rickusn

Thanks Kato.

I used to have a handy explanation on displacement definitions but I cant locate it.

Do you or does anybody else have anything in the way of documentation or sources?

Thanks. Rick

Sorry Smitty I didnt see your edit but still interested in more.

kato

Sort of a baseline definition: http://www.hazegray.org/faq/smn2.htm#B8
The problem is that the definitions are rather arbitrary, especially regarding full load displacement (and hence deadweight of a military ship).
"Standard Displacement" is about the only officially declared standard.

Edit: Just played with the dimensions and deadweight of the Trimaran LCS-2 a bit. My above estimate of 1000-1200 tons looks like it might work, if we're considering a design with an emphasis on cargo. Likely a bit more though. LCS-2 is at least twice as big as this Austal design would be, and has 608 tons deadweight, for a supposed full load of 2784 tons.

rickusn

Thanks Kato.

Im pretty sure thats the info I was referring to.

B.Smitty

OTOH, the commercial spec wave piercing cat HSV-X1 has a deadweight of 741 tonnes and a full load displacement of 1740 tonnes.

http://www.tea.army.mil/pubs/nr/depl...02%20final.pdf

So MRC could be under 1000 tonnes, full load displacement, but it would be a stretch.

kato

Yeah, but cats are better optimized for deadweight by hull shape.

ftp://www.foundation.csulb.edu/CCDoT...l%20Report.pdf
This document has some design studies regarding multi-hulled fast ships. Page 14 is rather interesting, as it cites NAVSEA studies for different hull forms for a set payload: in these, the Trimaran hull has the largest displacement in comparison to a monohull (10% smaller) or a catamaran (25% smaller) with current technology, for a payload of 1,500 tons.

http://www.ccdott.org/proj_results/high_speed_ships.htm
This site where i found that document is rather interesting regarding Trimaran designs, i recommend it

JHK

GFS seems to be a means to undertaking "Shaping" missions - humanitarian, human intel, etc., a grab bag of stuff other than what people are now calling "kinetic" war - largely connected to the GWOT.

For these sorts of missions, as the Special Forces always say "Humans are more important than hardware."

For a GFS, the training, experience, and education of the sailors, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, etc. involved is about 1000 times more important than the nature of the vessel that the GFS is embarked on - requires MASSIVE amounts of language skill, civil affairs guys (NECC is standing up one small Naval Civil Affairs Group right now) etc.

I sort of got a chuckle seeing this thread immediately descend into discussing the arcane technical details of possible GFS ships - not that that issue isn't of any importance (long term, I think the answer may be converted small container ships or Offshore Service Vessels) it's just so typical of the "technology is the answer to everything" mindset.

rickusn

I get a "chuckle" out of ignorant, arrogant newbie posters who have nothing to add but unfounded, unwarranted and unprovoked comments of derision about a thread.

In other words a "troll".

This is a Naval Affairs discussion board.

But you say discussing ships is off-limits. LOL

No one implied any such thing:

"it's just so typical of the "technology is the answer to everything" mindset."

This is quite vague.:

"(long term, I think the answer may be converted small container ships or Offshore Service Vessels)"

Did you actually read anything posted, documented or referenced?

I think not.

A myriad variety of ships were discussed.

Not only that a variety of different USN ships from tried and true to experimental will be involved.

These ships vary from no armament or sophistictaed sensors to the most cutting-edge warfighting technologies.

Your a troll IMHO and am reporting you as such..

Youve made a piss poor initial impression that much is clear.

Galrahn

GFS is a CONOP, it is a beginning built on those things you are talking about, except you framed the enforcement operation in the general by lumping it into the buzzword GWOT. At the end of the day, nothing about the GWOT is new, and neither are any of the activities you mentioned that are focused in the Global Fleet Station.

