Battle Of Midway Discussion

**TopHatter** · 08 Oct 07,, 11:52

Originally Posted by Ironduke

Correct me if I'm wrong -- but wasn't Midway almost exclusively a carrier battle? If so, both the Japanese and American support vessels were superfluous. While Japan clearly had an advantage in battleships, destroyers, cruisers, and so on, did they really play a part in the battle other than being anti-aircraft platforms?

Yes, they did indeed.

Although, a few notes on AA:

For Japan, the AA situation was rather odd.

First, Japan's huge numerical advantage was negated by spreading their ships all over the Pacific.

Even with that numerical advantage of battleships, they (the Kongo's excepted) were too slow to keep up with Nagumo's carriers.

The Japanese AA suites weren't particularly heavy on their escort ships. The carriers tended to have more AA guns than any other ship.

Their destroyers weren't comparable to the USN DDs in antiaircraft capability.

As for playing a part besides the AA role, there is always the potential for ASuW and the very real events for both screens in the ASW role (Nautilus constantly stalking the Nagumo force and I-168's successful strike on Yorktown)

Originally Posted by Ironduke

The US had a 1:45 - 1 advantage in fighter aircraft. I'd think that the land-based aircraft (127) would have had a faster turnaround time than the carrier based aircraft (233).

Not particularly so.

Remember a goodly portion of the Midway aircraft were big Catalinas (who ironically scored the only successful torpedo hit - aerial or otherwise - of the entire battle) and Flying Fortresses (well-nigh useless in the anti-ship role).

In addition, during the Tomonaga strike, the fuel-handling equipment went up in flames meaning hand-pumps had to be used. Like filling the Hoover Dam with a thimble.

The fighter advantage was nullified by not having all of the fighters being able to operate together as a semi-unified team (all part of the same task force.)

The superiority of the Zero was also an obvious factor.

**Dreadnought** · 08 Oct 07,, 14:26

IMO,

The IJN carriers lacked sufficient AA coverage. The carriers themselves carried more AA weaponry then they're own plane gard destroyers could. The starboard AA batteries had very limited arcs of fire where as the bridge and the flight decks were concerned. The galleries were also located below the flight decks outboard ergo not being able to fire across the deck and making them take radical turns in order to unmask the galleries themselves while making an easier target for multiple bombing/torpedo runs. By allowing their CAPS to be lured from the home carriers they set themselves up for the damage they incurred.

In addition IJN doctrine for the carriers control relied heavily on radical looping turns to avoid damage however as certain books state it may have worked well for "green" pilots but certainly not against an "A" team attack especially for the older and slower carriers such as Kaga.

**wabpilot** · 08 Oct 07,, 16:17

Originally Posted by zraver

The US won by accident, ....

I would disagree to a certain extent. Admiral Nimitz said we were "shot through with luck." The First Air Fleet showed up exactly where Intel said they would, and they attacked Midway first, as Intel said they would. Our search was more thorough, which was the result of years of perfecting the doctrine. Our second attack, by luck, was far more coordinate than it might have been. But, the victory was the result of good intelligence work, solid planning and solid execution. Luck played a part, as it does in every battle, but we made our luck. We put the right assets in the right place at the right time.

We also disrupted the Japanese intelligence gathering operation. We put our submarines out before they did. We hit French Frigate Shoals denying the Japanese a refueling base for their aerial reconaissance of Pearl Harbor. We sailed from Pearl before they thought we would.

**wabpilot** · 08 Oct 07,, 16:22

Originally Posted by Ironduke

Correct me if I'm wrong -- but wasn't Midway almost exclusively a carrier battle?

It was, but only because Nimitz refused to expose his battle line and because Spruance was equally reluctant to engage in surface action. Nimitz made a strategic decision to hold Pye's battle line on the west coast. On the first night of the battle when Yamamoto was steaming full speed eastward, Spruance deduced that he might do that. Thus, Spruance withdrew denying Yamamoto's Main Fleet a target for surface action.

**Tin Man** · 08 Oct 07,, 16:50

Did the IJN ever break USN codes? I know the USN broke IJN codes and the German`s partially broke RN Admiralty codes. Of course, German Enigma was repeatedly broken, interestingly by Poland before the war, who at least started the work and gave the US and British a head start.

Somebody mentioned it earlier, how much influence did ULTRA have on the actions at Midway?

**zraver** · 08 Oct 07,, 17:56

Originally Posted by wabpilot

I would disagree to a certain extent. Admiral Nimitz said we were "shot through with luck." The First Air Fleet showed up exactly where Intel said they would, and they attacked Midway first, as Intel said they would. Our search was more thorough, which was the result of years of perfecting the doctrine. Our second attack, by luck, was far more coordinate than it might have been. But, the victory was the result of good intelligence work, solid planning and solid execution. Luck played a part, as it does in every battle, but we made our luck. We put the right assets in the right place at the right time.

