TopHatter

Hence my earlier question
Did the Navy just get an itch to start blasting it's older ships out of the water?

And you're welcome
I'm not nearly the expert that rickusn is, but I hold my own now and then

__________________
If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and become more, you are a leader.
~John Quincy Adams

rickusn

Of course #s count but the USN has said at what cost?.

If you look at my earlier posts the USN decided to keep the OHP frigates around vice the Spruances. Mostly because of costs to operate, man and maintain them.

The USN is still commissioning Burkes into the fleet that are far more useful than the Spruances and the OHPs cheaper. The Spruances are seen as not needed in the short-term threat environment. In the longer term far more capable platfrms are planned to be in commission. It would be nice to keep them in reserve I agree but thats not happening except for acouple. Costs again.

Not to mention the fact the USN is pushing hard for LCS and DDX/CGX. They want nothing to get in the way. Thats why they even state that in no way, shape or form will they even consider keeping the Burke program going even if the new programs are delayed(In fact DDX already has been delayed).


The USN needed 99 high-end surface combatants to fill out 12 CSG, 12 ESG and 9 SSG formations. With planned reductions in those formations(11,9&9) they only need 87 at most(maybe less as I havent heard if they plan to reduce the SSG formations). Considering one carrier is slated to always be in a three year SLEP you could actually reduce that down another three ships for 84(as the USN seems to have done in their planning).

They will reach that # in 2011 22 Ticos & 62 Burkes. By Sept. 2006 they will have 22 Ticos, 50 Burkes and nominally 12 OHP(making up the short-fall vice Spruances) until the final 12 Burkes are commissioned. Plus I havent mentioned the possible mitigating effects of Sea Swap. But Sea Swap isnt really viable for a wartime scenario. Only peacetime. IMHO

My point? Decommisioning the Spruances prematurely is seen by the USN as an acceptable risk given the projected threat level for the next 5- 10 years..


Could be they are wrong time will tell.

Blademaster

I don't understand most of the abbreviations. Could you provide a dictionary? Thanks.

Don't forget that newer ships come with far greater capabilities than the old ships. So you might actually gain more robust capabilities in exchange for fewer ships.

TopHatter

Sure...got a list of which ones you need?

Blademaster

Righty here you go!

Amphibious Warfare Ships(35)
LHA 1/ 5
LHD 1/ 7
LPD 4/ 11
LSD 41/ 8
LSD 49/ 4
Combat Logistics Ships(32)
AE 26/ 6
AFS 1/ 3
AFS 8/ 3
AO 187/ 15
AOE 1/ 1
AOE 6/ 4
Support Ships(18)
LCC 19/ 2
AGF 3/ 1
AGOS 19/ 3
AGOS 23/ 1
ARS 50/ 4
AS 39/ 2
ATF 166/ 5
Mine warfare Shiips(17)
MCM 1/ 14 (5 NRF)
MHC 51/ 3 (1 NRF plus 9 others NRF but considered non-deployable and not assigned to the Ships Battle Force List)

TopHatter

Well, there are a couple of good sources to use, here is just one link for starters

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/ships/

rickusn

Holy Cow!!! I must be in a good mood.

First if you really read any of my posts you would see that I didnt "forget" about capabiliies.

Second irregardless of capabilities a ship can only be in one location at a time hence the standard "Quanity has a quality all its own".

Ill post this for you but simple google seaches will do wonders for you in the future.

