Defcon 6

After searching for this report forever I finally found it.

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CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SURFACE COMBATANT LAND ATTACK WARFARE, 2005-2015 (January 2003)


2003 CONOPS: Chapter 1, INTRODUCTION


1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an introduction to the mission area of land attack, along with the purpose, scope, and approach used in developing this document.


1.1 PURPOSE

In the fall of 1999, Director of Surface Warfare created the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization to synchronize requirements and programs, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and make the most effective use of existing and future resources across the multitude of affected system commands, program executive offices, and program offices. This Capstone Organization created the Concept of Operations and Doctrine Working Integrated Product Team (C&D WIPT), chaired by N764G1, to:

-- develop, publish, and periodically update an overarching concept of operations (CONOPS) focused on surface combatant land attack warfare

-- ensure that the evolving platform-level capability requirements support the naval and joint warfighters

-- support the development of associated doctrine in concert with the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)

In response to the above requirement, this document updates and replaces the original version of the Concept of Operations for Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare dated July 2001 and focuses on how the naval surface combatant will conduct land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe.


The purpose of this document is to:

-- focus the land attack systems engineering effort by setting forth the manner in which supported ground forces will employ a capability not previously resident in surface combatants accelerate the discussions necessary for the future development of doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to govern the use of this developing capability

-- provide practical guidance to the engineering community on surface combatant land attack warfare capability requirements and their proper technical interpretation

-- provide a source document for the acquisition and training communities to use in curriculum and courseware development

-- provide a common frame of reference so the Land Attack Capstone Organization can begin to coherently address the multitude of issues that are raised in this document

This document provides the concept of operations of how surface combatants1 will employ their new command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT) and weapon assets to provide a revolutionary capability to conduct joint land attack warfare in the 2005 to 2015 timeframe. Although tactical naval aviation and submarines are outside the scope of this version of the document, their contribution to land attack warfare is acknowledged.

Footnote 1: For the purpose of this document, surface combatants are defined as cruisers and destroyers that employ the land attack systems mentioned in this document.


1.2 APPROACH

The initial concept of operations dated July 2001 has been reviewed and signed by the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Executive Steering Committee. The initial CONOPS document defined land attack warfare; described surface combatant land attack missions, roles, and capabilities; identified the external land attack related agencies and systems, and the Marine Corps fire support requirements. Furthermore, it set forth some land attack weapon employment considerations and identified land attack operational issues requiring resolution.

The goals of this revision of the CONOPS are to address the four key issues identified in the initial document (deconfliction, mission planning and targeting, force level command and information flow, and logistics), address some additional issues that were identified during the review process, and to present a set of architectural operational views (Chapter 4) to support the employment concepts defined in this document.

As a first step in developing this document, a two-day workshop was held 24–25 October 2001. This workshop was designed to garner a broad range of input from subject matter experts representing the fleet, government agencies, and private industry. Participants were assigned to one of the four sub-groups, and each sub-group focused on one of the four key issue areas identified above. At the end of the workshop, each sub-group provided a list of key issues and recommended solutions. The product of the workshop, along with additional research, has been incorporated into this document.


1.3 BACKGROUND

During World War II, the primary employment of naval gunfire shifted to supporting amphibious operations and proved critical in enabling forcible entry operations against many heavily defended beachheads. The roles of naval gunfire support in these amphibious operations included:

-- (1) delivering high volume bombardment and beach preparation fires to clear obstacles and neutralize enemy coastal defenses necessary to enable assault forces to establish positions ashore;

-- (2) destroying critical targets necessary to ensure the seizure of the force beachhead;

-- (3) interdicting and/or neutralizing counterattack forces to enable the landing force to fully transition and buildup combat ashore; and

-- (4) attacking deep targets to support the breakout or continued operations of the landing force.

During the Cold War, the surface Navy concentrated on undersea warfare and anti-air warfare to defend aircraft carriers and sea lines of communication from the former Soviet Union’s air and submarine threats. This blue-water period was highlighted by two significant trends: a reduction in the number and size of naval guns, and the introduction of the first air-defense missile systems on surface combatants. In the 1970s the Navy eventually adopted the 5-inch/54-caliber gun as its standard. This 13 nautical mile range gun was intended for general-purpose use against surface craft, slow moving aircraft, and near shore targets. In the 1980s and 1990s ships and submarines were augmented with the Tomahawk
cruise missile system to provide a deep conventional and nuclear land attack capability.

With the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1989, the Navy increased its focus on littoral operations by developing capabilities to more effectively influence events ashore. In light of modern defensive systems designed to counter traditional World War II amphibious operations, new operational concepts were required to effectively employ limited resources while minimizing both casualties and collateral damage.


1.4 NEW OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

In the mid-1990s, the naval services defined their vision for the future in Forward…From the Sea. 2 This document restructured naval expeditionary forces for joint operations, thus requiring that naval fires systems be fully integrated with the emerging joint fires architecture. The vision called for an offensive maritime force for sustained operations in the challenging littoral regions.

Today’s naval forces are continuing the transformation across a broad front to achieve a networked and sea-based power projection force that will enable joint force operations, deliver long range effective firepower, and assure sustained global access for U.S. forces.

Footnote 2: Forward…From the Sea, signed by SecNav, CNO, and CMC, dated 19 September 1994.


1.4.1 Naval Transformation Roadmap (3)

The Naval Transformation Roadmap is a new operational construct that will transform the Navy to meet the wide array of 21st Century threats, and will fully integrate naval forces with the other joint forces operating across a unified battlespace. Four capabilities drive the Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea): Sea Strike, Sea Shield, Sea Basing, and FORCEnet.

-- Sea Strike will project dominant, long range, decisive, and precise offensive power against key enemy targets using a wide array of means, both lethal and nonlethal, including long-range aircraft and missiles, information operations, Special Forces, and Marines. Success depends upon acute situational awareness, rapid and secure methods of sharing knowledge, and networked forces fully integrated into joint and national systems.

