles of frontier.

Recent high-level talks among the three countries have called for more intelligence-sharing and coordinated operations along the border. Last Saturday, the first of six new border coordination centers -- with officers from the three nations -- opened at Torkham at the Khyber Pass, a "giant step" forward, said Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, the top U.S. commander in eastern Afghanistan.

But despite such efforts, front-line commanders such as Hammonds still grapple with key obstacles -- including unreliable Afghan and Pakistani soldiers, ambivalent villagers, and even disputes over where the true border lies. Commanders said they need at least 50 percent more U.S. troops and more reconstruction money. At current levels, they said, it will take at least five years to quell insurgent attacks, which increased nearly 40 percent in eastern Afghanistan last year, including a 22 percent rise in attacks along the border.

"This combat outpost will get attacked within the next week or so, with rockets or small-arms fire," said Hammonds, commander of Attack Company, 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment. "They can't stand that we are in this location."

The U.S. outpost -- which Hammonds and his forces set up a month ago in an insurgent safe house nicknamed the "Taliban Hotel" -- is part of an effort to stem the flow of fighters moving along routes from Pakistan's North and South Waziristan and other Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Collaboration is growing between Taliban commanders in Afghanistan such as Haqqani, who has tribal roots in Paktika province, and Pakistanis such as Baitullah Mehsud, a commander in South Waziristan who is reorganizing the Taliban with help from agents in Pakistan's intelligence service, according to U.S. military officials. Mehsud, the CIA has said, is responsible for the assassination of former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto in December.

Taliban fighters and facilitators plan and resupply in Waziristan towns and then move across the border to launch attacks as far inside Afghanistan as Kabul. Overall attacks in eastern Paktika province rose about 30 percent last year, and have more than quadrupled since 2003, according to military data. Attacks by improvised explosive devices have risen tenfold since 2003, and suicide bombings, unseen before 2006, numbered seven last year.

"The threat of suicide-borne IEDs and IEDs are everywhere. It's far more significant than in the past," said Lt. Col. Michael Fenzel, commander of the 1st Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Roadside bombs killed 10 of the battalion's 12 soldiers lost since May. The insurgents "have an IED division, a suicide-bombing division, and everything else supports those two things," he said.

Throughout last fall and winter, Fenzel's battalion conducted operations in eastern Paktika and southern Khowst province to establish closer ties with villagers and to help block the influx of fighters with the spring thaw. His troops are building several outposts, already pushing the fighting closer to the border and away from populated areas.

A new outpost two miles from Afghanistan's border with South Waziristan has drawn a large volume of mortars, rockets and small-arms fire away from a base in a large town farther inland. On the night of Nov. 24, Capt. Rob McChrystal recalled, he and his infantry company were manning the outpost when scores of Taliban converged on them. McChrystal, of Charleston, S.C., said he waited until the insurgents came within 200 yards before he attacked with artillery and aircraft fire.

"I expect a lot more of the same this spring," he said. "They'll attempt another direct-fire attack because the [outpost] is a thorn in their side."

In the latest operation, in the Kowchun Valley just north of Paktika, Hammonds's company staked out a position above a narrow streambed that snakes through a gorge into North Waziristan, the scene of dozens of firefights between U.S. troops and the Taliban. From his base, Hammonds can see for miles into Pakistan. Haqqani "is extremely upset and can't get anything through," said Fenzel, citing U.S. intelligence.

But because of a shortage of U.S. troops, Hammonds's company can stay in the area only for several weeks. He doubts that Afghan and Pakistani soldiers will be able to control the route once he leaves.

"You're in the middle of an ANA mutiny," Hammonds said one afternoon, referring to the Afghan National Army, as Afghan soldiers from the 203rd Battalion piled into pickup trucks and quit the camp. The Afghans left after learning that the operation, originally to last nine days, would continue for weeks. The exodus underscored Hammonds's belief that Afghan army units cannot guard the border because they rotate every three to six months and they lack enough local knowledge. "The key to securing the border is to remove the ANA completely," he said.

Instead, Hammonds favors the Afghan border police, but eastern Paktika now has only 66 percent of its 857 authorized border police officers and, until December, they were led by a corrupt commander who colluded with the Taliban.

