Thread: Online Book

Found this book here. And posted one chapter.:

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books_..._02/01_toc.htm

Chapter 28

A Naval Operational Architecture for Global Tactical Operations

J. Noel Williams and James S. O?Bras

No naval policy can be wise unless it takes into very careful account the tactics that ought to be used in war.1

?Commander Bradley Fiske, USN, 1905

The continuing effects of globalization on military and naval operations inevitably require the development of new tactics. This chapter describes an affordable, executable, naval operational architecture designed to carry out tactical operations successfully in an uncertain future characterized by globalization. The purpose of the architecture is to demonstrate how naval forces can be organized, trained, and equipped for tactical success in a balanced system that nests within the larger Department of Defense (DOD) system to create a system of systems.2 Such a system of systems, approach is fully in consonance with Joint Vision 2020, the future warfare vision of the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.

While more art than science in its execution, this architecture will delineate required capabilities with sufficient detail to articulate clearly its overall design and to provide a viable framework for implementation. Specifically, it will emphasize expeditionary littoral operations as an illustrative example of one component of a larger naval operational concept.3 Secondarily, it is another attempt to fulfill the challenge issued by Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.), in his seminal work Fleet Tactics, for a rebirth of tactical thought among naval officers.4 In describing the intellectual environment at the turn of the last century, Hughes stated, ?It was a time when naval officers aggressively asserted that policy and strategy were not to be unfounded wishes but plans that derived from a calculated capacity for tactical success.?5

At the beginning of this global millennium, we must foster a similar intellectual environment within the naval services and acknowledge, along with Hughes, that ?tactical and technological developments are inseparable.?6 While excellence in operational art and strategy are necessary conditions for victory, they are not sufficient conditions. Tactical success is the foundation upon which the higher military arts are based. Employment of tactical units in a complex and hostile operating environment is based upon a well-developed and executed set of tactics and doctrine that seeks either to produce decisive tactical advantage in each deliberately initiated engagement or to neutralize the effectiveness of any engagement initiated by the enemy.

The Systemic Challenge of Tactical Change
It is worth remembering the words of Alfred Thayer Mahan, who observed:

Changes in tactics have only taken place after changes in weapons which is necessarily the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energies of one or two, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class, but it is a great evil.7

He continues, ?History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pain to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage.?8 These are strong, critical but insightful words?words no less relevant today than when they were written over a century ago. As noted in chapter 1, there is a relationship that we are only beginning to recognize between contemporary globalization and seapower. Mahan was the great prophet of seapower, but he was also a strong proponent of technological and tactical change, what might today be called transformation. In his view, such change should suit the strategic environment and circumstances of the nation.9 Current circumstances are defined by globalization, including the proliferation of advanced military technology suitable for integration into antiaccess strategies. To achieve success in this environment requires an operational architecture that is more specifically tailored to the globalizing world, rather than simply retaining an architecture originally designed for the Cold War.

What follows is an operational architecture that optimizes existing and planned capabilities while encouraging the development of the doctrinal, cultural, and experiential foundation upon which the naval forces of this nation can go into battle in a globalizing world with great advantage.

Environment and Requirements
As noted in chapter 2, change and uncertainty are the dominant features of the future security environment. But this is nothing new. The end of the Cold War could be said to usher in a return to normalcy in international relations. Globalization, deferred by World War II and the Cold War, has once again taken the forefront of the international agenda. As also noted in chapter 2, there are differences between the more typical times before the Cold War and today, particularly the increasing connectedness of modern information technology, but many of the strategic principles?of which the foremost is to prepare for uncertainty?remain. This is a principle that guides the proposed architecture, which will articulate capabilities designed for a changing, uncertain world?a full-spectrum world.

As a maritime nation in a globalized world, the United States needs maritime forces capable of full-spectrum engagement and full-spectrum access assurance. In national security terms, full spectrum means the range of activities from peacetime training and engagement activities to theater warfighting campaigns?in short, the familiar low to high range of military training, peacekeeping, and warfighting operations. Agility and flexibility come to mind when thinking of characteristics necessary for forces to be effective in such a world.