-- Sea Shield will project both near and long range defensive power from the sea to protect the nation with forward deployed forces, assure allies and deter potential adversaries, assure theater access, and protect the joint forces ashore. Enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will provide the information superiority, and will build upon the tenets of network centric warfare. A mixture of manned and unmanned ISR systems will provide the foundation for battlespace dominance, and enable the capability to project defensive firepower deep overland.

-- Sea Basing will use 70% of the earth’s surface as a vast maneuvering space to extend sovereignty around the world and provide support for joint forces. The independence of naval vessels operating on the high seas allows the U.S. to conduct combat operations anywhere and anytime, without asking for permission. Basing joint command and control, fire support, and logistics assets at sea provides the capability to immediately respond to a conflict, reduces the logistical footprint ashore, and minimizes airlift and force protection requirements. Warfighting capabilities are distributed across multiple sea-based platforms networked together and integrated with assets ashore to provide a unified joint battlefield.

-- FORCEnet will integrate naval, joint, and national information grids to achieve unprecedented situational awareness and knowledge management. This concept will provide the joint force commander with secure, highly mobile, in-theater afloat headquarters, and will take advantage of the advances in communication and sensor technologies.

Footnote 3: Naval Transformation Roadmap (Power and Access…From the Sea), Draft document dated June 2002.


A Navy built around the above concepts will provide the nation with a highly adaptable fleet ready to strike at a moment’s notice. This fleet will deploy expeditionary strike forces (ESF) that include:

-- Carrier strike groups (CSGs) to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts

-- Expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) composed of amphibious ready groups with dedicated escorts optimized for littoral power projection missions.

-- Surface/submarine action groups to conduct precision strike, sea control, maritime intercept, and intelligence operations


1.4.2 Operational Maneuver From the Sea (4)

The Marine Corps’ concepts for the projection of naval power ashore, Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM), attempt to fully exploit the tenets of maneuver warfare in the challenging littoral environment. These concepts capitalize on existing and emerging technological advancements in mobility, information management, and the range, lethality and responsiveness of naval fires to conduct forcible entry from the sea rapidly striking directly at an enemy’s center of gravity thus avoiding set-piece, phased and highly rigid amphibious operations of the past. Significant advancements in the mobility of expeditionary forces enable them to maneuver from over-the horizon directly to objectives far inland exploiting the full limits of the sea, air and land in an expanded battlespace.

Footnote 4: OMFTS is the operational implementation of the Marine Corps Capstone Concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, dated 10 November 2001.

The successful implementation of OMFTS is highly dependent on improved sea-based command- and-control, logistics, and supporting fires. Highly mobile and therefore lighter maneuver forces employed in OMFTS require long-range, highly responsive, highly lethal, accurate and continuous supporting naval fires. The longer ranges and improved responsiveness of naval fires also make them capable of supporting emerging lighter and more mobile Army forces, particularly those participating in early entry operations in the littorals. These supporting naval fires will be provided by a new generation of mutually supporting air, ground, naval surface and sub-surface assets.


1.4.3 Global Information Grid and Future Naval Fires (5)

The rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespacein support of simultaneous joint operations will require a shift from platform-centric to networkcentric warfare (NCW). NCW is a concept centered on a vast, complex information infrastructure, linking geographically dispersed warfighters at all levels to increase force synergy, combat power, and operational effectiveness. The physical infrastructure is envisioned as a global information grid providing seamless back-plane connectivity to support a sensor grid, a command and control grid, and an engagement grid 6

This overarching network is intended to provide rapid global information dissemination and transfer, enabling theater and global information superiority and joint C4ISRT integration.

To create an operational capability out of the NCW concept, one single overarching family of systems (FoS) 7 must integrate these three grids to both enable rapid self-synchronization and decisive actions, and to provide a sensor to weapons-on-target warfare mission capability.

Footnote 5: Based on the Future Naval Fires White Paper published by NWDC, dated Apr 2002.

Footnote 6: Example does not show all existing or potential systems that would be included in the global information grid.

Footnote 7: The FoS includes legacy, emerging, and developmental systems working together.


1.4.3.1 Sensor Grid

Advances in sensing capability as well as the distribution of sensor data are required to support this family of systems. A sensor grid capable of providing continuous surveillance down to the tactical level throughout the battlespace is required to achieve the full potential of future naval fires. This sensor grid will integrate information from all available sensors into a common information base that will support the other two grids. It will overlay intelligence and surveillance information from multiple joint sensors and quickly detect, classify, and precisely locate targets for disposition by the command and control, and engagement grids.

This overlaying process will be accomplished through automating, coordinating, and correlating the processing of multiple tactical data streams from various surveillance and intelligence sources in near real-time.8 The sensor grid will then provide time-critical cueing information for advanced sensor systems as well as precision targeting coordinates for advanced weapon systems.

Footnote 8: CJCSM 3500.04B Universal Joint Task List, 1 Oct 99, OP2.5.3 defines near real-time as “…within 5 seconds to 5 minutes of occurrence.”





1.4.3.2 Command and Control Grid

Command and control of naval fires must be flexible and scaleable, allowing the linking of multiple control nodes throughout the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of battle. The system must allow the control node to pass engagement orders to individual firing units. It must also be capable of operating in a decentralized manner using command by negation to override any unwanted engagements. This flexibility will allow control nodes to exist at the combatant commander level located far from the engagement, in theater on either a navy ship, ashore with the ground combat commander, or on an enhanced command and control aircraft.

Additionally, the system must have the capability for programmable or selectable levels of unmanned systems autonomy. This flexible network architecture will allow for high-level control of engagements during contingencies as well as tactical level synchronization when required by the tempo of operations and enabled by the appropriate rules of engagement.

Speed of command will flatten the command hierarchy, place decision makers in parallel with shooters, and transform warfare from multiple, discrete functions into a single, continuous process. Once implemented, commanders will be able to collaboratively plan and execute missions in a dynamic environment with accurate, timely, and sustained situational awareness. Similarly, on-scene commanders will be able to rapidly respond to battlefield developments and decisively influence events. Advanced C4ISRT networks, the backbone that supports the entire structure, will integrate tactical and technical support applications with connections to enhanced satellite systems and other networks.

