Thread: FFG-7 weapons questions

Originally Posted by Master Chief

They should have put a RAM missile system there. That at least gave the ship a small limited air-defence system.

In the early 90's we did a feasibility study of putting RAM on the FFG-7 class ships. We even went up to General Dynamics that was building them then and witnessed their tests.

The biggest problem was where to put it. Most people wanted to put it just aft of the smokestack. They argued with me about having to put up ablative shields so a slow launch or hangfire doesn't burn through the uptakes and dump exhaust fumes of 20% Hydrochloric Acid down into the ship.

General Dynamics claimed their missiles don't hang fire. They were embarrassed that I reminded them that just the day before we got a report that one of their Tomahawks hang fired on the Missouri.

Addition of the RAM without taking something else off would push the stability envelope of the ship. Already we had to do the 3100 ton Shipalt to move waste drains up, add ballast, add reinforcement straps, etc. for the increasing topside weight of the ships.

If everybody wanted RAM, I pushed to have it replace the 76mm gun forward of the stack. The vacated ammo magazine below would be a perfect magazine and maintenance shop for the RAM launcher.

Though I like guns, a 76mm is just a tad too small for a warship. It won't cause enough damage to a ship of equal or larger size and is too slow in firing for anti-suicide boat defense. It's a good tank destroyer gun but not a Naval gun. Otherwise why did the Navy dump all of the 3"/50 single and twin mounts in favor of CIWS?

It's a shame they can't mount an old twin 5-inch/38 on them. At least then they'd look the part.

Originally Posted by rickusn

Dunno if the fake gun was really a joke. Officially maybe.

Unofficially Ill bet there is more to this story.

"More than meets the eye"?

According to the DT commentary, that mount is sitting on a wooden pallet.

Maybe it's a red herring of some kind?

Originally Posted by TopHatter

It's a shame they can't mount an old twin 5-inch/38 on them. At least then they'd look the part.



"More than meets the eye"?

According to the DT commentary, that mount is sitting on a wooden pallet.

Maybe it's a red herring of some kind?

Well, that's NOT a weapons system on there. Look closely and TopHatter starts off on the right foot by noting the square "box" is sitting on wood. Actually wood dunnage rather than lighter weight pallets. Look even closer and you can see four tie-downs coming off the top corners onto the missile foundation sub-base lifting padeyes.

Those are diffinitely access door panels in the side of the "box". What looks like a gun barrel sticking out of it I don't think is even on the ship. Rather its some boom of some sort pierside. What leads me to that possibility is the vent piping going behind the box looks like it is coming up just forward of the launcher foundation. But in reality I think it's some sort of ductwork on the pier and the foreshortening of a telephoto lens is throwing everything out of focus.

That is until somebody comes up with a photo from a different angle.

Personally I think it is merely a "Test Van" set on top of the vacated launcher foundation. We did that on many ships to test shipboard systems or potential installations of electronics and/or weaponry. It always confused people to see something like a USO donut hand-out trailer on a ship.

Originally Posted by RustyBattleship

They argued with me about having to put up ablative shields so a slow launch or hangfire doesn't burn through the uptakes and dump exhaust fumes of 20% Hydrochloric Acid down into the ship.

Hmmm, i think the German Navy uses ablative shields in only one of their RAM mountings - on the Gepard class, see below. Since a hangfire would blow straight onto the Exocet launcher there.


In most other cases, the placement is such that nothing precarious is in the way, or a hangfire would fire into a structure that is built for that anyway (like the forward RAM on a Brandenburg, where a hangfire would go into the side of the VLS - which is built for this kind of abuse anyway).

The USN is still downsizing so why would money be wasted on a new gun for a Guided Missile Frigate which in fact is really just a patrol ASW gunboat due to the fact that all ship launched missiles have been removed from these ships? The Navy should scrap the entire FFG-7 class, discharge all the crews that man these ships and use the money that is spent operating these ships to build new ships.

Actually ALL the FFGs were slated for decommissioning circa 2000 except possibly retaing 10-12 for the NRF.

On cost grounds the Spruances/Kidds began decommissioning in 1998 not to mention decision not to refuel the CGNs as they came do.

The OHP FFG 7 class is far cheaper to maintain and operate by nearly 40 to 50% if I remember correctly ie 35m to 18m or 33m to 19m a year something like that.

I have the exact #s somewhere maybe even posted somewhere on this site.

But costs grounds was not the only reasoning.

Politically the USN wanted to push forward DD21/DD(X)/DDX/DD1000/Zumwalt class or whatever nomenclature you wish and also to continue purchasing the excellent DDG 51 IIA class.

