rickusn

Should the Navy Do Missile Defense?

Commander L. Paul James III, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Proceedings, February 2007

If the Navy wants to play a major role in defending against ballistic missiles, it needs to embrace the mission more than it has in the past.





Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks' article in the January Proceedings, "Extending the Navy's Shield: Sea-Based Missile Defense," forcefully argues for a robust Navy ballistic-missile defense (BMD) capability. But his most important point may be his final one. The statement, "Much needs to be done because much lies in the balance,"1 could not be more true. Despite the successes to date, the future of the capability in the Navy is far from assured. The Navy is at a crossroads and as an institution must either embrace ballistic missile defense or cede this mission to the other services and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Either way, what the Navy does in the next year will have lasting ramifications.

It is not that the concept of sea basing is unpopular. Most in the Navy would agree that such a capability is desirable. But it is a whole different ballgame to acknowledge that a capability is desirable in the abstract and actually defining BMD as a mission area and committing scarce funding and personnel to it. Placing this mission on par with undersea or strike warfare would mean that the Navy would have to expend resources on a warfare area that many are not sure falls in the Navy's purview.

The costs of embracing this mission will be significant. Even if the MDA pays for system upgrades and some of the missiles, the Navy will have to supply the bulk of the interceptor inventory, the people, the training, the ships, and the supporting infrastructure. All this would come at a time when enthusiasm is low for new investments as we pay for past under-funding of shipbuilding accounts and respond to bills emanating from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The threat is certainly real, as demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War and again in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Concern is also growing over the ballistic-missile inventories of North Korea, Iran, Syria, and China. Arguably, both ballistic and cruise missiles pose the greatest threat today to the ability of the United States to project power and control the seas.

Currently, the status of Navy missile defense is mixed. Navy destroyers stand ready to defend the nation against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A mid-course capability is emerging, a rudimentary terminal-phase capability is being fielded, and several successor proposals to fill the niche intended for the now-defunct Navy Area Defense have at least reached PowerPoint briefing stage. On the surface it may appear that the Navy is on the cusp of realizing a formidable sea-based missile-defense capability.

The reality is somewhat less rosy, and it is worthwhile to look at where the Navy is today, as opposed to where it anticipated being as recently as five years ago. The Navy Area Defense program was cancelled in 2001, and four years later no decision has been reached on a permanent replacement. Even the near-term engagement capabilities are less than they might seem. The interim Sea Based Terminal (SBT) system, based on modifying existing surface-to-air missiles, promises, in the words of the MDA, "a near-term, limited emergency capability."2 And any eventual terminals and midcourse systems will be limited if MDA and the Navy do not procure sufficient interceptors to pace the threat.

Missile Defense in the Joint World

While the Navy ponders its decision, in the joint world the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) has been charged with "planning, integrating, and coordinating global ballistic-missile defense operations" and is extending its grasp over all such efforts. Its actions range from establishing missile-defense acquisition priorities to monitoring operations. The Strategic Command has also recently formed a Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense headed by a lieutenant general. While this role is evolving, it will likely be a major player, with significant impact on future Navy missile defense.

The Navy's future in this mission is not threatened just by the joint commands. The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command has committed literally thousands of personnel to fielding Army ballistic-missile defense systems. The Army has recently formed its third deployable BMD planning and execution nodes, known as Army Air and Missile Defense Commands. Finally, hundreds of Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles have been fielded, and the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system is due for early deployment in the next few years.

A Navy BMD Requirement?

There would not be anything intrinsically wrong with ceding ballistic-missile defense to joint commanders and the other services—provided the needs of the nation were met and a failure to play a leading role did not entail undue institutional risk to the Navy. Neither, unfortunately, is the case, and if the Navy fails to embrace missile defense and to make the requisite investment of people and funds, it will entail risk to both the nation and the Navy.

In addition to a potential ICBM attack by North Korea or by some rogue element in China or Russia, there are at least four potential scenarios where ballistic missiles could be employed against U.S. interests:

North Korea against South Korea and probably Japan
China against Taiwan
Iran against the Arab nations in the Arabian Gulf
Iran and perhaps Syria against Israel
Each of these scenarios features extensive numbers of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles that cannot be engaged by ground-based interceptors in the United States. In each scenario, the Navy could fill a major role. In the case of China-Taiwan or a North Korean launch at targets in Japan, the Navy would be expected to perform the primary role. There is also the issue of protecting the sea base against future ballistic-missile threats. This would clearly be a Navy mission.

