Thread: U.S. Navy Cancels LCS 4

From StrategyPage

The Littoral Combat Ship program has suffered another serious blow with the Navy terminating the construction of LCS-4, the second of the two the trimaran designs (Independence-class) that General Dynamics is using. Both LCS programs are suffering from serious cost overruns, and the Navy now has seen both LCS-3 and LCS-4 fall victim to this. This does place General Dynamics and Lockheed on a more equal footing.

The LCS is intended to be a low-end vessel with a high top speed (over 90 kilometers per hour), and capable of carrying out a number of missions, including minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare, special operations support, intelligence/surveillance, and even logistics, through a modular design that would allow the ships to use various mission packages. These ships were intended to replace the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and other vessels. So far, the cost for the LCS has ballooned to roughly $200 million, and this is before any mission packages are added. The basic armament of the LCS is a 57mm gun, point-defense systems like the Rolling Airframe Missile and the Phalanx Close-in-Weapon System, and a variety of decoys and electronic warhead gear.

The LCS, like the DD(X) is several times more expensive than the previous vessel in its class. The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates cost around $68 million each to build (about $100 million today). For that money, the Navy got a 3,600 ton warship with a top speed of 55 kilometers per hour, a 76mm gun, the ability to carry two helicopters, and (prior to the removal of the Mark 13 missile launchers) the ability to use Standard surface-to-air missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. The Perry also proved to be a very tough design. In the 1980s, the Stark and Samuel B. Roberts survived anti-ship missile hits and a mine respectively. For the price of one LCS, the United States Navy could get two new Perrys which could carry out most of the same missions.

The debate over ship costs and who is to blame for them will rage for a while as the Navy will not only have to fight contractors (and their congressional patrons), but also among themselves as they have to decide whether to keep building older designs like the Burke-class destroyers (about $1 billion each). The blame really goes all-around. The contractors often submit bids that are on the low side, but at the same time, the Navy has had a nasty habit of introducing essential, and expensive, changes during construction. Environmental regulations have also gotten stricter – often standards that are tightened just for the sake of tightening them. This costs shipbuilders money – and the costs get passed on to the consumer (in this case, the U.S. Navy).

The below is not a defense of the LCS or a denigration of the FFG 7 but IMHO touting the FFG 7 program is way off the mark.

StrategyPage while it sometimes has some interesting info usually has an axe to grind and Ive found its facts and figures to be often arbitrary and capricious and/or taken out of context.

But military equipment costs can be a difficult aspect to reconcile as they are as changeable as the wind plus they depend on what is being counted, why, when and by whom.

Actually this isnt true.:

"The Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates cost around $68 million each to build (about $100 million today). "

This is:

"The contractors often submit bids that are on the low side, but at the same time, the Navy has had a nasty habit of introducing essential, and expensive, changes during construction. "

See here:

http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/142393.pdf

This isnt:

"the ability to carry two helicopters"

Well actually it is but they couldnt operate two as originally built much less as originally designed.

In fact most of the first units didnt have as completed and most never got two helos, fin-stabilizees SQQ-89, Towed Array, LAMPS III capability,RAST,CIWS,SLQ-42 ECM. Those that did had to have expensive alterations. Not to mention the MK 92 fire control stunk and had to be expensively upgraded but only 12 ships got the CORT upgrade, 10 got an off-the-shelf ORDALT.

Even still w/o a 3-D radar plus the SPG-60 was inferior to the SPG 51 and SM-1 was inferior to SM-2 these ships did not have an effective AAW suite.

That these ships survived some serious damage is again IMHO more a testimonial to their fine crews. In particular the SB Roberts which literally nearly split in half and only the ingenuity of the crew held her together.

Here is a document worth reading:

http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/108301.pdf

Here are some comments I made at Galrahns blog.:

I didnt argue with "successful" although it took massive expenditures to make them so.

And I quote:

"Thus, it can be seen that at least the initial units of this class were not well equiped for most forms of war at sea when they were commissioned: despite this, they are ton for ton, the most expensive ships being built for the navy at this time."

And more:

"TWO hundred and two million dollars was authorized by the Congress for the lead ship."

Four times the $50m cost constraint put on the ship by Zumwalt.

"Detailed design of the FFG-7, then known as the Patrol Frigate, began in May 1973. The $94.4 million lead-ship construction contract was awarded in October 1973 to Bath Iron Works Corp., Bath, Maine. Construction began in March 1975, and the lead ship was delivered in November 1977. In February 1976, the Navy awarded contracts to Bath Iron Works and to two Todd Shipyard Corporation yard in Los Angeles and the other in Seattle for construction of 11 follow-on ships. Additional contracts were awarded to these yards.

The 1973 estimate for a total program of 5O ships was $3.2 billion, with an average unit cost of $63.8 million. The Department of Defense estimated at September 30, 1978, that the cost of a 52-ship FFG-7 program would be $10.1 billion, an average cost per ship of $194 million. Two primary factors causing this increase were the addition of equipment that was not included in the original cost estimate such as a towed sonar, fin stabilizers and electronics equipment and much higher than anticipated shipbuilding costs.

From the inception of the FFG-7 program, the Navy recognized a need for a large number of these frigates to replace World War II destroyers retiring from the fleet. In order to meet this numerical requirement, stringent design controls were placed on the size and cost of the FFG-7. Keeping down size and cost naturally led to some sacrifices in operational effectiveness, most of which appeared to be good management decisions. There were several areas where cost constraints may unduly effect operational effectiveness. Four matters are (1) the selection of the short-range AN/SQS-56 hull-mounted sonar, (2) the decision to include only minimal space, weight, and stability margins for modernizing the ship, (3) operation and maintenance of the ship, and (4) ship survivability."