Deconfliction tools must be developed that allow both the firing platform and other joint assets to rapidly deconflict ordnance flight paths to assist in rapid, safe engagements and enable horizontal, fully integrated operations. 9

Footnote 9: Deconfliction as a subset of coordination is addressed in detail in Chapter 6.


1.4.3.3 Engagement Grid

The family of systems must be capable of generating fire control solutions, executing engagements, monitoring and managing engagements in progress, and providing data links between sensors and weapons. Every weapon capable of receiving in-flight target updates could be assigned a network address. This information must be passed to the sensors in the network that individually or in aggregate are responsible for providing updated data to the munitions to ensure in-flight target updates are correctly transmitted and acted upon by the desired ordnance.

Additionally, engagement control would include the management and scheduling of sensors to ensure that fire control quality data is available at the appropriate time during the weapons’ flight path.

The engagement grid also plays a role in the deconfliction process. Examples of potential technology assisted deconfliction are: (1) the capability to automatically display ordnance flight paths prior to the firing of the ordnance as well as when the ordnance is in-flight, (2) shipboard combat direction systems that communicate with each other and generate alerts about flight path conflicts, and (3) ordnance that communicates with airborne systems to generate alerts about potential collision situations. Technology assisted deconfliction will allow rapid engagement of time sensitive targets and dynamically coordinated strikes. Additionally, information regarding munitions and aircraft flight paths must be provided to friendly air defense networks to prevent an inadvertent response to our own weapons.


1.4.4 Land Attack Vision

Because naval forces are forward deployed in international waters, they will often be on the scene before trouble starts. In the war on terror they will be the land attack weapons that wait providing the volume of precision fires across the littorals and “Denying enemies sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement with high volume precision strike, through a combination of complementary air and ground capabilities, against critical mobile and fixed targets at various ranges and in all weather and terrains.” 10 Surface combatants and submarines will bring unique all-weather, day/night, sustainable, and responsive fires as a complement to the capabilities provided by aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings.

These enhanced land attack capabilities are the result of advances in sensors, precision targeting systems, weapons, information exchange, and integrated command and control systems. Once all of these components are fully integrated, surface combatants and submarines will have the capability to conduct early, responsive, and precision tactical, operational, and strategic land attack missions while supporting the arrival of follow-on naval, joint, and coalition forces.

Director of Surface Warfare (N76)11 has defined land attack as the integrated employment of available sensors, weapons, and joint and coalition forces for projecting combat power into and on the ground portion of the battlespace to protect vital national interests and achieve national and military objectives. Employed forces can include aviation and sea- and ground-based assets. Figure 1-2 highlights how land attack warfare fits into the larger concept of joint, naval, and Navy fires. This figure focuses on naval surface combatant land attack.



Footnote 10: Operational goal from Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated 30 September 2001.

Footnote 11: The Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) is on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, responsible for the development of surface warfare requirements and resources.


1.4.4.1 Land Attack Missions

For the surface combatant, land attack warfare encompasses the dual missions of naval surface fire support and naval surface strike.

Naval surface fire support (NSFS) encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives.12 NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces.

Naval surface strike (NSS) is the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants. These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting operations against U.S. or Allied forces.13 These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, warmaking capacity, the will to make war, and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS is usually executed independent of ground maneuver forces.

Footnote 12: Definition from Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

Footnote 13: Director of Surface Warfare (code N76) memorandum, Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document, Ser: N864/OU653919, dated 11 September 2000.


1.4.4.2 Land Attack Roles

Surface combatants must be fully capable and responsive across the entire spectrum of warfare, from major theater war to small-scale contingencies (such as precision strikes against terrorist cells, training facilities, and staging areas) and non-combatant evacuation operations; from multi-ship battlegroups to independent operations. While conducting these operations, the surface combatant will perform one or more of the following roles.

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Text Box: Development of the Roles

The following role descriptions were developed by a working group and were approved and set forth in the Director of Surface Warfare letter dated 11 September 2000. The firing unit role was added later. These five roles provide a useful model for surface combatant employment for land attack missions. They should not be viewed as a comprehensive classification of all possible situations, but neither should they be considered as merely a cursory classification effort.
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The NSFS Supporting Unit (figure 1-3) provides fires in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. In this role, surface combatants receive orders to fire from a fire support coordination agency of the supported unit via network connectivity or directly from a forward observer. The network connectivity flows through either the supporting arms coordination center [(SACC) as depicted] or a controlling unit.





The NSFS Controlling Unit (figure 1-4) directs and controls the fires of two or more surface combatants in support of maneuver forces operating or preparing to operate ashore. The controlling unit receives requests for fire support from fire support coordination agencies, processes the requests in accordance with appropriate commander’s guidance and rules of engagement (ROE), and assigns one or more ships under its control to provide the requested fires. A ship in this role conducts tactical fire direction for supporting units.





The NSS Single Unit (figure 1-5), a single surface combatant operating alone, either by design or in anticipation of a greater force arriving in theater, must be capable of planning, targeting, controlling, synchronizing, integrating, coordinating, executing, and assessing own ship fires. The ship will receive mission orders, commander’s guidance, and ROE from higher authority, with no higher level on-scene commander or fires coordinating element in the area of operation. The ship will execute fire missions based upon surveillance and targeting data provided by reconnaissance and surveillance elements ashore or organic or off-board targeting systems. The ship will have the authority to determine which targets to engage, with what weapons, and to what degree, consistent with mission orders, existing ROE, and commander’s guidance.





The NSS Multi-Unit Commander (figure 1-6) directs and controls the fires of a group of surface combatants operating together but apart from a battlegroup or other controlling agency ashore while conducting NSS missions. The multi-unit commander will plan, target, synchronize, integrate, coordinate, execute, and assess the results of fires for the group.





The NSS Firing Unit (figure 1-7) conducts strike missions as directed by either the Tomahawk strike coordinator or the NSS multi-ship commander (as depicted).






