Thread: LCS a disaster?

Navy Issues Stop Work Order for Littoral Combat Ship 3 Announced


The Navy has issued a stop work order today to Lockheed Martin Corp. Maritime Systems & Sensors unit, Moorestown, N.J., for the construction of the third Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This stop work order will take effect immediately and is for a period of 90 days.

The stop work order was issued because of significant cost increases currently being experienced with the construction of LCS-1 and LCS-3, under construction by Lockheed Martin.

“I determined that at this point in time it was critical to stop work on LCS-3 to assess the LCS program and ensure we understand the program’s cost and management processes before we move forward. It is essential that we complete LCS 1 and get it to sea so we can evaluate this new ship design” said Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter.

The Navy is working closely with the contractor to identify the root cause of the costs growth. The Navy is reviewing the overall acquisition strategy for the LCS program and is working closely with the contractors to keep this program on track.

The contract for LCS-3 was awarded June 26, 2006, for $197.6 million, and the ship is being constructed at Bollinger Shipyard, Lockport, La.

"The Littoral Combat Ship program remains of critical importance to our Navy. With its great speed and interchangeable warfighting modules, the ship will provide unprecedented flexibility, allowing us to combat almost any specific threat -- from enemy mines to submarines to even pirates. It will help us defend our nation not just in the deep blue, but up close in the coastal regions of the world where our enemies like to hide and where so many of our friends and partners strive to prosper," said Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen.

The Navy is committed to the LCS class ship as it remains the cornerstone of the future fleet by providing critical capability.

For further information, contact Navy Public Affairs at (703) 697-5342.

Rick - do the figures include the figures for the "mission modules"? My reading is no. My understanding was that LCS plus module would cost ~$400 mil, so the figure for a mission ready LCS would be far higher than the costs above. A lot of money for a light frigate...

Expensive yes.

I dont remember the cost of the modules and of course am having a hell of a time trying to find the estimates. LOL

The cost of building the LCS hull has grown from $220 million to $270 million. But the average cost of the mission modules has dropped, from $180 million to $70 million.

The Navy is saying each ship will require 1.5 mission modules, so the total amounts average out to about $400 million per ship, says Robert Work, naval analyst with the Center for Budgetary and Strategic Studies.

The ship was made to appeal to foreign navies as well. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel have expressed interest in acquiring the LCS for their navies.

The Navy is on track to buy 55 of these ships, says Buzby. But Work predicts the Navy will build more, especially if foreign navies purchase the LCS.

The strict timelines make the LCS challenging, says Fred P. Moosally, president of Lockheed Martin maritime systems and sensors. “It’s a program you have to manage very carefully,” he says.

By 2015, Buzby predicts the Navy will have 30 littoral combat ships in the water and may have many other mission modules in production.

The Navy Third Fleet, based in San Diego, is responsible for developing new ways to employ the ship, says Buzby.

Navy officials are encouraged by the excitement that the LCS has spawned in the fleet, says Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton, the executive officer for Navy ships. “The intellectual fervor generated from mission modules has given rise to a whole cottage industry,” Hamilton tells a Surface Navy Association conference. “If you have the interface, they will come,” he adds. Special operations forces, for example, are considering employing the ship for various missions. Others are suggesting that the LCS should have a hospital module and a logistics module to transport cargo. “This is just a start,” says Hamilton.

Breaking yet another Navy tradition, the littoral combat ship will be manned by sailors whose complete training will take place ashore in ship-specific facilities.

The first such shore-based training center, being built in the San Diego homeport of the first four LCS ships, will become operational in June, says David Shikada, LCS training manager for Lockheed Martin Corp., which built the first ship, the USS Freedom.

Lockheed is building simulation-based trainers designed to instruct LCS crews in bridge management, ship navigation and handling, propulsion plant operations and mission control center operations.

“We are actually training officers in simulators before they get to the ship,” says Buzby. “What a novel idea, to have training facilities in place before the ship is ready to go.”

