Thread: Littoral Combat ships(History)

France actually built a dedicated "LCS" class - the Bougainville Aviso Colonial class, around 1930.
These were designed for standalone overseas littoral patrol duty, and carried light destroyer armament (three 5.4" guns plus 37mm AA guns and MGs), and could carry and support up to a company of marines, or also carry and lay up to 50 mines. They also carried a single seaplane. In WW2, they were modified as primary ASW escorts with mine rails replaced by DC rails, a ASW mortar fitted, and of course a heavier AA outfit.
Interestingly, they were a similar small size as LCS (2600 tons FL, 340ft long), but machinery outfit focused more on extremely long range than speed.
Post-WW2, the survivors were listed as frigates under NATO "F" pennants, previously they were listed 1st Rate Avisos. One acted as an escort in the Korean War, including for the Inchon landings.

Thanks for that Kato!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Very interesting.

I have discussed the MN before I probably wont here
but that doesnt mean they havent done some interesting things and some that parrelled the US and the UK as well.

No slight intended and any other info greatly appreciated!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Dont forget the Commandant Riviere frigates of the early 60s much the same approach.

I think I will discuss the UK/USN in this thread also instead of doing a separate one.

I forgot to mention the usefulness of the DD/DE ships in some other littoral operations such as defense of the amphibious ships and escort carriers off the beaches with the ultimate example being the DEs during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

In addition the DDs provided effective fire support in very close to shore to the point of grounding.

We now come to the end of the war and the great drawdown that lasted until June 25, 1950 when the Korean War broke out. Thank God for the USN which faced even more cuts .
With the chart below we will do a little back of the envelope analysis. Which should add a little perspective to my previous threads on force structure not to mention my future ones.

Ship Force Levels 1917-present

Force level drops by percentage from end of war until June 30, 1950.:

BB: 96%
CA/CL: 82%
Fleet Carriers: 61% This includes Light Fleet carriers little more useful than escort carriers. In June 1950 only four Essex class of twenty-four remained in commission( 3 new ie commissioned 1946 or later ) along with the three Midway class(2 new) for 63%. Two older light fleet carriers and two new ones were in commission.
Escort Carriers: 94%
DD: 64%
DE: 97%
SS: 69%
MW: 90%
Patrol: 97%
Amphibious:97%
Auxillary: 83%

TOTAL: 91%

You can see what was important to the USN then carriers, destroyers and submarines plus it has always remained so.

I was a bit surprised on submarines with that force accounting for only somewhere around 3% of the total of uniformed personnel.

Also you will see by this chart where the importance of the 600 ship fleet is derived. In June 1950 the USN comprised 634 warships if you look at the documents(which I have posted before) detailing the the 600 ship fleet plan if you include the SSBNs operational at the time 34 which the 600 fleet plan doesnt yuou come to excactly 634.

My point again is little changes in the USN and that only very,very slowly along with the fact the USN bound by tradition has a keen awareness of history and doesnt stray far from it even unfortunately, sometimes, the mistakes.

(SEE my post on USN LCS THREAD FOR SOME ILLUMINATION):

http://www.worldaffairsboard.com/nav...tml#post422893

In the late 1940s the USN and RN new that their existing DE type ships would be no match for the new submarines sure to fielded by the USSR.

So that we see the US first and the RN second embark on transforming existing destroyers into ASW optomised vessels.

Due to Korea and the fact that the predicted USSR submarine threat hadnt yet materialized the US/UK altered plans and gave limited upgrades to the rest of their existing destroyers. In particular the US.

Korea also demonstrated that the DMS, in particular, and the DM destroyer conversions along with the DE- APD conversions were not particularly useful and retired during the mid/late 1950s although a few of the APDs lasted until the late 1970's.

Although again the DDs provided fire support the Admiral in charge of those operations prized 8" gunfire over 5" and 6" which were found to be ineffective against concrete reinforced structures.

The British it must be mentioned provided many important carrier advances including the angled deck, mirror landing system and steam catapults all these new inventions were incorporated into USN carriers.