1.4.4.3 Land Attack Tenets

The following tenets summarize the naval services’ land attack vision:

-- Land attack will be offensive, integrated, network-centric, and sea-based

-- In conjunction with maneuver, land attack will be the primary means to engage an adversary

-- Land attack will be executed at the strategic, operational, and tactical level and at the lowest possible echelon

-- Land attack will be sufficiently flexible to successfully engage fixed, mobile, time critical, and hardened targets at long ranges

-- Land attack will have the capability to provide both precision and volume fires over a sustained period

-- Land attack assets will be dynamically allocated, coordinated, and deconflicted from a network-based architecture

-- Land attack system design will use human systems integration based on human centered design principles

-- Land attack systems will meet joint interoperability requirements

In short, land attack warfare will include the full spectrum of tactical, operational, and strategic attack capabilities. These capabilities will be fully integrated, coordinated, and synchronized with the joint force commander’s concept of operation and target priorities, and the ground commander’s scheme of maneuver. Joint systems integration will allow the Navy to focus on providing the required effects, at the required locations, and at the required times. This land attack vision necessarily portends fundamental organizational and doctrinal changes across the joint services to fully exploit these new capabilities.

Once these changes are made, the capability to provide tactically responsive fires at long ranges to maneuvering ground forces can be leveraged to successfully engage time critical targets within their window of vulnerability.


1.4.5 Land Attack Implementation Plan

In 1994, the Navy realized that it needed a comprehensive near and far term strategy to develop a land attack capability to support its evolving operational maneuver doctrine. For the near term, the Navy’s objective is to leverage existing systems to provide capability as soon as possible.

This will be accomplished through an aggregation of incremental improvements to existing gun, missile, weapon control, and C4ISRT systems, as well as leveraging global positioning system (GPS) technology to allow extended range munitions to achieve precision accuracy. These near term improvements will add to the Navy’s land attack capabilities, but they are neither intended nor expected to meet all of the Marine Corps’ stated NSFS requirements.14

The Navy has recently established the surface combatant family of ships program to produce a family of advanced technology surface combatants designed to meet multi-mission warfare areas to include littoral warfare operations. Completion of the lead ship is expected in 2012. Included in this family are the DD(X) destroyer, CG(X) cruiser, and littoral combat ship. Technology developments are expected to include a 155mm advanced gun system and new land attack missiles to meet the ground forces’ requirements for range, lethality, sustainability, volume of fire, and responsiveness. The Navy will employ unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to perform surveillance and reconnaissance missions.

These new land attack platforms and systems will provide commanders a greater choice of weapons than formerly available. The current practice of employing naval guns for short-range tactical missions and Tomahawk missiles for long-range strike missions will be modified in favor of putting the desired effects on target from the most suitable weapon available. For example, Tactical Tomahawk is designated to serve as an interim tactical missile until the advanced land attack missile is deployed. The specific mission objectives and constraints will determine selection among the advanced gun, land attack missile, or cruise missile weapons. These new capabilities will allow land commanders to balance maneuver with fires to meet their operational goals.

Footnote 14: NSFS Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter, dated 19 March 2002.

Defcon 6

2003 CONOPS, Chapter 2:
NAVAL FORCES LITTORAL THREAT CONTINUUM



2.0 NAVAL FORCES LITTORAL THREAT CONTINUUM

This chapter discusses conventional and unconventional threats to naval surface forces operating in the littoral.


2.1 INTRODUCTION

Naval forces operating in the littoral in the near to mid-range timeframe (2005 to 2015) will face a variety of threats and will be required to engage a large number and variety of targets. Threats will derive from hostile (rogue) nations as well as non-state actors that may be ethnic, religious, or criminal-based. These threats will increase in sophistication and lethality further into the mid-range timeframe. However, most potential threat entities may not have procured the more sophisticated weapons in large numbers.

Even if procured, the weapons systems must be employed properly which may require a significant training infrastructure, or alternatively, foreign advisors. Fire-and-forget weapons must also be properly employed to be effective. If rogue nations and non-state threat entities do not choose to upgrade their arsenals, due to fiscal or other reasons, lower technology weapons will continue to pose a danger to friendly naval forces.

The threat to naval forces will vary depending on the scenario. The principal threat will be to the naval units operating in the littoral, the forces involved in the ship-to-objective phase of operations, and the sensors and sensor platforms supporting these operations. Threat entities may seek to interdict or degrade the effectiveness of naval surface fires and associated command and control networks. Terrorists may also pose a threat to naval forces in their homeport, overseas, or while underway.


2.2 CONVENTIONAL LITTORAL DEFENSES

Naval forces, networks, and naval fires ordnance are susceptible to attack from a wide variety of enemy weapon systems and information warfarerelated activities. This tactical activity can be categorized as reactive or proactive depending on the normal mode in which they engage their targets. The following lists define what is meant by each category, and provide examples of weapons systems or platforms that typically fall into that category.

2.2.1 Reactive Defenses

Weapons systems or platforms that react to the approach of opposing forces:
-- coastal defense cruise missiles (mobile or fixed)
-- coastal defense artillery (mobile or fixed)
-- coastal defense torpedoes (fixed)
-- mines
-- integrated air defense systems
-- ground forces (patrols and garrisons)
-- aircraft (defensive counter air and close air support)
-- patrol boats (can be equipped with cruise missiles, torpedoes, and guns)
-- radio-frequency weapons

2.2.2 Proactive Defenses

Weapons systems or platforms that seek and engage opposing forces:
-- surface combatants (can be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, torpedoes, and guns)
-- aircraft (offensive counter air and strike aircraft)
-- special operations forces (SOF)
-- submarines (including mini-subs)
-- tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs)
-- information warfare attack operations designed to deny, deceive, disrupt, or destroy

Table 2-1 summarizes the type and basic capabilities of threats likely to be encountered in the near to mid-range timeframe. As higher technology weapons proliferate, threat capabilities will improve. The ranges provided are average. Some specific higher technology weapon systems may greatly exceed the listed range, e.g., the S-400 Series SAMs have an advertised 250 nautical mile (nm) range.





