B.Smitty

I read a bit through it in the Google cache but didn't see much mention of HSV-2. I might not be reading the right parts though.

Newport Papers 28: Waves of Hope

Won't there be a general need to move personnel, vehicles and equipment ashore?

Both LSDs and LPDs have significant vehicle storage space that could be used to house engineering equipment, HMMWVs, MRAPs, trucks, LAVs, even tanks if you wanted. But restricting them to helo offload and not having dedicated hangar spots for CH-53s (the LSG might be carrying H-60s instead) leaves you with little options for offloading equipment, short of pulling in to a port.

OTOH, having an LCU or LCM aboard would let you offload anywhere there is a beach.

A platoon of AAVs just won't give you that same capability. They can move personnel and light bulk cargo, but they aren't exactly optimal for the task.

Maybe i'm wrong. Maybe there won't be as much a need for GFS/LSGs to move hardware and people to/from shore. I'm just trying to understand here.

If it's on a T-AKE or HSV, how will it get ashore in unimproved areas or areas hit by a natural disaster? I'm guessing port facilities in areas affected by the tsunami weren't operational, if there were any.

Just seems to me there needs to be a way to move at least truck and trailer/container-sized equipment ashore in an area without effective port facilities.


I don't see what's so special about the Stiletto. It's big, so you'll only ever fit two in an LPD well deck. It can't be cheap, and it can't beach itself.

Wouldn't carrying multiple Mark V SOCs or CB90s in the same space as one Stiletto make for a more efficient use of space? The Stiletto is roughly the size of an LCAC right?

You could fit three CB90s in the same space with a lot of room to spare. Each can carry 20 troops at 40kts, can beach themselves and have a one-man bow ramp. They could even act as surrogate landing craft in some situations.

Wouldn't having a larger number of patrol/SOF craft onboard the LPD/LSD improve this situation? They could augment local capabilities and provide on-scene prosecution of suspect activity. (obviously in cooperation with the host government)

Galrahn

I must have read it in Proceedings; I'll look around and find the article. Basically it talks about how the Swift deployed from the west coast to the region, making a stop on the way to pick up a full load, in less than 10 days. In that crisis, Katrina, and Lebanon it was able to move back and forth over hundreds of nautical miles in slightly over a day with full loads, while other ships were making the trip one way in the same time period. The Swift can be loaded with 10 eighteen wheelers fully loaded in less than 20 minutes if necessary, and turn around from a dock in less than an hour.

The stories that really capture the capability of HSV Swift in its operations are very compelling, particularly when you compare them to the capabilities of a C-5 or C-17, because in the end there really is no comparison. Remember, while most ships max speed is 30 knots, the average cruise speed so far for the HSV Swift is around 28 knots, and that is over multiple years of operation all over every ocean with it fully loaded much of the time.

Again, I don't see the same loading plan that you do. The LPD-17 has 3 V's (vehicle decks), the upper V and lower V of any traditional LPD, but additionally it has a 3rd V specifically for AAVs (and EFVs in the future). I don't foresee a lot of marine corps vehicles beyond the AAVs (or EFVs) for a Littoral Strike Group.

The lower V, which is the largest vehicle deck on about the same plane as the well deck would be occupied by naval equipment, would operate much in the same way as a module bay on the LCS, with the deployment of a number of mission modules for ASuW, ASW, MIW, and SOF. It would include a number of larger modules like the large vehicle class UUVs proposed for Signal, Electronic, Measurement, and Imaging Intelligence (SIGINT, ELINT, MASINT, and IMINT), Meteorology and Oceanography (METOC), etc. (above and/or below ocean surface), and the proposed armed littoral ASW UUVs.

It has been stated the largest operational challenge facing the 10 ton UUVs is the difficulty of deploying them organically without an amphibious ship. A dedicated mother ship answers this challenge.

The lower V would also be utilized as a machine shop for repairs to deployable craft, and repair and reconfiguration to UUVs deployed from the various LSG assets.

