Thread: Speaking of NGFS.......

http://www.navalinstitute.com.au/jou...le_vol_109.htm

Naval Gunfire Support for the Assault of the Al Faw Peninsular
By Lieutenant Commander Ivan Ingham, RAN

The purpose of this article is to provide a brief insight into events leading up to and the NGS firings conducted by HMAS Anzac during Operation Falconer.

Anzac departed Fleet Base West for passage to the Middle East Area of Operations (MEAO) and a second deployment to Operation Slipper at the end of October last year (2002). Following our return to the Gulf theatre, it was soon obvious that the nature and conduct of these Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) against Iraq had changed. Whilst the surveillance and boarding tasks undertaken by the RAN, RN and the USN in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) remained broadly the same, the types of vessels, traffic patterns and the tactics employed had continued to evolve. As such, Anzac and the other vessels involved in Boarding and MIO were kept extremely busy during the harsh Gulf winter through Ramadan, Christmas and the New Year. Shortly thereafter, it soon became evident that significant developments were occurring on the international stage and that the political and military landscape was about to undergo some fundamental changes. This led to a flurry of attempts by vessels to trade (whilst some of this was authorised, the vast majority of this activity was illegal trafficking) and a sharp increase in Iraqi and Iranian naval movements. This challenging level of MIO activity was tackled concurrently with unit preparations for an impending conflict with Iraq and whilst countering a developing threat from asymmetric attack and sea-mines.

Table-top tactic sessions and contingency planning in January led to a busy internal training programme during February and early March. Designed to ensure that all our final organisational, materiel and personnel preparations were tested and correct. Individual training covered a wide variety of activities. NGS, Close Range, Small Arms firings, Damage Control, First Aid, Rules of Engagement, International Law, the Geneva Convention and countering the increasing risk of Biological and Chemical Attack were all key areas for our focus.

In early March, our expectation of NGS tasking in the event of conflict increased with a visit by Major Peter Boyce RA(V). Appointed as the UK Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO) from 148 Forward Observation Battery, Peter was attached to 3 Commando Brigade (UK) for Operation Telic (the UK codename for our Operation Falconer). Arriving by Lynx helicopter from the Type 22 frigate HMS Chatham, we discovered that he had come to provide us with a detailed brief on the UK concept for future land operations and outline the over-arching Artillery Plan and their requirements for NGS. Afterwards, we took the opportunity to highlight the strengths and advantages of the Anzac class frigate in NGS. Gun reliability, weight of ordnance (NEQ), and maximum effective range were all obvious significant advantages our 5 inch system enjoyed over the RN Vickers 4.5 inch gun. Additionally, Anzac had a greater magazine capacity than HM Ships Marlborough and Richmond, the two RN Type 23 frigates already earmarked for NGS tasking, and a shallower draught than the Type 22 frigate Chatham (the other RN unit identified to participate) and both Type 23 frigates. I believe it is fair to say that although Peter was unfamiliar with our Gun and Combat System, he was soon impressed by our fine ship and its people and after spending a few periods with us soon became a great supporter and friend of Anzac.

As March drew on, we practiced our drills, refined our procedures and spent a great deal of time proving our communication nets, paths and equipment. The maintainers progressed with important fine-tuning and some lengthy negotiations resulted in the resupply of a quantity of 5 inch HEPD war-stock ammunition from the USN which ensured that our magazines were optimised at their maximum capacity.

We also took the opportunity to host an overnight visit by a team of five specialist spotters who had been embarked with elements of the Amphibious Forces in the RN aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal. These spotters, also from 148 Battery had been assigned to 3 Commando Brigade and would provide the interface between bombing aircraft, artillery units from shore and naval bombardment units at sea. For the next 24 hours, we conducted a variety of NGS drills whilst we conducted boardings and patrolled the mouth of the KAA. This period practising advanced training provided us with the ideal opportunity to demonstrate our skills and allowed to us to make strong bonds with this specialist team.

On Thursday 13 March, we departed the northern most patrol area and returned to the UN stop and search area COMISKEY to assist with UNSCR 986 compliant boardings of large merchantmen. Two days later on Saturday 15 March we departed COMISKEY to rendezvous with the UK tanker RFA Orangeleaf for what was likely to be our last opportunity to replenish fuel and water prior to conflict. Afterwards, we passed through ‘the Dugout’ live firing area to conduct a final live NGS and Alarm Barrage practice firing.

