rickusn

In one of the threads below ASW was being discussed.

Below is a link to an excellent essay on the subject that I refer back to repeatedly.

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines

My real purpose here is that so many issues challenging the USN must be considered in an historical context rather than in a virtual vacuum that too often occurs.

Being a document found on an official USN webpage it is unusual by being quite forthright and sugarcoats nothing IMHO. Although it tends to perpetuate the myth of the Knox class being only fit for "lower threat ASW missions " but at least explains why both before and after. :

"ASW was always going to be a lower priority compared to antisurface (ASUW) and antiair (AAW) warfare. Destroyer officers wanted fast, seaworthy ships armed with guns and later, antiship missiles, able to defeat their like in direct combat."

"These ships were heroically unpopular in much of the destroyer community because of their explicit design emphasis on ASW at the expense of AAW and especially ASUW.(62) Given the attitude of the Destroyer community toward dedicated ASW escorts, it is not surprising that ASW advocates within that community had difficulty obtaining the resources needed either to solve existing technical problems in ASW, or to fund new, more innovative approaches."

Of course we know that the ASUW prioity has mostly been replaced by the land-attack priority.

And of course this still holds true:

"Truly multipurpose destroyers combining all three capabilities were too expensive to build in the numbers necessary for all ASW missions"

Although the Burke IIAs can be seen as an exception in some respects but look at the DDX/CGX programs. Again cost issues continue to plague efforts to build First-Rate Multi-Mission surface combatants.

However building Second-rate relatively Single-Mission surface comabatnts have their own drawbacks when it comes to cost. See recent LCS troubles and further back the OHP cost escalation.

And the premature demise of the mostly ASW oriented Spruance class can also be traced to the same issues ie cost vs capability/flexibility.

And of course the USNs historically less than enthusiastic enmbrace of consistent emphasis on ASW.

Although Mine Warfare has faired far worse than ASW.

The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines

Heres the excerpt I discussed a little above.:

"The culmination of this first phase of the helicopter's use as an ASW platform was the SH-3 Sea King. The Sea King was too big to be deployed on all but the largest surface combatants of its time, which limited the ASW helicopter to being a carrier-based platform. This would change in the early 1970s with the development of LAMPS (Light Airborne Multipurpose System) ASW helicopters, which leads into a discussion of the surface ASW community.

The key technical issue that dominated surface ASW during the 1960s was to get the SQS-26 to achieve its full potential as a bottom bounce and convergence zone active sonar. As long as the surface community was limited to direct path, above-the-layer submarine detections with its active sonar it was going to have limited utility as an ASW platform against any modern submarine, whether conventional or nuclear. With a fully capable SQS-26, it would become a more formidable anti-diesel ASW asset, but against a nuclear submarine it would still suffer from the lack of a weapon to match the range of its main sensor.

By the close of the 1960s, as the SQS-26 finally emerged from its extended development phase, the weapon issue became acute. During that decade, long range, surface ship ASW armament development had focused on ASROC and DASH. ASROC was fairly effective out to the 10,000 yard, direct path ranges achievable by the SQS-4 and SQS-23, but large range extensions for such a rocket propelled weapon were difficult to implement because of the time late of the weapon and the speed of the target.

In theory, DASH solved both the range and the time late problems, but in practice never achieved the operational reliability needed for effective operation. Often described as a technical failure, DASH's problems were almost certainly of a more organizational nature. For example, DASH operators aboard surface ships were drawn from the aviation community, where a non-flying assignment aboard a destroyer was viewed with a distinct lack of enthusiasm, leading inevitably in some cases to personnel decisions that directed less than optimal candidates into these billets.(59)

The eventual success of the SQS-26 get well program led the surface community to finally abandon DASH in 1968 and embrace a manned helicopter option. This led to the LAMPS I program, a conversion of a lightweight, commercial utility helicopter, which first deployed in 1972. LAMPS I was small enough to operate from many DASH ships and it gave SQS-26 ships a reliable, first convergence zone weapon. In the words of Bob Frosch, "(LAMPS) finally gave surface ships a final location and detection system to go with its convergence zone sonar so that we could finally use SQS-26 and towed arrays for purposes other than deciding when to pray."(60)

The LAMPS/SQS-26 combination was widely deployed in the Bronstein, Garcia, and Knox class destroyer escorts (later retyped as FFs-1037-1098), 58 of which were deployed between 1960-1967. These were arguably the first truly successful, postwar ASW ships, and at the same time, certainly the least popular members of the destroyer community. This inverse relationship between ASW effectiveness and acceptance in the destroyer community highlights the fundamental doctrinal turmoil that community was experiencing during this period.