The requirement for sea-based missile defense does not diminish the role of the Patriot or, in the future, THAAD and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). The capabilities are complementary. The Navy cannot hope to match the missile inventory brought to the fight by the Army, but neither can the Army match the Navy's mobility, flexibility, and tactical agility. The Navy protects the sea base, kicks the door down, and provides coverage while the Army Air Defense Artillery moves ashore. At this point the mission can be turned over to the Army, though sea-based forces could be pulsed to augment Army forces ashore during periods of increased threat or increased vulnerability.

The Risk of Turning Away

If the operational need for Navy missile defense appears clear, the risks of turning away from this mission are no less so. Ballistic-missile defense is a priority of the current administration, and Navy BMD in particular has had strong congressional support. Notwithstanding current budget pressure, the Missile Defense Agency continues to enjoy generous funding. Running afoul of this administration and congressional proponents of Navy BMD carries risk.

There are also inadvertent risks posed by the STRATCOM, the Missile Defense Agency, and others. These commands expect the Navy to contribute while they develop concepts of operation and war plans; unless the Navy participates, Aegis BMD ships will be employed without appropriate Navy input. To date, Navy participation in the daunting number of conferences, exercises, and tests supporting concept of operation and war plan development has been uneven in both the number of events attended and the experience of those who attend. This is not the fault of the Navy staff, the Aegis BMD program office, or the fleet commanders. The required personnel simply do not exist and, although the BMD specialty program is a start, it is a modest one.

The other component of risk is the potential opportunity to access Missile Defense Agency money and influence system development. In January 2002, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld cancelled all existing missile defense operational requirements documents, fundamentally restructuring how the MDA would develop and acquire systems.3 This permits spiral development where systems are continually being updated, even when they are operational. One murky aspect of acquisition reform, however, was the transition of the systems back to the services. In other words, when does the Missile Defense Agency stop training the crews and buying the missiles under the guise of research and development and transfer the functions, and the bills, to the services? If the Navy were to turn away from BMD, it is entirely possible that we would get systems we do not want or could not use but still would have to pay for them.

A Road Ahead

The question is, where do we go from here? All concerned should understand that whatever course is chosen, Navy missile defense cannot entail the commitment of substantial Navy funding or an increase in end strength. This is the hard part. Navy BMD will have to develop within a fiscally constrained environment. What acquisition funding is available will have to flow from the Missile Defense Agency or from Congress, and the ships and personnel we have today will form the heart of what we will fight with in the immediate future.

Since throwing Navy money at the problem is not an option, the Navy should throw brainpower at it. The necessary first steps are in progress. These consist of articulating a vision for Navy BMD and continuing to update the accompanying Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense concept of operations. Together, these should articulate the Navy role in joint missile defense today, a vision for the future, and a roadmap that lays out how the Navy intends to realize the vision. These documents are the key linkages between the today's limited capability and a potential future. They should include a hardheaded assessment of the present status, near- and far-term risks, consideration of the impact that BMD will have on Navy force structure, and acknowledgement that the Navy faces significant hurdles and hard truths.

Since the Navy cannot buy everything it needs, it should focus on what it absolutely needs. This includes pushing the MDA to develop a strong sea-based terminal capability and procuring sufficient interceptors to make a difference in potential conflict scenarios. The Navy should also focus on organizational changes, training, and doctrine development. What the service should strive for is to create trained personnel to lead the joint world in organizational innovation and the development of joint concepts, operational plans, and doctrine development.

Navy missile defense also needs someone in charge. In addition to providing a focus for the joint world and an advocate within the Navy, the service needs someone to ensure that milestones are being met. Fleet and carrier strike group commanders should provide guidance and establish operational requirements, but they are too committed to be the focal point for Navy ballistic-missile defense. Nor is the Aegis BMD program office the answer; it is there to develop systems, and it has done this magnificently. It should not be expected to develop tactics, write doctrine, or manage the Navy BMD community. That it is attempting to do this today speaks volumes on its commitment, but it cannot be viewed as a long-term answer.

What the Navy needs now is a missile defense—or perhaps air and missile defense—center of excellence. Headed by a flag officer, this organization would be the focus of Navy BMD and would work in concert with the Chief of Naval Operations' staff, Fleet Forces Command, program offices, fleet commanders, the Navy Warfare Development Command, and others with a vested interest in Navy ballistic-missile defense. A Navy Missile Defense Command could be the center for the development of training, doctrine, and tactics while coordinating developments with other agencies.