Current training programs prepare sailors in classrooms before they are sent aboard ships for on-the-job training.

“What we’re doing in the LCS is we are reducing and, hopefully, eliminating the on-the-job training piece,” says Shikada.

Because the LCS operating concept calls for ships to remain forward deployed, crews will swap out on rotations. The Navy is planning to man the first four littoral combat ships with blue and gold crews, says Buzby. When one crew is deployed, the other crew will have access to the shore-based training facility.

Lockheed is working to get the simulation systems up and running by June. “We’re in scramble mode. We’re trying to sweep up funding from a variety of sources that are available to develop the initial capability,” says Shikada. “There’s so much more to be done that we’re not on task or on contract to do, because of the trickle stream of funding.”

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.o...tExpansion.htm
January 2007

From something you posted in an earlier LCS discussion on the board. I'm suspicious at the modules coming in so cheap - particularly if the figure is meant to include a H60 R or S. The ASW/MCW modules don't really work without a helo, and it seems bizarre if the cost isnt included.

If the cost does grow to even $350 mil per hull, plus ~$120 mil for 1.5 modules per ship (conservatively) each ship is fast approaching half a billion dollars... Or approximately the same as a FREMM with longer range, proper organic AAW, CM capability etc...

There is no doubt that warship building costs have escalated to IMHO out-of-control.

There are many factors involved and they dont appear confined to the USN.

Most nations apparently, it appears to me anyway, are reducing the capabilities, robustness and/or production runs of their ships to contain total costs among other efforts to hide the true costs..

These cost mitigating avenues of approach may well be shortsighted.

But the alternative, again it appears, is having no new ships at all.

And that is where the USN is headed at least in the short-term.

With the Burke production run finally winding down after two decades or so an the LCS/DDX/CGX in increasingly trouble due to cost escalations makes for a bleak outlook for USN warship building. Again IMHO.

I just dont see the USN continuing the Burke program as fine as it has been in some respects.

I also dont see the USN relaxing its construction standards or reducing capabilities among a coupla of the variables.

And for the LCS design changes in the fast-track,immature program are inevitable and historically this greatly increases costs. One only has to see what it did to the cost of the LPD 17 class.

So I sure dont know or have any answers. Alas.

Even the more mature Virginia class SSN program is experiencing some difficulties and this is even after helping the RN with the Astute program.

All I can say is Thank God for the Burke IIA class or the USN would be in even more serious trouble as regards force structure.

"Force Structure" and "Administrative & Tactical formations" are what really interests me.

I hate it when cost and technical considerations get in the way. LOL

The LCS should have been far more experimental. Betting the ranch on it may well not pan out.

Even worse skimping on upgrades(only about $six million per ship) to the OHP's may come back to haunt the USN.

As there is now little choice but to decommission most if not all them early in the next decade. And those remaining of little value by that time except for NRF use.

Trying to reconstitute a further upgrade program for them now would not be cost effective in my estimation either.

Thanks for the module figures. I have many of them from various sources and times but I cant find them at least not quickly.

Helicopters have historically never been included in warship costs.

In fact the USN is desperaatley fighting to keep the module costs out of the picture as much as possible also. They are not now included in the shipbuilding accounts.

It is interesting, the stop order is only specific to the Lockheed version. There is no indication as of yet GD version is having the same problems, which means nothing.

It will be interesting what the Navy tells the new Congress when budget testimony starts in March.

I have not heard to much on LCS 2 USS Independence but there are some who are less than enthused on the design.

In the January Issue of USNI's Proceedings is an article entitled LCS: A STEP, NOT AN END which touches on many of the issues we have been discussing.

The issue isnt online yet I hope it is soon and places the article up for viewing.

Another view courtesy of CDR Salamander.:

http://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/20...ship-name.html

Wednesday, April 05, 2006
LCS-2 gets a big ship name
Time to beat my head against this wall again.

Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has named the Navy's newest Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) – Independence.
Why is it that we are wasting a name like “INDEPENDENCE” on one of the overpriced, underarmed, fast and not so furious, cheesy, “mission modules that don’t exist but on PPT and paper,” Little Crappy Ship?

Naming LCS-1 FREEDOM was bad enough. Just to build the callous on my head up some more. FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE belong on capital ships. FREEDOM and INDEPENDENCE need to be as big as their ideas. You put a name like that, especially one with such a tradition as INDEPENDENCE, on a CVN, LPH, or at least a SSN. It is almost like the little insecure kid of any age who buys a Pit Bull, brags about his prowess in all testosterony, and makes his friends call him “Hoss” or “G-One” – you just want to ask, “Why so insecure – what are you trying to compensate for?” I can almost hear it now……

“The USS INDEPENDENCE was sunk yesterday when confronted last night unescorted by a (insert country X here) Corvette. According to initial reports by a surviving crewmember, the Corvette was disguised as a South African Corvette of the same class operating in the same area. Their UAV provided clear pictures with no indications that it was from Country X.

Though able to defeat the two SSM fired at her, she was unable to escape at high speed due to damage from a 76mm round to her stern, keeping her to under 20 KTS. The Corvette was able to stand off outside the range of the only remaining significant weapon, the INDEPENDENCE’s 57mm gun. With the superior range of the Corvette’s 76mm gun, the enemy was able to leisurely destroy INDEPENDENCE in less than 5 minutes. With over 30 hits to her hull and superstructure, and on fire in multiple locations – the Captain of the INDEPENDECE could not control the fires onboard and abandoned ship with a loss of 30 of 65 crewmembers. Of the surviving 35 crewmembers, 20 had significant injuries. From initial SSM fire from the Corvette to the sinking of the INDEPENDENCE, the engagement took less than 20 minutes. The INDEPENDENCE was returning from a Mine Warfare mission and was not equipped to confront the superior firepower of the other warship.

The Corvette was sunk early this morning while trying to return to port, 10 miles from its territorial waters, by a Marine F-35 flying off the newly commissioned USS Clinton (CVN-21). Country X reports there were no survivors.

Vice Admiral Whisenhant-Black, COMFIFTHFLT, has ordered all remaining LCS to be escorted by either one of the Burke class DDG, or similar Allied warships while conducting operations. With only two ASUW modules available, and those still under evaluation, the risk of the remaining LCS operating independently for Mine Warfare or ASW is too great as they are needed to support Special Operation once those modules arrive.

On a similar note, this morning President Feingold stated that action would not be taken against the remaining Naval units of Country X as there is no way to determine if their Corvette initiated action, or if as charged, the INDEPENDENCE initiated hostile action when its embarked UAV attempted to collide with Corvette. The fact the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer were killed in the action along with all onboard records have made determination of the initiation of hostile action difficult. The President would not confirm or deny reports that he talked to the President of Country X after the sinking of the Corvette and apologized that he didn’t first ask for clarification about what happened first and that he had not authorized any action against the Corvette. Additionally, he would not respond to questions about a request by Country X for a UN investigation into the night action.

Initial buzz around the John Murtha Building (formally The Pentagon) is that VADM Whisenhant-Black may be relieved. That is seen as unlikely by many insiders due to her close relationship with the Secretary of the Navy McKinney and past support for her career by Vice President Boxer. Murtha Building watchers are keeping an eye on Secretary of Defense Sullivan’s schedule next Tuesday, where he is to take a bike ride with VADM Whisenhant-Black after her testimony at the Senate Armed Services Committee about need to restart the cancelled DDG-1000 program.”

Originally Posted by rickusn

I have not heard to much on LCS 2 USS Independence but there are some who are less than enthused on the design.

In the January Issue of USNI's Proceedings is an article entitled LCS: A STEP, NOT AN END which touches on many of the issues we have been discussing.

The issue isnt online yet I hope it is soon and places the article up for viewing.

I haven't read that article yet, I'll look at it before responding again.