The upper V is better designed for smaller equipment that can be transported by aircraft, perhaps a LAR platoon and HMMWVs like you suggest, but I envision SOF vehicles and NECC equipment occupying this space, including Riverine, mobile construction, and EOD equipment, all of which can be carried by aircraft. These vehicles can be deployed by MV-22 or CH-53, and do not require a landing craft. With the lower V occupied with naval equipment, it makes it hard to deploy heavy equipment, because heavy equipment usually deploys to the larger height clearance of the lower V.

I understand what you are saying, and in some ways I agree with it, but for the LSG I see mobility as a main element of the mother ships and the air, sea, and ground forces it deploys. I think it is important to seek out lightweight, mobile assets that can be air lifted or self deployed to keep the mother ship nimble. If heavy ground equipment is required by sea, a dedicated marine ship will be needed for the task.

It is also important to remember, the billets on a LPD-17 will fill up quickly with these Navy missions. After a AAV platoon, the rifle company, and the aviation staff for MV-22s or CH-53s, you are left with ~400-450 billets for Navy, which would fill up quicker than you may realize. I figure around ~100 -120 for the modules aboard, which would include the 2 M-80 'type' vehicles, unmanned platforms, RHIBs with crews, and the machine shop. I also figure ~70 SOF and an additional ~30+ medical.

That leaves room for the for the additional Command Staff and NECC billets, which would easily consume the ~200 - 250 spaces for EOD, Mobile Construction, Salvage, and Riverine. When you stop to think of the number of smaller elements empowered by the mother ship, the 699 billets traditionally dedicated to marines fills up quickly. However, the smaller billet capacity of the LSD would reduce this even more.

Well, admittedly I would put the heavy gear on the ships with no well deck. I absolutely see your point, and while the T-AKE and HSV both have a RO/RO capability I'm not sure I have a solution. Something similar to the LCU-2000 perhaps?

Since the Navy isn't even using a ship with a well deck, they must believe they don't need it.

Believe it or not, a heavily armed M80 Stiletto would still be about 30% cheaper than a LCAC, with more speed and nearly twice the range.

I agree it has limitations, and I don't want to claim it the exact right platform, I just think it could be. I think a sustainable large craft of 80/40 able to perform sustained MSO and UUV operations over 1 week period of time with a range of ~500 nautical miles is an important littoral capability in the LSG. I don't think smaller craft can provide that capability, but if they can I'm not stuck on any specific platform. I think the LSG theory works based on its capability and flexibility, not any specific platform.

Whatever the platform, if it can conduct MSO for a week (logistically supplied by air), at range and with speed, while launching and recovering manned and unmanned vehicles I think it works. That simple capability could relieve a LCS on a Maritime Domain Awareness assignment to free the LCS for other operations. I don't think the CB90 with its shorter range can deploy RHIBs, unmanned vehicles, or be logistically supplied by aircraft like the M80 Stiletto.

RHIBs, USVs, etc. can fit in the vehicle storage of a LPD-17, you don't need well deck space for those platforms. As I understand it, even the 33 ft long boats for the Riverine squadron can be moved from the well deck into the lower vehicle deck, meaning you would have this capability. I could be wrong on that; the source was familiar with the LPD, but not the total height of the 33 ft Riverine boats, although I think they would fit the height clearance similar to how they do on aircraft.

Something else though, the LPD-17 is designed to support an additional 50-55 Ft plug, which is something I assume when talking about the LPD-17 mothership concept. The 50 ft plug adds to the aviation facilities of the base LPD-17, but also to the size of the well deck. Assuming another 50 ft of well deck, you wouldn't be limited to only 2 80/40 ft ships, you would end up with the potential to hold an additional 55/40 worth of other deployable vessels, or 3 CB90 sized craft.

B.Smitty

I agree it's a valuable capability. Maybe more so than the LCSs in a GFS deployment, especially considering the price.


I suppose part of the difference here is the difference in focus between the LSG and the GFS.

The LSG appears to have a wartime focus, where the GFS looks more like an extension of a host nation's peacetime/GWOT Coast Guard duties.

Based on my reading of the CONOPS, I doubt there will ever be a need for an LCS's ASW modules in a GFS. MIW perhaps, but I imagine even this is less likely. UUVs also won't get a ton of use, other than survey perhaps. UAVs and USVs may, as with other ISR assets. SOF will be a primary focus.