2.3 UNCONVENTIONAL LITTORAL THREATS

Potential threats will most likely use unconventional means against U.S. naval forces by taking advantage of the constraints imposed by rules of engagement and U.S. forces’ adherence to the laws of war. Some rogue nations possess large numbers of fast, highly maneuverable, surface craft armed with crew served weapons and small arms that may conduct swarm attacks. Several potential rogue nations have large numbers of missile firing craft that could also engage friendly forces, generating multi-axis strikes in an attempt to overwhelm defenses. Commercial shipping can also be modified to carry hidden weapons similar to Q-ships1 from World Wars I and II. Non-state actors may use similar craft and ships for attacks against friendly shipping and/or port facilities.

Footnote 1: Combatants disguised as noncombatant vessels. These ships appeared to be harmless until they were in a position to attack.

Rogue nations can also use commercial and general aviation aircraft as surveillance assets and potentially as weapons platforms or as remote controlled weapons. Non-state actors can use similar aircraft as weapons.

Several rogue nations, as well as non-state actors, are known to either possess or are actively seeking chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) agents and related material. The proliferation of CBRNE agents, the means of delivering them, and the expressed desire by several non-state actors to employ them to cause mass casualties suggests these agents may be used against U.S. naval forces in the future. In general, chemical or biological agents and radiological material are considered to be cheaper and easier to produce or acquire than nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the seizure of special nuclear materials on the black market has lent new credibility to the nuclear threat as well. The combination of unconventional tactics, possibly including suicide attacks with CBRNE weapons, place U.S. naval forces operating in the littorals at increased risk throughout the timeframe of this document.

Defcon 6

2003 CONOPS Chapter 3:
REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES



3.0 REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT OBJECTIVES

This chapter addresses the required capabilities and employment objectives of naval fires within the context of the naval surface combatant.


3.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRES

Fires is defined as the effects of lethal and nonlethal weapons. Joint fires are fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. Fire support is fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. Joint fire support consists of joint fires that assist land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, and key waters.1

Joint doctrine defines strike as an attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.2 Broadly characterized, this definition encompasses all offensive actions that can be taken by air, naval, or ground forces to produce an effect (damage) on a defined objective. The naval services have refined this definition to narrow its scope in an attempt to differentiate between strike operations and fire support.

Footnote 1: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.

Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.


3.1.1 Subsystems of Fires

Fires is the synergistic product of three subsystems: target acquisition, command and control, and attack resources.3

-- Target Acquisition (TA). The goal of the target acquisition system is to provide timely and accurate information to enhance the attack of specified targets. Target acquisition systems and equipment perform the key tasks of target detection, location, tracking, identification, classification, and battle damage assessment. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.

-- Command and Control (C2). Employing command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems with unity of effort is key to effective coordination of fires, and includes the vertical and horizontal coordination accomplished by fire support coordinators, agencies and liaison elements. Successful C2 of fires integrates planning and coordination, technical and tactical fire direction procedures, and air operations to achieve the supported commander’s desired effects. C2 is further discussed in Chapter 4.

-- Attack Resources. Attack resources include air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, and subsurface- to-surface delivery assets. Fires also includes nonlethal and disruptive operations, such as psychological operations and electronic warfare. Detailed airspace and ground coordination is required regardless of the attack system employed. Coordination is further discussed in Chapter 6.

Footnote 3: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.


3.1.2 Naval Surface Fires

Naval surface fires must be fully integrated with the fires of all services to provide a full spectrum capability designed to unbalance and rapidly defeat an increasingly sophisticated, dangerous, and more complicated adversary. Often as the first on-scene force, surface combatants are capable of providing initial joint command and control of fires. When additional forces can be brought to bear, surface combatants will provide naval fires as part of a combined arms operations in joint campaigns.

Naval surface strike (NSS) has been defined in Chapter 1 as the destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through the use of conventional weapons provided by surface combatants.

These targets consist of strategic, operational, and tactical targets capable of conducting hostile operations against U.S. or Allied forces. These missions are characterized by attacks on strategic centers of gravity, war-making capacity, will to make war and military targets not directly in contact with friendly forces. NSS, usually conducted independent of ground maneuver forces, can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fires or joint fires. Naval surface fire support (NSFS), also defined in Chapter 1, encompasses fires provided by Navy surface gun, missile, and electronic warfare systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander’s objectives. NSFS is usually associated with support of ground maneuver forces. Surface combatants tasked with providing NSFS must remain cognizant of the four basic tasks that are the focus of fire support plans: support to forces in contact, support the concept of operations, synchronize fire support, and sustain fire support operations. NSFS can generally be characterized within the joint fires framework as fire support or joint fire support.

Achieving rapid and decisive effects against our adversary will require a shift from our current sequential approach4 to warfare. Future naval fires will support opportunities for simultaneous operations. The Navy will conduct strategic, operational and tactical fires throughout the littoral area that can be integrated with the direct insertion of highly mobile ground forces. Providing fires in support of simultaneous operations will require a fires system capable of providing the rapid application of integrated fires from dispersed formations throughout the battlespace. Achieving rapid, integrated fires requires a fully netted digital fires network capable of combining sensors, command and control, and fires.

Footnote 4: This sequential approach begins with strikes against air defenses and military and industrial infrastructure sites and transitions to support of ground forces only after significant degradation to the adversary’s capabilities.

Effective naval fires also require advances in existing support capabilities. These include at sea replenishment, joint and coalition interoperability, data transfer, organizational adaptability, and training.5

Footnote 5: Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.


3.1.3 Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)

Time sensitive targeting (TST) is a recently defined targeting and engagement process that is primarily being performed by air assets. Surface combatants with their improved land attack capabilities will also be able to conduct time sensitive engagements. TST has its foundation in Joint Vision 2010, from which the idea of precision engagement flows.

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TEXT BOX: Definitions of Time Sensitive and Time Critical Targets (6)

Time sensitive targets (TST) are defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “those targets requiring immediate response because they pose (or will soon pose) a clear and present danger to friendly force or are highly lucrative, fleeting targets of opportunity.” Key factors include value, mobility, and time sensitivity. Although not currently approved by joint doctrine, many joint commands use the term “time critical target (TCT)” as a sub-category of TST. These TCTs are deemed to pose such a threat to friendly forces that they are afforded distinctive ROE by the joint force commander (JFC). The JFC determines those situations, if any, where immediate engagement of the TCT threat outweighs other operational considerations. Joint TCTs are normally based upon adversary capabilities. In other words, a joint TCT is a target of great immediacy that possesses such a significant threat to the joint force that it is specifically designated by the JFC for immediate engagement in order to prevent damage to friendly forces.