As was true in the particular case of DASH, where inherent technical problems were often used to explain what were really organizational weaknesses, it was generally believed during the 1960s and much of the 1970s that surface ships were incapable of being effective ASW platforms against nuclear submarines. In most cases, it was more accurate to say that given the multimission demands facing the surface community and its own doctrinal priorities, ASW was always going to be a lower priority compared to antisurface (ASUW) and antiair (AAW) warfare. Destroyer officers wanted fast, seaworthy ships armed with guns and later, antiship missiles, able to defeat their like in direct combat.(61) This internal doctrinal proclivity was leavened by the powerful carrier aviation community's need for surface-to-air missile-armed, antiair escorts for carrier battle groups.

Juxtaposed alongside these powerful pressures was the need for large numbers of ocean going ASW escorts for battle groups, underway replenishment groups, amphibious groups, and merchant convoys. Truly multipurpose destroyers combining all three capabilities were too expensive to build in the numbers necessary for all ASW missions, and single purpose destroyer escorts like the Knox class were therefore built to provide the numbers needed for the lower threat ASW missions like amphibious group and convoy escort.

These ships were heroically unpopular in much of the destroyer community because of their explicit design emphasis on ASW at the expense of AAW and especially ASUW.(62) Given the attitude of the Destroyer community toward dedicated ASW escorts, it is not surprising that ASW advocates within that community had difficulty obtaining the resources needed either to solve existing technical problems in ASW, or to fund new, more innovative approaches.

Another problem was that the ASW R&D and acquisition community was increasingly dominated by practitioners of the passive acoustic approach, and particularly by the submarine community. Members of this community tended to view surface combatants as poor passive sonar platforms, which they were initially. On the other hand, efforts to make surface combatants better passive sonar platforms could be viewed by the same community as unnecessary and even competitive with other ASW platforms like the submarine, and therefore to be opposed. Indeed, this is how some explain the demise of Project Sea Hawk in the mid 1960s, a program that had been designed to produce an advanced ASW escort combining quiet gas turbine propulsion with an advanced, integrated sonar suite that included a new VDS capable of independent operation.(63)

Combined, this set of doctrinal and technical obstacles kept the surface ASW community relatively weak and underfunded. By the mid 1970s, though it had finally succeeded in deploying a force capable of providing a reasonably effective active screen, this screen was still permeable when it faced fast Soviet SSNs.

Beginning in the early 1970s though, the passive acoustic-based, barrier ASW strategy began to encounter unexpected challenges. The great fear and anticipation of Soviet development of quiet nuclear submarines remained largely unrealized in practice. Thus, efforts to counter this expected challenge tended to further reinforce the American acoustic advantage when they met with a mostly static threat measured in acoustic terms. This was a reassuring development, but it was accompanied by the three other challenges described earlier that I will refer to below as the Alfa, Charlie, and Delta threats, after the eponymous Soviet submarine classes. The Alfa threat was primarily a challenge to American ASW weapons, while the Charlie threat challenged the surface ASW community, and the Delta threat challenged the SOSUS, submarine, and VP communities."

rickusn

A bit more of my ramblings:

USN events of the mid-1960s:

http://www.bozair.com/adamsmen/Adams...%20History.pdf

"ADAMS departed mid January 1964 heading south to participate in the Atlantic Fleets annual spring training program, SPRINGBOARD 1964. During this operation ADAMS kicked off a new concept of tactical information, “the fast carrier task group”. The concept consisted of three or four missile escorts who operate continuously with an attack carrier, giving the carrier anti-submarine and anti-aircraft protection while the ships operate at high speeds and over long distances. The USS SARATOGA (CVA-60) accompanied by the fast escorts ADAMS (DDG-2), SELLERS (DDG-11) and MACDONOUGH (DLG-8). They were first to practice this new concept and another first for the ADAMS"

And of course the CGN/DLGN Long Beach, Bainbriddge and Truxton were envisioned to escort the Enterprise CVN.

This was driven IMHO by the sensed emasculation of the Gearing/Sumner classes due to the FRAM ASW modernization program by the destroyer community.