In many ways, the Navy already engages in aspects of the GFS CONOP, just in piecemeal as opposed to a coherent solution. The 2005 operations of the Emory S. Land off the west coast of Africa, last years deployment of the Mercy to Southeast Asia, or the almost never discussed operations of the USNS Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham are all good examples of components of a GFS.

However, none of those ships have the capability to put it all together, as each deals in a specialty, lacking the multi-purpose flexibility required for operations that incorporate the large variety of requirements that insures the bold CONOP contained in GFS is realized to its potential.

As an example, the strategy implies presence as a mission objective of the GFS CONOP that I think merits a discussion on platform, because the technology you take to the AOR determines the potential for exchange and potential diversity of operation. If your platform is a offshore service vessel, example, Ocean 6, or a container ship like USNS Gunnery Sgt. Fred W. Stockham, are you able to provide the mobility, flexibility, or capability to conduct operations if required? You may meet the requirements for training, humanitarian, or other non combat operations, but what about MSO, or an insertion or extraction mission that goes hot? Alternatively, if the GFS is focused on security, even if it is successful in improving security the entire GFS could be a failure if it doesn't meet demands that may occur from a humanitarian crisis. Flexibility, diversity in operation, and concurrency in support of those operations are critical to the strategy, no matter which roles are being required of the GFS. The enabler for meeting those aspects of the GFS concept is technology.

GFS incorporates a large variety of potential operational roles, with technology as the driver behind how broad that variety is. In the end, we agree on premise, GFS success ultimately comes down to people, but GFS scope will depend upon how many disparate groups of people are able to concurrently conduct business effectively in a GFS AOR with sufficient support at the operational level, with each level often having disparate requirements for support by the GFS.

To that end, technology is important, and in fact behind the specific people who will drive any specific AOR is probably the second most important aspect of the GFS strategy, because it is the critical resource that bridges the gap in the wide variety of operational requirements. I have a tremendous amount of faith in the quality of the USN officers, and believe it will be technology, not people, that will ultimately be the limiting factor that defines the scope of what is possible in the GFS strategy.

I understand Ricks frustration though. Nobody appreciates a first time poster who automatically assumes he is the most informed person in the room and characterizes not only the discussion as thoughtless, but the members of the discussion as a bunch of thoughtless nitwits who have bypassed every aspect of strategy except the technology involved. Since your new, I'll give you the benefit of the doubt, but would point out that had you engaged the discussion without the condescending attitude you might realize it is sometimes through the discussion of technology that those not familiar with GFS (or any specific CONOP) may realize the complexities of the strategy to better understand its operational implications.

JHK

Said no such thing. I specifically said the ships used in a GFS were an an important issue as well, if you review my post - feel free to criticize me for what I actually said, but I never said the above.

If I seemed arrogant and condescending (which was not my intent, but I seem to be perceived as much on boards at times) it's because I've spent most of the last three months analyzing the GFS, and Navy involvement in "Sea Shaping" (which apparently was tossed around as a new "Seapower 21" pillar alongside "Sea Shield" etc. a while back but has not become official as best I can tell) and also looking at how the Army, USCG, and USMC approach similar missions. I've read everything I can get my hands on regarding the issue.

My apologies if you're offended. I was simply intending to provoke discussion and I don't see where I made any sort of direct personal attack on anyone.

It's just after reading an enormous amount of material regarding SOCOM forces, the Army, USMC and their "Small Wars" efforts, Military Civil Affairs, one thing jumps out - everyone repeatedly emphasizes the human element, cultural awareness, language training as being much more important than technology. In the proposed missions GFS is tasked with undertaking, and being aware of the USN bias towards engineering and technlogical solutions (not that this is unknown in the other services, I don't wish to single the USN out as an offender in this) when I saw the first thread anywhere on a bulletin board discussing the somewhat-mysterious GFS and saw it discussing the details of the ships, with having NO discussion of the personnel assigned to the mission, I found it telling - would you at least grant I maybe have a point there?

Look, I LIKE ships too. It's more interesting to discuss missile mounts and even ship tonnage and what not, rather than how much language training a Petty Officer has, even to me.