Here is a ships abbreviation list:

TITLE: SHIP DESIGNATIONS

SHIP CLASSIFICATIONS
The following list of ship classifications is divided into
4 major sections: Combatant Ships, Combatant Craft, Support
Craft, and Auxiliary Ships. Each section is further broken down
into types of ships.
COMBATANT SHIPS
WARSHIPS
Aircraft Carriers
All ships designed primarily for the purpose of conducting
combat operations by aircraft which engage in attacks against
airborne, surface, sub-surface, and shore targets.
CTOL (Conventional Take Off and Landing Aircraft Carriers)
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier CV
Attack Aircraft Carrier CVA
Multi-purpose Aircraft Carrier Nuclear-Propulsion CVN
ASW Aircraft Carrier CVS
Surface Combatant
Large, heavily armed, surface ships which are designed
primarily to engage enemy forces on the high seas.
Battleships
Battleship BB
Cruisers
Gun Cruiser CA
Guided Missile Cruiser CG
Guided Missile Cruiser (Nuclear-Propulsion) CGN
Destroyers
Destroyer DD
Guided Missile Destroyer DDG
Frigates
Frigate FF
Guided Missile Frigate FFG
Submarine
All self-propelled submersible types regardless of whether
employed as combatant, auxiliary, or research and development
vehicles that have at least a residual combat capability.
Attack Submarines
Submarine SS (Some navues use SSK: K stands for hunter/killer)
Submarine (Nuclear-Powered) SSN
Ballistic Missile Submarines
Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear-Powered) SSBN
Other Combatant Classification
Patrol Combatant
Combatants whose mission may extend beyond coastal duties and
whose characteristics include adequate endurance and sea keeping
to provide a capability for operations exceeding 48 hours on the
high seas without support.
Patrol Ships
Patrol Combatant PG
Guided Missile Patrol Combatant (Hydrofoil) PHM
Amphibious Warfare Ships
All ships having organic capability for amphibious assault
and which have characteristics enabling long duration operations
on the high seas.
Amphibious Helicopter/Landing Craft Carriers
Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose) LHA
Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-Purpose) LHD
Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter) LPH
Amphibious Transport Dock LPD
Landing Craft Carriers
Amphibious Cargo Ship LKA
Amphibious Transport LPA
Dock Landing Ship LSD
Tank Landing Ship LST
Miscellaneous
Amphibious Command Ship LCC
Combat Logistics Ships
Ships which have the capability to provide underway
replenishment to fleet units.
Underway Replenishment
Ammunition Ship AE
Store Ship AF
Combat Store Ship AFS
Oiler AO
Fast Combat Support Ship AOE
Replenishment Oiler AOR
Mine Warfare Ships
All ships whose primary function is mine warfare on the high
seas.
Minesweepers
Minesweeper - Ocean MSO
Mine Countermeasures Ships
Mine Countermeasures Ship MCM
Minehunter, Coastal MHC
COMBATANT CRAFT
PATROL CRAFT
Surface patrol craft intended for use relatively near the
coast or in sheltered waters or rivers.
Coastal Patrol Combatants
Patrol Boat PB
Patrol Craft (Fast) PCP
River/Roadstead Craft
Mini-Armored Troop Carrier ATC
River Patrol Craft PBR
Amphibious Warfare Craft
All amphibious craft which have the organic capacity for
amphibious assault and are intended to operate principally in
coastal waters or may be carried aboard larger units.
Landing Craft
Landing Craft, Air Cushion LCAC
Landing Craft,. Mechanized LCM
Landing Craft, Personnel, Large LCPL
Landing Craft, Utility LCU
