rickusn

Interesting to note that LSD's are mentioned specifically in the news article posted below..

The plan until now has been to keep amphibious ships(or for that matter CGs and DDGs) far from shore and concentrating on operations conducted from over-the horizon. This of course for now has proved to be in some ways impractical if not unfeasable. Which would preclude the necessity of such a weapon. But it appears that to truly infuence events on land the USN's close to shore and inland waterway(rivers) capabilities must be enhanced and initiatives in that direction seem to be gaining momentum.:

BAE SYSTEMS DELIVERS MK 38 MACHINE GUN SYSTEMS TO THE U.S. NAVY04 Apr 2007 | Ref. 102/2007
MINNEAPOLIS – BAE Systems delivered the first of 67 Mk 38 Mod 2 Machine Gun Systems to the U.S. Navy this week. The systems will be delivered from spring 2007 through March 2008 and are planned for a variety of U.S. Navy platforms, including Guided Missile Cruisers, Landing Ship Docks, and DDG Class ships.

The Mk 38 Mod 2 is a 25mm, remotely controlled gun system that provides the U.S. Navy with a lethal weapon to fulfill the critical role of ship self-protection. The system, with an effective range of more than 2000 meters, is highly autonomous and is proven against multiple surface threats.

"The Mk 38 Mod 2 team has demonstrated exceptional technical skill and initiative,” said Commander LaPointe, project manager of the Naval Gunnery Project Office for Integrated Warfare Systems. "They have provided outstanding support to the program and are providing the warfighter with a more capable machine gun system."

Nine U.S. Naval ships currently have Mk 38 Mod 2 systems in service and have demonstrated excellent overall performance. The combined Mk 38 Mod 2 Government/contractor team recently completed a major upgrade to bring all mounts up to the current production configuration.

The Mk 38 Mod 2 main weapon is the M242 25mm Chain Gun, a proven NATO standard cannon with selectable rates of fire. The Mk 38 Mod 2 MGS fires all USN-approved 25mm ammunition at up to 180 rounds per minute, with 168 rounds on-mount. Additionally, the systems’ 4-axis stabilized electro-optical sensor provides round the clock surveillance capability, enhancing the ship’s overall mission effectiveness."


The plan until now has been to keep amphibious ships(or for that matter CGs and DDGs) far from shore and concentrating on operations conducted from over-the horizon. This of course for now has proved to be in some ways impractical if not unfeasable. Which would preclude the necessity of such a weapon. But it appears that to truly infuence events on land the USN's close to shore and inland waterway(rivers) capabilities must be enhanced and initiatives in that direction seem to be gaining momentum.

In my previous post I left out LCS, MCM and the PC-1 platforms more or less on purpose.

But to be sure they can be included in an LSG formation as could any USN platform.

However the LCS program has serious difficulties and the PC-1 class of which there are only 13 units is greatly taxed now both at home (five subordinated to CG control) and in Iraq(2?). The MCM classes utility except in some vary specific circumstances(ie mine-hunting) is minimal but it may well be that this will change although I havent heard anything that would support any such contention.

B.Smitty

So presumably the LSD would be filled with patrol and riverine craft instead of LCACs. I've seen reports that the USN is interested in the CB90H. Presumably SURC, Mark V SOC, and other "swift boat" like vessels would be carried.

Does an LSD, DDG, FFG and HSV combo provide sufficient helo support?

rickusn

"Does an LSD, DDG, FFG and HSV combo provide sufficient helo support?'

Now thats a good question!!!!

Galrahn

These are the pilot objectives as laid out by the Navy:

I'll wait and see before commenting further, my impression in reviewing much of the new Navy information about the Global Fleet Station concept is that they are not taking a very broad look at the littoral presence issues the Navy has been talking about for the last decade.

As best I can tell, the Navy is publically saying the pilot is a "one ship" operation, making the USS Pearl Harbor deployment something else. If that is true, I say opportunity missed.

Galrahn

This is a gem in the rough btw.

This improves the LCS concept dramatically in my opinion. It would also change the way novice navy people look at logistics if can be used to reload VLS.

B.Smitty

It does seem to be more PR than actual change to me.