I've actually been EXTREMELY impressed by this board as a whole regarding the knowledge demonstrated relative to a lot of other places discussing naval affairs on the web - it's not 90% "newbies" just proposing their fantasy new 40,000 ton USN battlecruiser with 2000 VLS cells and 6 Phalanxes on each side.

If the USN is really serious about the GFS mission (and it's hard to tell when things are lip service, or real seriousness) the focus needs to be on creating a service culture where an officer can take the time to achieve significant fluency in a language such as, say, the Yoruba spoken in parts of Nigeria, and get a PhD in some sort of Nigerian Area studies program, and not fear killing his career.

The Navy is taking steps to address this with expansion of the FAO program, etc., the question is whether it's enough.

The other big question is - is the USN is really the best choice for this mission? Or is the USMC, USCG, US Army Civil Affairs, Department of State, or even some notional entirely new "Department of Everything Else" agency of "System Administrators" as proposed by Thomas PM Barnett, the answer?

Again I know exactly what you mean about clueless newbies showing up proclaiming everyone else idiots - I assure you I'm not that guy, though I do come across as arrogant in all on-line formats (but I don't in person).

JHK

Buzzworditis is indeed significant problem, especially the constant renaming of the same thing over and over again with a new acronym.

As a CNA study ("Small-Scale Contigencies and the Forces that Shape the Navy") pointed out back in 1998 MOST of what the Navy has done in its history is NOT major combat operations, so there really is not that much new in the proposed GFS CONOPS. Heck, USN and USMC officers have RUN entire countries before (Haiti in the early 20th Century) and humanitarian aid and disaster assistance has been a repeated USN mission for 150+ years.

There's an incredible grab-bag of what people have called this stuff over the years, from even the "Small-Scale Contingencies" mentioned above, to OOTW (Operations Other than War) to "Phase 0 Shaping and Stability Operations" and that's just a sampling.

It's not exclusive to the GWOT rubric but it's undeniable that the GWOT is the driver behind the USN interest and focus on the whole subject.


Yes, even in terms of GFS, there have ALREADY been ships basically functioning as a sort-of-a-GFS like the Land, the hospital ships, etc. Also the FFG Kaufmann off Africa.

The Stockham and its modifications are a somewhat mysterious subject I'm attempting to get smarter about - I noticed it appeared in some recent news stories helping to rescue a Taiwanese ship that ran aground bringing humanitarian aid to the Solomon Islands after the tsunami there (note the news articles incorrectly said it was the "Stockton" and was Navy rather than USNS) so it seems the Stockham is around there providing humanitarian aid as well.

Also the USCG has had a "GFS" - they used an old WWII Buoy Tender, the Gentian, as a "Carribean Support Tender" for several years, but have since decommed her.

All of that is obviously extremely important. As in my previous post, I never said technology was irrelevant to the GFS conops, just that it was less important than personnel - I don't see where that's some sort of radical assertion.

The scenarios proposed by the CNO in the 2006 NOC implies modifiying an LPD 4 as a GFS station, but I'm dubious of the age and condition of these ships (again, something I'd like to get smarter on) and I question whether the goal of persistent, distributed GFS presence can be realistically met by pulling amphibious ships out of ARGs.

In the specific case of the GFS I actually, well, am because it's what my analytical job is at the moment - I actually thought it would be perceived as more arrogant to mention that in my initial post, which, in hindsight, seems to have been a poor idea :-)

In terms of the general Navy, I'm obviously not - I've never served in the military and what actual operators and ex-operators have to say is golden to me and I have the utmost respect for people in the service.

I do think a somewhat detached outside analytical perspective can be helpful.

I perceived there's a great danger in the automatic "Ok, we have a mission assigned - so what ship do we build/convert to accomplish this mission?" being the FIRST thought, rather than "How do we improve our training/recruiting/career paths/education to get the right sailor for the mission?" being the FIRST thought. The ship for the mission is highly important but should be the SECOND thought, for the Sea Shaping/GFS mission.

