Thread: LCS 3 to be Cancelled?

It will certainly be interesting to watch this. It is possible I suppose they may stop production when we get a new president or cut back the total production of ships.

I hope they kill it, because now that they have funding for 2 DD(X)s, which I think would be smart to build, they can cut the remaining DD(X)s and start over... also a smart move in my opinion.

In the meantime while they go back to the drawing board, they can build a few more DDG-51s, some LPD-17s, more SSNs, and fix the logistic ship shortage.

Galrahn,
Just some clarification. Are you saying that you would like to see the Navy cancel the entire LCS and go back to the drawing board, or just the Lockheed version?

Originally Posted by HKDan

Galrahn,
Just some clarification. Are you saying that you would like to see the Navy cancel the entire LCS and go back to the drawing board, or just the Lockheed version?

Build what has been ordered, including both DD(X) and all of the LCS hulls purchased to date that can be built affordably, and cancel everything else, including the CG(X).

I no longer have any faith in the LCS, and given the cost issues right now and the commercial issues surrounding the yards, the costs of the DD(X) and CG(X) represent slow death to the Navy without either a tremendous boost to the Navy budget or a new plan.

Since we know there will be no extra money in the budget, the new plan option is the best option.

The entire LCS program should be cancelled, the USN is being ripped off for having to pay between 300 to 400 million dollars per LCS for such a small, weakly armed ship that the LCS is.

It would be better if the Navy decomissioned all 30 FFG-7 class frigates, 9 Ticonderoga class cruisers, 6 Austin class LPD, four Tarawa Class LHA and CVN-65 as well as cancel all LCS orders. All the money saved by these cuts could than be used to build larger numbers of DDX and CGX, Virginia class SSN and San Antonio class LPDs, sooner and faster. Also the Navy could pressure Lockheed Martin to re-design LCS as a Frigate to reduce cost and produce a more balanced design in regards to speed, endurance, complement and armament. (35-45 knots, 10,000-12,000, 100 to 185, 16 cell vertical launch ESSM, RAM, one 76mm gun, CIWS, two mark 46 triple torpedo mounts, two 25mm cannons, four .50 caliber Machine Guns and two helicopters)

Once the new shipbuilding rate has stabalized at 15 ships per year, than the Navy could bring the nine Ticonderoga class
cruisers back into service.

Yearly construction from 2008 to 2018:

1 CVX ordered every three years.
1 LHDX ordered every two years
4 DDX or CGX per year
5 LCS/Frigates per year
1 LPD per year
2 Virginia Class SSN per year
1 Auxilary ship per year

2008-2018, total new construction:
2 CVX
40 DDX/CGX
50 LCS/Frigate
20 Virginia class SSN
5 LHDX
10 San Antonio Class LPD
10 Auxilary Ships (oilers, supply, sealift and special mission ships)

Originally Posted by JMH

It would be better if the Navy decomissioned all 30 FFG-7 class frigates, 9 Ticonderoga class cruisers, 6 Austin class LPD, four Tarawa Class LHA and CVN-65 as well as cancel all LCS orders.

I think that is a recipe for disaster. You would remove another carrier, reducing our total to 10, then remove 9 of the most powerful class of ships in the world more than a 14-20 years before they are ready for retirement to spend money on ships with outrageous costs associated with them, retire 30 ships with more aviation capability than all but 6 of the worlds Navies without a replacement plan, then retire 10 marine ships which is .8 of one of the US Navies afloat MEBs further reducing the capability of the USMC assault capability well before any of their replacements are built or ready, all to improve the Navy?

I would disagree with the suggestion that your plan is a roadmap for the US Navy to take a positive step. You are advocating retiring a Navy fleet with plenty of hull life left larger than all but 3 Navies worldwide as a first step, forgive me if I think that plan is flawed.

We could just keep building DDG-51s and design a real frigate instead of the LCS. The LCS is fine of r$220 million but at $450 million they're complete rip offs.

This might also be an appropriate time for the Navy to send a "we mean business" sort of message to shipbuilders.
I really can't see the Navy cancelling the entire program though. After all the talk about needing more capability in the littorals, not to mention the fact that the FFG's we have now need to be replaced ASAFP, I just cant see them dumping the whole show. The Lockheed Martin version, maybe. But not the whole program.
Then again, what do I know?

It is easy to blame shipbuilders, but it appears there is a good deal of blame that needs to be directed to the Navy as well.