Also, there's repeated references to HSVs for use in GSF, yet HSVs do not seem particularly appropriate for this to me. Persistence doesn't require speed. In fact, doesn't the design choices needed to make these ships fast reduce their endurance?

For long term persistence, it would seem that an MPF(E) or smaller converted RORO plus LSD would be a better choice than HSV plus LSD. The cargo ship provides the volume and tonnage, and the LSD provides the large well deck.

I suppose the HSVs can get in areas that an MPF(E) or LSD won't go. But HSV-2 isn't exactly a small ship either.

The HSVs seem more valuable for their "impress the natives" qualities.

rickusn

As Ive alluded to so many times and what the USN struggles to attain:

"Only through a persistent presence and interaction with host nations can the required cultural awareness and mutual
trust be achieved. This cannot be adequately achieved through surge or episodic deployments alone."

And really this was the bais for ESG's now downloaded to the GFS or as I prefer the LSG.

As much as Im all for non-combat ops the forces engaged must retain the ability to revert to combat ops at any time.

An old Adage is "train like you will fight because you will surely fight like you train."

The message has to be clear and concise as to your intentions.

Anything less IMHO breeds over-estimation or under-estimation which begets chaos.

Always remember the entire world has an inherent tendency to gravitate towards chaos.

Just look at a childs room a for quick reminder or my notes. LOL

rickusn

Also another adage that has inherent contradictions in todays world.:

"Whoever gets there fustus with the mostus wins"

pincer

ank you for an excellent conversation. I am new to the site but have been following this thread with interest.

First, there’s another useful document out there that I think has not been mentioned explicitly: The Navy White Paper on Global Fleet Stations (Inside Defense, March 2006, subscription required). It’s a bit dated now, but worth the read if you haven’t already.

A few thoughts/questions for the group:

First, perhaps trivial, is the name: what's global about any of the current concepts? I believe this name emerged from an early concept of maintaining land-based logistics and support stations for persistent regional forces in remote areas. These would have been nodes for combat logistics feeds, maintenance bases for small craft (e.g. PCs), and a source of support and supplies to expeditionary forces in the region engaged in Shaping operations. More recently, the concept has evolved to something closer to rickusn's "Littoral strike group" (nice name) I think. The idea is to seabase a set of capabilities that reside somewhere in the Phase 0 / Shaping / GWOT / TSC regimes.

My next question is: Are we proposing anything new? How will GFS differ from UNITAS, WATC, or the many PACFLT deployments for HA/DR? How will it differ from AFSBs (like the Stockham)? Is it more than the training engagements with host nation security forces we already routinely schedule? We already do a lot of low level engagement. Is GFS a new name for this activity or are we adding missions we are not currently doing?

Also, How does the GFS fit in to the larger picture of everything else the Navy needs to do? As rickusn just pointed out, we’ve got primary war fighting readiness to think about. If we tailor platforms for these low level missions, are we stealing money (and training time and energy) from the Navy’s core missions? It seems to me that in the past we’ve done community relations, fostered goodwill, forged enduring relationships etc (some of the GFS effects) with the assets we bought for war fighting. In that context, slight modifications of a prepo ship makes a lot of sense. Buying and dedicating JHSVs as GFS station ships may or may not.

Maybe the GFS should be considered not a new type of platform and force package, but rather a new type of deployment. We have strike group deployments (tip-of-the-spear warfighting capability), GWOT surge deployments (smaller units, smaller missions such as anti-piracy), and GFS deployments (small units, low-end partnership-building, 1000-ship navy supporting activities). Many platforms, properly loaded, could do any of these (think LSD). Some platforms could do the GFS deployment every once in a while then go back to their standard function (think Emory Land). The particular deployment would be filled with activities tailored to the platform’s strengths and the region’s needs at the time. This is essentially how we’re doing things now with the pilot programs. The lessons learned from these deployments won’t lead to some ideal platform description, but rather to an understanding of how a force package should be configured to do these sorts of deployments, independent of platform. This seems a more reasonable way to achieve some of these effects without necessarily buying new platforms for the mission.

Comments?