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel LCVP
Amphibious Warping Tug LWT
Side Loading Warping Tug SLWT
Special Warfare Craft
Light Seal Support Craft LSSC
Medium Seal Support Craft MSSC
Swimmer Delivery Vehicle SDV
Special Warfare Craft, Light SWCL
Special Warfare Craft, Medium SWCM
Mine Warfare Craft
All craft with the primary function of mine warfare that are
intended to operate principally in coastal waters and may also be
carried aboard larger units.
Mine Countermeasures Craft
Minesweeping Boat MSB
SUPPORT CRAFT
Service Craft
A grouping of navy-subordinated craft (including non-self-
propelled) designed to provide general support to either
combatant forces or shore-based establishments.
Dry Docks (Non-self-propelled)
Large Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock AFDB
Small Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock AFDL
Medium Auxiliary Floating Dry Dock AFDM
Auxiliary Repair Dry Dock ARD
Medium Auxiliary Repair Dry Dock ARDM
Yard Floating Dry Dock YFD
Tugs (Self-propelled)
Large Harbor Tug YTB
Small Harbor Tug YTL
Medium Harbor Tug YTM
Tankers (Self-propelled)
Fuel Oil Barge YO
Gasoline Barge YOG
Water Barge YW
Lighters and Barges
Self-propelled
Harbor Utility Craft YFU
Covered Lighter YF
Non-self-propelled
Open Car Lighter YC
Car Float YCF
Aircraft Transportation Lighter YCV
Covered Lighter YFN
Large Covered Lighter YFNB
Lighter (Special Purposes) YFNX
Refrigerated Covered Lighter YFRN
Range Tender YFRT
Garbage Lighter YGN
Gasoline Barge YON
Oil Storage Barge YOS
Sludge Removal Barge YSR
Water Barge YWN
Other Craft
Self-propelled
Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle DSRV
Deep Submergence Vehicle DSV
Submersible Research Vehicle NR
Miscellaneous Auxiliary Service Craft YAG
Ferry Boat or Launch YFB
Torpedo Trials Craft YTT
Dredge YM
Patrol Craft, Training YP
Non-self-propelled
Barracks Craft APL
Floating Crane YD
Diving Tender YDT
Dry Dock Companion Craft YFND
Floating Power Barge YFP
Salvage Lift Craft YLC
Dredge YMN
Gate Craft YNG
Floating Pile Driver YPD
Floating Workshop YR
Repair and Berthing Barge YRB
Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge YRBM
Floating Dry Dock Workshop (Hull) YRDH
Floating Dry Dock Workshop (Machine) YRDM
Radiological Repair Barge YRR
Salvage Craft Tender YRST
Unclassified Miscellaneous
Unclassified Miscellaneous Unit IX
AUXILIARY SHIPS
Mobile Logistics Ships
Ships which have the capability to provide direct material
support to other deployed units operating far from home base.
Material Support
Destroyer Tender AD
Repair Ship AR
Submarine Tender AS
Support Ships
A grouping of ships designed to operate in the open ocean in
a variety of sea states to provide general support to either
combatant forces or shore based establishments. (Includes
smaller auxiliaries which by the nature of their duties, leave
inshore waters).
Fleet Support
Salvage Ship ARS
Submarine Rescue Ship ASR
Fleet Ocean Tug ATF
Salvage and Rescue Ship ATS
Other Auxiliaries
Auxiliary Crane Ship ACS
Miscellaneous AG
Deep Submergence Support Ship AGDS
Miscellaneous Command Ship AGF
Missile Range Instrumentation Ship AGM
Oceanographic Research Ship AGOR
Ocean Surveillance Ship AGOS
Surveying Ship AGS
Auxiliary Research Submarine AGSS
Hospital Ship AH
Cargo Ship AK
Vehicle Cargo Ship AKR
Gasoline Tanker AOG
Transport Oiler AOT
Transport AP
Cable Repairing Ship ARC
Repair Ship, Small ARL
Aviation Logistic Support Ship AVB
Guided Missile Ship AVM
Auxiliary Aircraft Landing Training Ship AVT