A greater frustration, he and other U.S. troops said, is that they cannot trust their Pakistani counterparts. "The Pakistan military is corrupt and lets people come through," Hammonds said. Pakistani forces reportedly told insurgents the location of his observation post, and when U.S. troops in a firefight call the Pakistani military for help, he said, "they never answer the phone."

Pakistan's Frontier Corps, which mans several border checkpoints, is viewed as nearly an enemy force. "The Frontier Corps might as well be Taliban. . . . They are active facilitators of infiltration," said a U.S. soldier who spoke on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

Last May, after Maj. Larry J. Bauguess Jr. of the 82nd Airborne Division attended a meeting to ease frictions between Afghan and Pakistani forces in the Pakistani frontier town of Teri Mengel, he was shot dead by a Frontier Corps guard, military officials said. The U.S. military in Pakistan is funding a multimillion-dollar program to train and equip the Frontier Corps.

U.S. troops face a mixed reception as they offer aid and seek intelligence from local villagers. In the town of Potsmillah, residents spat at Hammonds's soldiers, while in Sra Kunda, they accepted shoes, prayer rugs and offers of a new porch for their mosque.

But in the Kowchun Valley, where there are few roads and no electricity or schools, villagers are loyal to their tribes, which straddle the border. Sra Kunda's 50 families survive by gathering wood and selling it in Pakistan, or tending meager plots of rain-watered wheat. Residents keep Pakistani time on their watches, use Pakistani rupees and frequent markets across the border. "We don't know whether we're from Pakistan or Afghanistan," said Nakib Balibi, 18. "So we just go on Pakistan time."

washingtonpost.com

It is a tricky situation in which the ISAF is placed.

They would like to inform the Pakistanis before a strike, but are wary that the Pakistanis fearing retaliation from the terrorists, may inform the terrorists themselves of the impending attack!!

Catch 22.

It is extraordinary that the Pakistan ISI, as per US intelligence, is supporting Mehsud when he has havocked the region and the Pakistan Army has faced his ire! Double faced? Janus?

The article indicates the total confusion that is prevailing out there.

A real confused situation to plan any worthwhile operation!

Ray · 04-06-2008, 04:01 AM

Quote:

Nato seeks direct talks with Pakistan

BUCHAREST, April 2: Nato Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said on Wednesday he wanted direct talks between his military alliance in Afghanistan and the new government in Pakistan.

With rows over troop numbers and deployments, and worries over the state of the porous Afghan-Pakistan border, Scheffer also dropped a broad hint he would soon head to Islamabad himself.

Speaking ahead of the formal opening of a Nato summit in the Romanian capital of Bucharest, Scheffer pleaded for more contact between the 47,000-strong Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) and the newly-elected government of Pakistan.

“Military-to-military contacts are good. We must complement a military dialogue with a political one. Nato (and) Isaf need a political dialogue with Pakistan because instability there breeds instability in Afghanistan,” he told foreign policy experts ahead of the summit opening dinner.

Scheffer added: “I look forward to going to Pakistan when the government is settled in.“We have a common fight against terrorism – my starting point is, Pakistan is part of the solution, not part of the problem.” Nato’s Afghanistan commitment has seen attention increasingly turn to north-western parts of Pakistan, from where the Taliban are allegedly directing the Afghan resistance.

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, at the same event, criticised the previous Pakistani government.

“We were told democracy (in Pakistan) would inflame the radicals,” he said.

“The problem was the previous government in Pakistan was cracking down on the democrats, not the extremists.”—AFP
Nato seeks direct talks with Pakistan

This is also an interesting input!

S-2 · 04-06-2008, 05:07 AM

Brigadier,

Posted the WAPO article about A Co. 1-503 Inf (Airborne) over on the "Valley of Death" thread a couple of days ago.

ISI officers/agents manning these points or army intelligence officers from the Pakistani divisions and corps in the area, if they decide to put their three collection centers on the Pakistani side? Will the Pakistanis staff their allotment to the afghan-based posts even should they decide not to go forward with the Pakistani collection centers? They say to keep your friends close and your enemies closer- perhaps that's what we've in mind?

I imagine that if they position all six w/ consideration to infiltration routes and secure them nicely, they might just attract the entire fight onto them.