B.Smitty

HSV-2 is not a warship, yet it's being mentioned in this context. What does it bring to the table here that a converted container ship or RORO wouldn't do better? Dash away when there's trouble? Access shallow ports?


Child's room? Try my entire house.

Galrahn

In my version of the "Littoral Strike Group" I have a HSV, so I can't say anything is wrong with the HSV being the pilot. The HSV would have access to areas a deep draft ship couldn't go, and that is important.

Assuming for a minute that "Global Fleet Stations" is a "Sea Basing" deployment for "Building Partner Capacity" through "Cultural Awareness" and "Task Focused Training," then I think it leaves a lot to be desired from the CNO's own message.

However, I don't believe in any major Navy intuitive unless it includes "Adaptive Force Packaging" that includes "Cross Fleet Standardization" models to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" for "Distributed Operations" to support the larger "Globally Networked Operations" that define the global challenges facing the United States in the 21st century.

So far from what I am reading, Global Fleet Station is about the first and passes up on the second.

The CNO's own definition of the littoral is: "Conceptually, the littoral is comprised of two segments. The seaward portion is that area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore. The landward portion is the area inland from the shore over which friendly forces can be supported and defended directly from the sea."

If using that definition, the Global Fleet Stations CONOP is limited and focused to only a small part of the littoral, which in my opinion sums up a lot of the problems with the various littoral strategies the US Navy has discussed since the 1997 QDR. In my opinion the US Navy littoral strategy should include the Global Fleet Station concept, but it must contain the warfighting capabilities that fit into the US Navy operational model so it can be sustained, supported, and ultimately effective. The Global Fleet Station concept outlined above is basically the engagement process in the littoral with host nations, but as it only contains that single focus, for me it fails the larger effort to establish US Navy focus in the littoral.

The CSG and ESG models fit well into the traditional challenges facing the United States, both in major conflict and in small wars, but those task force units fall short in providing the Navy with its littoral "Maritime Domain Awareness" solution that builds the "1000-ship navy" partnership required to fight the 21st century peace.

To me the "Littoral Strike Group" is the solution to several of the questions being asked surrounding the new Naval Maritime Strategy. The "Littoral Strike Group" represents a "Forward Naval Presence" able to provide "Information Operations" and "Maritime Security Operations" in troubled regions. Its flexibility must include "Crisis Response" to any humanitarian situation that may arise, able to react independently without returning to a major port for supply. It is through "Security Cooperation" and "Civil-Military Operations" with nearby nations the US can work to realize true regional partnerships, but also through "Sea Control" can the Navy impact troubled regions in "Counterterrorism," "Counter-proliferation," and "Counterinsurgency" actions that threaten regional stability.

True regional "Deterrence" requires that the Navy builds partnerships, but also possesses the capability to take action unilaterally when required, because although regional nations will often share objectives, there will be exceptions where regional political will prevent governments from taking action, even when they want to. This means the "Littoral Strike Group" may require limited "Expeditionary Power Projection" for limited combat, or as Israel learned last summer, an "Air and Missile Defense" just in case regional relations breakdown.

I see the Littoral Strike Group based on certain capabilities. While I am not sure the right mix, I envision something like:

1 LPD
- as C4ISR Command Ship / Mothership
- w/ 2 H-60S and 2 H-60R or 2 MV-22 or 2 CH-53E
- 2 80ft patrol vessels or 1 80ft patrol vessels and multiple smaller vessels
- unmanned vehicles including air, surface, and undersea
- 1 AAV platoon w/ 1 USMC Rifle Company
- Joint USN/USCG inspection teams
- medical detachment
- SOF

1 T-AKE w/ 2 H-60S and 1 HSV w/ 2 H-60S
- w/ civil military teams
- w/ State Dept teams
- w/ Army Engineers
- w/ SeaBees
- w/ Salvage Teams
- w/ stocked shop with parts specific to regional naval assets
- w/ mechanic detachments for repair of host nation vessels
- w/ stock humanitarian stores
- w/ 30 days supply for combat operations 1 USMC rifle company
- w/ SOF equipment
- Crane for swapping LCS modules in low sea states
- Additional LCS modules (4 MIW, 4 ASuW, 4 SOF)
- 4 spare module crews (2 MIW and 2 ASuW) all w/ SOF qualification