rickusn

As for CSG, ESG & SSG see below:

The Kearsage ESG (Expeditionary Strike Group), which deployed March 25 in support of the global war on terrorism, consists of the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge (LHD 3), the guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60), the amphibious transport ship USS Ponce (LPD 15), the guided-missile destroyer USS Gonzalez (DDG 66), the guided-missile frigate USS Kauffman (FFG 59), the dock landing ship USS Ashland (LSD 48), fast-attack submarine USS Scranton (SSN 756) and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, based at Camp Lejeune, N.C.


The Nimitz Carrier Strike Group (CSG) includes Carrier Air Wing 11, Destroyer Squadron 23, the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton (CG 59), the guided-missile destroyers USS Higgins (DDG 76) and USS Chafee (DDG 90), the fast-combat support ship USS Bridge (T-AOE 10), and the fast-attack submarine USS Louisville (SSN 724). Chafee and Louisville are home ported in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.


As a Surface Strike Group (SSG), Ramage (DDG 61) , Ross (DDG 71) and Elrod (FFG 55) will participate in regional exercises with allies, make diplomatic port calls and respond to any contingency, including those associated with the ongoing war on terrorism. Under their present configuration, they will serve as an independent, imposing force with a menacing strike capability. If the world situation requires, they are fully capable and ready to join any carrier or expeditionary strike group if called upon.

The three groups combined are called a Naval Expeditionary Strike Force (NESF) which was known in the past as a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG). Under the old scenario the amphibious ships called an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) usually operated alone after the Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) conducted just prior to deployment. The SSG was once known as a Surface Action Group (SAG) that operated independently and autonomously from the CVBGs.

We havent seen many SSG formations as enough ships havent been available to fill them out. This is slowly changing as more Burke DDGs enter the fleet without corresponding premature decommissionings and/or ships being assigned to other duties.

The SSG is proposed to eventually morph into a Missle Defense Surface Action Group (MDSAG).


USN: United States Navy (Just kidding LOL)

rickusn

Heres the latest SSG to deploy (DEC 2004):

As a Surface Strike Group (SSG), Taylor (FFG 50) , O'Bannon (DD 987) and Carney (DDG 64) will participate in regional exercises with allies, make diplomatic port calls and respond to any contingency including those associated with the ongoing war on terrorism.

This SSG deployed w/o the usual fanfare. I found an obscure reference to its deployment.

There is another SSG now undergoing training. Its make-up hasnt yet been publicly divulged to my knowledge.

SSGs dont seem to be forming in the Pacific Fleet this could be for any # of reasons.

rickusn

Here is an explanation of the USN comcept of operations:

The Naval Institute


This article is provided courtesy of the Naval Institute, the Independent Forum for National Security.

Global Concept of Operations

By Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy

The Navy's Global Concept of Operations meets the new National Military Strategy's requirements and implements "Sea Power 21" by more effectively distributing the assets we have. Aegis surface action groups, for example, can provide independent, immediate crisis response, preemptive strike, or be a force multiplier when joining expeditionary strike groups.

The 21st century presents our nation with varied and deadly new threats, including regional adversaries armed with growing antiaccess capabilities and international terrorist and criminal organizations. Countering such enemies requires naval forces that are widely dispersed, fully netted, and seamlessly integrated with joint forces. Such distributed sea-based forces must be capable of simultaneously generating combat power in disparate areas of the globe, thereby strengthening international security and, in time of crises, seizing and sustaining the initiative.

Such an enhanced capabilities-based force is central to "Sea Power 21," the Navy's vision. It also is key to fulfilling the National Military Strategy's requirement to concurrently defend the homeland, deter adversaries in four critical regions, swiftly defeat enemies in two of the four regions, and win one of the two conflicts decisively. This strategic prescription is referred to as 1/4/2/1.


Currently, our force structure is centered on 12 carrier battle groups and 12 amphibious ready groups. Yet, only the 12 carrier battle groups and 7 Tomahawk missile-equipped surface action groups that rotate through the Arabian Gulf are equipped to generate long-range striking power—giving us 19 independent strike groups. While our current amphibious ready groups are tremendously versatile and operationally valuable, they lack the long-range striking power and area control capabilities needed to operate independently against many of the enemies we will face in the decades ahead. Thus we must add to their capabilities, to produce expeditionary strike groups equipped to meet the demands of future naval operations.