Having a variety of non-combat capabilities is the key to GFS. Some combat capability is needed, of course, for force protection, and to assist in littoral COIN or to provide a mobile, local rapid reaction force. But i think much of the Marine's time would be spent escorting convoys of non-combatants, providing boarding parties for RHIBs or patrol craft, or acting as muscle for humanitarian operations.

With this in mind, I think the vehicle decks would be better filled with trucks, HMMWVs, Cougar/RG-31 Mine Protected Vehicles, various trailers, and so on. I might even throw in a platoon of M-1s to give some muscle to a rapid reaction force. Having them might permit a GFS group to undertake a Blackhawk Down style rescue operation. Not sure i'd want to try that with just AAVs, given the prevalent RPG threat around the world.

But all of this would require an LCM/LCU/LCAC capability. The British LCU Mk10 looks like an interesting fit here. It's around the same size as an LCM-8 but can carry an M-1. Being smaller than the normal LCU-1600 means you might fit additional patrol craft around it in the well deck.

I agree that a stretched LPD is a far better platform than an old LSD, but we have LSDs already and aren't they being pulled out of ARGs as LPDs are built? We don't have additional LPDs.

Can the additional billets be moved to the logistics ship or HSV?

Aren't they using an LSD for GFS experiments?


It may be cheaper than an LCAC, but I doubt it's cheaper than a conventional 25m patrol boat.

CB90s might be too small. I've thrown out the 25m Super Dvora in other threads for this mission. It can hit 48kts and has a 700nm range with typical missions lasting 4 days or so. And you can fit two in the same space as a Stiletto. Or, you might fit a Super Dvora and LCU Mk10 next to each other, and two Super Dvoras behind them in an LPD well deck. That gives you three patrol boats that can be in three different places at once, hundreds of miles away from the LPD, plus an LCU to move vehicles, people, and material.

Galrahn

I originally thought so, but haven't seen anything that indicates that is the case other than the original fictional stroy.

I don't foresee a major land combat force presence in the GFS concept. Anything that would require a Major Marine land force for operations would need an ESG.

I see GFS as part of the Littoral Strike Group role, and I don't see the Littoral Strike Group as a small version of the ESG, two different things.

I also don't see where ASW wouldn't be important. GFS is simply the nation outreach and partnership element to the littoral operation of the Navy, littoral warfare is still the same; specifically ASW, MIW, and countering small boats.

I think the Navy should know this, in 2005 when the Emory S Land was off west africa conducting engagement operations with Nigeria, I doubt those sailors were comfortable when they spotted a periscope shadowing them over a period of a few days. It took 2 days for the US and British frigate to arrive, by which time the sub was supposedly long gone. ASW in the US Navy is never important until they need it, which is usually too late.

B.Smitty

Here's a question - why not base a GFS/LSG around an LHD instead of an LPD/LSD?

They are larger, have a big well deck, and can operate Harriers or F-35Bs as well as numerous helos, and have useful command and control capabilities.

Sure, they are somewhat more expensive than an LPD-17, but they appear to be a more appropriate centerpiece for either mission.

If they're too expensive, perhaps an LMSR conversion like that proposed for the AFSB. Anyone know if a well deck could be added? Might give you a poor man's LHD.

pincer

LSD will be used in this year's (late summer) west africa / gulf of guinea deployment instead of the Emory S Land.

LSDs aren't being pulled out of ARGs, but the long range ship building plan does eventually have 3 "extra" LSDs on top of the 9 that would be associated with the 9 LPDs and 9 big decks. LPDs are great for independant operations, but as of now, the Navy is resisting building any more than the planned 9.

With the introduction of semi-permanent GFSs and/or LSGs, how would we adjust the ESG's role and OPTEMPO? Do we reduce their deployment rate/OPTEMPO? This would allow some assets (like LSDs) to be used for GFS/LSGs here and there, while allowing the ESG to be in a surge-ready mode in CONUS for longer periods. Does the ESG still participate in as many exercises with foreign militaries as it does now, or can the LSG take over some of that burden? Could we get away with 2-ship ESGs (LHD+LPD) if some of their vehicles were prepositioned on, for example, a forward LMSR with at-sea transfer capabilities (maybe with a mobile landing platform (MLP))?