Footnote 6: Commander’s Handbook for Joint Time-Sensitive Targeting, Appendix F, dated 22 March 2002.

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The current goal is to identify and effectively attack a target within 30 minutes (table 3-1). To achieve this goal requires an array of dedicated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets that have been organized in accordance with an intelligence preparation of the battlespace. The rules of engagement must facilitate rapid decision making by the commander or his battlestaff. The command and control systems must be technically capable of quickly disseminating targeting information to the engagement system. Time sensitive targets are further discussed in Chapter 7. 5 Detailed land attack warfare training requirements are provided in the Training Requirements Document (TRD), dated 26 January 2001.





3.2 NAVAL SURFACE FIRE SUPPORT


3.2.1 Marine Corps Required Capabilities

The Marine Corps has formally stated its requirements for naval surface fire support in the document titled, Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements for Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare.7 This section summarizes those requirements.

Footnote 7: Commanding General (CG), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) letter 3900 C428, dated 19 March 2002.


3.2.1.1 Sea-Based Fires as a Component of Combined Arms

Naval surface fire support augments the organic fires of the maneuver force with complementary, all weather fires that support the deep, close, and rear battle. The sea-based fire support system should include an all weather target acquisition capability that can produce target data for first round fire for effect. Further, a robust NSFS capability, to include counterfire detection/ engagement, is critical to support expeditionary operations during all stages of ship-to-objective maneuver.

Combined arms is the full integration of arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become more vulnerable to another. It pairs firepower with mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy. Marine Corps fire support doctrine is based upon this philosophy, whereby target destruction is frequently not the primary benefit of indirect fires.

Combined arms does not focus on specific percentages normally associated with damage criteria (e.g., 30% damage for destruction) but must concentrate on what fires can do to the enemy to shape the battlespace, set conditions for decisive action, and support maneuver. Fires can be used to create both some degree of hazard and the perception that the hazard is severe enough to merit deviation from a desired course of action. For example, if the enemy assumes a posture with the intent to protect himself from incoming fires he may sustain no physical damage but his cost of survival is the inability to perform his assigned mission.

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INSET BOX: Illustrative Scenario:

In the following illustrative scenario, a friendly mechanized infantry unit encounters an enemy mechanized infantry unit arrayed in a defensive position that is tied in with the terrain. The defensive position lies between the friendly unit and its assigned objective, and bypassing the position is impossible. The unit commander decides to attack through the left flank and into the enemy’s rear in an attempt to turn the position and pry the enemy out of his prepared defenses. Assuming an average rate of movement of 15 kilometers per hour, the attack will take a total of approximately 36 minutes. This rate of movement assumes that no counter-mobility obstacles will need to be breached, and that enemy indirect fire assets have been sufficiently suppressed to prevent any significant impact by these systems on the friendly force.



Fires have been planned to accomplish the following:

-- Suppress Target 1 to facilitate its attack by direct-fire ground systems and rotary-wing close air support (RW CAS).

-- Suppress and obscure Target 2 to prevent enemy force located there from effectively engaging friendly maneuver force with direct-fire weapon systems, and to facilitate its follow-on attack by friendly ground forces and RW CAS.

-- Suppress, neutralize or destroy enemy at Target 3 to prevent it from maneuvering against the flank of the attacking friendly force, and to prevent it from counter-attacking (Target 4) as the friendly force continues to maneuver to its objective.

-- Disrupt an enemy counter-attack from beyond the intermediate objective in the vicinity of Target 4 (on-call fire missions).
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Fires involve more than the mere delivery of ordnance on target. The psychological impact on an adversary of volume and seemingly random fires cannot be underestimated. Marines applying the tenets of maneuver warfare will continue to exploit integrated fires and maneuver to shatter the cohesion of an adversary. Volume and precision fires are equally important in achieving the desired effects on an enemy.


3.2.1.2 Operational Phases

The following provides a breakdown of the phases of an expeditionary operation to facilitate placing NSFS requirements into context.

-- Shaping the Battlespace. The emphasis in this phase will be on destruction, harassment, interdiction, and neutralization fires to degrade enemy capabilities within the battlespace. Naval fires are required for advance force and supporting operations in an uncertain or hostile environment. They will be used primarily for providing deep fires against critical fixed and relocatable targets.

-- Forcible Entry. In this phase, emphasis shifts from shaping operations to supporting the force as it maneuvers to objectives ashore. This is the most demanding phase for NSFS. Deep fires provided by naval aviation and NSFS continue to shape the battlespace while simultaneously providing close supporting fires and counterfire to forces ashore. Of primary importance will be the close supporting fires (destruction, neutralization, and suppression) in direct support of the maneuver force. During ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), fire support must provide immediate and responsive high volume fires in support of highly mobile forces as they maneuver throughout the non-linear battlespace.

-- Sustained/Subsequent Operations Ashore. If the expected duration of the operation ashore warrants a general unloading of the landing force, organic ground-based fire support systems will provide the bulk of highly responsive, close supporting fires. NSFS will continue to provide deep and close supporting fires, augmenting organic ground-based systems.


3.2.1.3 Command and Control

Command and control (C2) for expeditionary fire support demands a system compatible with on-scene or arriving forces. Throughout the entire planning and execution process, all components of the expeditionary fire support system must be interoperable and collaborative.

Given the joint nature of future operations, a reexamination of traditional command relationships is required to make these relationships more responsive and flexible. Central to an effective naval fire support system is that the commander responsible for the mission or for a phase of an operation, has the ability to plan, allocate, control, and coordinate fires from all available systems.

Commanders exercise authority within the four dimensional limits of boundaries established by a higher headquarters. The commander has complete targeting and organic weapons release authority and is responsible for the effects of all fires delivered into or within these boundaries. Once these boundaries have been established, the command and control of fires is a function of the fire support coordinator within whose boundaries the effects of the fires will be realized.