1 DDG-51
- w/ Sea Strike and Sea Shield capability, including limited ABM if available

4 LCS w/ 1 MH-60R each.
- ASW configuration w/ SOF qualification

Basically this is a 4 ship LCS squadron able to fully deploy any of the 4 modules (ASW, MIW, ASuW, or SOF) including helicopters supported by a T-AKE and HSV that act as tenders and littoral relations vessels escorted by a Flight I DDG-51 and a LPD-17 with a mixed USN/USMC loading plan. I think submarines (both SSN and SSGN) make a natural fit into this type of task force, but see no reason to qualify them here.

The LSG consists of small, medium, and large task force units that can be tailored to any number of missions. Spare LCS crews and unused mechanics are hands for construction and 'good will' operations. The USMC presence should focus on regional language skills while both deployed for training exercises and while on the LPD. As the T-AKE and HSV both enjoy civilian crews mixed with Navy crews, these platforms can sustain long deployments.

The key would be to entice officers, interested sailors, and the full marine company to make a 12-18 month commitment, perhaps with enticement of educational benefits through the use of college credit hours towards a degree in any number of international focus studies. The Navy should be able to entice professors into providing semester long classes on the LPD to these regional deployments considering the level of interaction with the local populace they could insure, particularly in anthropology, language study, history, and science curriculum.

The DDG-51, LCS, and individual attached military air, sea, land, and civilian detachments could rotate via standard 6 month exchanges using the 'sea swap' concept to sustain duration of presence for the Global Fleet Station.

Should the need arise for mission module swapping and a required crew is unavailable (example all LCS have to go MIW configuration to respond to a MIW threat), the LCS crews should be able to deploy to the area within 48 hours, which is faster than the time it would take to swap all 4 modules from a harbor one at a time, much less from a modified T-AKE.

In the end, I think the "Littoral Strike Group" in this configuration gives the Navy a much needed solution for the littoral mission of the 21st century, both at sea and in partnership. It allows a GFS to distribute its operations, as to insure presence over the horizon while interaction with a neighbor anywhere mutually agreed. By utilizing the LPD as a command ship, the Navy extends the littoral across the shore line of continents instead of simply from the sea over land, which increases the Maritime Domain Awareness regionally in ways that prevent global organizations from out flanking a concentrated naval sea base, while at the same time providing the Navy with the right warfighter capabilities to "Aggregate, Disaggregate, Re-aggregate" with other Navy elements in response to regional warfighter requirements.

Finally, it provides the mechanism the Navy requires in order to provide war fighter capabilities that simply cannot be obtained state side. As anyone familiar with ASW or MIW will tell you, these warfighter techniques require skilled people with the time to perfect their craft. The Global Fleet Station in operation combined with the outlined "Littoral Strike Group" provides the Navy with a unique opportunity for a forward deployed international cooperation framework to improve these critical areas that demand both time and practice.

The "Global Fleet Station" introduces a unique overseas medium for the US to engage in enhanced "Task Focused Training" that encourages partnership from the greater international community. Through this persistence the "1000-ship Navy" becomes more than just a regional buzzword for mutual "Security Cooperation", but an example where "Building Partner Capacity" with international partners achieves the type of "Globally Networked Operations" that lead not only to regional "Deterrence," but contribution towards the international "Deterrence" the US Navy is seeking with the phase 0 shaping operations in troubled regions to begin with.

All phrases in italics represent the ideas thrown around in this thread combined with the methods and missions outlined in the CNO Naval Operations Concept 2006 vision.

B.Smitty

Interesting as always Galrahn.

A couple questions/comments.

1. I still don't get what HSV brings to the table here. Your org already has 4 LCSs with shallow draft and some lift capability. Why add another?

2. It also seems a bit light on ship-to-shore interfaces. Certainly the HSV and LCSs could act in this capacity if local ports are available, but if they aren't, you'll only have a handful of helos and Marine AAVs.