We also disrupted the Japanese intelligence gathering operation. We put our submarines out before they did. We hit French Frigate Shoals denying the Japanese a refueling base for their aerial reconaissance of Pearl Harbor. We sailed from Pearl before they thought we would.

We did that by accident, our planes arrive din dribs and drabs and accidentally pulled the zeros low. That was neither planning nor execution but luck. If the Zeros had been high, or if the Japanese pilots had fought as a team and not as a gaggle of warriors then the high approach would have been blocked.

An American loss at Midway would have shattered the war effort. Saratoga and Ranger could not have gone on alone. Torch would have to be canceled while the US built new flatops. A Japanese win at Midway could have extended the war by a couple of years or more. By the time the new US fleet was ready the secondcrop of Japanese naval pilots that went down in the Marianas would have been graduated and seasoned over Australia and in the Indian Ocean.

**Dreadnought** · 08 Oct 07,, 20:11

Im not so sure I agree. The Japanese zero had an excellent rate of climb by its stats. They could have scaled to that elevation within moments and cut the attacks to pieces had they been paying attention and not "target fixated" as according to most popular critics. According to them the CAPS and every lookout onboard the carriers Akagi and Kaga were fixated on the battle at hand between the zeros and the low level attack planes thus taking their eyes off of the attack forming high above their own carriers until they pushed over and by then it was far too late for the CAPS to do anything about what was going to happen next. Just opinions.

**TopHatter** · 09 Oct 07,, 00:53

Originally Posted by TIN MAN

Did the IJN ever break USN codes? I know the USN broke IJN codes and the German`s partially broke RN Admiralty codes. Of course, German Enigma was repeatedly broken, interestingly by Poland before the war, who at least started the work and gave the US and British a head start.

I don't recall exactly where I read it but I believe the Japanese might have broken USN codes for weather reports (a mundane thing for you and me...life or death for sailors and aviators.) but were limited to mostly traffic analysis based on volume.

(Dang I wish I could remember where I read that...just a few days ago too. I must be getting old or something.

)

Originally Posted by TIN MAN

Somebody mentioned it earlier, how much influence did ULTRA have on the actions at Midway?

Tactically or strategically?

Strategically, Ultra was everything to the USN. They were able to predict virtually every move that the Japanese made in advance...starting with the first and most important piece of information: What is their target? (the answer of course was Midway)

Tactically Ultra wasn't of much use at all, simply because you need time to decode and translate the information and that means days or weeks of work when the battle is taking place over a relative period of hours

Originally Posted by zraver

We did that by accident, our planes arrive din dribs and drabs and accidentally pulled the zeros low.

Agreed.
Like I said earlier:
You also need your commanders in the field and their men behind the triggers to do their jobs well, otherwise you simply know a lot about an impending disaster.

Originally Posted by zraver

That was neither planning nor execution but luck. If the Zeros had been high, or if the Japanese pilots had fought as a team and not as a gaggle of warriors then the high approach would have been blocked.

Agreed again. Neither the IJN nor the USN had proper CAP coordination and it showed.

Dread, who don't you agree with?

**zraver** · 09 Oct 07,, 01:33

Originally Posted by TopHatter

Agreed again. Neither the IJN nor the USN had proper CAP coordination and it showed.

Dread, who don't you agree with?

It was even worse for the Japanese who had developed a doctrine of individual combat based on the experiences of China. They never developed the leader/wingman concept and it plagued them throughout the war. American and ANZAC pilots called flights of Japanese fighters a gaggle or a swarm for a reason. At midway it mean every pilot went low to kill a gaijin, later in the war it meant individuals had to fight 2-1 vs heavier faster aircraft that could take an ungodly amount of punishment.

Fire in the Sky, the air war in the South Pacific is a great read on Japanese air combat tactics and plane design and how the allies countered.

**TopHatter** · 09 Oct 07,, 02:06

Speaking of AA, we forgot the most important thing: Fire Control

**wabpilot** · 09 Oct 07,, 03:59

Originally Posted by zraver

We did that by accident, our planes arrive din dribs and drabs and accidentally pulled the zeros low. That was neither planning nor execution but luck.

I quoted Nimitz on our luck. But, you are dead wrong if you think it was all an accident. An accident that our patrol was done by the book? An accident that our patrol found the carriers? An accident that our sole focus was on attacking the Japanese carriers? An accident that we sent only the carrier task forces and submarines? An accident that we broke the Japanese purple code? An accident that Nimitz issued the orders he did? An accident that Spruance turned east after dark? No not one single accident. Each of those was the result of planning, practice or both.

