rickusn

"Plus, in the USN, the F125 main capabilities can already be filled by other ships (such as your motherships).'

That was the point I was making and why it would be my second choice although to be sure there would be diffrences.

The size and ability to house a variety of capabilities was my thinking about employing such a ship if the newfrigate/mothership concept of force structure couldnt be realized.

B.Smitty

The plan was to buy 55 LCSs for $27 to $32 billion (IIRC). Sea Base technologies and platforms will run another $30 billion or more.

By my read, you want 12 frigates and 10 "Motherships" to replace the LCS and Seabase, right? I think we'll need more hulls than that.

I don't know if a 5000 ton frigate will be able to meet the shallow draft requirements of the LCS.

Do we really need organic helos on this vessel? Do we really need two? Do they need to be H-60s? How about a hangar for something smaller with the ability to lilypad H-60s?

Could we not consolidate the air onto a small flattop and shrink the LCS combatant down to 1200-1500 tons?

Maybe this new, small flattop could be based on the Burke hull and have hangar space for 10-12 H-60s, plus small fixed wing or VTUAVs.

Or maybe on the LPD-17 hull and carry as many as 30 or more H-60s, or smaller numbers of CH-53s, V-22s or even F-35s.

The combatant could have a hanger large enough for a Dolphin/Panther-sized helo or two VTUAVs. Their primary job would be deployment of ASW/MIW USV/UUVs, small-boat ASuW, and MSO. They could have a 40+kt top speed, but I'm not sure the need outweighs the costs.

I can see the argument for sizing the combatant to at least carry one H-60. But I imagine it could still be smaller than the current LCS.

I'm still not sold on the LPD-17 based "Mothership" concept. It seems like an awfully large ship to deliver just a handful of small craft.

What's the minimum-sized boat necessary to deploy an AN/WLD-1? Galrahn has thrown out the M-80 Stiletto as a possibility, but even the "all well deck" LSD(X) concept could only carry 4 (if memory of a previous thread serves). That's not many combatants, given the size of the Mothership. And their individual capability is far lower than an LCS, frigate or corvette.

SPARTANS could sortie directly from the Mothership, but don't they have LOS comms issues? Will a handful of Motherships be able to control a large number of USV/UUVs over a very large area? Or is it better to split the command and control job up amongst more numerous, smaller vessels?

The nice thing about a large Mothership, though, is the ability to sustain it's boats for a long time with large fuel and munitions reserves. This would place less of a burden on replenishment ships.

rickusn

"By my read, you want 12 frigates and 10 "Motherships" to replace the LCS and Seabase, right? I think we'll need more hulls than that."

They arent replacing those programs and in fact have nothing to do with seabase at all. See below.

Im just in favor of eliminating those two programs altogether.

My ships are actually replacing 16 OHPs plus supporting Global Fleet Stations.

More than enough hulls combined with the existing force structure IMHO based on extensive reading and research of books, documents, articles, essays, papers, studies, expert/knowledeable/experienced analysis presented by others and reports. What a concept!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Especially when Seabase is brought back to reality. See below about seabase.

The other fourteen OHPs are being replaced very well by the Burke Flight II class.

Why more hulls????? Based on what? For what purpose?

Im quite aware of the official USN reasoning for LCS which is hardly backed by any reasonable, demonstrable, studied need.

The LCS force structure has none of that.

They just added these ships to existing formations in an ad hoc manner with no study of what they would actually do be cared for or protected and what the consequences and implications of such concerns, factors and issues would be.

The whole program is fly by the seat of your pants from beginning to end. It came from nowhere and at the moment is going nowhere and there is no documentation to support the vessels existence except for unverified, unstudied conceptual thoughts that have no meat or based on even a modicum of real world experience.

The USN has presented no properly researched justification for this program either before it was hastilly started or since.

The cost problems are just the tip of the iceburg as huge a problem as it is.

Everyone knows the emperor has no clothes on but everyone as usual is afraid to say it.

And why?