Figure 1: Maximizing Combat Flexibility for 1/4/2/1

(Go here to see the Figures 1 & 2): http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache...group%22&hl=en



Global ConOps

The U.S. Navy's Global Concept of Operations (ConOps) is centered on creating additional, innovative force packages to enhance deterrence and improve our ability to operate in more areas around the world. This expansion of operational power is critical because deterring adversaries in four theaters requires on-scene forces poised to project offensive and defensive power when required. In addition, swiftly defeating enemies in multiple theaters requires distributed combat-credible forces that are ready to fight and win, without gapping our presence elsewhere.

As currently configured, today's fleet is hard-pressed to meet these requirements, especially when taking into account required maintenance, crew training, and personnel tempo goals. To increase our operational agility, Global ConOps envisions a fleet comprised of 12 carrier strike groups, 12 expeditionary strike groups, 9 strike/missile defense surface action groups, and 4 converted Ohio (SSBN-726)-class nuclear-powered submarines equipped to launch as many as 154 Tomahawk missiles each. This reorganization will produce 37 independent strike groups, providing a continuous combat-intensive presence over a greater percentage of the globe than is currently possible. Key elements of this transformation include:


Carrier Strike Groups-Carrier strike groups will remain the core of our Navy's warfighting strength and the most powerful force packages in the world. Advanced technologies will sustain this operational impact, even as carrier groups become lighter. The present carrier battle group consists of an aircraft carrier, six surface combatants, two nuclear attack submarines, and one replenishment ship. Tomorrow's carrier strike group will have fewer surface combatants and submarines, an acceptable risk when operating against transnational enemies that pose a limited at-sea threat to our operating forces. Dramatic increases in carrier air wing striking power offset the transfer of surface and submarine striking power to expeditionary striking groups. Thanks to the advent of precision ordnance, today's carrier-based air wings can hit hundreds of aimpoints per day for extended periods, generating unprecedented combat power.
Expeditionary Strike Groups-Today's amphibious ready groups are composed of 2,300 Marines with associated armor, artillery, aircraft, and vehicles embarked on amphibious assault ships, amphibious transport docks, and dock landing ships. The expeditionary strike group of tomorrow will include these forces plus an appropriate number of surface combatants and a submarine. The addition of Ticonderoga (CG-47)-class guided-missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class guided-missile destroyers, for example, will arm expeditionary strike groups with the organic air defense, undersea warfare, and strike capability required for operating independently in low-to-medium threat environments, thereby increasing the fleet's responsiveness and strategic impact.
Surface Action Groups-Sea-based missile defense will be critical to deterring and winning future conflicts. Global ConOps addresses this growing mission by envisioning nine surface action groups. At least two units of each group will be Aegis ships loaded with missile defense weapons. A third ship, also preferably an Aegis combatant, will provide additional striking power and defensive protection to the group. These surface action groups also may serve as independent crisis-response forces that emphasize the precision-attack capability of their Tomahawk missiles.
Combat Logistics Force-The widely dispersed nature of future operations and the growing emphasis on sea basing of joint capabilities will be supported by the newer, more capable combat logistics force ships to be commissioned over the next decade. These cargo and ammunition (T-AKE) and fast combat support (T-AOE) ships will be crewed by Military Sealift Command civilian mariners and will have upgraded material-handling and transfer systems and multipurpose convertible cargo holds for dry stores or ammunition. A heavy underway replenishment system will double both delivery load weight and throughput rates of transfer and an innovative electric-drive propulsion system will provide increased electric power for auxiliary power needs.

These components of the future fleet will disperse and operate independently when facing transnational enemies, and they will combine to form expeditionary strike forces that maximize offensive power and defensive protection when facing powerful regional actors that manifest serious antiaccess capabilities. However deployed, our dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet of tomorrow will provide highly responsive power in support of joint force objectives around the world.
The Power of Ideas

By Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy

As the officer responsible for resourcing the Navy, I am interested in more than just the monetary capital required to maintain and transform our service. Achieving the goals of "Sea Power 21" and the full potential of the Global Concept of Operations (ConOps) will require prudent use of the Navy's most precious resource—people. Not only do our sailors man the ships, they also generate the ideas that are indispensable to our Navy’s future. Equipment by itself can only enable transformation. If our people do not have both the vision to see future possibilities that new technologies have enabled and the courage to embrace the resulting change, true transformation will not occur.