Maritime forces, by their nature, are continuously engaged globally. As ?permanent? overseas U.S. presence declines and as the interconnectedness of the world increases, the demand for maritime forces to remain active in the full spectrum of military activities will grow. Meaningful engagement in this type of world is hands-on, face-to-face, boots-on-the-ground, soles-on-the-deck-plates kind of work. Antiseptic, virtual presence will not do. Engagement is about people, not machines or technology, and being there is the sine qua non. Engagement is both physical and psychological?the act of conditioning a future battlespace involves developing detailed understanding of the political, military, and physical environment and shaping its future development to encourage allies, deter potential foes, and provide a state of assured coalition defense for U.S. interests.

Assuring geographic access is also a critical task for maritime forces. Technology is strengthening the hand of those smaller nations and actors who wish to deny access to regions vital to the economic and security interests of the Nation. There is an ever-present requirement to guarantee access to sea lines of communication and, should conflict arise, to defeat the opponent?s area denial systems. Maritime forces are designed to assure access. The sustainable rapid response capabilities that maritime forces uniquely provide make them essential enablers of the joint fight.

Tasks for the Fleet
A forward-deployed peacetime fleet should provide three specific functional capabilities: peacetime naval functions, battlespace dominance, and power projection. These functions are further broken down into specific measurements of the required tasks in the table below.10

Peacetime Naval Functions
Assure safe transit of naval, joint, and coalition forces and commercial shipping
Conduct at least two simultaneous noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)
Conduct theater engagement activities and other peacetime missions as required
Develop situational awareness
Provide theater-wide situational awareness
Battlespace Dominance
Neutralize land-space denial system
?Protect three critical theater complexes
?Defeat a denial system consisting of 400 theater ballistic missiles (TBMs), 400 cruise missiles, 200 transporter-erector-launchers (TELs)
Neutralize airspace denial system
?Destroy 4 integrated air defense system (IADS) command centers, 12 radar sites, 100 TELs
?Defeat a tactical air force of 200 planes (coordinated attack of 50 planes)
Neutralize sea denial system
?Destroy 4 command centers, 12 sensor sites, 100 TELs
?Defeat a navy of 50 ships and 15 attack submarines
?Neutralize up to 2,000 sea mines laid in multiple fields
Power Projection
Halt a corps-sized ground force
Defeat a brigade-sized ground force
Neutralize 4 command centers and 100 TELs
Neutralize complexes of 6 ports and 20 airfields
These tasks are notional and intended only to demonstrate the types of threats a fleet can be prepared to counter in the first 2 weeks of a zero-warning future conflict. As noted in chapter 25 of the current volume, successful execution of such a wide variety of near simultaneous tasks with the limited assets available to a forward-deployed fleet is a daunting challenge. Success demands a high standard of tactical mastery employed to take full advantage of the battlespace conditioning that skillful and persistent peacetime forward engagement practice makes possible.11

Force Composition
Even in a network-centric combat environment, tactical groups (small, integrated systems of systems) will be required to cope with collapsed battlespace conditions and saturation raids.12 These tactical groups constitute the elements of an operational architecture. The presence of these forward-deployed groups in peacetime operations will serve as a major deterrent, but should deterrence fail, their ability to defeat area denial systems, dominate the maritime battlespace, and support coalition forces ashore can provide a foundation of assured coalition defense upon which limited-objective offensive operations may be undertaken.13

The design and operation of these tactical groups will have a serious impact on current naval culture since the requirement to create tactical groups for specific combat tasks contrasts so sharply with the single multimission platform focus of the recent past. A single multimission platform tends to have a good but limited technical mission capability in several warfare areas, such as antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antiair warfare (AAW), and strike warfare, but maintenance and training demands tend to preclude development of sustained tactical competence in more than two disciplines simultaneously. Even if the technical potential of a single multimission platform could be fully realized, the limited magazine load-out would severely limit unit effectiveness in a high-intensity engagement. The classic solution to this problem is the formation of permanent tactical groups containing a mission-focused capability package surrounded by two layers of defensive capability in each applicable medium.14 The aircraft carrier battlegroup (CVBG) is the classic naval exemplar of this sort of thinking.

