T_igger_cs_30

Hi

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FEAR NAUGHT

I don't work here ...I am an analyst!

S-2

What have been the forces, motivation, rationales for tribally segmented societies to integrate into a larger, homogenous social network that led to the creation of nation-states?

Is the tribally-based cultural narrative of Afghanistan an unassailable icon? How does an archaic social network de-construct a "gun culture" from it's narrative without emasculating itself?

A couple of thoughts/questions.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Cactus

If I outline how the "Afghans" society has periodically reverted/degenerated to tribal identities, can you reverse-engineer a solution for the current situation?

First and foremost the terrain in the North-East and the South lends itself particularly well to sustaining a fragmented society. It is called the Roh - loosely translated to "The Hills". In the Roh the society has always been fragmented, with evidence as old as the Vedas and the Avestas supporting the claim. Fortunately while the tribes there are a chronic problem, they are not the fatal problem - they always need to coordinate with their bretheren in the highlands and the plains to cause real mischief. Also a fragmented society need not be uncivilized - societies in similar terrain, like say the Swiss/Helvetii in the Alps, have managed to reach some sort of equillibrium; you can learn a lot from their evolution. Do you have the History of the Cantons ready?

The vast majority of the Afghans live in the more gentle highlands of the Central and Southern Afghanistan. The physical terrain there is much more conducive to civilization and culture than the Roh or the Northern steppes. The geo-political terrain, however, is not. The idea of a distinct "Afghan" culture and civilization is relatively new one - just about as old as the United States, but without the benefit of two massive trenches separating from those who would challenge it. In most historic records the "Afghans" are treated as negotiable identities - a buffer zone between the markedly distinct and unnegotiable cultures and civilizations of Iran, Turan (Turkic CAs) and Hindustan (Indian Sub-Continent). The Afghans behaved not much differently to challenge tht point: Even as victors, they often moved off to set-up their empires around Delhi or Tehran. For them, any comfortable place was "home".

Most of the 16th, 17th and 18th Century history of this area was characterized by incessant power-struggle between the Mughals ruling India (Hindustan), their traditional blood-enemies the Uzbeks dominating Central Asia (Turan), and the Shahs of Iran (some Iranians, some Turkics, some even Afghans). All the major powers backed their factions, while the factions themsleves shifted alliances. Those alliances shaped the history of most modern "Afghan Tribes".

{Note: In the mid 1700s an Afghan slave-soldier of the Shah of Persia named Ahmed Shah Abdali/Durrani, taking advantage of the Shah's death to the West (in Iran), crumbling Mughal Empire to the East (in India) and civil war among the Uzbeg Turks to the North (in Turan), forged a kingdom called Afghanistan. Decades later all his enemies finally fell to the British and the Russians, who conveniently left his kingdom as a buffer-zone between their empires. Thus came about "Afghanistan". But millenia old links are hardly severed by one ambitious adventurer, nor are they rotted by neglect of two entirely foreign and transient powers.}

The Afghan tribal identities are not unassilable icons: The very fact that there are big tribes, like the Abdali/Durranis and the Ghilzais, prove that plenty of small tribes have submitted their identities to a larger identity. The Ghilzai, in fact, by the virtue of being nomads often pick up miscellaneous wanderers into their tribal structure almost regularly. The Russians and later Soviets were quite successful in rounding-off the most incompatible edges of the tribal society in the North, to the extent that there is very little tribal (as opposed to ethno-cultural) identification there today.

T_igger_cs_30

Ok

S-2

"...it all leads back to fear and intimidation..."

Sergeant Major,

Your point is compelling. Make no mistake- there is stark intimidation to the message. However, there's also (more or less) moral authority behind the intimidation lest it differ little from criminal brigands. Were it so, the villagers (often reasonably to well-armed) would defend themselves collectively.

They don't. Instead, the moral message of the Shabnamah (communcating through vehicles of xenophobic nat'lism and religion) confronts each villager independantly with a narrative that's historically appealing and emotionally well-grounded and understood.

We've yet, for a variety of reasons and rationales, to effectively counter their message. Equally, we've yet to construct our own powerful and mobilizing creed. Just now all the traditionally afghan levers of influence lie with our enemy.

Cactus and Waltzing Matilda have the floor, IMV. W.M, I believe, seeks to deliver a utilitarian solution which encompasses the same successful narrative appeal which the Taliban have fostered on the Afghan populace. Cactus (and others here-namely YOU-Brigadier!: ) possesses a firm historical perspective of the region social-cultural networks.

I think our army has made huge strides with our HTTs in deciphering this code to western sensibilities. Nonetheless, as Shek and I are arguing elsewhere, there's a temporal quality to our effort that suggests we won't long keep up our studies in the absence of something as compelling as 9/11-driven wars in this region. Perhaps the energy crunch will change that. Perhaps a doctrinal embrace of COIN by the U.S. Army will also change that.