This includes coordination with adjacent units whose battlespace is affected by the flight path or terminal effects of the weapons system/munition. NSFS controlling units support the airspace deconfliction process by providing weapons information, e.g., launch point and trajectory to the fire support coordination agency. This means that any adverse effects of NSFS delivered on a requested target are the responsibility of the requesting agency, not the commander of the ship who provided the fires.


3.2.1.4 Response Times

Ground forces require assistance in locating hostile fire support platforms in both the initial phases of amphibious operations and during subsequent operations ashore. A flexible and robust counterfire detection and location capability from the sea is a required component of the fire support system. The system should be responsive enough to achieve the first round away within 2.5 minutes of acquiring the counterfire target. The system must be fully interoperable and integrated with joint, automated, fire support C2 systems. Target acquisition will be accomplished from a combination of sensors netted together to provide the required area coverage.

The required system response times for all NSFS systems are drawn from the call for fire mission processing times specified for Marine Corps field artillery. Considering all mission types and all artillery munitions, the Marine Corps threshold requirement for NSFS execution responsiveness is 2.5 minutes. The objective requirement is to reduce response time to the limits of technology. The following diagram provides a breakdown of the fire support process with regard to responsiveness.

At extended ranges, time of flight can add minutes to the overall mission response time. A total mission time (call for fire to rounds on target) greater than 10 minutes significantly increases the probability of missing a relocatable target. Minimizing time of flight, as well as the total mission processing time is of vital importance when providing close supporting fires to maneuver forces in contact with the enemy.




3.2.1.5 Sustainability

Maneuver forces require all-weather, reliable, sustained fire support. Per the Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Guidance Document signed by Rear Admiral Mullen on 11 September 2000, “Replenishment at sea is sustainment.” The current technical difficulties of reloading vertical launch system (VLS) cells at sea require an increased reliance on shore based infrastructure.

The availability of friendly ports for reloading VLS cells cannot be counted upon in a highly uncertain future. The limitations of a shrinking surface fleet and the numerous taskings given to multi-mission capable ships will require that those ships assigned to NSFS roles possess greater staying power to continue support of forces ashore. The rapid conduct of ammunition resupply is an essential enabler to maintain continuous fire support. Sustainability is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.

Footnote 8: NWP 3-09.1, Navy Strike and Fire Support (Draft), dated 6 February 2002.



3.3 NAVAL SURFACE STRIKE (NSS)

Naval surface strike is a subset of strike warfare, which also includes air strike, special operations, and subsurface strike. NSS missions are designed to attack targets that comprise an adversary’s capacity to wage war, and to interdict enemy reinforcements and isolate these reinforcements from the battlefield.8 Currently, the Tomahawk missile is the only long-range weapon available to the surface combatant to perform NSS. Future weapons (such as the advanced gun system) and munitions (such as extended range guided munition, long range land attack projectile, and advanced land attack missile) will dramatically expand the choice of weapons available to perform NSS.

The basic requirements of NSS are as follows: 9

-- Provide a conventional capability against tactical, operational, and strategic targets during crisis response, regional conflicts, or a major theater war.

-- Respond to a broad range of desired terminal effects to include destruction, neutralization, interdiction, and suppression.

-- Destroy or neutralize enemy targets through the use of coordinated, precision strike weapons.

-- Deliver timely effects on target regardless of environmental conditions or time of day.

-- Engage time critical targets.

Footnote 9: Derived from the Surface Combatant Family of ShipsDD(X) CRD (Draft) (U).



3.4 MANPOWER, PERSONNEL, AND TRAINING

We can no longer afford to generate requirements or design systems without considering the impact on operator and decision maker performance and on the ability of battle groups and amphibious ready groups to train and operate in a joint battlefield environment. Today, responsibility for land attack warfare systems design and acquisition is spread across several program executive offices and program management offices in Naval Sea Systems Command, Naval Air Systems Command, and Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The signatories of the memorandum of agreement establishing the Land Attack Warfare Capstone Organization understand that while each land attack program is managed in response to individual requirements funding, unless coordinated, there is potential to produce systems which will not meet the tests of joint and fleet interoperability, compatibility, and supportability.

Developed in isolation, any or all of these land attack warfare systems will likely result in inefficient use of scarce resources and incur higher life cycle costs.

We must not design and field individual systems without considering from day one the impact they will have on our ability to train for and execute the full spectrum of land attack operations, from an individual sailor’s ability to operate and/or maintain specific pieces of equipment to the conduct of joint operations. In short, we must fundamentally change our cultural perspective on manpower, personnel, and training through consistent application of the principles of human systems integration (HSI) to achieve optimal manning and better mission training. Our ability to effectively and successfully employ a land attack warfare system will directly reflect our commitment to these principles and processes across all land attack warfare programs.

Navy ships and attendant combat systems are complex and present enormous HSI challenges. As a matter of routine, ships prepare for and operate in all weather and climates conducting multiple and simultaneous operations quite possibly in a multi-warfare environment with systems manned and operated by crews determined by diverse personnel and manning plans.

Performance demands, including those placed on these sailors by the design of complex combat systems, are unique in the breadth of their scope and the depth of their complexity. Navy ship systems employed in the fleet today, and those being designed for future operations, make intense demands on the readiness, performance effectiveness, and mental and physical capabilities of the personnel who man them. Specifically, many of these systems are extremely demanding on the senses. They will demand that the operators develop improved motor and cognitive skills, as well as better decision making and situational awareness. Add the highly varied nature of the threat, the need to conduct multi-warfare scenarios, and the need to integrate, coordinate, and interpret information from multiple sources. Without adequate design and support, mission risk increases and responsiveness decreases due to high workload and mission demands.

Department of Defense and Department of the Navy acquisition directives mandate that HIS initiatives be pursued to optimize total system performance and minimize total ownership costs by ensuring systems are built and employed to accommodate human performance characteristics.

Accordingly, it is imperative that in development of a land attack warfare concept of operations and, in particular tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for land attack warfare systems, human performance be given top priority. Land attack warfare systems CONOPS and TTP requirements must be developed in close collaboration with all individual land attack warfare programs to identify commonalities, merge requirements, and avoid duplication. Particular attention should be given to the identification of operator tasks in order to reduce workload, facilitate situational awareness, and enhance decision making.