The reasons for the cost overruns from the LM perspective are as follows:

- The initial program’s aggressive acquisition plan, which resulted in a moderate risk program plan that provided little flexibility in the areas of cost and schedule from the outset.

- With little schedule flexibility from the outset, the program was significantly impacted by the insertion of new shipbuilding standards and build specifications (shortly after contract award and at the conclusion of Final Design) that introduced extensive changes, above those expected for a lead ship. The Naval Vessel Rules introduced over 14,000 new technical requirements which required review and adjudication to determine applicability to the Lockheed Martin LCS design. This in turn drove many of the over 600 engineering changes on the lead ship.

- Adverse material shortages (e.g., steel needed for U. S. Army wartime requirements) and a vendor supply issue on a major component (i.e., main reduction gears delivered six months late) that forced out-of-sequence ship module construction in order to minimize the impact to the overriding program management goal --- schedule.

- First-of-Class issues associated with the process of transitioning a new ship design into production.

Testimony House Armed Services Committee

The Navy plan forward for the LCS is as follows:

During the 90-day stop work period, the Navy will complete an Industry / Government Root Cause analysis; evaluate contractual terms / conditions for proceeding forward on LCS 3; assess LM management team’s ability to deliver LCS 1 and LCS 3; revalidate earned value management system at Marinette Marine, Gibbs & Cox, and LM; re-baseline cost and schedule; revalidate contract performance status, and cost control processes in place; conduct an independent Program Management Assist Group (PMAG) and take corrective actions. The Navy will then perform a similar assessment for LCS 2 and LCS 4. Based on the findings and recommendations the Navy will develop a proposed financing plan regarding the cost growth. The Navy expects these initial actions to be complete within the first 30-45 days following the LCS-3 stop work.

The Navy is also determining how much of the lead-ship cost increase will carry over to follow ships, assessing company actions to regain cost control, and evaluating changes to improve Navy program management and oversight. The Navy will also develop an acquisition strategy for LCS 5 and follow which factors in the results of the LCS assessments and chosen course of action. This acquisition strategy assessment is expected to be complete within 90 days.

Navy Testimony in the same hearing

It really isn't about blame though. There are a good number of NGOs that will be put in front of both the House and the Senate this year that are going to ask very interesting questions about the Navy's current shipbuilding strategy. So fat I think the Navy has 7 budgeted and 3 more in this years budget.

There are a lot of hurdles to jump just to get the next three, much less the next 48.

BTW, I honestly don't think they will cancel LCS-3, but I think they may not build more this budget year and very likely could buy DDG-51s instead. The reason I don't think LCS-3 will be canceled is because it is being built by Bollinger Shipyards Inc.

This soon after Katrina, there is no political way in hell Congress will allow the Navy to cancel the contract even if the Navy wants to, particularly when the cost overruns for LCS-1 are in Marinette Marine Shipyard.

Good point about the shipyard. Politically LCS-3 is going to be very hard to sink.

Originally Posted by Galrahn

- With little schedule flexibility from the outset, the program was significantly impacted by the insertion of new shipbuilding standards and build specifications (shortly after contract award and at the conclusion of Final Design) that introduced extensive changes, above those expected for a lead ship. The Naval Vessel Rules introduced over 14,000 new technical requirements which required review and adjudication to determine applicability to the Lockheed Martin LCS design. This in turn drove many of the over 600 engineering changes on the lead ship.

IMHO, one huge source of cost overruns is the changing of the original design specification, leading to costly redesigns and delays. Its happened with the LCS. (And why did they decide to grandfather the changes? Where they that important?) The constantly changing capabilities and roles of the DD(X) & its predessors has led to overruns with those programs. THere are many more examples and they are not confined to the Navy.

Why do specifications change? I have a few ideas.
1. THe constant changing of military program managers as they move from post to post or are promoted out of their job. The new guy wants to put his stamp on the project or has a different idea/philosophy and makes a change.
2. Poorly written contracts that leave out specific capabilities or word them so poorly that the original intent is not met, requiring a change to achieve the intent. Working in the industry, I've seen this first hand. The contractor did everything (and more) that was directed by the contract, but there was not enough money to do everything that was desired as the contractor did not budget for them. In addition, the lack of specifics in certain areas meant that while the contract was fulfilled, we had to do a lot of extra work on our end to make everything fit properly.
3. The next gee whiz gadget or idea comes along and they want to include it in the base production ship.