But in any case the OHP FFG 7 class is scheduled to begin decommissioning again in 2010 and most if not all will be gone by 2015.

Again any remaining ships will be in the NRF.

Of course the LCS difficulties may delay or extend these dates unfortunately.

But their only real capability resides in the two Helos the operate and why they are often paired with a Burke I/II class.

Although you see this less and less as more Burke IIAs are commissioned.

And of course there inherent abilities as patrol vessels.

So why did the navy decide there will be no more frigates? Did they figure that all work will be done by 9000t missile destroyers in the future? I think that's kinda foolish. There should be smaller ships to serve in lower intensity areas and utility roles. Free up the larger ships for more serious work.

Originally Posted by gunnut

So why did the navy decide there will be no more frigates? Did they figure that all work will be done by 9000t missile destroyers in the future? I think that's kinda foolish. There should be smaller ships to serve in lower intensity areas and utility roles. Free up the larger ships for more serious work.

Which is exactly why the LCS provokes such strong feelings in people.

Ive expounded on similar questions before. But for Gunnut and others who missed my previous offerings I will expound a bit on the issues yet again.

So why did the navy decide there will be no more frigates?

On a Ton for ton cost basis the OHP was an exceedingly expensive ship to build.

Because preliminary designs in mid-1980's for a replacement for the much maligned Knox class grew to as much as 9200 tons.

Both the Knox(and the preceding Garcia/Brooke classes) were more often than not integrated into CVBGs despite their inherent limitations for such a purpose.

The OHP class too began fulfilling roles including CVBG players.

They were widely dismissed as "Helen Keller" ships because of all their serious limitations.

No 3-D radar, lack of fire control channels, no LF bow-mounted sonar, one shaft, lack of speed, lack dedicated AShM, lack of All-weather ASW weapon, lack of medium caliber gun among a myriad opf other shortcomings including the nearly useless and very vulnerable 76mm gun due to its placement.

TO be sure many updates and fixes were implemented to help SOME of the OHPs cope but this was very expensive and added considerable weight to the detriment of hull integrity and stability..

Their inherent ability to hangar and operate to LAMPS II helos was a major plus, relative low manning and annual operating cost were also major pluses.

And during the late 80's to the late 90s did outstanding work even remarkable duty.

The USN drawdown post-Cold War made the need for many. relatively cheap POS(Protection of Shipping) vessels as in convoys end quite abrubtly.

Combine this with the carrier drawndown to twelve carriers with no more than 11 considerd deployable and we enter the "no mans land" of # crunching.

With 11 deployable carriers with one other always in a 3-4 year SLEP and the JFK included in the deployable 11 also designated as an NRF/Training ship
110-120 surface combatants was deemed more than sufficient sufficient.

AS the USN since the late 40s had used conciously or not a 10-1 surface combatants to carriers(later Carriers/Convoys with the demise of the dedicated ASW carriers) ratio leaving out any ships considered non-deployable.

Plus too the reduction in airwings to 10 plus another carrier usually undergoing a year long maintenance availability and the gutting of the Reserve Wing gave evidence and impetus to those who did the counting to continue dropping the requirement to 100 surface combatants. And this in fact did happen. Only now with decommissionings ended and more Burke IIAs coming online are the #s creeping slowly back up.

So what the USN really wanted was the 27 Ticos, 28-30 Burkes, 4 Kidds and 31 Spruances and as many as 10-12 OHPs in service by OCT 1, 2000. ie 110-114 surface combatants. The OHPs further reduced if the USN would be allowed to refuel and upgrade some or all of the nuclear powered cruisers of which nine were built.

Then the individual Spruances/Kidds/Early Ticos/EarlyBurkes would decommission or displace the OHPs in the NRF as the Burke IIAs and the DD-21 came available. And the hope also was to increase the surface combatant fleet to a full 120 with no OHPs whatsoever ASAP politically.

Did they figure that all work will be done by 9000t missile destroyers in the future?

Precisely!!!!

I think that's kinda foolish.

Not if your goal is filling out CVBGs and other major warfighting formations vice POS.

There should be smaller ships to serve in lower intensity areas and utility roles. Free up the larger ships for more serious work.

That role and mission was seen to have mostly gone away with the virtual disappearance of the POS paradigm to resupply Europe.

If your surface combatant OOB has been cut in 1/2 but your major assets carriers and HVU units such as the the large deck amphibious ships have not?

What happens when all hell breaks loose???

That was the risk inherent in keeping the OHPs operational vice the Spruances and was even riskier in the mid/late 1990s until enough new Burke DDGs came on line.

And the risk will not go away entirely for many years yet.