It'd sure make that intell collection effort a lot easier. Naturally, bringing combat down upon their heads may keep them a tad busy from their collection conferences and meetings at these centers but that's a small cost to pay for the privilege of daily mortar and rocket-fire.

Some thoughts.

Ray · 04-06-2008, 05:21 AM

Please connect.

Which post in the Valley of Death?

S-2 · 04-06-2008, 05:51 AM

Brigadier,

Here you go, sir.

Valley of Death Post #57

Ray · 04-06-2008, 14:05 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by S-2

Brigadier,

Posted the WAPO article about A Co. 1-503 Inf (Airborne) over on the "Valley of Death" thread a couple of days ago.

ISI officers/agents manning these points or army intelligence officers from the Pakistani divisions and corps in the area, if they decide to put their three collection centers on the Pakistani side? Will the Pakistanis staff their allotment to the afghan-based posts even should they decide not to go forward with the Pakistani collection centers? They say to keep your friends close and your enemies closer- perhaps that's what we've in mind?

I imagine that if they position all six w/ consideration to infiltration routes and secure them nicely, they might just attract the entire fight onto them.

It'd sure make that intell collection effort a lot easier. Naturally, bringing combat down upon their heads may keep them a tad busy from their collection conferences and meetings at these centers but that's a small cost to pay for the privilege of daily mortar and rocket-fire.

Some thoughts.

It is a tough call!

Will be caught between the Devil and the Deep Sea!

It would be better to die as martyrs for Islam!

Cactus · 04-08-2008, 10:07 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by S-2

ISI officers/agents manning these points or army intelligence officers from the Pakistani divisions and corps in the area, if they decide to put their three collection centers on the Pakistani side?

Around 2005 the BBC carried a short report on how some of ISI's work is being farmed off to Directorate of Military Intelligence (i.e. the node for Army formations' intelligence) in an effort to increase accountability. Since then I haven't seen any updates. Further I don't see why/how that would make it more accountable at all, as an earlier BBC report notes:

"No one can make a career out of the ISI," General Qazi said. "ISI people are serving armed forces officers and after three years they go back. The director-general is appointed by the prime minister."

BBC News | SOUTH ASIA | Profile: Pakistan's military intelligence agency

S-2 · 04-08-2008, 15:32 PM

Thanks. I didn't know that the ISI wasn't a separate career path. I'd like to think that the Army's culture rubs off on the ISI.

I fear, though, the reverse. If so, that may be like Heer officers pulling a tour with the Waffen S.S. as part of their "professional development".

Ray · 04-08-2008, 15:56 PM

Ja Wohl, Herr Fuhrer!

Agnostic Muslim · 04-08-2008, 20:18 PM

Quote:

I fear, though, the reverse. If so, that may be like Heer officers pulling a tour with the Waffen S.S. as part of their "professional development".

Perhaps - if they were deputed to the ISI's "Politcal Wing", or the "Afghan (or Taliban, until recently at least) Wing".

Cactus · 04-09-2008, 13:19 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by S-2

I didn't know that the ISI wasn't a separate career path. I'd like to think that the Army's culture rubs off on the ISI.

Sorry, don't know enough about them to confirm one way or another authoritatively. There may be some police, civil service and foreign service components too, I would think. And some book reviews of Military, Inc. have mentioned that there is strong commercial input too. But the senior most policy-making and executive positions seem to be mainly from the military.

Agnostic Muslim · 04-15-2008, 09:18 AM

"No one can make a career out of the ISI," General Qazi said. "ISI people are serving armed forces officers and after three years they go back."

Apparently some people were making a career out of it:

Quote:

On another note, talking of a changing institutional mindset of the armed forces it may soon bear some long denied peace fruits in the restive areas of Waziristan. While insisting upon keeping the juiciest and most revealing parts of his discussion as "off the record", a contemplative but visibly happy Asfandyar Wali promised the coming of a hitherto meaningful peace accord in the region. "Insha Allah, in the coming 25 to 30 days, we should have inked a peace contract bearing the signatures of no less than 250 tribal Sardars and elders". That would indeed be a milestone and who knows, the real turning point in our desperate quest for peace.

