rickusn

And you started with this:

"and France is definitely better than UK at this point"

AND Then backtrack to this:

"admittedly its not so clear right now Rick, but i think in about ten years it will be clearer."

From "definitely better than the UK at this point" to "not so clear right now".

Whats up with that? You cant say both in virtually one breath and consider your opinions credible or educated.

Like I said get a Combat Fleets or a Janes preferably both and really study the hardware existing and then find and read some documentation on experience and trainhg.

For future programs go both routes.

Then get back to me.

And unless you have a crystal ball "in about ten years it will be clearer." holds no water ROTFLMAO.

Dectilion

i said that in two breaths.

and how does "in about ten years it will be clearer." hold no water? by that analysis you could not credibly claim that the US navy will be stronger than the Dutch navy in ten years. ANd my future analysis isnt based on a "crystal ball"

But perhaps you are right, admittedly you have considerably better access to documents than others do, and you are considerably more knowledgeable. If you helped make this information more readily available, the rest of us might have a more informed opinion. On the AAW destroyers front, what can you tell us about the Georges Leygues and Tourville classes?

oh and 100th post, yay!!! so im still a newbie, you have to be patient with my ignorance

__________________
ROAD WARRIOR!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

HKDan

[quote=Dectilion;396827]i said that in two breaths.


But perhaps you are right, admittedly you have considerably better access to documents than others do, and you are considerably more knowledgeable. If you helped make this information more readily available, the rest of us might have a more informed opinion.

Dectilion,

I can understand perfectly well your desire to defend your opinion, please continue to do so. Discussion is exactly what we are here for. On the other hand, on all of WAB I challenge you to find a single poster who makes a greater effort to not only find valuable sources of information, but also share them with the rest of us than RickUSN. His posts are generally treasure troves of useful information, and instead of keeping it all to himelf he spends no small amount of time and energy bringing it here to share with us, "the peanut gallery". So by all means disagree with him, thats fine. But your statement above doesnt give RickUSN credit for all that he has done here to make guys like you and me more knowledgeable.

gunnut

MN gets only 2 Horizons? Are those enough? Everyone else in the world is building advanced AAWs (UK, Germany, Japan, Korea, Spain, Australia) how come France orders only 2? And MN will have 2 CVs to protect.

What are these used for? Singapore and Saudi Arabia both have La Fayette derivatives that look to be massively upgraded compared to the French version. Isn't it kind of a waste to have advanced hulls like this but not put more stuff on it?

__________________
"Only Nixon can go to China." -- Old Vulcan proverb.

kato

By the time the two French Horizons commission (2008-2009), the MN will only have one carrier still, for quite some years to come. The two ships replace on a one-by-one base the destroyers Suffren and Duquesne, which do carrier escort duty.
Cassard and Jean Bart currently pull AAW duty for the amphibious groups pretty much. France is thinking about a dedicated AAW variant of FREMM (additional ships) to replace them nowadays. The second Horizon pair has been quietly dropped (like the originally planned third French pair, or the second Italian pair, before).

Btw, the German (F124) project only replaced previously existing AAW destroyers (which, after their last MLU, i'd say were roughly as capable as the Cassards) on a one-by-one basis as well. Germany originally had an option for a fourth F124 with the builders, but didn't take it.

The French La Fayettes are not used in the same role. They're used for EEZ patrol, flagshowing, and disaster relief (e.g. helping evacuate civilians, La Fayette evacuated 200 from Lebanon). Minor secondary roles are AAW/ASuW-only escort/patrol.

Singapore, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all needed something more "multi-purpose" for a very different mission profile.

edit:

What i wrote there makes the La Fayette's mission profile look like that of the Floreal "surveillance frigates" (OPVs). In some ways, the mission profile is the same in fact. The La Fayette class forms a high-end complement to the Floreal in some way. The two differ in that the Floreal fill the low-end missions, and the La Fayette fill the high-end missions, within an overlapping similar mission spectrum.

The MN organizes its fleet slightly differently overall. The destroyer-typed ships are all tied into specific escort roles (e.g. for carrier or amphib strike groups).
The frigate-typed lighter ships (the La Fayette and Floreal classes) fill "the other missions" - which is mostly what i tried to outline above. If you look at the La Fayette class more as high-end OPVs and presence ships and less as low-end (armed) frigates, they look a lot more impressive.
Note that the Avisos/corvettes pretty much fill up spots in both of those fields as needed, but go more towards the same mission set as the destroyers - they pretty much only end up in "presence missions" if a ASW capacity is needed.

rickusn

"Cassard and Jean Bart currently pull AAW duty for the amphibious groups pretty much."