Dispersed networked multimission platforms can constitute an effective force in the absence of threat but invite defeat in detail when a single platform can be exposed to a mass saturation attack or a stealth threat. In the presence of significant threats, the well-integrated tactical group can still exploit the benefits of theater-scale networking, while providing effective combined arms mutual support between elements.

A new feature in tactical group design is the deliberate attempt to correlate mission capability with group signature. A tactical group designed to operate in a collapsed battlespace or near the edge of a defended envelope should not present a cooperative target. Such a group should have comprehensive signature control and quiet operating modes (that is, it should be able to disappear into the environmental background at will) and have the situational awareness to know when to do so.

A group designed to execute a sustained mission that demands high-signature operations must operate well within a defended envelope and must be provided with effective multilayered defenses. Such a group may well be strategically or operationally significant. As a high-value, detectable target, it will attract enemy attention. An astute commander can employ camouflage, cover, and deception techniques to induce an enemy to commit and expose large resources to engage an enticing and exposed but false target.

Four new naval tactical groups should be formed to complement the aircraft carrier battlegroup:
theater air and missile defense group (TAMDG)
theater land attack group (TLAG)
mine countermeasures group (MCMG)
expeditionary littoral attack group (enhanced amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit?special operations capable [ARG/MEU?SOC]).
These five standing tactical groups would be the basic building blocks for most naval operational forces. The four new groups would provide a sound foundation for a renaissance in expeditionary warfare and restore operational mobility to the carrier battlegroup as well. The following will describe these tactical groups using the force structure of 2015 to 2021 for convenience and simplicity. Some groups can be implemented today using program of record forces. Others, to achieve their full potential, must await the arrival of new capabilities in the 2010 to 2015 timeframe.

Aircraft Carrier Battlegroup
The redefined aircraft carrier battlegroup would consist of a nuclear powered carrier (CVN), a CG?52 class cruiser, 2 DDG?51 class destroyers, a nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN), and a logistics element consisting of a T?AO and T?AKE. The CVBG command element would manage the strike warfare assets of the fleet. This group is similar to but somewhat smaller than the traditional CVBG. It actually represents more air defense and strike capability and equal ASW capability than was present in a late Cold War CVBG. This CVBG is illustrated in figure 28?1.



Theater Air and Missile Defense Group (TAMDG)
The Navy theater-wide ballistic missile defense (TBMD) capability is scheduled for deployment in CG?52 class cruisers approximately in the year 2010. Deployment of this capability will make these ships high value strategic assets. If the CG?52 is to provide real protection, at least two and preferably three ships of this class must be kept forward deployed continuously in each of the high-threat theaters. The TAMDG would consist of two CG?52 ships for TBMD capability and would serve as host for the area air defense commander (AADC). These high-signature ships would be positioned by the joint force commander (JFC), protected by a DDG?51 and an SSN, and generally stationed well within the defended envelope. Being forward deployed and continually on station, the TAMDG is well positioned to coordinate theater air and missile defenses. The AADC can marshal the resources of the fleet to provide a protective air and missile defense umbrella over the theater area of responsibility (AOR). The TAMDB is illustrated in figure 28?2.