Two reasons.:

Because the USN stated that they would never again build a frigate. And even though the LCS meets the displacement to be called this its an abortion. And nobody is foolish enough to call it one. Its a glorified MCM ship and thats it.

Because with no other credible surface combatant building program in sight any program is better than no program at all. Or is it???????????

The LCS program was/is built on panic and pie-in-the sky dreaming.

And the results of that are just now becoming apparent.

As for 313 ships I doubt we will see it but that # is inflated by the expensively, useless LCS and the proposed seabasing cargo ships that are now not currently counted!!! In liue of actual warships that actually have a purpose, inherent capability and efficient, effective utility.

If the USN really wants 313 ships lets make sure they are at least warships first and something else second not the other way around.

First of all forget 60 or 50 or 40 or even 30 LCS it wont happen and even iif it did these ships are now so expensive and yet still so vulnerable with so little inherent capability/utility that any commnander would be loath to employ them in any but the most benign environment.

Look up the cost of the existing MCM ships and compare it to the cost of the LCS seaframe, the MW module and helicopters and keep in mind that they will need escort just like the existing MCM ships plus even a bigger logistics train and I believe you will answer many of your own questions about the efficacy of these ships or similar ones.

With the capabilities inherent in the ships I propose in concert with existing USN warships and formations the # of ships I propose is about right and hopefully affordable. But I have no control on that.

But they fit the USNs stated goals better than the LCS having inherent capability, flexibility, sustainability & utility among other attributes utterly lacking in the LCS.

LCS has very little capability in any warfare area IMHO and will be a sitting duck in shallow water against any threat in a hot war and of no peace time/OperationsOtherThanWAR value whatsoever.

They are not escorts for they have to be escorted. They cannot do peacetime patrols/maritime interdiction or OOTW ops because they lack proper endurance and seakeeping qualities.

Seabase is a boondoggle period IMHO.

It was begun in the name jointness for jointness sake.

It would employ all available assets of the rest of the fleet just to protect for one thing.

How often would this concept be used??????????????

It has only only a single purpose for a rare at best occurence.

The expense isnt justified to either procure, operate, maintain or train the people to properly and efficiently employ these ships for a use which may never happen at all.

This force structure can not be sustained practically or realistically.

Talk about your white elephants.

If the Army wants it great let them pay for it, operate it and maintain it provide the people to train to use it.

Id rather reactivate the battleships thats how much sense seabase as programmed makes to me.

The USN and USMC should stick to the amphibious groupings they now have resident in the ESGs and using the scalability concept that isnt something new when and if a seabase type operation is necessary.

One caveat continue experimentation with the MLP and HSV concepts.

The three other LHA(R) and LHD ships belong in the amphibious force which was reduced to supply them in the first place so no worry there.

The cargo ships are actually replacements for existing prepositoned ships or logistics ships so and no worry there either.

"I don't know if a 5000 ton frigate will be able to meet the shallow draft requirements of the LCS. "

Nor do I have any intention that they would.

But again my contention is that these 1/2 a billion dollar or more LCSw/modules and helos wont be risked there either.

"Could we not consolidate the air onto a small flattop and shrink the LCS combatant down to 1200-1500 tons?

Maybe this new, small flattop could be based on the Burke hull and have hangar space for 10-12 H-60s, plus small fixed wing or VTUAVs. "

The Burke hull????????????

Small flattop??????????????

Shrink the LCS ??? What capabilities ?????How would you care and feed it???

How would you get it to the war zone? What would it do there????

I dont see any purpose or efficient, practical, pragmatic or realistic reasoning or logic for your proposal. Sorry. Maybe someone else does or will.

And your right you dont undertstand the Mothership concept or the inherent flexibility and capability of the LPD 17 design despite its teething troubles.

Nor apparently do you understand the logical, pragmatic, efficient, effective, realistic reasoning of the USN for operating two helos from ASW oriented warships.

It is true other navies always dont but it is a cost reason only when/ifthose navies have/had their way they have, do and would continue to operate two.

Look it up.

Does anybody really read the documents I link or paste or read the books I reccommned??????