Any decision to embrace BMD will cause additional pain at a time when the Navy is already under extreme budgetary pressure and when there is certainly no under-employed group of personnel to call on. Yet the threat posed by increasingly sophisticated ballistic missiles and the institutional risk posed by resisting this mission area leave the Navy little option. As Admiral Hicks concluded: "Much needs to be done, because much lies in the balance."4

RAdm Alan B. Hicks, USN, "Extending the Navy's Shield: Sea-Based Ballistic-Missile Defense," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2007, pp. 56-59. back to article
Missile Defense Agency, For Your Information, "First at-Sea Demonstration of Sea Based Terminal Capability Successfully Completed," 24 May 2006. back to article
"Missile Defense Program Direction," Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 2 January 2002. back to article
Hicks, "Extending the Navy's Shield," Proceedings, January 2007. back to article


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Commander James is a retired surface warfare officer with more than a decade of experience in Navy missile defense. He is currently a consultant with DMG Associates and is an occasional contributor to Proceedings.

Galrahn

I am somewhat disappointed in this article. I think the case made here is weak, weak on facts and details and weak on direction. It isn't that I disagree with the author, I just don't think a compelling case is made by this article.

This article appears to me to be written to specific criticisms of the program, criticisms that are equally weak on substance in my opinion. I think Proceedings published a 'failed opportunity' to take a serious evaluation of AEGIS BMD, because this article appears to take is a generic approach of making missile defense a navy investment before discussing what missile defense approach is best to take as a national strategy.

The suggestion is a for another Command in the Navy that would clearly compete with the Missile Defense Agency's already established Naval presence. I fail to get the point of this article.

rickusn

"I fail to get the point of this article."

That may be Galrahn because you are so far ahead of the curve on this than most of us.

I believe it was presented to extend the dialog begun in January.

It wasnt meant by understanding of it to be a technical or a defining treatise on BMD but more of a "talking points" essay.

A (re)reading of the January article would probably be helpful also. Which Im going to do this afternoon along with another look at our previous discussion a short time ago in the Stennis Strike Group Thread.

But for me the defining point of the article was that the USN has arrived at a "crossroads" of where it should go with BMD capabilities.

On this I agree.

I havent paid alot of attention to the issue except very recently.

One of the reasons is that my perception was that it would take a long time if ever to become more than a side show.

It appears events have moved a bit faster than I was anticpating.

So the question is where does the USN go with this new mission? Or even should it?

Along with:

Who pays?
Who sets the doctrine?
Who is in Command?
How does the misson and role integrate with the more traditional requirements of conventional AAW, ASuW, ASW, Mine Warfare, C4ISR,MIO and patrol?

Or as he points out the Seabasing concept.

Im sure you can think of other points and issues.

rickusn

BTW I dont think I posted the January article. So here it is. And Galrahn please enlighten us with the materail you have on the issue. Thanks. :

Extending the Navy's Shield: Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense

Rear Admiral Alan B. Hicks, U.S. Navy

Proceedings, January 2007

Discuss in the eForum.

The Navy's Aegis fleet plays a key role in the nation's ballistic missile defense network.


U.S. NAVY

The guided-missile cruiser USS Shiloh (CG-67) launches a Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) during a June 2006 test. The Navy's ballistic-missile defense system is designed to intercept short- to medium-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse phase of flight.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is one of the most challenging missions facing the United States. This threat came into sharp focus on our Fourth of July 2006 when North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles (5 July 2006 Far East time). The North Korean detonation of a nuclear device just three months later put an exclamation point to these events. The presence of Iranian observers at the July launches and ties of both of those countries to international terrorist organizations make these developments even more ominous.

A ballistic missile's speed, range, and altitude leave defenders little room for error in warning, detection, tracking, and engagement. Today, the United States faces a greater danger from an expanding number of hostile regimes and terrorist groups that seek to acquire and use ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). These adversaries may not respond to traditional tools and concepts of deterrence. More than 25 counties—some friendly to the United States and some not so—have ballistic missile and WMD programs in various stages of development. Our intelligence estimates indicate that a small number of countries could acquire ICBM capabilities by 2020, either through indigenous development or technology transfer, thus posing a direct threat to the nation.