Theater Land Attack Group (TLAG)
The Navy is scheduled to deploy an interim surface land attack capability in the CG?47, CG?52, and DDG?51 class ships by 2007, with a mature capability arriving in the DD(X) class starting in 2010. The TLAG of 2015 would consist of one DDG?51, two DD(X), and one SSN. This TLAG will be a low-signature group capable of operating at the edge of the defended envelope and will be capable of intervening decisively in corps-scale ground maneuver warfare. The forward-deployed TLAG will become another strategic asset. This group will be responsive to the JFC by maintaining a continuous counterinvasion posture in peacetime. As additional TLAGs surge into theater, groups of this type become available to support forcible entry operations or to serve as a mobile naval firebase conducting deep interdiction operations. In the interim, the CG?52 and CG?47 could substitute for DD(X) starting in 2003. As NTW capability is deployed in the CG?52, they will no longer be available for this application. Nonetheless, establishing interim TLAGs would allow early development of tactics and tactical doctrine for such a group, would firmly establish their role with the JFCs, and would provide an additional decade for the development of the naval fire support coordination and command culture needed to turn this vital potential capability into a reality. Retaining the DD?963 and giving it the naval land-attack upgrade would be more logical than playing a shell game with the CG?52. But it would also be more costly than operating the FFG?31 that will be retained in its place pending the DD(X) arrival.15 The TLAG is illustrated in figure 28?3.



Mine Countermeasures Group (MCMG)
Naval mine warfare shapes the spatial and temporal dimensions of the littoral battlespace. A typical sea denial system consists of a regional ocean surveillance system, a command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) element, a maritime strike element, a coastal defense element, a submarine warfare element, and a mine warfare element. As detailed in chapter 20, a properly integrated sea denial system can make maritime theater access quite difficult to assure. Over the next 20 years, we must expect to encounter some full-blown sea denial systems, a point well made in chapter 25. We are much more likely to face a light mine warfare threat in every operating area and a medium to heavy local mine warfare threat wherever an enemy nation deliberately plans aggression against our allies or our interests. We can no longer afford to wish away such threats. If we do not aggressively engage the mine warfare threat, we will find that our transoceanic power projection strategy becomes increasingly ineffective. This environment provides the strategic rationale for a major departure in our approach to mine warfare.

The Navy intends to distribute widely an organic mine countermeasure capability throughout the fleet. This capability should provide a sea mine reconnaissance and mine avoidance capability with a limited mine disposal capability. This approach provides for a reasonable mine threat characterization and the ability to operate the fleet with reasonable safety in areas of light mine threat. But it does not provide the capability to assure the safe and timely movement of shipping over sea lines of communication, nor does it provide the capability to open port approaches or to ensure safe operating areas for amphibious forcible entry operations in the face of a medium to heavy mine threat. A heavier, dedicated, forward-deployed MCM capability is required to deal with such threats in a timely manner. This would be combined with a comprehensive program to exploit organic MCM capabilities by conducting an extensive and sustained overt and covert mine reconnaissance/precision seabed mapping and surveillance program in peacetime to develop and sustain up-to-date databases for exploitation in crisis response and theater warfare. Every Navy ship in transit would thus become a data-gathering platform.

The mine countermeasures group is the embodiment of a dedicated MCM capability. It would consist of a mine countermeasures headquarters ship (MCS), an air MCM squadron equipped with modified Sea Hawk (CH?60) helicopters, a surface MCM squadron equipped with 4 Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships (MCM?1) and 3 Osprey-class mine hunter/coastal ships (MHC?51), a float-on/float-off (FLO/FLO) ship to provide high speed transport for the surface MCM squadron and a damaged ship evacuation capability, a sea barge ship (manned by Seabees, construction battalion personnel) to provide a magazine for assault MCM expendables and to transport eight landing craft air cushion vehicles modified for MCM duties (MCACs), and a SEAL team/underwater demolition team (UDT) group. This group would be complemented by an SSN for covert mine reconnaissance and a DDG?81 to provide area air defense and fire support for the MCM operation.

One mine countermeasures group should be forward deployed in Japan or prepositioned at Guam. This Western Pacific MCMG could be activated about the third day following notification, Day (N+3), and on station and fully effective by Day (N+7) in the Northeast Asia (NEA) region. We propose that a second MCMG be forward deployed in Southwest Asia (SWA) or prepositioned in Diego Garcia, Singapore, or Perth, Australia. This deployment gives a similar employment timeline in SWA to that defined for NEA. This group can also deploy to the Mediterranean AOR by Day (N+10). Thus, one-third of the U.S. MCM capability can be operational in either the SWA or NEA regions within 1 week and two-thirds within 10 days thereafter. The third MCMG would be based in Texas and would serve as an MCM training and experimental base. The third MCMG should also have a rapid deployment capability (a third FLO/FLO and Seabee barge would be needed).