But here they part ways for the most part.

Thought they both built small ASW ships the reasoning was different.

The USN wanted to develop a new submarine chaser for coastal operations for "mobilization" purposes.

This resulted in the Dealey case which actually grew to the point where this class was seen as capable of escorting an Essex class ASW carrier conversion.

But while fast was seen as underarmed and lacking redundancy in the propulsion system for the cost.

Another attempt was made with the four diesel powered Jones class which were an abject failure.

The UK on the other hand was looking for a smaller, cheaper ASW frigate to complement the larger, more expensive Whitby class and follow-on slightly upgraded Rothesay ASW frigates along with AA and AD variants of the Whitbys.

None was seen as a carrier escort.

The USN at the time was also building new design large multi-purpose destroyers at first all-gunned armed but soon an emphasis on AAW missile armament.

The UK followed but on a far smaller scale they also during this time completed a handful destoyers begun in the mid-late 1940's more comparable to the USN Gearing class.

In the late 1950s the UK began construction of the secon-rate yet muti-purpose tribal class figates which lead the way to the ubiquitos and much admired Leander class similar in hull design to the Whitby/Rothesay classes.

But incorpoating the small helo, the point-defense AAW missiles, the long range air-detection radar of the Tribal class among other upgrades in fact really an entirely new warship with little in common with the Whitby/Rothesay except hull form, limbo mortar and the ever present twin 4.5" guns. The Rothesays were then ugraded to incorporate as many of the new features as possible.

The USN in the late 1950s were now faced a two fold dilema block obsolescence of the WWII built destroyers and an ever increasing ASW threat now even greater with the advent of nuclear powered submarines.

The USN simply couldnt afford to build enough new highly capable multi-purpose warships to replace all 250 Fletcher/Sumner/Gearing class destroyers in-commission at the end of the Korean War.

These concerns along with the Dealey operational experiments gave rise to a larger version of the Dealeys the Bronstein class which lead to the Garcia/Brooke classes and ultimately the Knox class frigates.

It also lead to the FRAM I/II ASW conversions of the Gearing/Sumner classes which was an expedient stop-gap measure until replacements could be built.

The primary dislike of the USN for these developments was the"secondary"** nature of ASW for the surface fleet.

**See link:

http://steeljawscribe.com/wordpress/...huntington.pdf

Along with a relative lack of speed and redundancy provided for the new DD replacements, lack of AAW missile focus and worse no focus on ASuW.

Even the Spruance class was blasted years before the first unit was even commissioned.

All of which leads us back to the OHP FFG 7 class which I discussed in the thread linked above.

I forgot to mention the OHP also mitigated some redundancy concerns as though it only had a single shaft and screw it did have two turbines(Gas in this case vice steam) and two drop down pods fwd that could bring the ship home at 6 kts.

But before I close for now the Asheville class Gunboats merit some discussion.

They were built in response to the Cuban missile Crisis.

At 40+ knots they were fast but at 245tons they were quite small and only carried a single 3" gun and a single 40mm gun.

But were "extensively" used in Vietnam.

Some WWII built DERs used until 1965 exclusively on Distant Early Warning patrol also saw a new lease on life for use off Vietnam.

The argument will always be about smaller or bigger?

AND

High-End or Low-End?:

And

Single-Purpose or Multi-Purpose?

Bye for now.

Originally Posted by rickusn

Dont forget the Commandant Riviere frigates of the early 60s much the same approach.

Yes, the Commandant Riviere were their direct successors officially. The concept, with the Commandant Riviere, was already "watered down" a bit though, as another focus was needed at that point (late 50s/early 60s) - the Commandant Riviere focused quite a bit more on ASW from the start. And the overseas possessions were mostly gone at that point, so the need for a system as originally designed wasn't there anymore.

As for the Bougainville class, in addition to what i said above, they were also built with very low draft for littoral operations.
8 ships were finished, out of 10 planned; out of these, three were scuttled at various dates (one at Toulon), one sunk to prevent capture, one was sunk by a RN sub in 1940. The other three survived WW2, and were kept in service until 1957/58, when the French completely renewed their WW2 fleet. All three saw further postwar service in Indochina or Korea up until 1956.