Or do any reading or researching of their own?

Or do you all just make things up out of thin air?

As I never(well rarely) see any documentation presented to back many opinions and ideas. Even when specifically asked.

But always ready to blast others ideas and opinions in particular when they are based on substance.

And then plead ignorance after bashing those making a concerted effort to inform and educate them.

Its stupefying and mystifying.

I always feel like Im spoon feeding rather than haivng an enlighening and
informative discussion of the concepts, lessons and reasonings found in them.

Can people really go through an entire life like that?? LOL

And yet I keep trying.

There must be something really wrong with me to keep banging my head on concrete walls of intransigence reinforced by the steel of arrogance and ignorance.

Galrahn

At 80x40 (LCAC size) a LSD(X) or LSD-41 can support 4 vessels.

However, it would also be able to additionally support a large number of USVs and other patrol vessels that be loaded onto trailers and stored in a vehicle deck. Several dozen at least. With the news that the DOD is testing torpedoes on Spartan, among other things, a mothership under that type of concept would be 4 ~500 ton sustainable vessels with several dozen other ~2 ton 'smaller attack vessels' as well.

Without a LCS in the water, it is still too early for me to speculate on my likes or dislikes in specific terms. All I know for certain is the current price is way too high, and there needs to be a legitimate effort to reduce costs, which means reduced capability. The first capability I see that should be reduced is speed, which also happens to be the aspect of greatest cost increase on both hulls.

rickusn

And the whole concept of LCSs utility is based on "speed".

So what does that tell you?

Plus its alreadu Useless in Bluewater or high sea states with low endurance means no flexibility in employment.

A glorified, gold-plated minesweeper and we dont even know if it will be any good at that.

LOL
ROTFLMAO

rickusn

Steeljaw Scribe » Maritime Strategy 2007: The Author Speaks

Excerpts From a participant in drafting the strategy. I reccomennd reading it completely.:

"No fleet size/force composition prescription. You “punted” this. Yep, we did, and we did it from the start. At no point in this strategy did fleet size enter into the discussion. We were moving from the perspective of what is it we want to do to protect and extend the American way of life and the global system that protects it. Fleet size debates will arise from here, but I do think we’ve created the intellectual basis for growth (unlike ANY OF THE OTHER SERVICES) with this document."

And my frigate & Mothership proposal flowed from this based on what I read of USN operational concepts: "from the perspective of what is it we want to do to protect and extend the American way of life and the global system that protects it."

But #s of course matter that they shied away from it for political reasons may be the better part of valour but eventually the bullet will have to be bit to justify buying new or maintaing existing ships.

I attempted to both at once to justify both the USNs concepts in particular Global Fleet Stations, ASW and "scalability" and form a firm, reasonable, understandable basis for industrial and financial planning based on what the USN has publicly stated and documented is there goal and vision.

LCS and Seabase as now programmed do NOT fit that strategy from my perspective.

Wheras a highly capable frigate, Mothership and existing CSG,ESG and SSG pardigms and both USN/USMC force structure do.

To be sure I have been a proponet of HSVs and the MLP but only in the context of experimentation and again the "scalability" of USMC amphibious operations. Army follow on forces being a totally different issue.

I forsee little need future need for a full blown war happening many times ie once every couple of years or so to justify the seabase concept as now programmed.

Its inflexible and unadaptable with only a single purpose much like the BB reactivation concept but actually far,far worse. As resources for the Sea Base have been stolen from the existing USMC/USN amphibious forces which are far more useful on a daily basis and with "scalability" inherent in the force structure have a better capability to form a sea base as required vice the programmed fixed assets for only one purpose.

In other words an expensive White Elephant that sucks up an inordinate amount of resources but showing little to no return on investment in either the short run or long run.

On the 1986 strategy:

"In some ways, the fleet size gave birth to the strategy, rather than the other way around. Anyone who believes that it is the role of this document to lay out an argument as politically charged as fleet size just doesn’t understand how quickly something like this can die in this town. "

Now this is very true as Ive related before in particular "Fleet size" driving "strategy".