The mine countermeasures group is essential for ensuring theater access in the face of a sea denial system and provides a credible basis for reactive early forcible entry and deliberate forcible entry operations.

In addition to organic mine countermeasure capabilities, consisting largely of mine avoidance capabilities, a forward-deployed MCMG would be required to meet medium to high threat environments characteristic of forcible entry operations. The MCMG is illustrated in figure 28?4.



Expeditionary Littoral Attack Group 16
The expeditionary littoral attack group (ELAG) of 2015?2021 would consist of four amphibious ships, a DDG?51, a special operations capable (SOC) SSN, and a DD(X) (DD[X] or Streetfighter). This configuration forms a complete group level system of systems, better allowing multiple tasking (split amphibious ready group operations), allows for increased combat vehicle embarkation, and provides space for rapid reconfiguration. The ELAG design provides full composite warfare commander battle management, two layers of AAW defense (JSF?M Marine version Joint Strike Fighters and SM?IIBK4 standard missiles for area air defense and ship self-defense system on all ships for local area and self-defense) and ASW defense (SSN for outer zone, the SH?60R from an amphibious assault ship [LHD] and destroyers for inner- and middle-zone ASW), substantial fire support capability, and covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and special operations forces insertion/recovery capability. The ELAG command element would be fully capable of marshaling and directing the full resources of the fleet for intervention in ground maneuver combat. The Navy currently plans to support 36 amphibious warfare ships. The current Global Naval Force Presence Policy can be fully satisfied with 9 ELAGs using the current peacetime rotational cycle. While a standard ELAG composition containing two large deck amphibious ships would be ideal, the program of record will not support such a design. The actual force would contain two ELAG varieties. Three ELAG (H)s would each contain a LHD, a Tarawa-class amphibious assault ship (LHA), a Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship (LSD?41), and a Harpers Ferry-class (LSD?49) as their amphibious component. Six ELAG (M)s would each contain a LHD/LHA, two San Antonio-class amphibious transport docks (LPD?17s), and a LSD?41 or 49 in their amphibious component. The ELAG (H)s would be based to service the Northeast Asia and Mediterranean AORs where the experience of the last decade shows that split-ARG operations are most likely.

The ELAG, incorporating an enhanced four-ship ARG/MEU (SOC), would become the central building block for establishing amphibious forcible entry capabilities. This approach becomes possible because the ELAG has enough space to accommodate a complete battalion landing team (BLT) set of equipment with room in its lift print for reconfiguration afloat.17

The above naval operational architecture, consisting of five tactical groups, proposes a federated naval force operational architecture based on a small set of combined arms naval tactical groups. An operational concept is needed to animate this operational architecture. The naval operational concept would include a basing and deployment pattern that provides peacetime engagement forces for the joint force commanders and supports a crisis response pattern that sustains deterrence in the unengaged theaters while providing adequate and timely combat potential for employment in the engaged theater.18 This early maritime forcible entry capability would be employable about Day (N+12) to (N+14). An operationally decisive deliberate maritime forcible entry capability may be rapidly concentrated for employment in major theater warfare about Day (N+30) to (N+35).

To have a credible maritime forcible entry capability, a naval force must be able to achieve and sustain air and sea dominance in the objective area, isolate the land battlespace from reinforcement, reduce resistance on the beach and inland landing zones to low levels, and rapidly breach or bypass all obstacles and barriers to ingress to and egress from the landing zones and landing force objectives. It must also be able to land rapidly and sustain a landing force of sufficient combat power to seize and hold its objectives.