"The two ships replace on a one-by-one base the destroyers Suffren and Duquesne, which do carrier escort duty."

Both statements are patently false.

The Cassard and Jean Bart stink at ASW even the helo they carry is for liason only.

Cassard for sure and possibly Jean Bart for the most part has escorted De Gaulle for AAW.

Im going to waste sometime searrching the news archives to prove it. IOve posted many stories about the MN apparently you havent read them but I will make an effort to find them.

So be careful how you respond.

The Masurca AAW system was deactivated on both ships in 2000 with Suffren decommissioned in 2001.

Their main ASW weapon Malafon was removed in 1998.

These ships had no helo capability whatsoever.

De Gaulle wasnt even commissioned until 2001.

La Fayettes have been used to escort De Gaulle which Ive commented here many times is very risky and the purpose fo which still escapes me as they cant do ASW or area AAW. Once again only having a liason helo and only the short range Crotale roughly similar to Sea Sparrow.

Kato Ill warn you once about posting false information then I will ask the administrators to take action.

I notice you have been busy at defensetalk spewing the same misinformation.

I may talk with the administrators there soon also.

I thought this modus operandi was a momentary lapse on your part apprently not.

And dectilion you make a Grand Statement about the MN being "definitely better" provide no documentation to support such an assine statement and then besmirch my efforts.

Up Yours.

rickusn

Kato my most humble apologies on reading "AAW" as "ASW" but the rest stands.

1999

GRAFTON is temporarily attached to the French Task Group consisting of the aircraft carrier FS FOCH, a frigate FS CASSARD and supported by an oiler FS MEUSE.

FS Charles de Gaulle - Active Service

On 11 October 2001, the Cassard frigate, four AWACS aircraft and the Charles De Gaulle were involved in a successful trial of the "Liaison 16" high-bandwidth secure data network. The network allows real-time monitoring of the airspace from the South of England to the Mediterranean Sea. The collected data were also transmited in real time to the Jean Bart through the older "Liaison 11" system.

Operation Enduring Freedom - Deployments

"France had 2,000 military personnel in the region as of early November 2001. As of 07 November 2001 a total of 1,200 navy troops, 200 air force staff, 100 logistics staff and 500 military intelligence officers were engaged -- including personnel operating out of France. Aircraft included Mirage IVP reconnaissance jets and a Transall Gabriel plane equipped with electronic surveillance equipment. The French aircraft carrier, the Charles-de-Gaulle, deployed from Toulon for the north of the Indian Ocean, on December 1, 2001. It crossed the Suez Canal on December 11, 2001. Articulated around the aircraft carrier, the air and sea group also includes the anti-aircraft frigate Jean Bart, the anti-submarine frigates Jean de Vienne and the La Motte-Piquet, the supply tanker Meuse and the nuclear attack submarine Rubis. The Charles-de-Gaulle embarked 16 Super-Etendard (reconaissance and assault), two Rafale (air superiority), and two Hawkeye (air surveillance). The air and sea group, in addition to the support for the ground actions in Afghanistan, will take part in the maritime patrol of the zone, in order to avoid the exfiltration of terrorist leaders by sea. "

HMS - references in online news media

Mar 28, 2004
Task Force 473, as it is officially titled, includes the French frigate Jean Bart, the British destroyer HMS Gloucester, the French nuclear attack submarine ...


Warship Port Visits Seawaves Magazine

Jean Bart escorted De Gaulle in 2004. I had a link to an artricle but it is no longer available.

Défense

"The aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle 's air and sea group left the Toulon naval base on May 4th for a two months mission in the Atlantic Ocean and the Channel. During this mission, named FRAME 05, trainings with the Canadian navy, and interaction between aircraft carrier groups with the US navy, are to take place within the framework of the recent joint operations (Heracles in 2002, exercises in the Mediterranean in 2003, and mission Agapanthe in 2004).

The air-and-sea group comprises the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, the anti-aircraft frigate Jean Bart, the anti-submarine frigate Tourville, the supply ship Meuse, and the nuclear assault submarine Rubis, to be relieved during the mission by the Perle. The on-board air group includes 12 Super Etendard Modernisé fighter planes, 8 Rafale Marine and 2 Hawkeye. "

The Future Takes Shape

France – the carrier Charles de Gaulle, with a crew of 1,950, plus 800 marines; the frigate Tourville, crew 301; frigate Jean Bart, 225 crew; tanker Meuse, crew 164; submarine Rubis, crew 66.