However the 1967 Major Fleet Escort Study stated that ASW considerations were paramount.:

http://www.nps.navy.mil/orfacpag/res...s/JCABook1.pdf

"the number of escorts per escorted force was driven by ASW requirements,"

And drove the # of escorts back up to a miniumum of 5-7.

Although even in the mid 80s many in the USN still considered 10-12 surface combatants the proper requirement for a CVBG.

However it would be over a decade before Spruance DDs entered the fleet in useful #s.

Therefore it is no wonder that the Garcia//Brooke/Knox class bore the brunt of ASW duties in all USN formations.

Even after the Spruances entered service.

Notice to that while BPDMS (Sea Sparrow) was at first installed the last 14 ships did not receive it. The entire class was later fitted with a Phalanx in the area that BPDMS formerly was located.

Reasoning may vary but to an untrained eye looking superficially at a Knox and the proposed design that became the Spruance class the similarity would be strikiing..

So that could make justifying the new design/construction program problematic.

And look : "The cost became 100% over original cost."

Sound familiar?

Also:

"SS-26 superior to SQQ-23 for first 3 escort ships in group."

Now at the time only the 10 Belknap/Truxton DLGs had this sonar along with new Brooke/Garcia class and the in-construction Knox class.

Also from the MFE:

STUDY CONCLUSIONS

1. The efficient escort force level ranges from 242 to 340.

2. Total number of escorts is determined by ASW.

3. 107 to 125 should be SAM equipped; remainder with basic point defense.

4. Sensitivity tests indicate this range covers almost all interesting excursions from base ase ASW. (because drives total #)

5. Trade-off between shipbuilding & modernization programs.

6. Construction program should begin now (1967).

Also:

1. Single-ender missile ship preferable to double-ender.

2. BPDMS should be provided on DXs based on cost effectiveness.

3. DX and DXG combined formations reduce overall required AAW missile ships.

4. Decoys and ECM are economically attractive.

5. SQS-26 superior to SQQ-23 for first 3 escort ships in group.

6. Long ASW range weapon needed to exploit sonar range potential. (more impact and ith TACTAS)

7. 5”/54/.w. gun preferable to 5”/54 rapid fire.

8. LAMPS hangar and flight deck is needed.

9. Fleet capable (30 kt) DX-2’s needed for CVA ASW. DE/DX-1 fill all other needs.

10. Current DE inventory fills needs for DX-1’s.

OBSERVATIONS: STUDY CONCEPT VS FINAL DESIGN OF DD963

1. The cost became 100% over original cost.

2. Personnel. There was a growth in number of personnel. Because expected full automation was not realized, the school house could not produce fully trained graduates. OJT still needed to complement the ships’ specific peculiarities. Also, because IMAS atdockside did not assist as much as hoped.

3. The Litton design which changed from steam to gas turbines revolutionized the thinking toward Navy propulsion systems.

rickusn

In regards to CVBG compostition and the Knox class frigates in particular I came across this today.

I have many other examples in my notes but thought I would share this one.

USS Buchanan DDG 14

1989
BATTLE GROUP ECHO/USS RANGER CVBG

USS RANGER CV-61
USS CAMDEN AOE-2
USS WILLIAM H. STANLEY CG-32
USS BUCHANAN DDG-14
USS HOEL DDG 13
USS PAUL F. FOSTER DD 964
USS COOK FF-1083
USS HAROLD E. HOLT FF-1074

Shamus

Good stuff Rick,thanks .

__________________
A positive attitude may not solve all your problems, but
it will annoy enough people to make it worth the effort.

B.Smitty

From rickusn's first document,

So we gained a acoustical advantage over the Soviets by "solving" the ASW problem against our own, more advanced submarines.

If we apply this reasoning to the current littoral, AIP SSK problem, wouldn't it behoove us to pursue development of our own line of advanced SSKs in order to understand the technology needed to "solve" the littoral ASW SSK problem?

Wouldn't a US SSK program also permit far more frequent and unrestrained training opportunities for Navy ASW forces?

wabpilot

Until the middle 1970s we had a couple of D/E boats that were used exclusively for ASW training. A sort of dissimilar combat for the ASW branch. Now we borrow the Swedish Navy every year to practice against. Still, it would be nice if the US had a couple of AIP boats of our own.

B.Smitty

How much of the ASW fleet gets to practice against the Swedish Navy every year?

From what i've read, we have exercises against friendly SSKs all the time. Is this really enough? Shouldn't we train like we fight, as the other aspects of our military do? Wouldn't this mean having our own SSKs to provide the numbers and availability to maintain an adequate level of training for all of our ASW assets?