If I'm some perceived sort of flamethrowing radical for even thinking the above paragraph - well, that's an indication of the problem.

Galrahn

USNS GYSGT Fred W. Stockham (T-AK 3017) was modified a few years ago to improve its medical facility, enlarge its hanger, and change its inventory to focus around mobile equipment for special operations instead of traditionally heavy equipment usually deployed on pre-positioning ships. The famous quote is that "it is out doing work we really can't talk about."

The Stockham has been successful, to the point the Navy is now planning to deploy the LSD-49s for dedicated to GWOT missions. The intention appears to scale up the capability beyond what the Stockham can provide, specifically adding the deployment of more, smaller naval forces and other attachments to augment SOF forces based on lessons learned in theaters like Iraq and Afghanistan.

Back to the GFS...

I haven't seen anything official outside the 2006 NOC, so my opinions carry no official weight.

It seems to me GFS is basically three main categories, with each category containing a series of missions that taken together are intended to 'shape and influence' regional affairs. Those categories would be Governmental, Non-Governmental, and Military.

Governmental
The Global Fleet Station would be an interface between US government agencies and regional local law enforcement officials, civil and military authorities, and private citizens to assess host nation needs and build working relationships. The Global Fleet Station would be the supporting element for official government activity and exchange, an enabler and sometimes the provider of capabilities required to meet local needs and challenges. This activity could include anything from assessment support for the Dept. of Agriculture on local farmland to Bird Flu research in association with the US Dept. of Health. In this category, the GFS is a supporting element, while governmental agencies take the lead. By forward deploying important capabilities on the GFS, examples could be medical teams or Seabees, the Global Fleet Station provides significant leverage in key areas of infrastructure to local populations that provide options to local US government officials that might not otherwise be available.

Non-Governmental
The Global Fleet Station role in NGO support to regional problems provides a unique opportunity for the United States to effect shaping operations. It is not uncommon to see NGOs active in the regions targeted for Global Fleet Stations, whether it is a Christian missionary in remote parts of a country or business interests in a populated regional port. The GFS role would range from crisis management response coordination to influencing social issues like rebuilding a local school that burned down or providing fresh water to the local population in a flooded region. Depending upon the make up of the detachments to the GFS, influence should range beyond the humanitarian to also include infrastructure improvement and developing a better understanding of regional commercial concerns.

Military
Despite the enabling of governmental and non-governmental influence in the region, the Global Fleet Station will consist mostly of military forces, even in provisioning for other categories of influence. The GFS military role would be to develop full maritime domain awareness of the maritime region to insure security in its AOR, while also engaging in information gathering within the region to understand the dynamics beyond the beach. This information building capability would then facilitate cooperation on a regional level, and thus directly enable other military operations including forward maritime security operations, sea control, deterrence, security cooperation, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, air and missile defense, and other information operations.

It is through naval presence, crisis response, expeditionary power projection, and civil-military operations I believe the Global Fleet Station offers a unique opportunity to enable US strategy in getting proactive during peacetime in deterrence of activity that leads to conflict.

You have mentioned people, and I think you bring up a good point, unfortunately I don't believe the Navy is going to have all the answers quickly. The education and training concerns you have raised are not specific to the GFS concept, as you noted it is a larger cultural issue within the Navy, something that appears to be in discussion and in play as evident by numerous articles recently in Proceedings, and press conference statements by the NCO. However, those issues are separate to the GFS concept, and in fact are addressed independent of GFS. While it is true the GFS may enable the recommendation by a regional attaché of a foreign naval officer to a naval exchange program to the NWC for example, beyond that there is little within the scope of the GFS concept that specifically deals with the education and cultural awareness aspect for sailors involved in the concept that they won't develop as part of the job in theater.