Canadian Navy: News & Information

(2005)
The Royal Navy destroyer HMS Nottingham followed by the frigate Jean Bart, the submarine Rubis and finally the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle entered the harbour safely. With all the ships in harbour, PSU 3 had to maintain 24/7 operations during the foreign ships’ visit.



SeaWaves Magazine Port Visits March 2007

In March 07 Cassard was escorting De Gaulle.

Defence Internet | Defence News | HMS Lancaster gets a roaring homecoming

HMS Lancaster, a Type 23 frigate, left Portsmouth on 13 February 2006 to work with a French task group in the Northern Arabian Sea. She provided protection to the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle as her aircraft launched reconnaissance and strike missions over Kandahar province, Afghanistan, and also worked closely with the French destroyer Casasard, the frigate Montcalm, nuclear-powered submarine Saphir and the supply ship Somme.



http://www.strategypage.com/military.../30-87213.aspx

CdG's Group will leave Toulon on Feb. 8th., 2007

The group will comprise the frigate Cassard, the frigate Duplex, one SNA plus the AOE Marne.

It is noteworthy that the group was to deploy in the Atlantic area, but that plan was changed this month.

http://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/6-41795.aspx

2/20/2007 11:48:40 AM
The French BattleGroup left Toulon on Sunday the 10th . It has conducted day and night trials near the French coast .
It has then participated at a French-Spanish Naval excercise where a simulated attack on the Spanish Carrier "Principe de Asturias" took place . The attack involved 10 Super Etendards Modernized and few Rafales . The result of the exercise hasn 't been disclosed yet .

The CdG will then go to the Red Sea and in the North Indian Ocean with a stop at Djibouti .The 3rd Rafale F2 will join the other 2 already onboard at that time .
The BattleGroup will be composed of :

- CdG Aircraft Carrier (3 Rafale F2s , 9 F1s , 16 SEMs)
- Frigate Cassard
- Frigate Sutherland (UK)
- Frigate Tourville
- Frigate Dupleix
- Command and supply Ship Marne
- SNA Casabianca

Athens News Agency: Daily News Bulletin in English, 06-04-12


THESSALONIKI, 12/04/2006 (ANA)
One of the biggest ships of the French fleet will visit the port of Thessaloniki, Macedonia, on April 25.
It is the French fleet's anti-aircraft defense frigate "Jean Bart", which is on a supervision mission in the Black Sea area. The frigate, 139 meters long and 14 meters wide, will remain in Thessaloniki until April 28 to provide relaxation for its crew which is composed of 240 people.

Captain Pascal Auxerre is expected to host a reception on the frigate which will depart for Toulon on April 28.


While it is true that these ships can escort amphibious groups again it is as AAW escorts not ASW. And only in a crisis or because De Gaulle is in extneded overhaul. It has not been normal operations. But then again the Mistral class is quite new so when the Horizons are commissioned we might well see them relegated to that duty.:

European Tribune - Comments - European Salon de News, Discussion et Klatsch – 28. December

Are concerned the ship of projection and command (BPC) Mistral, the transports of barges (TCD) Sirocco and Orage, the anti-aircraft frigate Cassard, the Guépratte frigate, the supply tanker Meuse and the hunters of mines Pégase and Verseau.

Défense
Action taken between 18 and 20 August:

20 August: The landing ship logistic Foudre and the anti-aircraft frigate Cassard cast off from Toulon, and are due on the theatre of operations during the week. On board the Foudre, components from the 13 and 2 engineers regiments and over 100 engineers vehicles destined to the emergency reinforcement of UNIFIL.
The Mistral, along with the Jean Bart, unloaded 225 tons of first aid freight in Beirut.

Helicopter Panther from the Jean Bart carried out a reconnaissance flight to assess the maritime pollution, alongside with the CEDRE (Documentation, Research and Experiment Centre on accidental water pollution).

Mistrals first mission:

Today's Pic's Monday, July 24, 2006 - Page 4 - Military Photos

The French navy anti-aircraft frigate Jean Bart sails off the coast of Larnaca, Cyprus, Sunday July 23, 2006, as it arrives in Cyprus to begin evacuating foreigners from Lebanon. It is the Mistral's first ever mission.(

rickusn

And more fromm 2002.:

Park View Lounge :: View topic - French Military History

TF 473:

De Gaulle
Jean Bart
Cassard
Surcouf(La Fayette class)
De Grasse (ASW)
Somme (Tanker)
Safir(SSN)

Task Force 473, photographed March 13, 2002. The French Navy participated in Operation Enduring Freedom by serving as a force-projector of French bombing runs. Later the Task Force patrolled waters surrounding the Southern Middle East in order to disrupt any possible terrorist ploys.