However many seem to be proposing that not only should we have kept all 51 OHPs in service but to have built more frigates.

For me the risk outweighs their utility and has.

Gunnet,

History of the Oliver Hazard Perry program here, with comparisons to LCS and today.

Another excellent article Galrahn but I have two points that may need clarification.:

AFAIK the OHP hulls are steel and the superstructures are alumininum.

I know for a fact that this is a bit off unless you mean for USN frigates.:

"The FFG 7 introduced new propulsion with gas turbines, "

As the USSR introduced this type of propulsion in surface combatants.

And it was in frigates of other nations including the USSR by the early 1970's.

The USN lagged far behind in adopting GT propulsion.

The Spruance class introduced the gas turbine to USN surface combatants.

Originally Posted by rickusn

AFAIK the OHP hulls are steel and the superstructures are alumininum..

Nope Aluminum hull is accurate, they used steel plates 3/4 the strength of other warships of the time as well.

This was a factor in both the Stark and Roberts incidents in the Gulf, and was a factor in repair of both ships as well.

Originally Posted by rickusn

"The FFG 7 introduced new propulsion with gas turbines, "

The Spruance class introduced the gas turbine to USN surface combatants.

ya you are correct there, Ashville is another example, I should have pointed out the gas turbine single screw which was considered the novel approach of the time. Oh well. Nice catch though.

"Nope Aluminum hull is accurate, they used steel plates 3/4 the strength of other warships of the time as well."

If they are aluminum hulls then why the reference to "steel plates"?

Can you provide documentation on these aluminum hulls.

Or Ill have to stand by my steel hulls and aluminum superstructure belief.

Aluminum Armor

"In contrast, the steel hull frigate USS Stark was hit by two Iraqi Exocet missiles in 1988 and survived. "

More:

"There was alot of arguing at the time that US Frigates because of their stronger steel hulls would have faired better."

More:

" Section F.7: Aluminum in warship construction There are many misconceptions and incorrect stories regarding the use of aluminum in warship construction.


One common story is that HMS Sheffield, a destroyer sunk during the 1982 Falkland War, was lost because her alleged aluminum superstructure made her more vulnerable to damage. This story is completely untrue, because Sheffield's superstructure was not aluminum. Like all ships of her class, her hull and superstructure were entirely steel. Aluminum played no role in her loss.


Two Royal Navy warships lost during the Falklands War did have aluminum superstructures, and their loss is incorrectly attributed to this feature. Ardent was hit by seven 500- and 1000-pound bombs, plus at least two more bombs which failed to detonate, and sank some six hours after the attack. Any warship of her size, regardless of aluminum or steel construction, would likely be sunk by this many bombs, so aluminum cannot be blamed here. Antelope, another aluminum-superstructure ship, was struck by two bombs, which lodged in the ship but failed to explode. Later, while one of the bombs was being defused, it exploded, blowing a major hole in the hull and starting a large fire. The fire eventually reached the magazines, causing these to explode. Again, an aluminum superstructure appears to have little connection to the ship's loss, which was caused by the explosion of the bomb and the magazines.


A related story claims the US Navy and Royal Navy abanonded aluminum superstructures, in favor of steel, as a result of the Falklands war. Since aluminum superstructures played little or no role in the Falkands losses, this story is obviously untrue. The Royal Navy's switch to steel appears to be a result of a 1977 fire in the frigate Amazon. In the US Navy, the switch from aluminum to steel superstructures was a result of the 1975 collision between the carrier John F. Kennedy and the cruiser Belknap. The collision caused major fires aboard the cruiser, and her aluminum superstructure essentially melted; she was reduced to a badly burnt hulk. This incident lead to a decision to adopt steel superstructures in the next new warship class, the Arleigh Burke (DDG 51) class destroyers. This decision had been made prior to the Falkands War."

From: sci.military.naval FAQ, Part F - Surface Combatants

More:
"The Arleigh Burke class breaks with previous American construction practices, by being built entirely of steel, rather than having a steel hull and aluminum superstructure."

And yet more:

"Construction materials include a steel hull with an aluminum superstructure."

"In both attacks, the ships suffered intense fires aggravated by the all aluminum construction of the superstructure."

More:

"A lookout spotted the first Exocet just seconds before the missile struck, tearing a ten-by-fifteen-foot hole in the warship's steel hull on the port side before ripping through the crew's quarters. "

This has been a recurring issue and of course I never save the discussions for long enough.

Thanks
Rick

Your right, I confused myself. Aluminum superstructure, steel hull is right. I'm having a dyslexic Monday. Sorry Rick, I'll get some coffee and learn to read for next time.