A Critical National Need

The BMD mission is a national priority. President George W. Bush directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with fielding an initial set of missile-defense capabilities that would "be capable of protecting not only the United States and our deployed forces, but also our friends and allies."1 Responsibility for this effort rests with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), to which the Navy's BMD program reports.

Even a modest BMD capability can enhance and expand U.S. policy options. The United States' inaugural activation of the national Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) in June 2006 and its transition to alert status only days later were real and powerful demonstrations of U.S. technological capability and resolve. During the July 2006 events, U.S. Aegis BMD ships and their crews provided the first line of defense against the North Korean ballistic missiles. This contingency surge demonstrated the growing extent to which the Navy is counted on as an important factor in the joint BMD equation.

A National Joint Effort

Requirements for specific BMD capabilities to promote global security and order are predicated on filling warfighting gaps. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognized that ballistic missile proliferation threatened access in critical world regions of vital interest to the United States.

The ability to maintain sea control at times and places of the nation's choosing will continue to be essential for any joint force action as well as for protecting the sea lines of commerce. Sea control enhances the ability to deter both nation-state and non-state adversaries. The QDR called out the need for "tailored deterrence, including prompt global strike capabilities to defend and respond in an overwhelming manner against WMD attacks, and air and missile defenses, as well as other defensive measures, to deter attacks by demonstrating the ability to deny an adversary's objectives."2

The MDA is developing a fully integrated and layered joint system capable of defeating ballistic missiles of all ranges during all phases of flight. Its elements provide accurate and precise missile identification and tracking using advanced overhead and terrestrial-based sensors; a reliable command and control, battle management, and communications infrastructure; and sophisticated interceptor missiles. Future BMDS capability plans include the introduction of directed-energy weapons (e.g., lasers). Critical to its effectiveness are shared operational pictures, confident combat identification, interoperable battle management systems, adaptive joint planning, flexible engagement coordination, and integrated fire control.

While a BMD system for homeland defense has the highest national priority, naval and joint force requirements also call for integrated theater missile defense systems that can effectively protect forward operating forces—ashore and afloat—and population centers from both ballistic- and cruise-missile attack. Navy BMD systems—with their inherent strategic, operational, and tactical mobility and agility—contribute significantly to regional stability and peace.

Ship-Based BMD

National Security Presidential Directive 23 identified sea-based interceptors as a critical element of U.S. missile-defense systems. Presidential emphasis was not lost on the Navy's leadership. During his Senate confirmation hearings in 2005 for the post of Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen stated: ". . . missile defense is a core Navy mission."3 The prime requirement shaping Navy BMD is this: The ability to deter or defeat an adversary's use of ballistic missiles to challenge U.S. strategies, plans, and operations.

To achieve the Navy's vision-Americans secure at home and abroad; sea and air lanes open for the free movement of international commerce; steadily deepening cooperation among the maritime forces of emerging partner nations; and a combat-ready Navy large enough, agile enough, and lethal enough to deter any threat and defeat any foe in support of the joint force—Admiral Mullen has called for the development of a Sea Shield Missile Defense concept of operations. This would provide for defense of the Joint Sea Base and forward operating base infrastructure, regional defense of allies and joint maneuver forces ashore, and defense of the U.S. homeland.

Finally, the Naval Operations Concept 2006, signed by the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in July, calls for sustained operations in forward areas:

Forward deployed U.S. Naval forces contribute to joint air and missile defense by providing the capability to detect and destroy enemy aircraft and missiles in flight . . . [These] capabilities protect joint and multinational forces operating overseas, allied and friendly nations, and provide the first echelon of homeland defense-in-depth. The growing threat of ballistic missile attack requires continued emphasis of this naval mission.4
A Unique Naval Capability


U.S. NAVY

During the June 2006 test, conducted with the Missile Defense Agency, the SM-3 fired by the Shiloh successfully intercepted a separating ballistic-missile target fired from the Pacific Missile Range facility in Hawaii. This marked the seventh intercept in eight flights by the system.
Required combat capabilities have always driven the composition of the Fleet and the characteristics of its ships. For almost 25 centuries, naval combat was characterized as ship versus ship or ship versus fort, with the key weapons required being the ram, catapult, or gun. By the end of the 19th century, the invention of the mobile torpedo initiated a rapid acceleration in weapon technology. The 20th century saw the mating of the torpedo with the submarine, followed very closely by the introduction of the aircraft, and then the cruise missile.