And more on the Lebanon crisis the ONLY time the Cassard/Jean Bart have been seen with Amphibious ships.:

Opération Baliste - Mirrorpedia
Task Force 473, photographed March 13, 2002. The French Navy participated in Operation Enduring Freedom by serving as a force-projector of French bombing runs. Later the Task Force patrolled waters surrounding the Southern Middle East in order to disrupt any possible terrorist ploys.

kato

Indeed, i did mix these up somewhat, fully taking the blame there.
The two Cassards pull escort duty for both the carrier and the amphibs - they were deployed a lot during Operation Baliste.

Suffren and Duquesne however are planned to be replaced by the two Horizon destroyers, with Forbin replacing the already decommissioned Suffren and Chevalier Paul replacing Duquesne
See Jane's Fighting Ships 2004/05, page 231, the Horizon entry:
I'm sorry, i'll have to call you on that one.

Netmarine states:
(Duquesne fired 3 Masurca missiles in March 2005 tests; the last previous firing was in September 2001; in June 2005, eight missiles were fired in less than 20 minutes)

According to Jane's Fighting Ships 2004/05 (page 231), the Malafon ASW systems were indeed removed in the 1998/1999 refit, having been inoperational since 1997. The same entry still lists the Masurca as active, btw (or rather, has no note regarding deactivation).
Duquesne still carries four torpedo launchers for ASW, with 10 light ECAN L5 torpedoes.

Duquesne did however pull AAW duty for CdG during CdG's acceptance trials. She also escorted Charles de Gaulle during Operation Agapanthe (TF473, February to April 2004) along with Jean Bart in the same taskforce.

Courbet & Aconit - Exercice Péan 02 (off Crete) with CdG, along with Cassard and Tourville
Guépratte - Exercice Péan 03 (off Crete) with CdG, along with Cassard and La Motte-Piquet

These are the only operations i can find where a La Fayette operated in a taskforce with Charles de Gaulle.
I'd be interested in other such operations being pointed out.

edit:
Ah, Operation Heracles. Sorry, but while some people may list the La Fayettes deployed along with the carrier group as escorts, they were not. La Fayette replaced Guépratte replaced Surcouf in that TF btw. The ships were part of the TF as they replenished from their auxiliaries. Their actual job there was this:
Netmarine.
(patrol operations in the Gulf of Oman)


-----

Maybe you might want to point out such false information to me in the relevant threads over there so i actually know where i am misinforming other people.

kato

As for the Cassards escorting Amphibs other than Operation Baliste, here's France's official contribution to NATO Response Force NRF-8, 2007:

In 1996, Cassard also escorted TCD Ouragan in the Persian Gulf.

In the 90s, most Amphib missions were actually unescorted (as no escorts were needed for the tasks).

rickusn

"In 1996, Cassard also escorted TCD Ouragan in the Persian Gulf."

Your point is that again "pretty much" this was the Cassards's main duty? LOL ROTHFLMAO

"In the 90s, most Amphib missions were actually unescorted (as no escorts were needed for the tasks)."

This decade has been no different except for one crisis and an on paper only allocation.

Ah yes I did overlook Duquense in the 2004 deploymnent even though I posted a link to it:

"Le groupe aéronaval est composé des frégates antiaériennes Jean Bart et HMS Gloucester, de la frégate lance-missiles Duquesne, du sous-marin nucléaire Améthyste et du pétrolier Meuse."

And my info came from Combat Fleets 2005-2006 on the Masurca 2000 deactivation.

And I do vaguely remember(now that you jog my memory) thay made it operational for a test in 2005.

But it wasnt operational for the 2004 deployment AFAIK.

You yourself say it wasnt fired since 2001.

If you think that Duquenesne and Masurca have any effective combat capability your sadly mistaken.

Of course as Ive stated the comabat capability of the Cassard and Jean Bart along with La Fayette class, Georges Leygues and Tourville classes is almost as ephemeral.

And thats why FREMM is such a desperate program.

Surcouf(LA Fayette class) deployed with Cassard and De Gaulle in 2006 my link is broke to the article but I will try and find another one.And you found other ones.

But I will find another.

But my basic point, which I linked nearly every year of this decade to a story of which interestling enough means nothing to you, the De Gaulle primarilly being escorted for AAW by the Cassard and Jean Bart or both.

Or these ships being operated independently when not assigned to De Gaulle.

And while Cassard is assigned to the NATO formation but it was on paper only as the ship was until recently operating with De Gaulle. And did for the Lebanon crisis pulling double duty in both cases.