A peacetime fleet between the years 2015 and 2021 would normally consist of a CVBG, a TAMDG, a TLAG, and an ELAG. By Day (N+10), this force level could be at least doubled. In addition, the forward-deployed/prepositioned MCMG and at least one maritime prepositioned squadron would have been activated and would have arrived on scene. This naval force constitutes a fairly large fleet. By Day (N+12), all of the preconditions for an early forcible entry (EFE) operation should have been achieved. We will now focus on how an amphibious task force with the mission payload for a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB)?such as that detailed in chapter 23?can be rapidly formed from forward-deployed/forward-based forces and ready surge forces. The ELAG is illustrated in figure 28?5.





Early Forcible Entry Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
An amphibious advanced force would be formed from the regional MCMG, a TLAG, and an LHD from a forward-deployed ELAG (M) on or about Day (N+10). About the same time, a surging ELAG (H) and the remaining elements of the ELAG (M) would be concentrated in theater. The LHD of the ELAG (M) would be operated as a light aircraft carrier with a JSF?M air group. All surging and prepositioned shipping would sortie with a full personnel load. Other personnel would be flown to waypoints by commercial air transport to join ships in transit as they pass. Two composited enhanced MEUs represent the largest landing force reliably achievable on short notice with the existing program of record force. Some fairly minor modifications to the program of record open much broader horizons.

A service support package for fly-in Marine squadrons could be prepositioned on forward-deployed CVNs. The retirement of the Tomcat fighter (F?14) and Viking-ASW aircraft (S?3B) squadrons after 2006 will create enough space on the 2 CVNs of our notional force to accommodate the 3 Marine Corps fighter-attack squadrons and 1 reconnaissance-intelligence aircraft squadron of a Marine aircraft group (MAG). This action will allow the seabasing of a fixed wing MAG on the CVNs and LHD (which would function as a light aircraft carrier). We further propose stationing a large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ship (LMSR) acquired as the third ship of maritime prepositioning force?enhanced (MPF?E) in Diego Garcia (designated T?AK). This T?AK would have about 250,000 square feet of excess space. We propose modifying this ship to accommodate a landing craft air cushion (LCAC) compatible side stage and provide personnel accommodations for 900 people (for example, tank battalion personnel plus naval support element detachment). The net result is that about 150,000 square feet of actual vehicle space would be available in this one ship. After unload, this T?AK would become a combat service support ship for the MEB. We would also propose that three LMSR variants be built (designated T?AKD). This class would have a 4 LCAC well deck, accommodations for 900 personnel, and 250,000 square feet of actual vehicle space. One of these three ships would also be prepositioned at Diego Garcia. The T?AK and T?AKD at Diego Garcia could support a forcible entry operation in the Mediterranean or Northeast Asia AORs by Day (N+12).

The landing force for our MEB can be a heavy brigade-sized ground combat element (GCE) with a substantial air combat element (ACE) and a lean combat service support element (CSSE) and at least 15 days of supply. The GCE could contain as many as one AAV mounted infantry battalion, one vertical assault battalion, a tank battalion (fly-in personnel, equipment aboard LMSR), and a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion as its main close combat elements. Its ground fire support element would consist of one direct support artillery battalion and one high mobility artillery rocket (HIMAR) battery. The air transport component of the ACE is sufficient to deliver the vertical assault battalion in 2 lifts up to a 90 nautical mile radius in about 2 hours. The ATF surface assault can deliver 2 to 3 mechanized BLTs from about 20 nautical miles at sea in about 3 hours.

This EFE MEB (assault echelon [AE]) requires 315,000 square feet (350,000 square feet if we include the NSE with the MEB assault echelon). The combined gross vehicle space in the 2 ELAGs is 208,000 square feet. The LMSR (T?AK) as modified for MPF?E adds about a gross of 150,000 square feet. The T?AKD adds an additional gross of 250,000 square feet. The total gross vehicle square available in the early forcible entry ATF is thus 608,000 square-foot gross to house a 350,000 square-foot ATF. This yields a combat loading factor of 1.7. This extra space allows the landing force to reconfigure its load plan afloat if necessary.