This development (hopefully) may have its roots in the revision of the tribal area policy when the then DG ISI, Ashfaq Kayani took charge of this spy outfit. According to an informed insider, the paradigm shift started with his shifting out of intelligence officers who had been posted in the region for the past many years. Due to such long and uninterrupted associations, they instead of changing the socio-political landscape had themselves become a part of it. Becoming a hostage to the phenomenon of personal considerations taking preference over professional judgments and obligations.

Ensconced comfortably in a cafeteria corner, the seasoned ANP president was in no mood to spill any beans but his typical nonchalant shrug of shoulders betrayed him when he feigned ignorance about what is being described as his critical role in drumming some sense in the power duo of Negroponte and Boucher who were here just some days back.

Seems like some positive developments are in the offing, and the reference to "peace deals with Tribal Sardars and elders" rather than "taliban", seems a positive change in direction.

04-05-2008, 17:42 PM	#1 (permalink)
troung A Self Important *Senior Contributor* Join Date: 08-03-03 Posts: 4,121 Country:	Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive Targeting the Khyber Pass: The Taliban’s Spring Offensive The Jamestown Foundation 04/03/2008 - By Andrew McGregor (from Terrorism Monitor, April 3) - Taliban Deputy Leader Mullah Bradar Muhammad Akhand announced “a new series of operations” under the code name “Operation Ebrat” (Lesson) on March 27. The Taliban’s spring offensive is “aimed at giving the enemy a lesson through directing powerful strikes at it, which it can never expect, until it is forced to end the occupation of Afghanistan and withdraw all the occupier soldiers… We will add to the tactics and experiences of the past years new types of operations. The operations will also be expanded to cover all locations of the country, in order for the enemy to be weighed down everywhere” (Sawt al-Jihad, March 28). There are indications that a main target of the offensive will be the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier, in particular the strategically vital Khyber Pass. Citing an improvement in the skills and capacity of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), Afghanistan’s Defense Ministry immediately dismissed the announcement as “a psychological campaign and not a reality which could be implemented on the ground" (AFP, March 25). In reality the situation along the border is extremely precarious and threatens the ability of Coalition forces to operate within Afghanistan. Joint Intelligence Centers on the Border The first in a planned series of six joint intelligence centers along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border was opened at the Afghanistan border town of Torkham on March 29. When the plan is fully implemented there will be three such centers on each side of the border at a cost of $3 million each. There are high hopes for the centers, which have been described by the U.S. commander in Afghanistan as “the cornerstone upon which future cooperative efforts will grow” (Daily Times [Lahore], March 30). According to U.S. Brigadier General Joe Votel, “The macro view is to disrupt insurgents from going back and forth, going into Afghanistan and back into Pakistan, too. This is not going to instantly stop the infiltration problem, but it’s a good step forward” (Daily Times, March 30). The centers are designed to coordinate intelligence gathering and sharing between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the intelligence agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project is an outgrowth of the earlier Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) established in Kabul in January 2007. This center, comprising 12 ISAF, six Afghan and six Pakistani intelligence officers, was initiated by the Military Intelligence Sharing Working Group, a subcommittee of the Tripartite Plenary Commission of military commanders that meets on a bimonthly basis (American Forces Press Service, January 30, 2007). The JIOC is designed to facilitate intelligence sharing, joint operations planning and an exchange of information on improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The working languages are English, Dari and Pashto, aided by a number of translators. The new border centers will each be manned by 15 to 20 intelligence agents. One of the main innovations is the ability to view real-time video feeds from U.S. surveillance aircraft. The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, described the centers as “a giant step forward in cooperation, communication and coordination” (The News [Karachi], March 29). Despite such glowing descriptions, there remains one hitch—Pakistan’s military has yet to make a full commitment to the project. According to Major General Athar Abbas, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, a military information organization, “At this time this proposal is being analyzed and evaluated by the concerned officials. But Pakistan has not yet come to a decision on this matter" (The News, March 30). General Abbas and other officials have declined to discuss Pakistan’s reservations or even to commit to a deadline for a decision. It is possible that the failure to sign on as full partners in the project may have something to do with the stated intention of Pakistan’s new prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, to pursue a greater focus on negotiation than military action in dealing with the Taliban and other frontier militants. There may also be reservations on the part of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to share intelligence on their clients within the Taliban. Actual intelligence cooperation along the border is hampered by a number of factors, not least of which is a basic inability to agree on exactly where the border lies. In the past, Pakistan has responded to complaints from Afghanistan of Taliban fighters infiltrating across the border by threatening to fence or even mine the frontier, a shocking proposal to the Pashtun clans that straddle the artificial divide. Afghanistan’s long-standing policy is simply to refuse recognition of the colonial-era Durand Line, which it claims was forced on it by British imperialists in 1893. Pakistan accepts the Durand Line, but the two nations are frequently unable to agree on exactly where the 1,500-mile line is drawn. U.S. Intervention in the Frontier Region? The United States