Your really stretching this "pretty much" thing to extremes.

And you still havent acknowledged that Suffren went into reserve in 2001.

So its beyond me how it could be escorting carriers.

Much less how irrelevant it is that a Horizon class DDG replaces her eight years later.

Like Dectilion you fight your battles with ships and weapons that dont exist except on paper.

Good luck with that.

But of course think what you want.


AS for those looking for those thinking France ahs any where near the experinence in Amphhibious operations you may want to start with this.:

http://www.ijnhonline.org/volume1_nu...f_speller1.pdf

Amphibious Renaissance
The Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, 1956-1966[1]

Dr. Ian Speller, King’s College London and the
UK Joint Services Command and Staff College

Expeditionary capabilities, including amphibious forces, are currently undergoing something of a renaissance within the British armed services. The change in the strategic environment since the end of the Cold War has brought a corresponding change in defense posture. Where once the Royal Navy was primarily concerned with the struggle for sea control in the eastern Atlantic it is now adapting to a new role projecting power and influence far beyond Britain’s shores. This is not the first time that such a change has occurred.

From the mid-1950s, the Royal Navy undertook a major reappraisal of its role, reducing the emphasis that it placed on preparing for a war against the Soviet Union and placing a new priority on power projection. Expeditionary capabilities, previously ignored, became central to the fleet’s rationale. The navy developed a concept of mobile amphibious task groups, supported by large aircraft carriers and the necessary escorts and replenishment ships. These forces were to concentrate in the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, in the region described by the British as ‘east of Suez’. Almost inevitably, this brought them into conflict with the Royal Air Force (RAF) who had developed their own scheme for the projection of power overseas. In the debates that followed, the various strengths and limitations of either case were discussed exhaustively and the value of both was tested in a number of actual operations.

The debates are of historical interest because their outcome had a fundamental impact on the shape and size of the British armed forces in the 1970s, 1980s and beyond. They may also be of contemporary value as they highlight issues that remain important today, particularly as both the United States and the United Kingdom once again seek to project power overseas in a fashion that is militarily effective, politically acceptable and economically sustainable.

Obviously, in 20 minutes I will not be able to cover the subject in as much detail as I would like. I may have to skim over some points. I would be delighted to elaborate on these during the discussion period. All of the important issues are covered in some depth in my paper, copies of which are available on request.[2]

The Future Role of the Navy

The 1956 Suez Crisis demonstrated the inability of the British armed forces to mount a rapid military response to crises beyond Europe. As a result, the 1957 Defence Review articulated a shift towards smaller, professional forces and greater strategic mobility to meet the demands of limited conflict beyond Europe.[3] Even prior to Suez the Navy had anticipated the requirement and developed a new concept for the Future Role of the Navy. They announced that, in the future, forces devoted to major war would be reduced and resources would be reallocated to limited war tasks. At the center of this new concept was the creation of a task group built around an aircraft carrier and a new ‘commando carrier’ that would be based at Singapore.[4]

The new concept represented a fundamental shift in naval priorities. Prior to 1956 the main emphasis in plans and procurement had been preparation for a major conflict with the Soviet Union. Power projection capabilities in general and amphibious forces in particular had received a low priority.[5] The change did not occur without some opposition. However, despite some initial misgivings, in the years after 1956 the navy embraced their new expeditionary role. Two 20,000 ton aircraft carriers were converted into helicopter equipped ‘commando carriers’ (LPH); the obsolete ships of the Amphibious Warfare Squadron were replaced by the new LPDs HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid and six new Landing Ships, Logistic (LSLs) were built.

Amphibious vessels were only one component of this new expeditionary capability. Aircraft carriers were at the center of the proposed new task force. The Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, had begun his defense review with a skeptical attitude towards the value of aircraft carriers. However, the First Sea Lord, Lord Mountbatten had skillfully overcome this opposition by demonstrating their value in support of operations overseas.[6] Unfortunately, gaining and maintaining approval for the replacement of the existing ships would prove more difficult.