U.S. NAVY (CHRIS DESMOND)

History is replete with examples of forces that were inferior in either size or technical quality to their adversaries carrying the day. In almost all cases the key ingredients to the winners' successes were their people's quality and training and their superior operating concepts using the technology at hand. Sea Warrior is our path to developing that human capital. Through targeted recruitment, focused training, and thoughtful assignment of our people, we will develop the technical expertise to operate future technologies and the mastery of the operational art to achieve a true transformation. The Navy's Global ConOps is the brainchild of one relatively junior staff officer, Commander Steve Richter, who had the vision to see the possibilities and the courage to translate talk into deeds despite his critics. Navy leaders must create a vibrant intellectual environment where new ideas, both technical and operational, are rewarded. We must create an environment where we can find and develop the next Wayne Meyer (the father of Aegis), Arleigh Burke, or Alfred Thayer Mahan. Only then will we reach our full potential.

Future Investments for the Global ConOps

The Navy's Global ConOps is vital to answering the challenge of 1/4/2/1. It is central to achieving the vision of "Sea Power 21" by providing the framework for future growth. As we populate the Global ConOps architecture and link it with ForceNet, we must ensure new ships and systems pass three tests: First, they must integrate smoothly and effectively with joint force packages. Second, they must enhance the strategic impact of the Navy and Marine Corps team. Last, they must be highly adaptable, because naval systems last a very long time. For example, 60% of today's ships still will be on watch around the world 20 years from now.

As new platforms and systems enter the fleet, Global ConOps will provide the foundation for a sea-based force of unparalleled effectiveness. Major new components of our Navy will include:

DD(X)-The Navy's new destroyer will provide distributed, precision offensive and defensive firepower at long range in support of forces ashore. DD(X) will be a multimission surface combatant tailored for land attack and maritime dominance, providing forward presence and deterrence while operating as an integral part of joint and combined expeditionary forces. It also will be used as the baseline for spiral development of technology to support a wide range of future surface ships, including CG(X).
LCS-The littoral combat ship will be optimized for war fighting in the littoral environment. It will be a theater-based asset designed to counter enemy access-denial weapons such as diesel-electric-powered submarines, mines, and fast patrol boats. LCS will include modular mission payloads that provide operational flexibility to match the threat. LCS units also will be attached to carrier and expeditionary strike groups as required, to give them enhanced protection when operating near shore.
LHA(R)-The next class of amphibious assault ships will have increased survivability and amphibious lift capabilities, while providing forward basing for special operating forces. These ships will be designed to take full advantage of the impressive capabilities of the short take-off/vertical landing variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and tilt-rotor V-22 aircraft. This increase in embarked air power, when combined with persistent sensing from unmanned aerial vehicles and long-range striking capabilities provided by missile-equipped surface and subsurface units, will generate the increased combat power that lies at the heart of future expeditionary strike groups.
MPF(F)—Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) concepts envision platforms that greatly increase the sea basing of joint forces. MPF(F) will mitigate antiaccess strategies by assembling and projecting power from far offshore, reducing our dependence on vulnerable ports and airfields. At-sea onload and offload compatibilities with inter- and intratheater assets will enable MPF(F), as part of maritime prepositioning groups, to more effectively support forces ashore in joint operations areas, decreasing deployment and employment time lines while increasing strategic agility.
AFSB-Afloat forward staging bases are being considered as part of the sea-basing concept to further exploit the flexibility of support ships for expeditionary purposes. Such platforms could host highly capable afloat command-and-control centers, special operations forces, or civil-military disaster relief teams for example, thereby expanding tactical and operational opportunities. MPF(F) variant ships may be built with modular adaptability to be employed in such capacities.
SSGN/SOF-Four nuclear-powered missile-firing submarines will be converted to carry as many as 154 Tomahawk missiles each, and to embark special operations forces. These ships also will be upgraded to possess enhanced command-and-control connectivity. The unparalleled degree of conventional firepower and covert strike capacity delivered by these ships will add a new and exciting dimension to undersea warfare.