Even still, our efforts are in their infancy (I suspect) both in terms of knowledge and infrastructure. Both elements of our HTTs/PRTs are fragile and neither have developed sufficiently yet to be "war-winners". They, though, offer NATO's only practical pathway to establishing any long-term legitimacy for the Afghani gov't.

The Afghan COIN academy and our HTTs/PRTs might easily disappear tomorrow. Nothing in our budget or doctrine suggests a place for them. Still, they're both patently necessary, if only preliminary to greater needs.

What's most clear to me is the absence of a physical presence. We lack troops. Nothing combats "night letters" like a combat outpost near a village market. We've no practical and visible presence in Afghanistan. As such, our message is neither delivered nor enforced-except by bombs, or so the message is shaped.

Our enemy has no such problem.

T_igger_cs_30

T_igger_cs_30

Tom Johnson

I would like to thank you all for commenting on my paper. It is much appreciated.

Please be aware that I will shortly be publishing a much more complete manuscript dealing with some of the issues I raised in this initial paper on Taliban narratives. i continue to believe that an understanding of their discourses is critical aspect of COIN. Unfortunately we have been very sophomoric in our understanding

Thanks again for taking my work seriously and your comments.

Tom Johnson
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey CA
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at NPS - Home

T_igger_cs_30

Cactus

Hello Tom, and Welcome!

Out of curiosity, is the main objective of your next paper the identification and diagnosis of this otherwise unperceived challenge? Or is it to take the paper the next logical step and prescribe/suggest some solutions?

Adux

Tigger, Cactus

Impressive insights.

S-2

Sergeant Major,

"I think Anthropologists are an essential part of Intelligence analysis now..."

Concur. The question is how to integrate those resources without disturbing academic sensibilities. We're discussing "applied" vs. "pure". Can we develop martial-related anthropological expertise specific to our intelligence needs without creating undue friction? We need the access.

"...these threads are not for hastily constructed responses."

Not this thread nor this guy. I'm no subject matter expert here and am avidly taking notes.

S-2

From the Globe and Mail-

Talking To The Taliban-Globe & Mail

Forty-two video recordings in six parts of Taliban fighters in Kandahar.

"I personally believe that negotiations are inevitable," said Thomas Johnson, director of the culture and conflict studies program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., and a leading expert on the Pashtun tribal areas.

"The problem of course is finding people willing to negotiate," Mr. Johnson said. "Pashtuns generally will not negotiate when they sense they are winning. Hence, you see that the Taliban are ‘willing' to negotiate, but only after international forces leave the country."

EDIT: I like Graeme Smith. He was, IIRC, the Moscow correspondent for the G&M when Canadian forces first deployed into Kandahar in the spring of 2006 and subsequently took on much of G&M's coverage of the Canadians down south. Both Christine Lamb of the London Times and Graeme Smith did some superb early writing on this area.

WaltzingMatilda

S-2,

As usual, you’ve posed some very tough questions…most of which I haven’t the slightest idea how to answer, as I’ve only recently become interested in Afghanistan (largely due to your posts). Having said that, your questions deserve a response, irrespective of how flawed or incomplete my answers may be. Hopefully, others will continue to chime in...

War tends to promote internal unity, although within the specific context of Afghanistan, it’s hard to definitively say this is in fact the case at present. Analysts remain divided over the extent to which the Taliban has been able to recruit across tribal lines and are uncertain as to the degree of cohesion within the movement. For example, Johnson argues the Taliban “represents a tribal power grab by the Ghilzais” aimed primarily at the Durrani, whom they seek to “subjugate and co-opt.” As evidence, he claims the Taliban leadership is composed almost entirely of Hotaki Ghilzais with a somewhat smaller number of Kakar Ghurgusht. In contrast, Antonio Giustozzi argues the Taliban is a more “composite-like” tribal movement primarily concerned with the ideological commitment of its members, as opposed to their tribal affiliation. He claims the Taliban leadership is, in fact, largely made up of DURRANI with significant numbers of Ghilzai, Kakar, and Karlanri following close behind.

Obviously, an insurgency segmented in geographic scope, limited in tribal composition, and dependent upon coercive measures is much more vulnerable to a well-coordinated counterinsurgent strategy. I fear, however, that the coalition—as presently configured and strategically conceived—provides the flagpole around which otherwise disparate Afghan tribes are able to coalesce.

Again, I hope others will be able to shed some light on this subject, which is critically important to our understanding of the Afghan conflict and the nature of the Taliban insurgency.

Cactus is spot on, IMV.

…by acquiring a monopoly on the “legitimate” use of force.

S-2

"...…by acquiring a monopoly on the “legitimate” use of force."

Succinctly put and perfectly obvious right under my nose.

"I fear, however, that the coalition—as presently configured and strategically conceived—provides the flagpole around which otherwise disparate Afghan tribes are able to coalesce."

See Graeme Smith's G&M coverage referenced above- part II for further reinforcement of this point from taliban fighters.

"Cactus is spot on, IMV."

I also think so.