If we want to use the method described in the document to "solve" the littoral ASW problem, we need to develop and refine our own SSKs to the point where they're superior to our opponent's, and then attempt to beat them with our ASW gear. This sounds like a more major effort than just borrowing a few foreign SSKs every once in a while.

I realize that we can use our extremely capable SSN fleet as surrogate SSKs for many training exercises, but they have a different set of strengths and weaknesses, especially in shallow littoral regions.

Also, buying our own SSKs would allow us to beef up the number of attack subs for a lot less than $2 billion a pop (Virginia SSN price).

I'd like to say that instead of SSKs we should focus on larger UUVs, but it seems like UUV command and control issues are much harder problems to solve.

Galrahn

As far as I am concerned, this is an excellent way to do ASW for the US Navy.

Rick this stuff is gold, thanks much.

B.Smitty

In the past 5 years, DESI, has provided 450 engagement days worth of training, against submarines from Columbia, Peru and Chile - not exactly the who's who of submarine warfare. And that doesn't seem like much training when spread across 5 years and the entire USN.

Efforts are underway to expand this to include Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Norway and Germany. But even if we get Germany, will they really share intimate, technical capabilities of their boats? Will there crews really play gloves off? Will we be willing to openly test new, highly-classified systems and techniques against foreign boats?

There's a major quantitative and qualitative difference between (occasionally) training against foreign-crewed SSKs of varying age and ability, and training against the best and brightest crews from our submarine community, using first-class, indigenously-produced boats.

The Gotland alone provided 160 engagement days of training in a single year. Imagine how much more we could provide if we had a fleet of 10 or 20 of our own.

Building world-beating SSNs gave us intimate knowledge on how to beat them. My guess is, the same would be true for SSKs.

Galrahn

True but most of that comes in the last 3 years.

Keep in mind it isn't only about engagement days, part of having a variety of crews is exposure to a variety of tactics, which leads to tactical development, post operation analysis, classroom study, and simulation development to enhance ASW. Those 450 days get compounded several times into aspects of ASW training that are also vital to the development of ASW capability.

DESI isn't about signiture recognition, it is about ASW tactical operation in depth. The only way to get signiture recognition is on the front line against potential advesaries.

B.Smitty

I understand that it's not about signature recognition.

Like most training, ASW has to be a perishable skill.

Just seems to me that occasionally going up against older boats with non-top-flight, foreign crews might give us a false sense of confidence in our abilities.

Regularly tangling with highly-trained, American crews in world-class boats would provide a much more furtile ground for innovation - tactically, doctrinally and technologically. And it would provide a more consistent level of quality training, fleet-wide.

Of course we do have an extremely capable SSN fleet. They can act as SSK surrogates. But, from what I've read, they are regularly stretched to provide capabilities to operational commanders and training.

B.Smitty

I've been wondering something about Sea Talon and the LCS's ASW suite.

Will AN/WLD-1 towing RTAS/MFTA really provide enough standoff distance for the LCS to make the extra complexity worthwhile?

Given the AN/WLD-1's relatively slow speed (~15kts transit, IIRC), it seems like the LCS will have to approach fairly close to the RMVs operating area, drop it off, and then speed away to a safer standoff distance. If there's a lurking sub nearby, the LCS might walk in to a torpedo or AShM.

SPARTAN can at least transit at 40+kts for some period of time to its operating area.

I was wondering if any thought had been given to using heavy lift helos to deploy, recover and monitor RMVs or USVs far away from manned ships?

A CH-53K could carry a single RMV internally out 150+nm in less than an hour. It could also sling a SPARTAN, but would be more restricted speed-wise. Long-term monitoring could be via VTUAV, UAV or helo/V-22 relay. If sophisticated enough, a properly configured CH-53K might even be able to refuel deployed unmanned systems, thus greatly extending their sortie duration.

Taken even further, one could envision using this method with other USVs and UUVs of varying sizes, allowing the helo to carry greater numbers.

I suppose one problem would be weight transfer of a 14k+ lbs RMV out the back of a hovering CH-53K. I imagine a LAPES style parachute extraction system could be developed, but might place more stress on the RMV than lowering via cable. Using a slung RMV would solve this, but would reduce the helos speed and range.

Still, it seems like a much faster way to deploy a sensor field than via LCS. And you don't risk any manned vessels to mines or torpedoes.

rickusn

I agree LCS is not the answer.