The Admiralty developed the case for their new task force. Drawing on assets from all three Services the core of the force was to be an Amphibious Group of three operational ships, based at Singapore. These ships would be supported by four aircraft carriers, of which a maximum of three would be in service at any one time. An amphibious group of this size would be able to land and support a balanced military force of up to brigade group size. It would be able to conduct a tactical landing against a hostile shore or on a friendly coast where reception facilities were absent.[7]

Should Britain be required to maintain a presence east of Suez with no bases except in Australia the Admiralty advocated what was called the Double Stance. This required the maintenance of two amphibious groups supported by a total of six large aircraft carriers in order to guarantee the permanent availability of a brigade sized landing force with appropriate air support. The resulting force, to be called the Joint Services Seaborne Force, would draw on assets from all three services. Needless to say, this would require a significant increase in expenditure on the navy.[8] Unsurprising the key Chiefs of Staff study completed in 1961, British Strategy in the Sixties, ruled out the Double Stance on the grounds of cost. Nevertheless, it did approve the concept of a single amphibious group requiring the deployment of all four major vessels east of Suez. Aircraft carrier strength was limited to one and later two such vessels maintained in commission in theatre.[9]

The utility of the Admiralty’s concept was demonstrated during the 1961 Kuwait crisis. In response to a perceived threat to Kuwaiti independence from Iraq, the British deployed to Kuwait a reinforced infantry brigade group supported by air and maritime assets. Under the existing plan to reinforce Kuwait, the majority of troops were to arrive by air and join equipment held in stockpiles in Kuwait and Bahrain. However, in the first days of the crisis, both Turkey and Sudan refused to allow over-flight of their airspace and this, in conjunction with the ‘air barrier’ of unfriendly states in the Middle East, seriously undermined the plan. Indeed, 24 hours after the initial Kuwaiti request for help on 30 June the only full unit in Kuwait was No. 42 Commando landed from the commando carrier HMS Bulwark and supported by half a squadron of tanks from the LST HMS Striker.[10]

Unimpeded by political restrictions and able to poise over the horizon in international waters, ostensibly slow amphibious ships proved quicker and more mobile than the air transported alternative. In addition, and in contrast to troops arriving in long-range transport aircraft, the troops landed by helicopter from Bulwark did not need airport facilities to arrive and if necessary could secure theatre entry in a non-benign situation. In the event the amphibious force was able to adopt a covering position to secure the entry of the follow-on forces arriving by air and no Iraqi attack materialized. It was noteworthy that despite the existence of airfield facilities at Kuwait and Bahrain, the RAF was unable to secure a satisfactory air defense environment before the arrival of the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious on 9 July.[11]

By 1964, all of the ships of the Amphibious Group were in service or being built. The situation regarding aircraft carriers was less satisfactory. The hulls of all of the existing ships had been laid down during the Second World War. Expensive modernization programs might extend the lives of these vessels but it was clear that if the navy was to maintain a fleet of three operational carriers into the 1970s, as planned, new construction would be required. The Admiralty favored large carriers over smaller, less capable vessels. Despite some concern that large and therefore costly vessels might encounter political opposition, in June 1962 the Admiralty approved a design concept for a ship of 53,000 tons and costing about £60 million to construct.[12] This brought them into conflict with the RAF who had their own ideas about the best way to deploy air power overseas.

The Joint Services Seaborne Force versus the Island Stance

In what became known as the ‘Island Strategy’ or ‘Island Stance’ the RAF claimed that British interests could be supported through the application of long-range air power deployed from a notional series of bases that could be established across the region.[13] The strategy offered a more limited intervention capability based around the use of long-range strike aircraft and air transported troops. It provided for intervention by a parachute battalion and an infantry brigade group, without armor up to 1,000 miles from the mounting base. The majority of the military force would be left in the United Kingdom and deployed by air into theatre if required.

The Admiralty correctly interpreted the Island Strategy as an attack on their plans. There was no place for either aircraft carriers or amphibious ships in the RAF plan. The navy criticized the scheme on the grounds strategic reality, political feasibility, and military practicality.[14]

They claimed that the strategy was not realistic because it was inflexible. Being tied to static bases, it would be unable to adapt to meet new threats in different areas. They also questioned the political feasibility or desirability of maintaining all of the island bases that were required. It was suggested that the establishment of bases off the east coast Africa would be interpreted as a threat to the newly independent East African nations. This might result in an increase in Chinese or Soviet influence in the region.

The navy also pointed out that the military feasibility of going into battle at ranges of up to 1,000 miles was untried and was dependent on there being no worthwhile opposition in the air or on the ground. In any case, even under the most favorable conditions, with four days warning, it would still take between eight and ten days to undertake the unopposed airlift of a brigade group 1,000 miles forward. There was little difference between this figure and the reaction time for a seaborne lift. The air-transported troops would have the additional disadvantage of arriving unacclimatised. With few land and air forces permanently based in the theatre the strategy would also lack the physical deterrence associated with seaborne forces.