The EFE ATF requires a well-designed deployment pattern controlled by a thoroughly professional joint maritime command element. This force could be the maritime component of a joint early entry task force that would resemble a small composite MEF. An Army airborne/air-landed brigade could provide a second ground combat element and an Air Force aerospace expeditionary force could reinforce the Marine ACE. Synchronization of the training, readiness, and deployment of the entire naval force will be required to ensure a responsive global surge capability, and a naval forces command (Navy/Marine Corps) could facilitate this essential task.

Deliberate Forcible Entry MEB
A deliberate forcible entry (DFE) force is another option available for military planners. A DFE force, available in the combat theater at Day (N+30), is a very large fleet including up to 5 CVBGs, 4 TAMDGs, 10 TLAGs, 2 MCMGs, and 1 expeditionary littoral attack force (ELAF) consisting of up to 2 MEB-size landing forces embarked on 2 ATFs. The MEB GCE is a heavy mechanized brigade with a robust ACE and a capable CSSE. Each MEB GCE is somewhat larger than that assigned to the EFE MEB. It has an additional mechanized BLT and artillery battalion. The DFE MEB can deliver 2 vertical assault BLTs up to 75 nautical miles inland in 2 lifts and can deliver 3 mechanized BLTs in 3 assault waves from about 20 nautical miles at sea in less than 2.5 hours. In this case, 2 ATFs with 32 of the planned 36 amphibious ships and 3 T?AKDs are committed to the operation. The DFE MEB GCE contains up to 3 AAV mounted infantry battalions, 1 LAR battalion, and a tank battalion as its main close combat elements. Its fire support element contains two direct support artillery battalions and a HIMAR battery. The corresponding ACE includes 32 Sea Stallion CH?53E, 48 Osprey MV?22, 24 Cobra AH?1 Z, and 12 Huey UH?1Y aircraft.

An MEB-sized amphibious task force contains 16 amphibious ships and 1 proposed T?AKD. The DFE MEB (AE) requires 365,000 square feet (about 410,000 square feet if the NSE is included with the MEB). The ATF is composed of one ELAG (H) and three ELAG (M)s. The total gross vehicle space in this force is 681,000 square feet (431,400 square feet in the ELAGs + 250,000 square feet in the AKD = 681,000 square feet). This yields a combat loading factor of 1.7. A combat loading factor of 1.3 represents a tight load with about 18 inches of space around each vehicle.19

The DFE ATF would be capable of delivering 4 mechanized BLTs ashore from about 20 nautical miles at sea in about 2 hours. It is also capable of delivering 2 air-mobile BLTs to landing zones at a radius of 100 nautical miles in about 2.5 hours.

In summary, a robust amphibious forcible entry capability could be employed at 35 days following conflict start (C+35). The planned 36 ship amphibious force is fully utilized in support of an ELAF and an advanced force; however, the planned lift fingerprint is much too tight to allow for load plan flexibility. As discussed, this deficiency can be corrected by acquisition of three LMSR variants. The fly-in of ACE elements to the forward-deployed carriers mentioned earlier would be essential to forcible entry operations. A substantial Marine SSP and personnel augmentation could also be accommodated. An SSP could be prepositioned on each of the three forward-deployed carriers.

Of note, the similarity between the two proposed forcible entry MEBs (EFE and DFE) and the MPF MEB design offers the possibility of standardizing the Marine Corps at the MEB level, which is discussed in chapter 22. A notional MEF would contain an MPF MEB and a DFE MEB.

Conclusion
The central feature of modern warfare is that a smaller, well-trained, well-balanced combined arms force is much more capable than a larger unbalanced force. The foregoing discussion is intended to provide a notional construct of how such a balanced naval force can be created with minor adjustments to the program of record. It is a compelling argument when one considers the emerging globalized security environment in which naval forces could be the primary means of establishing military access to areas of crisis.


J. Noel Williams recently retired as lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps and is now associated with the Potomac Institute Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities. His last military assignment was to the Strategic Initiatives Group, HQMC. A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he earned an M.A. in national security studies at Georgetown University, a Master of Military Studies from the Marine Corps University, an international relations secondary occupational specialty, and is also a graduate of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. James S. O?Brasky is an expert in joint and naval force design and planning and in gaming advanced technology system designs. He recently retired from Government service after 32 years with the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division.