In fact, the one "accident" you mention should have happened. The accident was Enterprise and Hornet not getting their strikes off on time and in good order. The doctrine and the plan was for a coordinated attack. Fortune smiled on us that first day when our people put together a coordinated attack out of what was a foul up. But, the plan was for a coordinated attack and that's how it started out. The fact is it really did happen as a coordinated attack, just not the one that was planned.

**Dreadnought** · 09 Oct 07,, 15:37

Originally Posted by TopHatter

I don't recall exactly where I read it but I believe the Japanese might have broken USN codes for weather reports (a mundane thing for you and me...life or death for sailors and aviators.) but were limited to mostly traffic analysis based on volume.

(Dang I wish I could remember where I read that...just a few days ago too. I must be getting old or something.

)

Tactically or strategically?

Strategically, Ultra was everything to the USN. They were able to predict virtually every move that the Japanese made in advance...starting with the first and most important piece of information: What is their target? (the answer of course was Midway)

Tactically Ultra wasn't of much use at all, simply because you need time to decode and translate the information and that means days or weeks of work when the battle is taking place over a relative period of hours

Agreed.
Like I said earlier:
You also need your commanders in the field and their men behind the triggers to do their jobs well, otherwise you simply know a lot about an impending disaster.
Agreed again. Neither the IJN nor the USN had proper CAP coordination and it showed.

Dread, who don't you agree with?

TH, The one thing I disagree with is the thought that "if the zeros had been higher". Not pointing fingers here. The Zero's had every ability to gain that crucial altitude however they were distracted. Its not that the aircraft was not capable in any case. It was the pilots that were not thinking about the "what if's? And as we know it was the "what if's" that led to their disasters aboard their carriers by not spotting the aircraft that were aproaching at the higher altitudes nor the lower while they were tangling with the much lower attacks over and between the other carriers drawing them away from their home carriers leaving them as sitting ducks when U.S. planes started to push over into their dives.

**zraver** · 09 Oct 07,, 17:53

Originally Posted by wabpilot

I quoted Nimitz on our luck. But, you are dead wrong if you think it was all an accident. An accident that our patrol was done by the book? An accident that our patrol found the carriers? An accident that our sole focus was on attacking the Japanese carriers? An accident that we sent only the carrier task forces and submarines? An accident that we broke the Japanese purple code? An accident that Nimitz issued the orders he did? An accident that Spruance turned east after dark? No not one single accident. Each of those was the result of planning, practice or both.

In fact, the one "accident" you mention should have happened. The accident was Enterprise and Hornet not getting their strikes off on time and in good order. The doctrine and the plan was for a coordinated attack. Fortune smiled on us that first day when our people put together a coordinated attack out of what was a foul up. But, the plan was for a coordinated attack and that's how it started out. The fact is it really did happen as a coordinated attack, just not the one that was planned.

And not one shred of that would have mattered if the Japanese had kept a high cover. The air groups would have been slaughtered and the American carriers sent to the bottom.

**Dreadnought** · 09 Oct 07,, 18:05

If we consider that question would it not have been a simple question of reinforcing the CAP long before this time instead of being fixated/distracted.

IMO I would state that numerous factors where working against Nagumo when all this had transpired.

The Americans did among others one thing right. Irregardless of the damage they caused the Americans continued to launch,launch,launch keeping the Japanese in the defensive mode. Something nobody had been able to do to the IJN. Outside of the CAPS Nagumo was waiting for a moment to launch that just would not come and the waiting was what doomed them that day IMO.

**wabpilot** · 10 Oct 07,, 20:57

Originally Posted by zraver

And not one shred of that would have mattered if the Japanese had kept a high cover. The air groups would have been slaughtered and the American carriers sent to the bottom.

Well, Admirals Nimitz, Fletcher and Spruance would disagree, not to mention the aviators who actually fought the Japanese at Midway and elsewhere. The IJN was not invincible. Had their CAP been in place, and had it been able to penetrate our fighter escort, there would have been more US losses, but we would still have hit some of the carriers.

The Japanese search pattern was still defective. The Japanese were still dithering about hitting Midway or the carriers which were not certainly located.

Finally, had Fletcher lost his air groups, he would have simply withdrawn. Or do you not understand the instruction to be guided by the principal of calculated risk? Only an idiot would have sailed around Point Luck waiting for the Japanese to counter attack. Fletcher was no fool. He would have high tailed it out of there. Leaving the Japanese to try and take Midway with a substandard amphibious force.