I agree people and specific skills are critical to GFS effectiveness, but I don’t think specific people or specific individual skills are a determining factor in defining the objectives the Navy is seeking to achieve in the concept, nor the strategy in which to execute the concept. In the end, people will be chosen from a pool of qualified candidates, and if there is a lack of qualified candidates that problem will be assigned to those who train the fleet to fight. Existing skills in language or cultural awareness will have little effect on the strategy behind the Global Fleet Station itself, rather I think what is more likely is that GFS becomes yet another driver for the emphasis of developing those skills within the fleet as a whole.

That is the broad overview of how I see GFS. I have no idea if it is how the Navy sees the concept. I see real opportunity in the Global Fleet Station concept, but I think there are important services associated with the concept that can't be ignored and need to be considered up front. For example, I believe full Maritime Domain Awareness is a critical enabler in all aspects of the GFS concept, because providing important, reliable information is a great way to start a conversation with a regional partner. It puts the US GFS concept in the right framework, as an enabler for regional security by providing a service of value as opposed to an offshore military presence by a foreign power. Achieving full Maritime Domain Awareness is easier said than done though, so it could become a driver in the final design of what makes up a Global Fleet Station in addition to the various specialized detachments assigned.

rickusn

"immediately descend into discussing the arcane technical details of possible GFS ships."

First of all the discussion was none of the above.

Second you cant discuss GFS w/o discussing ships which the above quote implies is out of order.

Now you may well ask why are the platforms important.

Galrahn touched on "Domain Awareness".

That is of course critical for force protection among other lesser issues.

But more important to me is logistics because the areas where GFS task groups are slated to go are in the main quite underdeveloped.

Naval strategy has always proclaimed that the USN can do what it does as it is not dependent on nor imposes on other countries infrastucture.

This will remain the same.

Therefore the USN has to bring everything with it to support its people and mission.

So the "real" question to be asked first is: What platforms will provide the C4ISR, force protection, supply, medical, berthing, food, rest & relaxation and many other logistical considerations and still be cost-effective.

Of course people are important but IMHO IS "secondary" to considerations of how to care, protect and support them for prolonged periods organically.

Not to mention the equipment and smaller platforms be it land, air or water (surface or subsurface) they will be employing.

This requires a thoughtful analysis backed by experimentation which as Galrahn points out has, is and will be carefully undertaken, scrutinized and documented.

But still on the whole this initiative as Mullens says remains under the umbrella of the Maritime Strategy(and in particular Seapower 21).

Specifically it is variation on the theme of:

Prescence, Persistence and Dispersion of forces.

The smaller task groups and/or elements of these forces can at any time be integrated and reconstituted into a much larger whole seamlessly, quickly and potently.

Which by implication requires serious discussion of so-called " arcane technical details" of platforms that will enable people to do their jobs.

For the USN this has always been so even paramount.

As all the recruiting of motivated and skilled individuals who are properly and appropriately trained is useless w/o the means to properly support them once deployed in the the areas to do the missions chosen.

Once again we arrive at the same place this started a discussion of Platforms that may/could/would/should/will enable them to perform their missions safely, effectively and efficiently for protacted periods of time far, far from their or any shore-based infrastructure and support.

In order for GFS to work the proper platforms have to be indentified first.

You say you havent served in the military and it glaringly shows.

Of course this is all so "arcane" in your opinion because all we need to do is recruit talented people and then drop them off in the middle of nowhere or worse and hope for the best.

Or have I misunderstood you?

I think not.

Pretty risky proposition you seem to be proposing IMHO.

In fact you dont even have a clue how your going to get them there much less provide for them to be useful once there.

As far as Im concerned you second impression was even worse than the first.

LOL

Galrahn

I see developing a Global Fleet Station strategy as a four step process, but in the end it is difficult to participate in all of those steps because we simply don't have all the information to reach definite conclusions.