And :

Cost increased to approximatley "$221 by FY 1980"

FY 1982 CBO estimate for FFG 7: $280m

So lets see $64m, $194m, $221m, $280m and indeed the cost actually increased more in the 1980's to over $400m per ship IIRC.

And even then:

These ships had vey early in life hull cracking over 70% of their length opening the MK13 magazine to seawater among other areas and again a very expensive retrofit.

"The "short-hull" Perry-class frigates are being retired at an advanced rate, even though they have 20 years left on their life."

And this is most damning for the classes shorfalls in capability:

"The FFG-7 class was designed from the keel up as a total warfare system, capable of operating independently or as an integral part of a carrier or surface action group."

The Protection of Shipping designation of this and the other frigate classes is a myth perpetuated by the USN and many others so that the ships the USN really wanted would at least have some hope of getting built.

And in fact the USN tried every many to make these ships into "high-end" ships in name if not fact becasue the USN not only had every intention of using them so but did use them as such.

My whole point is to use this program as a poster child for excellence in a warship program is ill-advised.

Unfortumately this ship(FFG 7) like the Garcia/Brooke/Knox class and now the LCS are cast by the USN as not battlegroup capable units but in fact were, are and will be cast in that role despite limited capabilities and high-cost.

The USN already states that "two LCS will be embedded in Carrier Strike Groups.".

But this is not new because a historical look at the FF/FFG classes will show you the same operational use.

And heres Norman Friedman on why POS is a myth.:

"Convoy protection was not so important as the protection of naval formations because, it could be argued, there were so many merchant ships in Western service that even substantial losses early in a war could be sustained."

In fact the actual designated convoy escorts actually resided in reserve in the form of the mass of WWII built DEs for which there never was a replacement program.

In fact:

"Thus, as of 1982, the issue of the mass replacement of the "low end" Second World War has been resolved:there will be no mass replacemnets, unless the United States makes asuden decision in favour of massive increase in defence spending."

Anyway I was going to go into much of this in my littoral combat ship thread but I felt this needed to be answered now.

So i amy as well throw out some more nuggets on the FFG 7 class.

It was actually originally concieved to be three variants of one hull for ASW, AAW and ASuW.

The ASW built around SQS-26 and ASROC.
The AAW built around the MK 13 launcher.
The ASuW built around 5" guns and Harpoon.

With the development of manned-ASW helos fo frigate sized-ships and the towed array then SQS-26 and ASROC could be dispensed with.

Along with the fact that it was thought("Ironically") that plenty of ASW escorts already existed.

Yes it is true other navies ahd fitted manned helos to this sized ship.

The Canadiens went large with Sea Kings(10 ton) and the UK went small with Wasps(1.5 ton) and later Lynx(4 ton) and now Merlins(15 tons)(but thats a whole other story).

The USN chose Sea Sprites(6 ton) first and later Sea Hawks (10 ton).

With the development that Harpoon could be fired from the Mk 13 AAW launcher the ASuW variant could be dispensed with.

But with size and cost restraints no 3-D radar could be fitted and only a STIR adaptation of the SPG-60 for illumination was supplied to provide two FC channels resulting in a relatively ineffective AAW outfit.

The 76 mm gun and CIWS were after thoughts due to cost and the need to have the MK 13 launcher moved from aft to fwd when the decsion was made to incorporate a larger hanger.

In particular one only needs to look at the location of the 76mm gun to understand its lack of usefulness.

Anyway I had planned on fleshing out my recent LCS thread plus my US/UK comparison. now that will have to wait.

Originally Posted by rickusn

StrategyPage while it sometimes has some interesting info usually has an axe to grind and Ive found its facts and figures to be often arbitrary and capricious and/or taken out of context.

Very true. I usually include a disclaimer before posting StrategyPage articles.

In addition to arbitrary and capricious, I would add the words "flippant", "exaggerated" and "dismissive".

Still and all, as you said, their articles usually have some interesting info.
You just have to view like a Wikipedia article.

Good point by point dissection by the way

One thing I especially agreed with is the fate of the Samuel B Roberts. VADM William Rowden, then-head of NAVSEA remarked just after the mining "Had she been left to her own devices, she likely would have sunk. The real thing that separates losing this ship from saving this ship was the performance of the crew."

This is not to take away anything from the designers and builders of the Roberts but as rickusn said, the article was rather arbitrary and capricious in failing to mention the superb D/C efforts by the crew.

In fact, just before deploying to the Gulf, Roberts earned several Mission E's, including D/C and missed the Battle E only because she was so newly in commission.

"In addition to arbitrary and capricious, I would add the words "flippant", "exaggerated" and "dismissive"."

LOL

And a few more that I chose not to use so as not to be seen as unduly derogatory.

ROTFLMAO

Originally Posted by rickusn

Gunnut:

Im not high on the La Fayettes but your question hits the nail on the head.:

"Why can't we buy or design something sensible and economical ...?"

Of course there are so many factors to consider and no matter what the USN builds someone will be unhappy as a look at USN shipbuilding history will prove.:

"Why can't we buy or design something sensible and economical ...?"

Stay tuned for a short history of USN littoral combat ships history beginning with the WWI "flush-deck" destroyer conversions of WWII.

And maybe a little more about USN Force structure Post-WWII/Korea and USN/UK warship program parrallels/divergence and comparison/contrasts.

If there is interest.

It doesn't have to be the Lafayette. Something along the line of a 3000t to 4000t shallow draft vessel that's simple, not expensive, and certainly no lavish spare-no-expense design philosophy. The result is probably not the state of the art vessel that takes forever to build and costs as much as a destroyer. But it will perform the job adequately and we can have enough of them.

I read long time ago that there are 3 aspects to any job: fast, well, and cheap. We can have only 2 out of the 3. Something has to give.