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Fight Less, Win More

A former Marine captain with experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq comments on his four paradoxes of counter-insurgency as applied within his recent teaching experience at the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Academy.

While evidently rather ramshackle, this modest institution has provided a unique setting for bringing diplomats, N.A.T.O, U.S., and Afghan officers together.

Fick's Four Paradoxes of Counter-Insurgency

1.) The best weapons don’t shoot.

2.) The more you protect yourself, the less safe you are.

3.) The more force you use, the less effective you may be.

4.) You can win every battle and still lose the war.

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"This aggression will not stand, man!" Jeff Lebowski

captchasep

Paradox 1,3, and 4, seem to make sense. But what of two? Obviously he doesn't mean take security off the priorities of work but then

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captchasep,

I don't know if you read the article but here is a portion relevant to Fick's second paradox-

"The second pillar of the academy's curriculum relates to the first: The more you protect your forces, the less safe you may be. To be effective, troops, diplomats and civilian aid workers need to get out among the people. But nearly every American I saw in Kabul was hidden behind high walls or racing through the streets in armored convoys.

Afghanistan, however, isn't Iraq. Tourists travel through much of the country in relative safety, glass office towers are sprouting up in Kabul, and Coca-Cola recently opened a bottling plant. I drove through the capital in a dirty green Toyota, wearing civilian clothes and stopping to shop in bazaars, eat in restaurants and visit businesses. In two weeks, I saw more of Kabul than most military officers do in a year.

This isolation also infects our diplomatic community. After a State Department official gave a presentation at the academy, he and I climbed a nearby hill to explore the ruins of an old palace. He was only nine days from the end of his 12-month tour, and our walk was the first time he'd ever been allowed to get out and explore the city.

Of course, mingling with the population means exposing ourselves to attacks, and commanders have an obligation to safeguard their troops. But they have an even greater responsibility to accomplish their mission. When we retreat behind body armor and concrete barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society we claim to defend. If we emphasize "force protection" above all else, we will never develop the cultural understanding, relationships and intelligence we need to win. Accepting the greater tactical risk of reaching out to Afghans reduces the strategic risk that the Taliban will return to power."

I think that these real-time observations point out that interaction with the local population in Afghanistan, to include Kabul (not so sure about Kandahar), unlike Iraq, is possible.

How and to what degree? Can our troops patrol dismounted? Can they do so without body-armor and helmets? Can diplomats and N.G.O. representatives operate at all? Can they do so effectively?

Each question in that continuing spectrum of risk assumptions will be answered differently throughout different districts of Afghanistan. Still, without a detailed and local risk analysis, we miss opportunities to engage the native population more closely. Where force protection is paramount-first, last, and always, we shall never develop the trust of local populations and the understanding that we need to be successful.

tangshiyn

I don't agree this point of view,whether ues the best weapons decided by the situation,agree?

Shek

These are paradoxes of counterinsurgency (the situation). COIN is fundamentally a political question; therefore, weapons that don't shoot tend not to be the best weapons, as you don't win by just killing the insurgents. That's treating the symptons and not the disease.

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"So little pains do the vulgar take in the investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand." Thucydides 1.20.3