Thread: New Maritime Strategy Out

Originally Posted by rickusn

I never really understood what the LCS was supposed to or how it was supposed to do it.

The high-speed requirement which isnt likely to be met must certainly have caused a myriad of design problems.

With 62 Burkes and 22 Ticos plus a handful of DDX/CGX the USN should be able to field 10 CSGs, 10 ESGs and 10 SSGs.

Another requirement is a dozen frigate type ships for mostly Western Hemisphere Ops and ASW/MW R&D.

Four based in San Diego and the rest in Mayport.

This ship should have high endurance/Seakeeping standards and the ability to operate/maintain two 15 ton helos, boats for boarding, a remote vehicle operating capablity and appropriate self-defense weapons/sensors.

Larger than LCS but not over 5000 tons and preferably less if possible.

Ten Motherships based on the LPD 17 class capable of supporting small boats/attack craft, support up to four CH 53 equivilants and able to operate remote vehicles. And again fitted with appropriate self-defense weapons.

These vessels could be operated independently or with CSG/ESG/SSG formations.

But usually accompanied by a single non-organic helo fitted Burke DDG.

With 28 Burkes with no organic helo divvied up with other helo capable ships in particular Carriers, LHA/Ds and "motherships"(for lack of a better term) their true strength can be leveraged and their inherent shortcomings minimized.

Those Burkes, Frigates and Motherships are all team players in wartime scenarios and all but the Burkes capable of useful independent non-wartime missions.

How to pay for it?

Seabase to me its a non-starter far too vulnerable tactically, strategically and logistically IMHO at least as proposed.

Just some thoughts.

Im probably way off base.

The plan was to buy 55 LCSs for $27 to $32 billion (IIRC). Sea Base technologies and platforms will run another $30 billion or more.

By my read, you want 12 frigates and 10 "Motherships" to replace the LCS and Seabase, right? I think we'll need more hulls than that.

I don't know if a 5000 ton frigate will be able to meet the shallow draft requirements of the LCS.

Do we really need organic helos on this vessel? Do we really need two? Do they need to be H-60s? How about a hangar for something smaller with the ability to lilypad H-60s?

Could we not consolidate the air onto a small flattop and shrink the LCS combatant down to 1200-1500 tons?

Maybe this new, small flattop could be based on the Burke hull and have hangar space for 10-12 H-60s, plus small fixed wing or VTUAVs.

Or maybe on the LPD-17 hull and carry as many as 30 or more H-60s, or smaller numbers of CH-53s, V-22s or even F-35s.

The combatant could have a hanger large enough for a Dolphin/Panther-sized helo or two VTUAVs. Their primary job would be deployment of ASW/MIW USV/UUVs, small-boat ASuW, and MSO. They could have a 40+kt top speed, but I'm not sure the need outweighs the costs.

I can see the argument for sizing the combatant to at least carry one H-60. But I imagine it could still be smaller than the current LCS.

I'm still not sold on the LPD-17 based "Mothership" concept. It seems like an awfully large ship to deliver just a handful of small craft.

What's the minimum-sized boat necessary to deploy an AN/WLD-1? Galrahn has thrown out the M-80 Stiletto as a possibility, but even the "all well deck" LSD(X) concept could only carry 4 (if memory of a previous thread serves). That's not many combatants, given the size of the Mothership. And their individual capability is far lower than an LCS, frigate or corvette.

SPARTANS could sortie directly from the Mothership, but don't they have LOS comms issues? Will a handful of Motherships be able to control a large number of USV/UUVs over a very large area? Or is it better to split the command and control job up amongst more numerous, smaller vessels?

The nice thing about a large Mothership, though, is the ability to sustain it's boats for a long time with large fuel and munitions reserves. This would place less of a burden on replenishment ships.

At 80x40 (LCAC size) a LSD(X) or LSD-41 can support 4 vessels.

However, it would also be able to additionally support a large number of USVs and other patrol vessels that be loaded onto trailers and stored in a vehicle deck. Several dozen at least. With the news that the DOD is testing torpedoes on Spartan, among other things, a mothership under that type of concept would be 4 ~500 ton sustainable vessels with several dozen other ~2 ton 'smaller attack vessels' as well.

Without a LCS in the water, it is still too early for me to speculate on my likes or dislikes in specific terms. All I know for certain is the current price is way too high, and there needs to be a legitimate effort to reduce costs, which means reduced capability. The first capability I see that should be reduced is speed, which also happens to be the aspect of greatest cost increase on both hulls.

And the whole concept of LCSs utility is based on "speed".

So what does that tell you?

Plus its alreadu Useless in Bluewater or high sea states with low endurance means no flexibility in employment.

A glorified, gold-plated minesweeper and we dont even know if it will be any good at that.

LOL
ROTFLMAO

Steeljaw Scribe » Maritime Strategy 2007: The Author Speaks

Excerpts From a participant in drafting the strategy. I reccomennd reading it completely.:

"No fleet size/force composition prescription. You “punted” this. Yep, we did, and we did it from the start. At no point in this strategy did fleet size enter into the discussion. We were moving from the perspective of what is it we want to do to protect and extend the American way of life and the global system that protects it. Fleet size debates will arise from here, but I do think we’ve created the intellectual basis for growth (unlike ANY OF THE OTHER SERVICES) with this document."

And my frigate & Mothership proposal flowed from this based on what I read of USN operational concepts: "from the perspective of what is it we want to do to protect and extend the American way of life and the global system that protects it."

But #s of course matter that they shied away from it for political reasons may be the better part of valour but eventually the bullet will have to be bit to justify buying new or maintaing existing ships.

I attempted to both at once to justify both the USNs concepts in particular Global Fleet Stations, ASW and "scalability" and form a firm, reasonable, understandable basis for industrial and financial planning based on what the USN has publicly stated and documented is there goal and vision.

LCS and Seabase as now programmed do NOT fit that strategy from my perspective.

Wheras a highly capable frigate, Mothership and existing CSG,ESG and SSG pardigms and both USN/USMC force structure do.

To be sure I have been a proponet of HSVs and the MLP but only in the context of experimentation and again the "scalability" of USMC amphibious operations. Army follow on forces being a totally different issue.

I forsee little need future need for a full blown war happening many times ie once every couple of years or so to justify the seabase concept as now programmed.

Its inflexible and unadaptable with only a single purpose much like the BB reactivation concept but actually far,far worse. As resources for the Sea Base have been stolen from the existing USMC/USN amphibious forces which are far more useful on a daily basis and with "scalability" inherent in the force structure have a better capability to form a sea base as required vice the programmed fixed assets for only one purpose.

In other words an expensive White Elephant that sucks up an inordinate amount of resources but showing little to no return on investment in either the short run or long run.

On the 1986 strategy:

"In some ways, the fleet size gave birth to the strategy, rather than the other way around. Anyone who believes that it is the role of this document to lay out an argument as politically charged as fleet size just doesn’t understand how quickly something like this can die in this town. "

Now this is very true as Ive related before in particular "Fleet size" driving "strategy".