is pursuing a number of initiatives to increase security and diminish the influence of the Taliban in the frontier regions of Pakistan, including a massive economic aid program, counter-insurgency training for the Frontier Corps and enhancement of the CIA’s monitoring and surveillance abilities in the area (Dawn [Karachi], February 26). The CIA already gathers information on the region from over-flights of its unmanned Predator surveillance aircraft, which can also deliver precisely targeted missiles on suspected Taliban safe-houses. Complicating efforts to increase security in the border region is a belief within Pakistan that the United States is preparing to intervene militarily in Pakistan’s frontier region (The Nation [Islamabad], March 24). In a March 30 interview, CIA Director Michael Hayden declared that the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region would be the most probable source for new terrorist attacks on the United States: “If there is another terrorist attack, it will originate there.” The CIA chief warned that the situation along the border “presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general and to the United States in particular.” Hayden also suggested that Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri were present in the Pakistan tribal frontier, where they were training “operatives who look Western” (NBC, March 30; Dawn, March 31). A spokesman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry responded angrily to the CIA director’s comments, stating that if the United States has information about the whereabouts of the al-Qaeda leadership, it should share it with Pakistan so it can take action. “Such a statement does not help trace alleged hideouts… Terrorists have threatened Pakistan and targeted our people. We are, therefore, combating terrorism in our own interest" (Daily Times, April 3). Syed Munawar Hasan, leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, suggested that Hayden’s statements were “white lies,” similar to Washington’s allegations of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Munawar urged the new government to stand fast in the face of what he described as U.S. threats to invade Pakistan despite the establishment of a democratic government (The News, April 2). The provincial assembly of the North-West Frontier Province issued a unanimous condemnation of Hayden’s remarks (The Post [Lahore], April 2; Geo TV News, April 1). The Torkham Gate The location of the first joint intelligence center at Torkham reflects the strategic importance of this border town at the Afghanistan end of the fabled Khyber Pass. It is the main gateway for supplies to U.S. and ISAF forces within Afghanistan and is believed to be one of the main targets for the forthcoming Taliban spring offensive (The Nation, April 2). Linking Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province and Pakistan’s Khyber Agency, Torkham is traditionally the busiest commercial border post between the two countries. A new round of attacks on Torkham may have already begun—as many as 40 oil tankers destined for Coalition forces in Afghanistan were destroyed in a series of explosions in a Torkham parking lot on March 20 (Dawn, March 24). There were 70 to 100 tankers awaiting clearance to cross into Afghanistan at the time. Only a day before the attack on the tankers, an effort by a U.S. Army colonel to expedite border clearances for military transports at Torkham failed when the chief Pakistani customs official refused to meet with her (Daily Times, March 19). Vehicles typically wait in parking lots at Torkham for up to 20 days awaiting clearance to proceed. Part of the problem is due to delays in permits faxed to Torkham from the U.S. base in Bagram—until these are received the vehicles are forbidden to cross into Afghanistan (Daily Times, March 27). There are also accusations that some tanker operators may be selling their fuel along the road in Pakistan before deliberately torching their vehicles at Torkham to claim the insurance on the missing load. Torkham has also become a nearly unregulated transit point for legal and illegal migrants since the demolition of the border gate by the National Highway Authority of Pakistan two years ago. A series of meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials—attended as well by NATO officials—have been unable to agree on the design and other details of a replacement gate. Smuggling and illegal crossings have spun out of control while tensions between the respective border authorities nearly erupted into open fighting in September 2006 (Daily Times, April 2). Conclusion Pakistan’s reluctance to make a full commitment to intelligence sharing raises a number of difficult questions: Is the ISI still cooperating or even aiding the Afghan Taliban? Do the military and the intelligence services operate outside of political control? Is it possible to collaborate with the Taliban and not the Taliban’s allies, al-Qaeda? Why do the better-armed and -trained regular forces frequently relinquish their security role in the frontier regions to the poorly-equipped Pashtun Frontier Corps? After a meeting on security and terrorism issues with Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Kayani on April 3, a spokesman for Prime Minister Gillani stated that the prime minister was formulating a comprehensive terrorism strategy “based on political engagement, economic development and backed by a credible military element” (Daily Times, April 3). Many within the new government believe that Musharraf’s aggressive military approach to the frontier crisis is responsible for the recent rash of suicide bombings and other attacks that have taken scores of lives across the country. In the meantime there is a dangerous lack of coordination on border issues in which all parties bear responsibility. There is every indication that the Taliban have identified Torkham as a crucial weak point in the supply and logistics system that maintains the international military presence in Afghanistan. The failure to share intelligence combined with bureaucratic delays and infighting along the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier threatens the entire Coalition mission in Afghanistan. Dr. Andrew McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto, Canada. Posted By: Jamestown __________________ To sit down with these men and deal with them as the representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride ones own dignity and to invite the disaster of their treachery - General Matthew Ridgway