Responses to each of these threats fundamentally changed the way this nation fights at and from the sea, and has required us to upgrade and add new combat capability to our general-purpose warships to counter threats. To this mix we must add the capability to counter ballistic missiles into the 21st century in order to upgrade the existing Fleet and build the next. The threat of ballistic missiles to all the enduring purposes and missions of the nation and the Navy is real and upon us now.

Because the sea-based BMD capability is embedded in globally deployed, general-purpose, multi-mission Aegis warships, the Navy is uniquely suited to play an essential role as part of the current and future joint BMD mission. The Navy provides this broad, multi-mission capability at an affordable cost within its existing forward-deployed, rotational, and surge-capable naval forces. Aegis BMD adds another significant dimension to the already robust general-purpose, multi-mission cruisers and destroyers. These forces provide persistent presence in important world regions and can be surged forward in response to specific threats and contingencies.

This naval capability requires no massive airlift of systems and personnel to a threatened country, nor does it require permission for access from a host country. With control of the seas, warships can steam indefinitely in international waters off an adversary's shore without the need for host-government permission or reliance on shore support facilities. No additional operating personnel are required, and no additional facilities are needed, as Aegis BMD ships take full advantage of existing Navy infrastructure and support.

Naval BMD is based on almost 40 years of Aegis weapon system development and operation and more than 50 years of Standard Missile (SM) research, development, testing, and real-world performance in the U.S. and several allied navies.5 The systems are mature and highly reliable, and have been developed and maintained by an efficient, highly skilled Navy-industry team with a legacy of success.

On 24 September 2004, the first BMD surveillance and tracking Aegis destroyer, the USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG-54), deployed to the Sea of Japan on the world's first BMD patrol. Additional BMD-capable ships followed. In February 2005, during the Stellar Dragon flight test, the USS Lake Erie (CG-70) fired an SM-3 missile and successfully intercepted a unitary ballistic-missile target outside of the earth's atmosphere. Also during that mission, the USS Russell (DDG-59) successfully detected a target-missile launch and passed data to the Lake Erie and the Joint National Integration Center in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The Russell demonstrated that it could conduct real-time detection, tracking, and discrimination of a target. In November 2005, the Lake Erie successfully intercepted a separating target—in essence hitting a "bullet" with a "super computer."

In 2006 both the Lake Erie and the USS Shiloh (CG-67) had successful intercepts against separating targets replicating medium-range ballistic-missile threats. As part of their flight test, both cruisers conducted simultaneous antisubmarine warfare, surface action, antiship cruise missile defense, and Tomahawk land-attack missile strikes, demonstrating the impressive capabilities of the Navy's general purpose, multi-mission Aegis fleet.

The Way Forward

By the end of 2006 the Navy deployed a ballistic-missile engagement capability in three Ticonderoga (CG-47) -class cruisers and three Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) -class destroyers. This system allows the ships to intercept and destroy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This nascent Navy BMD capability is fully integrated into the national, joint BMDS. By 2010, 18 cruisers and destroyers with the Aegis BMD capability will ply the world's seas.

The Navy is extending the capability of the SPY-1 radar and the SM-3 and SM-2 Block IV missiles, as well as improving Aegis BMD integrated fire-control protocols with other air and missile defense systems to enable the Fleet to make an even larger contribution to the nation's joint—and increasingly combined—BMD mission.

The Navy has achieved an enviable record of eight hits for nine interceptor missile launches. This accomplishment is attributable to several factors, three of which stand out: first, the maturity of extant Aegis-related systems and the supporting naval infrastructure; second, the professionalism, commitment, and engineering rigor of a Navy-industry team that embraces the philosophy espoused by Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, the father of Aegis, to "Build a Little . . . Test a Little . . . Learn a Lot"; and third, the evolutionary upgrading of technologies and systems to pace the threat. Today's force of 84 Aegis cruisers and destroyers provides the foundation for effective and affordable near-term BMD.

As Aegis BMD continues to evolve, America's ability to defend against ballistic missiles of all ranges during all phases of flight will significantly improve. These Aegis BMD upgrades, coupled with the planned CG(X) program, will make the Navy the keystone for U.S. ballistic-missile defense. Much needs to be done, as much hangs in the balance.