Having an LCAC or LCU might be overkill, but wouldn't it be prudent to have at least a few small landing craft that can carry HMMWVs, trucks, cargo and personnel?

If so, then wouldn't the larger well-deck capacity of the older LSDs be an asset?

3. I'm still not 100% sure I understand the range of missions a GFS or LSG will undertake. They seems rather open ended. And the GFS appears to be a lot less combat-oriented than your LSG. The GFS appears to be geared towards liaison and small-scale operations. Does this sound right?

Edit: Ok I just reread your post Galrahn. I think i'm understanding things a bit better now


4. This LSG organization seems a lot larger than what was thrown around in the articles posted. (8 ships vs 3) Obviously it would be far more capable, but that comes at a cost. We could afford fewer of them, which means they could be in fewer places and would require more support. Would there not still be cases where you need a minimalist organization like that proposed for the GFS?

pincer

JHSV advantages in the GFS case include:
- cost (2 to 3 times cheaper than LCS)
- deck space (at least 20k sq ft)
- berthing space (at leat 104 permanent berths)
- speed for log/support function
- civilian crews (provide less bellicose image)
- shallow draft for moving vehicles/cargo to shore

But I agree that an amphib(with LCUs)+LCS combo covers a lot of the JHSV's advantages.

B.Smitty

A JHSV, I suppose, could be used as a fast connector from a regional port or sea base in support of the GFS.

Galrahn

The HSV-2 Swift is an incredible capability. The Navy War College website just got redone, so it may be awhile before they get enough complaints to put the Newport Papers online again, but when they do download and read Newport Paper #28, you'll get a good idea regarding what a HSV can bring to the table.

I don't see it that way.

Assuming it is an LPD-17, the rifle company can deploy 3 ways; AAV, rubber boat, or by air. Even if a CAAT detachment or logistical element with HMMWVs is stored aboard, those platforms can be deployed by air ship to shore connectors, and that would only be assuming a larger ground operation that would probably require more than a single rifle company anyway, or specifically a ESG with its MEU (SOF).

The heavy equipment that would be for humanitarian response or civil-military affairs would be carried on the HSV or T-AKE, and for that a LCAC or LCU wouldn't be much use anyway.

Keep in mind, I see the 3 main Littoral Strike Group ships undertaking different roles, much like an old ARG did when the Marines used LSTs.

The LPD is a Command Ship / Mothership, which means this is a maritime domain centric node that is more Navy than Marine, despite the USMC rifle company. The 'mothership' would include a number of unmanned and manned deployable craft, including up to 2 M-80 Stiletto "type" craft. By "type" I mean a 80 by 40 ft deployable craft for SOF/MSO operations with a crew of 3 and 12 man payload package that includes unmanned vehicles and a 11 meter RHIB. Other deployable craft from the mothership would include 11 meter RHIBs, 11 meter USVs, UAVs both fixed wing (Scan Eagle) and VTOL (Fire Scout), and UUVs for ASW and MIW. The additional LCS crews would be based on the mothership.

The HSV would be the GFS civil affairs and national engagement element, and carry virtually all of the equipment to support this role. It would operate as the housing platform for those personal as well.

The T-AKE would act as the mothership, LCS, and HSV tender, including a machine shop for repairing the various deployable manned and unmanned systems and supporting them logistically, even including swapping out LCS modules. The T-AKE would additionally carry stores dedicated to crisis response, to insure an immediate follow on response to the 'first response' capability provided by the HSV. The size of the T-AKE, combined with its logistical capability that includes aviation fuel, makes it ideal for a forward sea station in support of littoral operations, but also as an additional storage platform for specialized equipment that can be offloaded selectively in support of civil or military engagement operations, including Riverine Squadron equipment that can be selectively offloaded and joined by Riverine Squadron personal flown in from the states for the exercise.

The GFS plan as proposed isn't as inspiring as I had been hoping to be honest. Basically the Navy is going to do the same thing it currently does, use a new buzzword, and expect some new result. According to Alcoholics Anonymous, doing the same thing again and again with the expectation of a new result is the clinical definition of insanity.