04-06-2008, 05:07 AM	#4 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Bend, Oregon Posts: 1,924 Country:	Ray Reply Brigadier, Posted the WAPO article about A Co. 1-503 Inf (Airborne) over on the "Valley of Death" thread a couple of days ago. ISI officers/agents manning these points or army intelligence officers from the Pakistani divisions and corps in the area, if they decide to put their three collection centers on the Pakistani side? Will the Pakistanis staff their allotment to the afghan-based posts even should they decide not to go forward with the Pakistani collection centers? They say to keep your friends close and your enemies closer- perhaps that's what we've in mind? I imagine that if they position all six w/ consideration to infiltration routes and secure them nicely, they might just attract the entire fight onto them. It'd sure make that intell collection effort a lot easier. Naturally, bringing combat down upon their heads may keep them a tad busy from their collection conferences and meetings at these centers but that's a small cost to pay for the privilege of daily mortar and rocket-fire. Some thoughts. __________________ "This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

04-06-2008, 05:51 AM	#6 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Bend, Oregon Posts: 1,924 Country:	Ray Reply Brigadier, Here you go, sir. Valley of Death Post #57

04-08-2008, 15:32 PM	#9 (permalink)
S-2 *Military Professional* Join Date: 09-11-06 Location: Bend, Oregon Posts: 1,924 Country:	Cactus Thanks. I didn't know that the ISI wasn't a separate career path. I'd like to think that the Army's culture rubs off on the ISI. I fear, though, the reverse. If so, that may be like Heer officers pulling a tour with the Waffen S.S. as part of their "professional development".

Thread Tools
Show Printable Version Email this Page
Display Modes	Rate This Thread
Linear Mode Switch to Hybrid Mode Switch to Threaded Mode	Rate This Thread:

04-06-2008, 05:21 AM	#5 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 24,972 Country:	Please connect. Which post in the Valley of Death?

04-08-2008, 15:56 PM	#10 (permalink)
Ray Postmaster General *Military Professional* Join Date: 08-20-03 Posts: 24,972 Country:	Ja Wohl, Herr Fuhrer!

Currently Active Users Viewing This Thread: 1 (0 members and 1 guests)

Similar Threads
Thread	Thread Starter	Forum	Replies	Last Post
Random Thoughts on the Mighty Hog - Part 2	Shipwreck	Military Aviation	102	05-10-2008 15:24 PM
Where anti-Arab prejudice and oil make the difference	Ray	Current Affairs	2	05-17-2007 04:45 AM
Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future	Ray	The Field Mess	2	11-05-2006 10:42 AM
2003 Navy Global Conops	Defcon 6	Naval Forces	6	07-06-2006 22:26 PM
Taliban operatives plan spring offensive	Ray	Current Affairs	13	04-30-2005 21:13 PM