1"President Announces Progress in Missile Defense Capabilities," 17 December 2002. Welcome to the White House. back to article
22006 Quadrennial Defense Review 2006, p. 27.back to article
3ADM Mike Mullen answers to advance policy questions presented at the 19 April 2005 hearing of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services to consider his reappointment to the grade of Admiral and his nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, http://armed-services.senate.gov/sta...2004-19-05.pdf. back to article
4Naval Operations Concept 2006, p. 22.back to article
5In addition to the U.S. Navy, the Aegis system is in service or will soon be with the navies of Japan, Spain, Norway, South Korea, and Australia, with other navies expressing an interest to acquire Aegis systems. Several are also interested in obtaining a BMD capability. Indeed, the engagement of allied navies in the Aegis program has laid the foundation for a global Aegis BMD enterprise.back to article

Rear Admiral Hicks is Program Director, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, the sea-based element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System under development by the Missile Defense Agency

Galrahn

There is a push from within the Pentagon to expand the scope of BMD now to account for CG modernization programs. In other words, the push is to change the current 'all ahead slow' plan in midstream to pour more money into BMD and expand it before the Navy concludes the limited deployment plan for BMD.

I'm not a fan of this push. I'll post more tonight when I have time to collect better information for discussion.

Galrahn

A Quick Review of AEGIS Missile Defense.

The US Navy is in the middle of a missile defense program based on the AEGIS Platform. As of the end of 2006, the program is on track for implementation on 16 AEGIS warships. That implementation will ultimately consist of 18 AEGIS warships able to support version 3.6 of AEGIS BMD software able to support SM-3 BMD interceptors.

Current BMD Ships:

San Diego, California, U.S.A.

DDG 53 - USS John Paul Jones
DDG 65 - USS Benfold
DDG 69 - USS Milius
DDG 73 - USS Decatur
DDG 76 - USS Higgins

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

CG 70 - USS Lake Erie
CG 73 - USS Port Royal
DDG 59 - USS Russell
DDG 60 - USS Paul Hamilton
DDG 70 - USS Hopper
DDG 77 - USS O'Kane

Yokosuka, Japan

CG 67 - USS Shiloh
DDG 54 - USS Curtis Wilbur
DDG 56 - USS John S. McCain
DDG 62 - USS Fitzgerald
DDG 63 - USS Stethem

These 16 ships represent 3 cruisers and all 13 Flight I and Flight II DDGs in the Pacific Fleet. The remaining 2 ships to be selected have not been named. As of the 2006 baseline, all three cruisers and the USS Decatur (DDG 73), USS Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), and USS Stethem (DDG 63) finished 2006 with v3.6 - Long Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T), which is full capability able to support SM-3s. The next two ships to get the upgrade, which I believe either happened last month or happens this month is the USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56).

This limited deployment, limited to 18 ships, is designed to proceed slowly in AEGIS BMD as part of continous upgrades of the AEGIS system. The intention is to prevent BMD from becoming a focus of AEGIS, while gradually improving the capability of the Navy to address Theater Ballistic Missile threats as part of a larger network, and eventually, when the technology comes online, to incorporate intercontinental intercept capability. For interceptors, the Navy has chosen to upgrade Block IV-ER Standards to the SM-3 system instead of investing in new missiles heavily while the SM-6 and other systems continue development. Again, this is to insure money isn't over invested into BMD technology while still maintaining an investment.

The plan is to have v3.6 - Long Range Surveillance and Track (LRS&T) on all 18 ships able to support interceptors by 2010 in a gradual upgrade. The next baseline benchmark ends in 2008 with all 18 ships supporting LRS&T, but not all with interceptors.

The big push for action in AEGIS BMD is coming from 2 sides, neither of which is happy with the current implementation. On one side you have a contingent looking to increase the funding and expand the list of AEGIS warships deploying AEGIS BMD. The push would imply that all CGs in the modernization and eventually DDGs in their modernization that follows should get AEGIS BMD upgrades. It is estimated this would cost at least 6.6 billion just to install the software throughout the fleet, and even more for ship board interceptors.

The other side doesn't want to see BMD become the centerpiece of AEGIS, and tends to reject AEGIS BMD in general. There has been a lot of talk to make AEGIS BMD a centerpiece of the CG(X) program. This is very unpopular for obvious reasons, While the Navy wants the CG(X) to feature AEGIS BMD, it doesn't want the mission profile to define the platform, and doesn't want to be forced to invest Naval specific funding into the technology, instead taking the relatively small budget increments that flow into AEGIS BMD from the Missile Defense Agency.