They were extremely versatile vessels; in WW2 used for both coastal and open-ocean convoy escort duty. During the Casablanca attacks, a Bougainville was used for combat SAR duty among the attacked French fleet, as well as some air defense - it downed at least one US aircraft during that. In the Pacific, they were used in ASW duty against Japanese subs. One was used to clandestinely land ground forces on Corsica. Postwar, Bougainvilles performed humanitarian/disaster relief in France's Pacific posessions, as well as anti-piracy patrol around Indochina. This involved in at least one occasion a direct interchange of MG/cannon fire with hostile ground forces in the Saigon Delta. One was later also assigned to training duties, alongside the old Jean d'Arc cruiser.

On the 250 WWII destroyers the USN attempted to replace.

They built 77 new units plus converted three WWII cruisers whose mission was similar to the latest new built DLGs of the mid 1960's.

The cancellation of the Typhon missile program set back surface combatant construction.

They got 75 units of the Bronstein/Garcia/Brooke/Knox class built.

The MFE called for 60 DD/DDG plus nuclear powered escorts but only 31 Spruances were built one as a pork project and six nuclear powered escorts.

Planned up to 75 OHP class reduced to 50 then fewer but wre added back and then Congress funded a final as pork.

Then the USN got the four bargain Kidds .

The proposed 600 ship fleet called for 238 destroyer type escorts.

And then the Ticos got started building .

And the USN even finally got the Burke program started to begin replacement of the 1950/early 1960 era ships.

Its not like the USN didnt try thats for sure.

What about Cruisers you say? 19 were in-commission at the end of the Korean War but this was inflated by units temporarilly commissoned to provide fire support for the reason I related earlier.

So if you consider that the USN considered one for each carrier to be sufficient and only one of those of a Talos missile configuration then 15 would be our #..

USS LONG BEACH CGN actually comprised the capbilities of a TALOS cruiser type ship and a Terrier destroyer type ship.

And the USN did convert six to various TALOS missile conversions(two of which were also configured as Fleet Flagships) and had planned another three which were canceled.

Along with keeping in service two all-gun cruisers that also were configured as Fleet Flagships.

So we come to fourteen planned 10 of which would be armed with Talos which was far more important.

Pretty close.

In the early 60's in reponse to the lack of high-end escorts now according to the uSN including even the newly FRAMed WWII era destroyers.

The USN experimented beginning in 1964 with using tree or four missile armed escorts for each carrier rather than the previous two(one after Korea) all-gun cruisers and eight destroyers(A DESRON).

Ther MFE study of 1967 confirmed that three or four missile escorts would be sufficient as long as they also were ASW capable along with two or three dedicated ASW ships.

The building of only 30 Spruances caused the USN to consider two sufficient.

But the FF/FFGs of the Garcia/Brooke/Knox class were assigned to carrier battlegroups from the outset and continued even after the Spruances were built because the USN may officially have stated that was enough but they knew damn well it wasnt by the mere fact of how they trained and deployed.

As late as 1988 Captain Galdorisi wrote that CVBGs were conceptually designed to contain four AAW ships, two Spruances and four to six FF/FFGs.

And while the battlgroups didnt always deploy with that many they did deploy with frigates not just the high-end ships officially conceptualized and sometimes in liu of some of those ships. Particulary for ASW.

This got even worse when in the late 80s early 1990's all the older DDGs/CGs/FF/FFG were retired and before enough Burkes were ready for deployment.

Leaving the OHP FFG 7 class to fill even the high-end DDG role for which it was ill equipped. Not that it hadnt from time to time before but now there was little choice.

Sorry for ranting a bit but sometimes the games that get played with force structure irk me a bit. LOL

It may have been a calculated, educated low risk gamble but its fortunate no one pressed the USN at this very vulnerable time.

Well more later.

