Ray

This is our Afghanistan!

Any chance of success?

If so, how?

__________________


"Some have learnt many Tricks of sly Evasion, Instead of Truth they use Equivocation, And eke it out with mental Reservation, Which is to good Men an Abomination."

I don't have to attend every argument I'm invited to.

HAKUNA MATATA

Cactus

Ray,

As one of the comments in the article notes, the article grossly overstates the number of suicide bombings; and as you yourself have posted sometime back, I think, that the vast majority of the suicide bombers originate from across the Pak-Afghan border. In my humble opinion it is an important distinction because a suicide bombing campaign is almost always a very bad sign - especially if coming from within - because it signifies a very desperate and morally-bankrupt foe. Fortunately things are not quite so bad. The people have not lost the will to live, they have not made the devil's bargain of life for destruction.

The Afghan peoples' will to live and fight for their survival, even development, is the light at the end of the tunnel. So yes, there is a good chance of success - barring a massive cluster f-up on our side and sudden, coincidental luck on the side of our foes. As to the "how", I would think it comes out of the traditional building blocks of any modern state: good education, a capable defense force, and a loyal opposition.

S-2

"...the Taliban have tracked down thieves and executed them. They leave the corpses on display to warn the others. People feel safe again and this has boosted their support... Just a couple of weeks ago they killed the father of a UN staff member, even though the village elders pleaded for his life. Nowhere is safe now. There are dozens of suicide bombings every week."

Either poorly conveyed by the writer or reflecting confusion by the interviewee/subject, this doesn't constitute a credible assessment of Afghanistan's condition.

It was interesting to watch a story about a girl's soccer team in Kabul recently. A very traditionally dressed sixteen year old was discussing an experience she'd had with a fellow female teenage passenger on a city bus. She, a school student and soccer player was riding next to a girl neither allowed to play soccer nor ATTEND school. Both girls, residents of Kabul, seemed surprised at the existence of these varied condition within their own city. The story was accompanied by a variety of images of Afghani women in Kabul during the sixties wearing MINI-SKIRTS openly and unafraid. In short, a very modern contradiction to our often misplaced stereotypes and notions.

I'll be interested to see how U.S. ground forces redeploy over the next eighteen months as regional conditions and considerations begin shifting. Iraq and Iran obviously influence those possible redeployments. There's little doubt in my mind that we need far more American forces in Afghanistan than are currently stationed.

Cactus says,

"So yes, there is a good chance of success..."

What's success? Not to be a smart-ass but do we REALLY know what our objectives are in Afghanistan? I'd love to have a cultural anthropologist explain this from CJTF-82 (OEF)'s website-

"Army Capt. Don Canterna, Bravo Co.’s commander, talked with Khangul and village elders until dusk.

The village elder’s main concern is land mines from the Soviet War that continue to plague the area. Rival farmers are digging up old land mines to replant in rival fields in an attempt to kill off the competition.

“Except they’re hurting more kids than farmers,” explained a village elder."

TF Fury Patrols Pachir Wa Agam District

I thought that I'd read it all until just now. Stunning.

__________________
"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

Cactus

Whose standards of success are you questioning? Even amongst ourselves we have widely varying standards of success, don't we? I took standards of success in context of this article: First, no return of Tali-Tubbies to power; next, marginalization of Tali-Tubby supporters in Afghan psyche; finally, a general committment among Afghans to never let the likes of Tali-Tubbies back into mainstream ~ whatever difference among themselves might be. Basically defense, education and loyal opposition.

Medieval Europeans would recognize it as "Fortress Mentality". Here is an Economist article, very deeply flawed in its interpretations and narrative style it assumes, but nonetheless illuminating in the cultural details:

http://www.economist.com/world/displ...ory_id=8345531

entropy

Reminds me about Somalia. The Islamic Courts did bring order to Mogadishu, and low lawlessness reigns as they are driven back to the south.

__________________
If memory serves...

S-2

"Even amongst ourselves we have widely varying standards of success, don't we?"

Exactly. I've simply come to wonder what any individual's definition of success has come to mean. Ryan Crocker recently said this about Iraq but I believe that it applies to Afghanistan as well-

"There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory. Any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect..."

His comments imply an undetermined commitment of some length. We should expect no less in Afghanistan.

"I took standards of success in context of this article: First, no return of Tali-Tubbies to power; next, marginalization of Tali-Tubby supporters in Afghan psyche; finally, a general committment among Afghans to never let the likes of Tali-Tubbies back into mainstream ~ whatever difference among themselves might be. Basically defense, education and loyal opposition."

Well put. Points two and three are the greater challenge, requiring a consistant and long-term perspective by donor nations and Afghans alike. There are massive cultural and organizational impediments to both "education" and "loyal opposition". Still, IMV, you are functionally correct.

Cactus, I also believe that success is possible. When confronted by a medieval "fortress mentality" amongst farmers who'd willingly mine their neighbor's fields as example, I try not to lose my perspective and time-line of patience.

Cactus

The difference is that instituions like Islamic Courts never bring order, they bring overwhelming force to push out the opposition from the public field of view. If we look at institutions in a civil war as a diffeent rungs of a spring clashing back and forth, what the Islamic Courts-like institutions do is bring overwhelming weight on one side of a spring and take all other rungs out of public's view. Now in rare cases, over prolonged, unchallenged periods of time they manage to destroy the elasticity of other rngs and become supreme. But in 99% of the cases it is just a matter of time before the other rungs spring right back. True order, in such an analogy of civil war, is a condition that brings all the institutions to equilibrium.

|---------------------------Field of Public View---------------------------|
Civil War:
[side1]/\/\/\/\/\/\/[side2]\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\[side3]/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\[Islamic Court] (back and forth)

Supposed Order:
[side1]||[side2]||[side3]||[Islamic Court]<<

Real Equilibrium:
[side1]-----------[side2]---------------[side3]--------------[Islamic Court]