I am interested in how the introduction of new force packages, the GFS/LSG, might change how we deploy ESGs.

B.Smitty

I don't either. A reinforced company-sized element plus SOF seems reasonable. (but what do I know) Even so, having a tank platoon would dramatically improve the combat capabilities of such a force. Remember, in Mogadishu, we had to go beg for Pakistani tanks to help bail us out.

Hmm. Well, to me, that scenario points to the need for organic ASW capability on the mothership. Stopping to reconfigure an LCS or two with their ASW modules will take as long or longer than waiting for a frigate.

I can see carrying ASW/MIW modules as part of the GFS for training and outreach purposes, though.

Using LCSs this way makes me wonder again about the wisdom of the mission module concept. It appears to be a great way to provide surge capacity in a specific area, if you can wait for the ships to be reconfigured. But rapid retasking requires true multi-mission capability.

B.Smitty

I had another thought about your proposed LSG, Galrahn. In it, there are four LCSs, a T-AKE, as HSV, an LPD and only one Burke.

Given the potential for these ships to be distributed over a large area, and all but the Burke having only AAW point-defenses, is a single escort enough to provide air defense?

I would expect, in a shooting war, the T-AKE and HSV wouldn't be too close to the action, but might still be vulnerable to attack. The LCSs would be though, and four of them could be operating over a fairly large area. The Burke would have to shadow them, and potentially leave the other vessels undefended, or force them to move closer than they would want to the action. Would two LCSs to a Burke be a more reasonable (and defensible) ratio?

I suppose in a real conflict, you could expect a CVBG or two and USAF airpower to be overhead. Not to mention additional escorts.

B.Smitty

Would there be much overlap in tasking between ESGs and GSF/LSGs? Would there be less need for ESGs around the world if we had these lighter-weight GSF/LSGs?

B.Smitty

Galrahn,

Had another question about your notional LSG organization. LCSs are designed for mission module swap out via their RORO capabilities right? If so, will just the inclusion of a crane on the T-AKE be enough? Wouldn't they still need to pull in to a port and offload the modules and reconfigure the LCSs?

Galrahn

With the new stabilized cranes come the expectation the modules can be extended into the side doors of the LCS. Actually not just the LCS, but also the side hatches of the LPD-17 and DDG-51 Flight IIAs.

From what I have read and seen, the LCS module will be able to swap out in less than day.

I don't think there is much overlap between an ESG and a LSG. ESGs are about combat power, while LSGs are about littoral presence.

As for more DDGs, I don't know. To be honest I'm working with the LCS in the model and I don't even really like the LCS much, it is still a Powerpoint solution until it proves otherwise. The FFG-7s would certainly be nice, and MCMs are certainly useful, but both are expensive to operate.

The US Navy currently fields the largest anti-aircraft/anti-missile networked system in the world in its AEGIS fleet (land or sea based btw), and within that framework operates CSGs and ESGs. The LSG is intended to operate in low intensity, limited threat littorals where a 57mm would represent the high end of the threat matrix. I add a single DDG-51 because in any situation the class represents a major deterrent. In the various theaters discussed for GFS, a single DDG-51 represents more than enough capability, and if there was a case where it didn't, that development alone might trigger a surge deployment or rotation of a heavier strike group to the region.

One more thought Smitty, expect the vast majority of LCS deployments to be with ASW or MIW modules, not the ASuW module, even if much of the time on deployment is spent on MSO. As the LCS program moves on, I am not going to be surprised if the Flight I version of the LCS has a NETFIRES or VLS payload by default, eliminating the ASuW module altogether. The same unmanned systems used in the ASW module are used in the ASuW module, all that is missing is the payload to those systems, which btw, are in the process of being developed to be swapped itself.

B.Smitty

This is an interesting idea, but how will the module containers/pallets be moved around inside the LCS. Seems like a tricky operation in high sea states.
What would be better in their place? Frigates, like you said? Dedicated, mission-specific vessels like MCMs?