If you evaluate the MDA budget, comparing Naval BMD to land based BMD, it is clear THAAD and other ground based BMD gets the majority of funding. From the Navy perspective, while they would take the money, they don't want it if it becomes a determining factor regarding the development of AEGIS. The Navy is comfortable with this actually, although many critics are not. An example is how much funding went into AEGIS BMD early to incorporate the Army and USMC Patriot Defense System as an interceptor for AEGIS BMD, which reduced the pressing need to spend big money on a Navy interceptor ahead of its schedule for the SM-6.

In many ways, I think the Navy has it exactly right, and in a rare show has presented a very wise limited approach to AEGIS BMD.

I'd point out that Adm. Fallon specifically has been one of the better statesman on the subject, pointing out the versatility it provides the Navy in crisis response and assurance to allies without actually being a proven system. The leverage provided by offshore AEGIS BMD during last years North Korean 'demonstrations' utilizing limited AEGIS BMD deployments as a political tool was successful, although unclear how much, in changing the public international discourse to the 'demonstration' by both Japan and China.

That effect is a return on investment from a political perspective. AEGIS BMD gives the US political cover to respond with a purely defensive military response (AEGIS BMD and Patriot systems) which reduces the oppositions political noise to propaganda episodes like the North Korean launches last year. From a deterrent perspective, AEGIS BMD is successful without actually proving it, and because it is seen as a defensive tool and not seen as an imperial US footprint (despite the reality the same platform carries cruise missiles), AEGIS BMD serves as both a political and military advantage.

The recent deployment of 2 AEGIS BMD DDGs to the Persian Gulf with the Stennis, which Fallon or someone thinking like him appears to have specifically chosen as opposed to not having them in the deployment of the 'surged' Reagan (or surging an east coast carrier), is a another example of the Navy leveraging AEGIS BMD.

That leverage is not in actual capability rather specifically in the political, as a counter to rhetoric if needed. Why did the pentagon press statement and the president himself, both mention in the same sentence the deployment of Patriots and the Stennis CSG (with its pair of AEGIS BMD ships)? That couldn't of been an accident, rather it was the clue.

Just like the clue the Nimitz has been announced the next CSG to leave, sometime in late Feb. or early March, likely to replace the Eisenhower to maintain the 2 CSG force in the Gulf. The Nimitz group, like the Stennis, also has 4 DDGs instead of 2 or 3 like previous CSGs, including the AEGIS BMD ships USS John Paul Jones (DDG 53), and USS Higgins (DDG 76).

For an undesired and limited capability, the Navy appears to be going out of its way to deploy AEGIS BMD off the coast of Iran at a time (late March) where saber rattling will be at a high point (after the next UN deadline). While I don't believe the AEGIS BMD deployments are for war, I do think AEGIS BMD is a tool designed to 'take the wind out of the sails' of the political propaganda of Iranian Theater Ballistic missile strikes, as the capability can be cited as an effective propaganda tool in the US arsenal regardless of its unproven capability.

It will be interesting how the AEGIS BMD discussion unfolds. Continued test success for AEGIS BMD can be capitalized in political success, but that isn't going to sway many people who deal in the absolutes of warfare. With the 'all ahead slow' plan now entering the '2008 benchmark' phase it would appear the Navy limited deployment of AEGIS BMD has been wise due to its limited scope, regardless of its theoretical or actual capabilities.

After all, BMD has a proven record as a successful military tool able to effect a desired political result. While final evaluation painted a different picture after the fact, there is no question that Patriot deployments in 1991 to Israel as a counter to SCUD Theater Ballistic Missiles is what ultimately kept Israel out of the Gulf War. In effect, it was almost 16 years ago that BMD proved its value as a military tool to effect a political value making it worth the investment, despite its marginal (or even ineffective) military capability at the time. If you think about it, the limited deployment of a limited capability of an untested system offers a tremendous political deterrent value with a relatively light investment. If it ever becomes a required capability needed in combat, the merit of the limited scope of the program would certainly be re-evaluated, but as it is today I'd call AEGIS BMD in its limited form and deployment strategy a major success.

Galrahn

Sources worth a read:

AEI - Events

US Navy To Double Aegis Missile Defenese Fleet

finally this gem of the 12/11/2006 test that did not succeed, but gives a good idea how the 3.6 software works. Remember, the 3.0 is either BMD OR regular AEGIS, and only 6-8 ships currently have v3.6