Figure 2: Joint Maritime Force Packages to Respond to a Broad Range of Requirements and Missions

LCS - Littoral Combat Ship
CSG - Carrier Strike Group
ESG - Expeditionary Strike Group
SAG - Surface Action Group
SSGN - Nuclear-powered Cruise Missile Submarine
AFSB - Afloat Forward Staging Base
ESF - Expeditionary Strike Force
MPF(F) - Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)

Joint Maritime Force Packages

The wide range of combat capabilities provided by 37 independent strike groups will add enhanced flexibility to the fleet, generating force packages that are swiftly tailored to the task and scaled to meet operational requirements. From deterrence enhancement to winning in combat, the 21st-century capabilities brought forward by way of Global ConOps will provide joint force commanders with maneuver, fire, and sustainment options critical to mission accomplishment—projecting decisive power . . . from the sea.

Franco Lolan

I don't see much in regards to developing attack submarine capabilities.

TopHatter

...other than a brand-new class of attack submarines being brought into commision rather quickly.

rickusn

Heres some cost figures I came accross awhile ago now:

Annual Operating Costs for Present and Future Classes of Navy Ships

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ship Class Millions of 2003 Dollars

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Current Operating Costs
DD-963 Spruance Destroyer 34
FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry Frigate 19
DDG-51 Arleigh Burke Destroyer 26
CG-47 Ticonderoga Cruiser 35
Estimated Operating Costs Based on Cost Goals
DD(X) Future Destroyer 20
Littoral Combat Ship 14
CG(X) Future Cruiser 27

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: Congressional Budget Office using data from the Navy's Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) database.
Note: Operating costs for ships not yet deployed represent CBO estimates based on the Navy's manning and cost thresholds for those vessels. Operating costs for the CG(X) are based on the same goals as those for the DD(X).

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Some Navy officials also regard Spruance class destroyers as unreliable and more prone to unexpected breakdowns than any other surface combatant. Various engineering systems are said to be particularly unreliable. The Navy argues that retaining Spruances for their full service life would require upgrading those systems as well as some of the ships' combat systems, at a cost of $50 million to $100 million per ship. That approach would be similar to the upgrades that the Navy performed on Leahy and Belknap class cruisers in the 1980s, which it retained in the fleet until the early to mid-1990s.


Now compare that to the OHP $6m per ship refits to keep them going!!!!!!!!!!!!

TopHatter

Yeah but darn it...what good is a neutered OHP? I mean, they are the cat's ass for counter-narcotics operations, especially with their commodius helo support. But for CVBG ops?

rickusn

Its not about good. Its about cheap.

You did hit the nail on the head though "commodious helo support". Thats why you still see 14 of thirty involved in ESG and SSG ops usually operating in tandem with a Burke I/II DDG w/o organic helo capability. They no longer deploy in CSGs. There no longer are CVBGs. In the CSG the carriers are now beginning to carry two extra ASW helos presumably to support the Burke I/II assigned in much the same manner as the OHPs.

But the OHPs will phase out of even this role with or w/o DDX early in the next decade if not sooner.

In an interesting note: The USMC has officially reduced its long-standing requirement for 12 three amphibious ship formations to 10. Although the USN is only planning to build 9 new LPDs. However in the short-term there will be at least 11 LHA/LHD(also 12 LSD ships will be in-service for quite some time) which will apparently nominally make up the shortfall.