I am sure that there are others. Here are a couple possible solutions:

1. Keep PMs on longer to improve stability. Fire those that don't perform. Do not let specifications change unless approved by higher. Now this will reduce flexibility a lot, but it will hopefully save some money.
2. Improve your contracts writing process. Pay these people more and attract better & brighter people, plus add more of them. They are chronically overworked and have to rush what they do to get to everything.
3. Revolutionary costs money, see F22. Evolutionary brings capability increases without breaking the bank. Hold off from including every new capability that comes along. Design your hull to accomodate improvements and buy them later when they are fully researched, designed, and fielded.

Some discipline needs to be incorporated into the shipbuilding process or we will spend ourselves out of a Navy.

Originally Posted by Galrahn

I think that is a recipe for disaster. You would remove another carrier, reducing our total to 10, then remove 9 of the most powerful class of ships in the world more than a 14-20 years before they are ready for retirement to spend money on ships with outrageous costs associated with them, retire 30 ships with more aviation capability than all but 6 of the worlds Navies without a replacement plan, then retire 10 marine ships which is .8 of one of the US Navies afloat MEBs further reducing the capability of the USMC assault capability well before any of their replacements are built or ready, all to improve the Navy?

I would disagree with the suggestion that your plan is a roadmap for the US Navy to take a positive step. You are advocating retiring a Navy fleet with plenty of hull life left larger than all but 3 Navies worldwide as a first step, forgive me if I think that plan is flawed.

The money to fund a new Navy that is able to win a Naval and air war against China in 2020 is not going to come from Congress, so it needs to come from the Navy. A new generation of kinetic energy and Laser weapons needs to be developed and deployed on CGX and DDX size warships if the Navy hopes to survive long enough to win in a confrontation with China in 2020. Forty DDX and CGX destroyers would more than make up for the loss nine Ticonderoga class cruisers, (which could be brought back into service if needed).

Because the Navy is not able to provide adequate Naval gunfire support, it would be rather foolish for the Marines to conduct a large scale amphibious assault. Consequently, the effects from the loss of Austin class LPDs and Tarawa class LHA's until they are replaced by more capable LHDX and San Antonio class LPD's would be rather insignificant.

It is irresponsible to keep deploying the Oliver Hazard Perry class FFGs to high threat areas, when in effect they have been reduced to ASW patrol gunboats by the removal of all Standard and Harpoon missiles, which leaves them very vulnerable to air, anti-ship missile attack and surface attack. But than again, perhaps if a few FFG-7 class Frigates are sunk and or damaged by Iranian anti-ship missiles, Congress might actually increase funding for the US Navy, but that would be rather callous if the human cost is any consideration. Whatever the case, the Navy needs to get laser weapons and kinetic energy weapons deployed at sea on missile cruisers and destroyers by 2020 if the Navy expects to survive and win in an all out naval and air war with China in 2020.

Do you think that you are being a little too generous with the capabilities that you are giving the Chinese in 2020? Nobody can tell you what the PLAN is going to look like in 13 years, but IMHO it is pretty safe to assume that at that stage they will not have eclipsed the USN.

Originally Posted by HKDan

Do you think that you are being a little too generous with the capabilities that you are giving the Chinese in 2020? Nobody can tell you what the PLAN is going to look like in 13 years, but IMHO it is pretty safe to assume that at that stage they will not have eclipsed the USN.

The PLAN will not be much of a problem, except for perhaps their submarines; it is the PLA Air Force of thousands of aircraft and anti ship missiles that could effectively overwhelm almost any ship based air defence by 2020. Also, Peoples Republic of China Strategic Rocket Force anti-satellite missiles, which could destroy all US Navy communications satellites and make netric-centered warfare useless in the middle of an air-sea engagement between China and US Navy near Taiwan. This would than make the USN carrier strike groups vulnerable to swarm attacks from huge numbers of Peoples Republic of China anti-ship missiles, short-range ballistic missiles and aircraft.

Also, advanced long-range missile's from China could be used to try to destroy US warships as they left port in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, Apra Harbor, Guam and Yokosuka, Japan to head for Taiwan.

Laser air defense weapons deployed onboard CGX size cruisers and DDX size destroyers would effectively shoot down all incoming Chinese missiles and still leave enough space onboard to carry offensive weapons that could be used to destroy Chinese land, sea and airbases with long range missile strikes from locations at sea near Taiwan.