Maybe :

On Captain Hughes architect of the ASW section of the MFE 1967. Wrote the book "Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice" 1986.and "Fleet Tactics and Coastal Operations" 1999/2000. Champion of small ships and in the late 1990s collaborated with Cebrowski with the so-called "streetfighter" concept.

"Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1952
Capt. Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. served two years aboard the
USS CUSHING (DD-797) as Navigator and DCA. He then
served on the staff of COMINRON FOUR before becoming
the Executive Officer of the USS SHRIKE (MSC-201) from
December 1954 until February 1956. Capt. Hughes then
assumed duties as the Commanding Officer of the USS
HUMMINGBIRD (MSC-192) until July 1957. After a threeyear
tour at the Naval Academy Capt. Hughes was the
Operations Officer of the USS ROBERT A. OWENS (DDE-
827) until 1962 when he was transferred to the USS
DYESS (DDR-880) as her Executive Officer.
Attending U.S. Naval Postgraduate School In Monterey,
California, Capt. Hughes earned a Master's degree in
Operations Research in 1964. He then attended Nuclear
Power Basic School in Bainbridge, Maryland followed by
studies at the Nuclear Power Training Center in West
Milton, New York, where he earned his qualification to
operate nuclear power plants. In 1965 he returned to the
DYESS serving again as her Executive Officer. From
August 1966 to August 1968 he assumed duties as ASW
Analyst on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP- 96). During this time he led the ASW analysis of the successful Major Fleet Escort Study which yielded the DX/DXG Program.

Capt. Hughes was Morton’s seventh Commanding Officer, from 8 October 1968 until she was decommissioned for modernization on 28 September 1969.

As of November 2002 Captain Hughes is:
Dean of the Graduate School of Operational Information and Sciences
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, Ca.

Note: This bio was taken from the WestPac 1968-69 cruise book and is therefore missing the years 1970 to 2002.

More on FFG -7 by Capt. Slade USN writing in Proceedings 1990.:

""In a service predominantly focused on carrier battle-group operations, the FFG-7 has often been criticized because it is not the advanced-technology, multipurpose destroyer the fleet operators really wanted"."

And still wants.

Being cynical:

When one considers that the USN knew this ship would cost $450m(before modules!!!) to build but demanded it be built for 220m even for the first unit which is always more expensive begs a question.

Did a faction in the USN deliberately scuttle this ship program?

Not to mention other limitations placed on the vessel plus keeping the speed requirement artificially high even though they knew that the helo capabilities requirement dictated a slower speed.

http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/pubs/Case%207%20LCS.pdf

"Its cost (estimated at over $450 million) and numbers (planned procurement of 55 ships) suggest that the Navy does not plan on losing large numbers of them. Further, its CONOPS call for it to operate under the protection of the rest of the fleet in most threatening situations."

Washington Pulse

"The original estimates were close to $400 million, not $220 million, but the Navy was so focused on proving that it could build an inexpensive warship that it allowed contractors to submit lowball estimates, the official said."

Now how could this be????????????

Plus the fact that in April 1986 the USN stated they would never again build a frigate type ship which LCS surely is.

And isnt it a coincidence that this was the year Capt. Hughes book "Fleet Tactics" came out endorsing small ships?

Which have been totally dismissed by the USN!!

So LCS essentially has become a $500m+ MCM/Small helo carrier frigate? ship?.

And people wonder why its canceled? Or worse blame its cancellation on factors other than what is really occurring?

No wonder the USN sources I have pressed on LCS have stone-walled me at every turn for four years now!!!! LOL ROTFLMAO

Correct me if Im wrong on any of this.

I surely would like to be.

Im pro-Navy how does this look to the USN detractors fo which there is a multitude?

It could be an ugly winter for the USN barring unforseen events.

I also starterd rereading this. Some good stuff in there which is alternately good and not so good for the USN and LCS. But is certainly an important analysis.:

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publicati...040218.LCS.pdf

"Admiral Clark approved the LCS over the objections of his own staff and to the irritation
of key portions of the surface, submarine, and aviation communities. If this be the case,
the thinking goes, the LCS could be terminated as soon as his tenure is up.'

Well it did take a bit longer.