I was reading the comments on the CDR Salamander blog, and sid made a point I don't necessarily agree with. I think too many people are getting locked into the Strategic, Tactical, and Operational study of the LCS concept and whether or not it is some form of streetfighter concept or not.

I still see the LCS as two concepts rolled into one package, a small combatant and a naval truck. I think both are Strategic, Tactical, and Operational requirements for the US Navy to address, well studied btw going back to both the original SC-21 but also to current operations of L class deployments to the Gulf. I think the question isn't the need for those roles, rather whether the LCS is the best platform for those roles.

In my research, war gaming, and discussions, I am starting to believe a LPD-17 variant is a better, more cost effective option. It not only addresses the small crew and aircraft requirements, but has the well deck and stowage capability to address both roles while also addressing the logistical problems the LCS concept creates, while also fitting nicely into the larger strategic missions put forth in the 1000 ship navy and global fleet station strategic concepts.

I've thought seriously about contributing an article to Proceedings, but I don't really want to do it because I would no longer be as anonymous.

And I missed this:


"Etter spoke a week after deciding to reassign the program executive officer for ships, Rear Adm. Charles Hamilton, to a position outside the Naval Sea Systems Command. Sources said the reassignment was not due solely to problems with the Littoral Combat Ship."

He was getting a "bit long in the tooth" anyway.:

Rear Admiral Charles Samuel Hamilton, II
Program Executive Officer for Ships (PEO Ships)

Rear Admiral Hamilton is a native of Amityville, N.Y. He attended Duke University, graduating in May 1974 with a Bachelor of Science in Zoology. He was commissioned in the Navy in May 1974 through the NROTC Program at Duke.

Rear Adm. Hamilton’s sea tours include USS Hawkins (DD 873); USS Coontz (DDG 40); USS Callaghan (DDG 994); USS Fox (CG 33); and command of USS O’Brien (DD 975).

Rear Adm. Hamilton’s shore tours include Program Resource Appraisal Division (OP-91), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; Aegis Cruiser Destroyer Branch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP 355F); and Military Staff Specialist for Naval Warfare in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology).

In May 1996, Rear Adm. Hamilton became Program Manager for the Arsenal Ship, which was designed to provide massed precision fires in support of Fleet Commander’s warfighting requirements.

From April 1998 to February 2000, Rear Adm. Hamilton served as Deputy for Fleet in the Program Executive Office Theater Surface Combatants (PEO TSC-F).

Rear Adm. Hamilton served as Program Executive Officer for Surface Strike (PEO (S)) from February 2000 until November 2002. Following consolidation of the PEO structure in November 2002, Rear Adm. Hamilton became Deputy PEO for Ships.

In April 2003 Rear Adm. Hamilton was named Program Executive Officer for Ships. PEO Ships provides the Navy with a single, platform-focused organization responsible for the research, development, systems integration, construction, and lifecycle support of current and future surface combatant, amphibious and auxiliary ships to include: DD 963, FFG 7, DDG 51, CG 47, DD(X), LCS, MCM, MHC, LPD 17, LHD, LHA(R), MPF(F), Sealift Ships, CLF Ships, Special Mission Ships, Coast Guard Deepwater Support, Small Boats and Craft, Command Ships, and MSC vessels.

Rear Adm. Hamilton’s graduate education includes Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., where he graduated with distinction, receiving a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, and the National War College where he graduated with distinction and was awarded a Master of Science in National Security Strategy.

Rear Adm. Hamilton’s awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal (oak leaf cluster in lieu of second award), Legion of Merit (gold star in lieu of second award), Meritorious Service Medal (with three gold stars), Navy Commendation Medal and various unit and service awards.