Further signs of the impending conflict occurred on the afternoon of Monday 17 March when 40 cargo dhows responding to reports from the BBC and CNN that offensive action was about to commence, attempted a mass-breakout from Iraqi territorial waters. The Indian crews later told our Boarding Teams that they were escaping Iraq in fear for their lives. Our task for the next 24-36 hours was to check all these vessels to ensure that none were carrying Iraqi military personnel or contraband (particularly mines, weapons, ammunition and explosives). Once boarded and deemed clear, the vessels were instructed to proceed south and clear of the NAG.

During the morning of 18 March we learned that our Prime Minister had announced the Government had authorised CDF to activate those ADF units already deployed to the Gulf, as part of any future US-led coalition operation against Iraq. Later that day, the Navigating Officer (LEUT Brendan Horn), NGLO and I visited Marlborough to call on Captain Anderson RN and his warfare team to discuss the conduct of any NGS tasking. (Although Anzac was considered the primary NGS unit, Marlborough had national communication paths vital for connectivity with UK Land and thus not available in Anzac. Therefore as the senior UK ship, Marlborough was nominated as the lead unit for any NGS tasking). The meeting allowed ideas to be exchanged and plans for the transit north-west through the KAA waterway into the Fire Support Areas (FSA) to be finalised. The meeting also proved crucial for determining our plan with respect to the timeline and tactical aspects including command, control and communications.

On Wednesday 19 March Anzac was directed to conduct a surveillance patrol of Iraq’s two large installations, the Min Al Baker Oil Terminal (MABOT) and the Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal (KAAOT). This was an important task, as it was believed that Iraq had placed a sabotage team, probably Special Forces, onboard the terminals. (Sabotage of these platforms would almost certainly lead to a massive environmental disaster that would affect world opinion and impact adversely on coalition maritime operations). Anzac remained between the terminals until late on 20 March when we witnessed coalition Special Forces successfully assault and secure these installations. During this period we also witnessed the start of the Tomahawk land attacks and return Scud missile firings from Iraq towards Kuwait. Against this background the NGLO provided a final brief for the Command team on the plan to capture the Al Faw Peninsular by 40 and 42 Commando Royal Marines (UK).

At approximately 2100 we were informed that H-Hour (the start of the pre-planned timeline) was at 2200 when we were to be at 30 minutes notice for NGS. A few hours later at 0050 on Friday 21 March we were detached to rendezvous with Malborough, Chatham and Richmond. Shortly after, at 0130, a sitrep pipe informed the Ships Company that we would soon be closing up our Cable Party, SSD and assuming Action Stations before starting our transit into the KAA for our passage up to Fire Support Area Juno.

By 0240 we were in NBC State One, Condition Patrol Alpha and had taken up a station 1000 yards astern of Marlborough who was employing her mine avoidance sonar. Both units then started to creep slowly north. Earlier, Chatham and Richmond had begun their journey up to the nearest FSA, Sword. A third and most northerly FSA called Gold was also available for activation if required. (Historians will recognise the names Sword, Juno and Gold from the D-Day Normandy landings of WWII).


Shortly afterward, at approximately 0330, an AC130 Gunship reported that it had detected an Iraqi PB90 patrol craft tracking south in the KAA towards us, which it subsequently engaged and sunk. We arrived in Juno at 0436 and after establishing communications with Spotter Number 1 from B Coy 40 Commando RM, who was located very close to the oil installation on the south-eastern tip of the Al Faw Peninsular, passed ship on station, guns up, ready for call for fire. In response, the spotter reported that Bravo Company had Good eyes on the area, that little resistance had been encountered, no movement on the military installation had been observed and that they had 2 Iraqi dead and taken 13 enemy prisoners of war.

At 0558 Anzac received the first ‘call for fire’ against a military installation with ‘own troops danger close’ to the south of the target. We fired 6 ranging salvoes followed by a burst of 5 rounds for effect. Afterwards, the spotter reported ‘Good Shooting’ and that ‘all rounds had landed effectively inside the installation’. About thirty minutes later, we were directed to conduct a ‘Re-fire’ mission at our previous target. We immediately re-engaged this target with a burst of 3 rounds which was also reported as ‘successful’.

