South Asia Analysis Group
Paper no. 202
23. 02. 2001
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Rethinking Indian Nuclearisation
by Rajesh Kumar Mishra
The resounding new debate on nuclear proliferation round the globe reflects further apprehensions among the existing nuclear weapon states. This new surge of nuclear debate can do no good but would considerably harm various new post cold war international initiatives on non proliferation. Suspicions are bound to cloud over the reorientation of upcoming foreign policies both at regional and international levels. Consequently, India, already burdened with lots of regional and international compulsions and being an active international actor, cannot remain unaffected by this new trend.
India’s quest for nuclear energy had started in 1974. The major shift in the philosophy behind Pokhran II from Pokhran I is clear manifestation of India’s neighbourhood threat perceptions and the associated global complexities. Overall, it is the reflection of an Indian understanding of the world security dynamics. Though, officially, India is still unequivocally committed to a world free from weapons of mass destruction.
Since long India has been facing a threatening nexus between China and Pakistan. These regional adversaries not separately but jointly act against India. Pakistan has been acting and responding to the Chinese meticulous inter-national plans quite swiftly. In fact, Pakistan has been behaving in a manner that definitely exceeds its strategic defence requirements. This uniqueness of hostile alliance may cause an arms race breaking out between India and China.
Unlike Pakistan, development in Indian nuclear science and technology is completely indigenous in nature and scope. And the weaponisation programme witnessed its flashpoint when five nuclear tests were conducted in May 1998. Subsequently, a broad framework for the development, deployment, delivery, command and control was proposed by the National Security Advisory Board on 17th August 1999. This draft proposal is commonly debated as India’s Nuclear Doctrine. The manifest capability and willingness of a nuclear weapon power to be responsible enough are indicated in the declaration of its “no-first-use (NFU)” principle.
The preamble of this document opens with India’s belief in complete disarmament and that the weapons of mass destruction constitute the gravest threat to humanity. The doctrine explains that the fundamental purpose of the Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces. And any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India would invoke measures to counter the threat. As a defensive document, it pleads for “credible minimum nuclear deterrence”.
The credible minimum nuclear deterrence theory is based on triad of nuclear attack – bombers/aircraft; mobile, ready to be deployed or deployed missiles; and sea-based carriers and assets. Presently, the Indian reliability on Mirage 2000 and Sukohi-30 is much in debate. The different variants of Prithvi (short-range ballistic missiles) are reportedly credible for their purpose with expected range and payload capabilities. Most significant, the series of Agni (intermediate range ballistic missiles) are being tested for achieving higher accuracy in reach and magnitude of destruction to the enemy state or entity. And, reportedly, the programmes are to pursue capability enhancement in the shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in shortest possible time. Though, currently not so transparent, India needs though not an elaborate one, but at least an effective command and control system.
Basically, India needs a strong defence build-up to face any bolt from the blue due to its neighbouring hostile countries- China and Pakistan. In fact, this has compelled India to follow the “credible” defensive plans and strategies that could have been otherwise avoided.
China has long been pursuing the policy of “encirclement of India”. In past, also, it has already shown belligerence against India. Of late, the establishment of radar base in Coco island (belonging to Myanmar) at place that is only a gunshot away from the Indian Andaman and Nicobar islands has alarmed the Indian defence. And the tracing of Chinese trawler fitted with modern electronic surveillance equipment off the Indian shores has created speculations in the Indian navy.
In addition, sources reveal that China is believed to have deployed some 125 long-range (1700 km or more) nuclear armed ballistic missiles. More so, it is reported that China is having some 150 bomber-deliverable nuclear weapons and 120 tactical nuclear weapons deliverable by short-range missiles or artillery. Again, it has been widely mentioned of Chinese move of deployment of nuclear forces in Tibet and other bordering provinces. The advancement towards Chinese DG-25 missiles is being specially planned as counter move to Indian development of Agni II and III missiles. It has also been reported that a further upgrade of Hong Niano-3 (HN-3) is now being developed with range increased to 2500Km for ship, submarine and aircraft launch.
China’s promotion of many of Pakistan's missile and technology programmes and acquisitions. SIPRI report ( SIPRI Yearbook 1997, Oxford University Press, New York) is set to further increase India’s concerns. Through logical coherence of events and facts, India might interpret China's continued technology transfers to Pakistan, as a product of Beijing's intent to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan. Alternatively, it might suggest that Beijing seeks to increase the capabilities of Pakistan in the hope that Pakistan might deliver a greater threat to India. According to its estimates, there have been numerous missile transactions from China to Pakistan. One series of transfers sent more than 2000 portable SAM missiles to Pakistan. Another group of transactions sent six LY-60N ship-to-air missile systems and almost 100 accompanying ship-to-air missiles to Pakistan. China has continuously been criticised for the transfer of numerous M-9 and M-11 missiles, each capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, to Pakistan. It has also been widely publicised that Pakistan acquired blueprints and equipment to build a factory for M-11 missiles in addition to the M-11 missile components from the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry.
In addition, RAND issue paper ( Jones, Gregory. S , From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan, RAND Issue Paper 192, March 2000) mentions that there are many reports of China having provided Pakistan with substantial aid to both its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. An alternative to a direct Chinese nuclear confrontation with India is for China to continue or even increase its aid to Pakistan. China’s goal would be to make it harder for India to use its superior resources to gain advantage over Pakistan. The issue paper also does not rule out the expected direct nuclear threat to India. It elaborates that China has a more complex nuclear policy that does not rule out nuclear attacks on its neighbours. It is not clear what China’s real nuclear policy is, but it might under some circumstances include the first use of nuclear weapons. Though this opinion reflects under-estimation of the Indian defence capabilities, one cannot deny the superiority of Chinese defence and economic strength and the fact that historically, China has been an aggressive and expansionist country cannot be overlooked.
Even the present global nuclear regime is discriminatory and non-transparent. This further adds to the Indian threat perceptions. Today, the attitude and justification of the erstwhile super powers as well as China reflect the same cold war underpinnings of mutual distrust and international permutations of national self-interests. And the complexities in the global power structure are bound to affect India’s foreign policy.
Any attempt to promote the continuity of cold war thoughts and foreign policy contours by the major international actors may further complicate the Indian foreign policy-making mechanism. The issues of national interest concerning both the defence and development should be effectively communicated at all international forums. And, in accordance with the needs, policy perceptions should also be changed. Openness in both words and deeds would aptly suit the future opportunities. While consolidating national defence, India should simultaneously seek to actualise all possible peaceful means to achieve international peace and prosperity.
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