A bit more:

Rear Adm. Hamilton’s sea tours include Electronics Material Officer and Combat Information Center Officer onboard USS Hawkins, DD 873 (1974 to 1976); Fire Control Officer and Missile Officer onboard USS Coontz, DDG 40 (1976 to1978); Operations Officer onboard USS Callaghan, DDG 994 (1981 to 1984); Executive Officer, USS Fox, CG 33 (1986 to 1988); and Commanding Officer USS O’Brien, DD 975 (1991 to 1993).
Rear Adm. Hamilton’s shore tours include Anti-Submarine Warfare Program Analyst and Administrative Assistant to Director, Program Resource Appraisal Division (OP-91), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (1984 to 1986); Head Aegis Destroyer Section (OP-355F) and Financial Coordinator, AEGIS Cruiser Destroyer Branch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (1986 to 1988); and Military Staff Specialist for Naval Warfare in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) (1994 to 1996).
In May 1996, Rear Adm. Hamilton became Program Manager for the Arsenal Ship, which was designed to provide massed precision fires in support of Fleet Commander’s warfighting requirements. After completing the first two design phases and passing significant acquisition reform lessons learned to the DD 21 Program Office, Rear Adm. Hamilton closed down the Arsenal Ship Program in March 1998.
From April 1998 to February 2000, Rear Adm. Hamilton served as Deputy for Fleet in the Program Executive Office Theater Surface Combatants (PEO TSC-F). In this position, he was responsible for Fleet Introduction and Lifetime Support of 120 surface combatants (DDG 51, CG 47, DDG 993, DD 963, FFG 7).
Rear Adm. Hamilton served as Program Executive Officer for Surface Strike (PEO (S)) from February 2000 until November 2002. As PEO (S), he managed the Zumwalt-class DD 21/DD (X), Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), Advanced Land Attack Missile (ALAM), Integrated Power System (IPS), and Affordability Through Commonality (ATC) Programs, as well as the Littoral Combat Ship initiative.
Rear Adm. Hamilton became Deputy Program Executive Officer for Ships (PEO Ships) in November 2002 and in April 2003 was named Program Executive Officer for Ships. PEO Ships provides the Navy with a single, platform-focused organization responsible for the research, development, systems integration, construction, and lifecycle support of current and future surface combatant, amphibious and auxiliary ships to include: DD, FFG, DDG, CG, DD(X), LCS, MCM, MHC, LPD-17, LHD, LHA(R), Sealift Ships, CLF Ships, Special Mission Ships, Coast Guard Deepwater Support, Small Boats and Craft, Command Ships, and MSC vessels.
Rear Adm. Hamilton’s graduate education includes Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., where he graduated with distinction, receiving a Masters of Arts in National Security Affairs (1981), and the National War College where he graduated with distinction and was awarded a Master of Science in National Security Strategy (1994).
Rear Adm. Hamilton’s awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal (oak leaf cluster in lieu of second award), Legion of Merit (gold star in lieu of second award), Meritorious Service Medal (with three gold stars), Navy Commendation Medal and various unit and service awards.

Originally Posted by rickusn

Another view courtesy of CDR Salamander.:

I read that back when he posted it, I thought it was a red herring story. The story completely ignores what is known about the ASW and MIW CONOPS, and is in fact silly because the Cyclone's have deployed independently along the African coast where the same situation could occur today.

It is like writing a story about an air attack against an OHP off a South American country, which would most likely result in a severely damaged OHP. The air threat doesn't deter the USN from deploying OHPs on drug enforcement missions, just like a mythical SSM threat off Africa doesn't deter Cyclone's from deploying to Africa.

"I've thought seriously about contributing an article to Proceedings, but I don't really want to do it because I would no longer be as anonymous.'

Do it!!**

Anonymitity is highly overrated.




** But beware I believe any submissions become the property of USNI unless Ive been mislead.

However you could post any and all articles here. They would greatly interest me!!!!!!!!!!!!!

"I have not heard to much on LCS 2 USS Independence but there are some who are less than enthused on the design."

Would you mind telling us what the problems people have with this design are? Are the issues specific to the GD design or more just issues with the LCS concept in itself?
It seems to me that at this stage the people working at GD have been given a tremendous opportunity to walk off with the LCS program if they can control costs and LM can't.