Shortly afterwards, Chatham received a fire mission at another target inside the same military installation. However, this mission was interrupted at 0655 when she experienced a stoppage resulting from a misfire. As we had been monitoring and shadowing this mission we had taken the precaution of entering and processing Chatham’s target data and with our gun already assigned were able to immediately report ‘ready on target’. We then followed with two bursts of 5 rounds when we were told to engage at 0656. Again, the spotter reported ‘good shooting with the target successfully engaged’.

For the remainder of the day we remained on station in Juno with the Officer of the Watch working hard to provide weapon arcs across the bombardment area so that we could provide immediate back up to missions allocated to Chatham and Marlborough. Meanwhile, a large number of LUGM and Manta mines had been discovered in a tug and barge lying about two miles to our north-west, so we were ideally placed to act as a staging point for helicopters and RHIBs carrying EOD and boarding teams.

Shortly after sunset, the spotters reported that the marines were preparing their defensive positions and would only call upon us if they were attacked overnight. They informed us that they were going to secure their radios to save their batteries but asked us to maintain a good listening watch and requested that we stay at short notice to respond and be at immediate notice by first light the next day.

Early on the morning of Saturday 22 March we again closed up at Action Stations after receiving a report that three very fast moving contacts were closing from the north. Later, we learned that the contacts were US Special Forces and so we reverted to our modified defence watch manning. Later at approximately 1050, we were again called upon to provide fire support. This time the target was an Iraqi Type 59-1 field artillery piece that we engaged with 1 ranging salvo and a single burst of 3 rounds before receiving a report that we had destroyed the gun. Number 2 Spotter who was supporting D Company on the western side of the Al Faw Peninsular reported that ‘Anzac's rounds were again very accurate and very effective’.

Later that afternoon we received notice that the elements of 3 Commando Brigade were moving in very close to the main part of the Iraqi military installation and requested that we be ready to provide further fire support. Then at 1514, we were allocated a target in the Iraqi bunker complex, which we fired 7 single salvoes against before recording our data for future engagements. About fifteen minutes later, we were given a ‘New Target’ which we engaged by applying a correction from our previous target. A total of 3 ranging salvoes followed by a burst of 3 rounds were fired for effect. We then received notice that the Royal Marines were moving into position in readiness for a final assault on to the military installation.

Soon after we received instructions to Re-Fire against the bunker complex. However, after our first burst of 5 salvoes for effect, an error in the loading procedure resulted in a stoppage and a short interruption to our engagement. Nevertheless, the marines were able to continue advancing on to the target position, which they secured quickly and effectively without the requirement for any follow on bombardment. As the bunker complex was now secure, no further tasking was received and thus, Anzac had completed her last firing and the final NGS engagement of the conflict.


At 2150 that night the OC of the troops ashore sent the following message to Anzac and the three RN frigates:

Callsign P7O, Q0V and my manoeuvre callsign have now completed all initial tasks. The Al Faw Vegetation Belt has now been successfully cleared of all enemy and the Airfield and Military Installation are now both secure with no enemy resistance. Success was largely due to aggressive use of Indirect Fire assets and swift response of respective units that had a huge impact on the ground and shattered the enemy will to fight. Elsewhere on the Peninsular, friendly forces have achieved similar success although resistance was greater than anticipated from isolated pockets of enemy. On behalf of my C/S and P70, thank you for your swift response to 'Calls For Fire' and accurate shooting. Best Wishes to you all for a safe transit home. Bravo Zulu and Bon Voyage.

In order to have a unit available for any contingent tasking, Anzac was asked to remain on-call in Juno overnight whilst Marlborough, Chatham and Richmond departed their respective FSAs and headed south. We remained on the Gun-Line for a second night before departing the next day to rejoin the coalition task force. Firing the first and final NGS rounds of this conflict, Anzac also fired the most missions and remained on the gun-line in the Fire Support Area for the longest period.





About the Author
Lieutenant Commander Ingham is the Gunnery Officer and AWO aboard HMAS Anzac.