Notes
1 Bradley A. Fiske, ?American Naval Policy,? U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1905, 79. [BACK]

2 For a military perspective of the systems of systems concept, see William A. Owens with Edward Offley, Lifting the Fog of War (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2000), 98?102, 224?225. [BACK]

3 The difference between an operational architecture and an operational concept is that the former documents how a naval force should be organized and the capabilities that it should possess, while an operational concept describes in more detail how the force expects to fight. [BACK]

4 Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986); and rev. ed., Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2000). [BACK]

5 Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, 1. [BACK]

6 Ibid., 25. [BACK]

7 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 1660?1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 9?10. [BACK]

8 Ibid., 10. [BACK]

9 See, for example, Mahan?s discussion in ?Considerations Governing the Disposition of Navies,? in Mahan on Naval Strategy: Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 281?318. [BACK]

10These are based on our own assessment of mission requirements in a globalized world and may not necessarily reflect current policy. [BACK]

11 The zero-warning condition is an essential force design assumption. As force designers, we are charged with providing the warfighter with a system that ensures a reasonable probability of success under plausible worst-case conditions. For the foreseeable future, the plausible worst-case condition is a zero-warning conflict in the presence of area denial systems armed with weapons of mass effect. Zero-warning conflicts can arise from the following conditions:

1. An enemy that attacks from an exercise posture without full force generation.
2. An enemy deployment pattern that gradually saturates the indication and warning indicators so that an attack-imminent condition becomes the routine situation leading to discounted warning.
3. An error in decisionmaking on the part of the President or the Secretary of Defense (for example, misinterpreting indications and warning). [BACK]

12 The dominant reference on network-centric warfare remains Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, ?Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,? U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 124, no. 1(January 1998), 28?35. [BACK]

13 Recognizing that both Clark A. Murdock (chapter 25) and Donald C.F. Daniel (chapter 27) argue that forward-deployed naval forces may not provide a significant deterrent, we have elected to focus on their capacity to support limited-objective offensive operations. [BACK]

14 Layered defenses are designed to provide multiple opportunities to intercept threats to the group. Optimally, a naval group should have both an area AAW defense and individual ship self-defense capabilities with a ?depth of fire? that would allow for at least independent shots. A three-shot system reduces the possibility of a single missile leaking through to less than 3 percent. Likewise, the group should have an ASW outer zone, inner zone, and individual ship self-defense capabilities. In this regard, the group?s acoustic and electronic operational signature largely determines the dimensions and location of safe operating areas. [BACK]

15 The FFG?31 class is the late construction product improvement of the FFG?7 design. Its combat system is more complete and better integrated than the earlier versions. An FFG?31 costs about half as much to operate as a DD?963 VLS. [BACK]

16 As noted in chapter 19 of the current volume, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has recently initiated development of a concept of an expeditionary assault group, consisting of Aegis DDGs, SSNs, and combat logistics ships attached to (and trained with) current amphibious ready groups (ARGs). However, similar proposals have been studied in the past without resulting in changes to the current ARGs. Our concept of expeditionary littoral attack groups is similar to the proposed expeditionary assault group but includes additional capabilities. [BACK]

17 A 60,000 square-foot enhanced MEU would be fitted into 104,000 square feet of actual space. This produces a combat loading factor of 1.7 versus the traditional 1.3. The current MEU lift print is 48,500 square feet. [BACK]

18 A full exploration of the future naval operational concept is beyond the scope of this chapter. We must settle for a short exposition on how our tactical groups may be orchestrated to create an early maritime forcible entry capability for joint decisive operations in smaller-scale contingencies and for tactically decisive forcible entry operations in the early stages of major theater warfare. [BACK]

19 The current lift print is even tighter because it includes vehicles preboated in the landing craft. A 1.7 combat loading factor eliminates the preboating and allows easy reconfiguration of the load plan afloat. A 2.0 combat loading factor would be needed if decontamination, container processing, and intermediate maintenance activity afloat were required. [BACK]