If the LSG has a primary ASW mission, then presumably diesel subs would also be part of the threat matrix. I would think AShMs (land, are, sea or sub based) may be too.

Might not an LSG be in place in the Persian Gulf when a renewed Tanker War starts?


That's good, but what if the LSG is configured for a MIW exercise and, suddenly, finds itself needing ASW capability? Do you always keep at least one LCS configured for ASW? I suppose you could, and keep it near the motherships. My worry here is that the LSG might be spread around a large geographic area, and the two ASW ships (1 LCS and the Burke) still might not be in the right spot at the right time.

From my layman's perspective, i think having basic ASW AND MIW capabilities as part of a core LCS configuration would be a step in the right direction. But this might entail a larger vessel. The modules would then just expand on these core capabilities.

One criticism leveled against the LCS is how well various mission module crews will integrate with core LCS crews, and how the LCS command and module command structures will work.

Having a core capability in these areas on the LCS at all times might help to alleviate this problem. The core ASW/MIW crews will have a habitual relationship with the LCS commander and crew. This might ease module crew assimilation. The module crews are just there to augment. They just provide manning for an additional AN/WLD-1 or MH-60S, for instance. But the core command and control functions are always aboard.

B.Smitty

Just found a 2005 paper by the esteemed Robert Work that as an interesting chapter on his concept for Forward Fleet Stations.

http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publicati...and_Keep_T.pdf

Page 203.

In it, instead of basing the fleet station around logistics and amphibious ships, the fleet station is a territory owned by the US or a close ally.

"The advantages inherent in developing a thorough appreciation of local areas of operation and the need to establish a forward support network suggests a return to the flexible Fleet Stations of the Continental/Frigate Era, and a modest expansion of the TFBN’s mobile logistics forces. In turn, the new Fleet Stations would become a key asset in forging a global maritime coalition of like-minded nations focused on preserving maritime order and safety. In this regard, five potential Fleet Stations immediately stand out:

• A West Africa Station, perhaps supported off of British-owned Ascension Island. This station would support Battle Network Forces working with naval powers in the South Atlantic to guard the southernmost maritime approaches into the Atlantic Basin and the growing offshore energy infrastructure off the west coast of Africa and the east coast of Brazil; to conduct maritime interdiction operations in the mid- and south-Atlantic; and to
patrol the west coast of Africa.

• A Mediterranean Station, supported out of the 6th Fleet forward operating bases in Italy and Spain. This station would support Battle Network Forces working with Mediterranean nations to secure the Straits of Gibraltar, Bosporus Straits, and the Suez Canal; to deny the Mediterranean Sea as an avenue of transportation for extremists, illegal immigrants, or WMD; and to patrol the northwest coast of Africa.

• An Indian Ocean Station, supported out of the 5th Fleet forward operating base in Manama, Bahrain, and Diego Garcia. This station would support Battle Network Forces working with Indian Ocean and Gulf Cooperation Council States to secure the southern approaches to the Red Sea, and the western approaches to the traffic lanes in the Southeast Asian Littoral; to deny the sea to extremists, pirates, and maritime terrorists in the Indian Ocean; and to help build partner capacity in confronting these threats.

• A Southeast Asian Station, supported off of the US territory of Palau, and cooperative security locations in Singapore and northwest Australia. This station would support Battle Network Forces working with Southeast Asian states to secure maritime traffic through the many straits in the region; to deny the sea to extremists, pirates, and maritime terrorists; and to help build partner capacity in confronting these threats.

• A Western Pacific Station, supported off of the US territory of Guam. This station would support Battle Network Forces working with Western Pacific states to secure the eastern approaches to the busy sea lanes of the Southeast Asian littoral and to deny extremist moves beyond the Indian Ocean theater.

Each of these five stations would include a mobile “station ship” and dedicated replenishment vessels. Of course, while these ships would be focused on supporting LCS operations, they would be fungible, multi-purpose National Global Patrol/Irregular Warfare/Homeland Defense and TFBN assets, able to support forward operations of US nuclear attack submarines (such as
their rearmament), Coast Guard cutters and vessels, as well as other US combatants (these ships will be discussed more thoroughly in the section on Logistics Sea Base)."