The debate was conducted in the context of bitter inter-service rivalry. In the short-term, the shortcomings of the Island Strategy and the superior intervention capability of carrier/amphibious forces ensured the success of the Admiralty case. On 30 July 1963, the Minister of Defence announced to Parliament the decision to build an aircraft carrier of about 50,000.[15] The Admiralty clearly hoped that more would follow. Indeed, they went as far as to agree a name for the second vessel. Unfortunately, this success was to be short lived. Within three years, the carrier replacement program had been cancelled.

The Royal Marines

Inter-service rivalry also characterized the relationship between the army and the Royal Marines. The Royal Marines had prospered under the navy’s new role. The Commando Brigade expanded from three to five battalion-sized units and consideration was given to raising a sixth. The brigade also received additional artillery and logistic support elements, provided by the army. These were designed to allow the brigade, or individual commando units, to operate independently in an expeditionary role. This caused some disquiet in the army who displayed a periodic interest in the amphibious role east of Suez. This had less to do with a genuine commitment to amphibious operations than to a belief that by replacing one or more Royal Marine Commando units they might be able to avoid cuts to their own infantry regiments. Such attempts became particularly vigorous as the defense review initiated by the new Labour Government in 1964 began to bite.[16]

It is hard to portray this as anything other than cynical single-service politics. The army had no knowledge or experience of amphibious operations whereas the Royal Marines were specialists in this role, with years of hard won experience. In reality, it made little sense for the already over-stretched army to take on a new responsibility at the expense of the Royal Marines who were fully manned and turning away prospective recruits. In the event the gathering pace of change made the debate rather academic as the role that was being fought over was abandoned. Nevertheless, the debate over who should provide the infantry element of an amphibious force, and the degree to which specialist skills are required, has proven to be an enduring one that can still invite controversy today.

The End of Empire

The Royal Navy contributed towards the protection of British interests overseas in a variety of ways during the 1960s. This was particularly true of the east of Suez region. From exercises with allies and port visits by individual vessels, to participation in the ANZUK naval force and provision of the Hong Kong frigate guard ship the navy was an everyday feature of the military and diplomatic life of the region. The conceptual basis for the navy’s policy was founded on the belief that the mobility and access provided by the politically free environment of the sea offered the ideal means of projecting power over a wide area and in response to unforeseen circumstances. They also believed that on many occasions the threat of air strikes by distant (and thus unseen) bombers would be insufficient to deter opposition and that troops arriving at secure airports in long-range transport aircraft would not suffice in all circumstances.

The utility of the maritime concept was demonstrated in operations at Kuwait in 1961, at Tanganyika in 1964, and during the final withdrawal from Aden in 1967.

Conclusion

In the decade between 1956 and 1966, British amphibious capabilities had undergone something of a renaissance. Old, obsolescent war-built ships and craft were replaced by a modern mix of helicopter-equipped commando carriers, dock landing ships, and logistic landing ships. For the first time since 1945 the Royal Navy accepted amphibious warfare as a high priority task and the Royal Marines prospered. The Admiralty did not claim that they alone could meet the needs of British foreign and defense policy overseas and portrayed their concept for a maritime strategy as being inherently joint. Army units would provide support and follow-on elements for the amphibious group while RAF land-based aircraft were acknowledged as a vital supplement to carrier-based aviation. Inevitably, however, the concept of a Joint Services Seaborne Force was liable to attract funds to the navy budget and at the expense of the other services. The ‘Double Stance’ was ideally suited to British needs east of Suez, but a navy that included six large aircraft carriers and eight major amphibious ships could only be afforded if radical cuts were made in other areas of the defense budget. This was never likely to happen. The Single Stance approach adopted in the 1960s placed a much smaller burden on the budget, but this reduced capability made it inevitable that scarce ships would sometimes be in the wrong place at the wrong time

When reception facilities could be guaranteed, air transported troops promised faster arrival times than the maritime alternative. Likewise, land-based fighter and strike aircraft could provide a cheaper alternative to carrier aviation when crises occurred within range of their bases. Neither situation could be relied upon. In situations where reception facilities were not available, or where larger forces requiring heavy equipment were needed, a mixture of maritime and air transported assets could build up a balanced military force faster than by air alone. Experience at Kuwait and Tanganyika showed that when a warning period allowed ships to poise offshore, maritime assets could offer an extremely rapid intervention capability. Strike aircraft operating from island bases lacked the mobility, flexibility, and physical deterrence associated with a forward deployed maritime force. There was also a serious question about the long-term viability of the bases from which they would operate.

The concept of a task force comprising an Amphibious Group and a large aircraft carrier and supported by joint assets was extremely well suited to British needs. Able to travel freely across international waters without reliance on forward bases, host nation support or over-flight rights—maritime forces could offer influence without provocation in a way that could not be matched by land based alternatives.