In it's simplest form:

1) Identify the national security interest. (where)
2) Identify the obstacles. (against whom)
3) Prioritize the short, mid, and long term goals. (to what end)
4) Formulate strategies (how) and Identify resource requirements to achieve objectives (with what)

Step 1 and step 2 are easy to generalize, but I think it is difficult to break them down into specifics on an internet forum.

Step 1 for the Navy is to engage in troubled regions around the globe to protect the political and economic interests of the United States. Examples would include the Gulf of Guinea region, the Horn of Africa and Persian Gulf region, and the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca region. In reality, the region could change but the problems typically remain the same.

Step 2 is to clearly define the obstacles facing the GFS which will include some combination of small rogue states that actively destabilize these regions, and non state actors involved in illegal or violent ideological activity. That is a general answer, but each region will represent a unique set of problems, thus any solution will need to be flexible and able to adapt to circumstances as they develop.

I think step 3 and 4 is where the real debate starts.

I think the short term goals should be to establish processes for regional security in conjunction with regional military and civil law enforcement while establishing total maritime domain awareness in an AOR. I think mid term goals would be to develop trust, cooperation, and partnership for regional security among regional partners and interoperability with willing global partners, and I think long term goals would be to establish regional stability.

I base my theories on how and with what resources to execute the plan based on meeting those objectives.

Finally, step 4 is a two part question where one directly effects the other. How you formulate your strategy determines what resources you need, just like what resources you have determines how you can execute your strategy.

Rick and I have discussed this at length in many places, and we both tend to have the same general concept that for GFS to fit the Navy logistical train and be effective in meeting its objectives, the Navy is going to need a new formation called a "Littoral Strike Group," which is a GWOT variation of the existing Carrier Strike Group and Expeditionary Strike Group the Navy already deploys.

For me, discussing the specifics of the "Littoral Strike Group" GFS solution should probably be is a whole different thread, or is this the best thread for it?

B.Smitty

Feel free to discuss it here, if you want. I'm getting a lot out of these posts. This type of discussion is exactly what I was looking for when I started this thread.

What is a Littoral Strike Group in your mind?

rickusn

Personally I almost always start a new thread as up-to-date information becomes available.

Until then this IMHO is a useful thread.

As for:

"What is a Littoral Strike Group in your mind?"

Exactly what has been experimented for the better part of the last year.

ie an Amphibious ship(in particular the LSDs for now as they have been and will be available for the forseeable future).

A DDG 51 class flight I/II(no organic helos) and an OHP FFG which does.

Later an HSV would be quite useful but as of now they arent being built.

Thats for platforms.

AS for other personnel. There is a plethora of existing or soon to exist detachments that provide expertise in the close-to-shore and river interfaces that at some point depending on geographical area connect with Blue-water.

And IMHO blue-water interfaces are a must for all the issues I outlined in previous posts.

As the USN draws-down the Carrier and the large -deck LHA/LHD forces there are in reality plenty of escorts to suffice.

Its been over 15 years since we even thought of employing forcible-entry amphibious operations in a real world scenario.

While we shouldnt lose the capability just yet the assets earmarked for such an endeavor must find a other uses for the large expenditure of resources required to bring them into being and sustain them.

This is also an issue for the submarine force. They are in the process(well always have been) of making themselves useful and relevant.

In certain situations I would include one with the LSG again that depends on circumstances.

But the USN submarine force has always proven adaptable to changing environments and has for the most part a platform that has been far more flexible than others in deploying especially at short notice.

Of course having been an active submariner (Three decades ago. LOL.) Im somewhat biased.

Again IMHO the ability to provide capabilities(limited as they may.) across the entire spectrum of Naval Missions is paramount.

Just for the deterent value if nothing else.

It may stop certain actors in Maritime Domain but will ceratinly give them pause.

And often that pause, that uncertainty, that seed of doubt is enough to ensure favorable outcomes.

When its not a BIG HAMMER is often required to repair the situation.

Best to have it with you.

And as I pointed out earlier it comes down to realistic, practical and pragmatic Risk Management.