I don't like the idea for the following reason, the process described can be summed up as multiple unilateral engagements in succession. It lacks presence, it lacks persistence, and it lacks sustained relations. While I understand the HSV will move between various points to engage multiple partners within a region, there needs to be consistent follow up, and there can't be allowance for gaps.

In many ways, the GFS concept is modeled after the model provided by Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, but it ignores the lessons learned. Camp Lemonier has been incredibly successful in that region because its operational tempo in relations and 'good will' operations is consistent, and visibly dedicated from the perspective of the local population. I fail to see how a ship that makes a tri-monthly port of call as it works its way down a coastline of nations gives a visibly dedicated presence.

However, if you add a 4 ship LCS squadron that is fully supported, and a mothership with various naval and marine engagement capabilities, you add a number of elements for both pre and post HSV engagement activities.

-----

Lets take a hypothetical scenario. Suppose the proposed Littoral Strike Group was deployed to the Gulf of Guinea. The HSV vessel has 4 engagements over the next 3 months, each 3 weeks long. The first with Ghana, the second with Congo, and the third with Nigeria.

With the Navy GFS concept, these are individual engagements, and there is no maritime presence near Congo or Nigeria while the HSV is engaged in Ghana. With the Littoral Strike Group, a LCS can engage each of these countries prior to the HSV arrival, and even if it is a few weekly port visits to small ports, the engagements begin the process of information gathering operations and cultural awareness prior to the HSV engagement.

While this is happening, 2 more LCS can operate anywhere from the Strait of Gibraltar to the South Atlantic Ocean in Maritime Domain Awareness and in support of MSO, while the LPD conducts MSO operations while liaisons visit various maritime commercial interests throughout the region, including the large BP presence off Angola or the major US energy interests in Nigeria (who is the 5th largest oil provider to the US).

While these distributed operations take place, the T-AKE supplies logistics to the Littoral Strike Group, interfacing with logistical supply ships from Rota to maintain its own stores, and redistribute to the group.

When a small group of terrorists attack a group of contractors in the Niger River Delta, the LPD offers Nigerian coast guard and navy with information support regarding revel activity. When the T-AKE arrives a few days later, the Navy repairs a few Nigerian coast guard craft damaged during a recent firefight with the rebels. The following day, when pirates attempt to attack a commercial ship departing the region, the LPD responds, and with UAVs the US Navy is able to track the pirates retreat back to its rebel safe house. Later that evening, a joint CIA/Nigerian police operation captures the pirates.

------

If you follow the news, the story I outlined is actually a lot more similar to reality than it is to faction, as it is a combination of various events reported in the media over the last few years. The region suffers from human trafficking and rebels that operate in the Niger River Delta, who btw were a bigger cause than Iran last summer for the high oil prices in the US.

At the time, there was a single US frigate in the region, and according to the Office of Naval Intelligence Worldwide Threat to Shipping Reports from that 3 month time period, no less than 6 events were reported within 100 nautical miles of the frigate, which was probably too busy with events in the Nigerian Delta region and couldn't respond.

To me, the Littoral Strike Group is a sustained regional solution with a sustained engagement strategy built on maritime domain awareness and local partnership building that can adapt to local events while sustaining core missions, where as Global Fleet Stations, at least in its presented form by the US Navy, is a series of unilateral engagements in a region with the capability to rapidly redeploy to emerging issues, but as a single platform cannot sustain presence with any single engaged partner.

Last year we saw the USS Hue City, USS James E Williams, and USS Trenton deployed in Surface Strike Group (GWOT SSG) 06-2, and they were eventually reinforced/replaced with the USS Barry, USS Wasp, USS Mount Whitney, USS Swift, and USNS Kanawha during the Lebanon operation. Those ships represented a very similar set of capabilities in combination that is proposed in the Littoral Strike Group. A mothership (USS Trenton replaced by USS Wasp) and a command ship (USS Mount Whitney) with an engagement platform (USS Swift) and a logistical element (USNS Kanawha), supported by a major combat ship (USS Hue City) and distributed maritime military forces (USS Barry and USS James E Williams).

The Littoral Strike Group is basically the same combination of capabilities made up of a slightly different mix with a greater focus on civil operation engagement and naval littoral capability.