Unfortunately, the operations that they were designed to support were essentially those of choice rather than necessity. When the government chose to concentrate resources on more immediate tasks, the maritime approach was doomed. For a period, in the late 1960s, the government sought to use airpower as a means of maintaining a very limited intervention capability. This did not occur because air power could do the same job better, or more cheaply. Rather, it was a reflection of the fact that the task had changed. Britain no longer aspired to maintain the robust, multi-faceted intervention capability that the maritime force provided.

The military and political value of the Joint Services Seaborne Force concept was belatedly demonstrated during the 1982 Falklands conflict. The task force that re-captured the Falkland Islands was in essence a smaller version of the force envisaged by the Admiralty twenty years earlier. Unfortunately, it lacked the scale and range of capabilities envisaged in the 1960s, and for this the sailors, marines, soldiers, and airmen were to pay a heavy price. However, the ability of a balanced maritime force to respond rapidly and effectively to unforeseen circumstances was demonstrated once again. The task force that sailed from Britain in April 1982 provided a visible sign of British determination and offered the politicians a variety of political options including, ultimately, the re-conquest of the disputed islands. This could not have been achieved by any other means. The arguments deployed by the Navy in the 1960s were vindicated once again. Given their stated desire to maintain a role in the wider world, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic would do well to remember this.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1]The analysis, opinions, and conclusions expressed or implied in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the JSCSC, the UK MoD, or any other government agency.

[2]Given the cancellation of the 15th Naval Symposium the complete paper will now be published as ‘The Royal Navy, Expeditionary Operations and the End of Empire, 1956–1975’ in the forthcoming book, Greg Kennedy (ed.) Britain’s Maritime Strategy East of Suez, 1900–2000: Influences and Actions (London: Frank Cass).

[3]Defence: Outline of Future Policy 1957; Cmnd. 124.

[4]UK Public Records Office, Kew (henceforth PRO): DEFE 5/70, COS (56) 280, The Future Role of the Navy.

[5]For a detailed examination of this, see Ian Speller, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945–1956 (London: Palgrave, 2001).

[6]E. Grove, Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy Since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), 199-209.

[7]PRO: ADM 205/192, Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme, 17 May 1961. PRO: DEFE 5/150, COS 109/64, 2 April 1964. PRO: DEFE 4/167, COS 26 mtg/64, 2 April 1964.

[8]PRO: ADM 205/192.

[9]PRO: CAB 131/25, D (61) 28, 16 May 1961. PRO: ADM 1/29638. PR: DEFE 7/2235. PRO: CAB 131/27, D (61) 1 mtg, 12 January 1962.

[10]PRO: DEFE 5/118, COS (61) 378, 18 October 1961.

[11]Ibid.

[12]PRO: ADM 167/160, Board Memo. B.1421 and Board Minute 5535.

[13]PRO: AIR 8/2354.

[14]PRO: AIR 20/11423.

[15]PRO: CAB 127/37, CC (63) 50th Conclusions, cabinet meeting on 30 July 1963. Parliamentary Debate (Hansard), Volume 682, column 237–238 and 992–994.

rickusn

Might have the year wrong on Surcouf. Wish I would save the articles I always seem to nee a year or more later. LOL

But here we have Surcouf with the RN in 2006.:

The Royal Navy flotilla that took part in Konkan 2006, with their respective commanding officers;

• HMS Illustrious RO6 - Commanding Officer: Commodore Robert Cooling, Strike Group Commander
• RFA Fort Victoria A387 - Commanding Officer: Captain William M Walworth
• HMS Gloucester D96 - Commanding Officer: Commander Mike P Paterson
• RFA Diligence A132 - Commanding Officer: Captain Shaun P Jones
• FS Surcouf F711 - Commanding Officer: Captain Laurent Hava
• HMS Sovereign S108 - Commanding Officer: Not Known

Konkan 2006 [www.bharat-rakshak.com]

rickusn

Im finding plenty with RN carriers LOL.

GNN - Government News Network

FS GUEPRATTE is currently deployed with HMS INVINCIBLE as the escort to the carrier East of Suez and is due to return in April. HMS NOTTINGHAM is currently scheduled to deploy with CHARLES DE GAULLE (CDG) to the US in May before CDG participates in the International Fleet Review.

Im going to hav eto go digging into some of my old hard-drives I fear to find what Im looking for if i didnt already dispose of the articles Im serhcing for.

Im sure Ive posted them on some discussion board but that might be an even more time consuming task.

gunnut