Systems should be designed to facilitate and support supervisory control – that is user supervision of “smarter” automated systems. Workload should be reduced or eliminated, particularly with regard to data input and manipulations done between non-congruent land-attack system components. A “system of systems” in land attack warfare is needed which produces quality and concise task products which personnel can approve or edit quickly. This result will facilitate mission execution speed and accuracy, with consistency across land attack warfare platforms. The design and production of such systems begins with thorough task and procedural analysis, and uses human factors engineering to apply quality design solutions that are tested in an iterative manner with fleet personnel.

Required operator functions/tasks must be adaptable to various training configurations inport and underway, single and multi-ship, and scalable to distance learning. These functions/tasks must ultimately be integrated into training systems that will provide operators with (1) a synthetic training environment, (2) a merged environment of live data augmented by synthetic information, and (3) segregated live and synthetic training capability to support individual and team training.

The Surface Combatant Land Attack Warfare Training Requirements Document (TRD), was approved 26 January 2001 by the Land Attack Capstone Flag Level Steering Committee. It states the requirements of mission area training and provides specific guidelines to program managers for the integrated development of land attack warfare mission area training capability. The Draft Revision 1 to the TRD contains a separate chapter on HSI requirements. Brief descriptions of HSI methodologies/tools are also provided. The TRD provides the foundation for ensuring that future surface navy sailors are appropriately selected and trained to accomplish land attack warfare.

Defcon 6

2003 CONOPS, Chapter 4: COMMAND AND CONTROL



4.0 COMMAND AND CONTROL

This chapter provides an overview of the command and control issues associated with conducting surface combatant land attack missions. It also presents examples of the flow of command and control information in each of the five surface combatant roles.


4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets forth general and specific guidance regarding command and control (C2) functions as they apply to surface combatants conducting naval fires operations. It begins with a summary of several factors and considerations affecting C2, and then provides an overview of the joint and naval organization and structure within which surface combatants operate. It covers the various types of command relationships with emphasis on the supporting and supported relationships that could be most common and relevant for surface combatant commanding officers. The command relationships discussion is followed by a summary table of the inherent responsibilities of a surface combatant in each of the five surface combatant naval fires roles. The final section of the chapter presents specific illustrative examples, to include detailed diagrams, of how a fire mission would be processed in each of the five roles. These examples were developed during the workshop referred to in Chapter 1.1

Footnote 1: The October 2001 workshop examined four specific tactical situations, each highlighting one or more surface combatant roles. The primary goal was to trace the flow of command information required to deliver fires in each specific situation to develop generalized conclusions regarding command and control of fires. A secondary goal was to develop operational sequence diagrams (OSD) that depict the agencies involved in conducting fire missions and to highlight the actions that would be performed. Section 4.5 provides a detailed discussion of the four OSDs.


4.2 FACTORS AND CONSIDERATIONS

The organization, structure, and command relationships are normally established by a common superior commander or establishing authority based on mission, nature, and expected duration of the operation, forces available, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, battlespace assigned, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. The increased capabilities of naval surface fire support (NSFS) and naval surface strike (NSS) weapons, the demands for shorter response times, and the added complexity of future command and control systems suggest a re-evaluation of the organization, structure, and command relationships and the many factors and considerations involved. A notional C2 structure for the future is presented in section 4.3.

4.2.1 Definition

Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.2

Footnote 2: Joint Pub 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

Command and control responsibilities extend beyond direct control of forces and weapons to include the coordination of various weapons throughout the battlespace. This control and coordination not only creates the desired effects on the enemy through the decisive and combined use of firepower, but also avoids physical conflict between weapons or delivery systems, and prevents friendly casualties. Coordination is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

4.2.2 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Rules of engagement (ROE) are the directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. ROE implement the inherent right of self-defense, define use of force for mission accomplishment, and apply throughout the spectrum of conflict. New systems will enable fast, efficient command and control to be exercised from any level, tactical through strategic. Commanders may have access to a much broader array of weapons. Consequently, the ability to rapidly amend ROEs, to include guidance on weapons release authority, will become increasingly important.

4.2.3 Establishing Directive

A superior commander establishes support relationships between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. A support relationship is often appropriate for amphibious operations or on other occasions when surface combatants are supporting ground forces.3 An establishing directive is normally issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should identify responsibilities for strike planning and execution, and fire support planning and coordination among commanders involved in the support relationship (e.g., an amphibious operation). The role of a surface combatant may change throughout the course of the operation, as it moves from first on scene to part of a larger force, shifting between strike and fire support missions. The establishing directive must support these changing roles by articulating clear, responsive command relationships, NSFS/NSS priorities, and procedures for conflict resolution.

Footnote 3: See Joint Pub 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, for a detailed discussion of command relationships in amphibious operations.

4.2.4 Task Organization

Task organization establishes the supporting and supported relationships essential to creating unity of command, synchronizing operations, preventing fratricide, and maximizing the effects of fires. The organization of forces, especially in a joint environment, directly affects command and control, responsiveness, and versatility during land attack operations. Forces are organized based on mission, commander’s vision, and overall concept of operations. Other factors include forces available, unity of effort, and provision for centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Centralization of key functions should not restrict the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. Sophisticated command and control networks and the increased range and accuracy of weapons provide commanders access to a broad array of forces and weapons systems from outside the operations area. This ready access blurs the distinct lines that once separated forces assigned to surface strike from those assigned to fire support. For example, a surface combatant may be tasked to execute a strike mission while performing a fire support mission. The command and control systems, both internal and external to the ship, should be able to accommodate this situation.



4.3 ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE

Surface combatants are elements of the joint and Navy operational command organizations (figure 4-1). The unified theater combatant commander designates joint force or joint task force commanders (JFC/JTFC) to conduct sustained operations or campaigns. Offensive naval forces organized into carrier strike groups (CSGs), surface and submarine strike groups, and expeditionary strike groups (ESGs) will be assigned to a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC).



Surface combatants will operate as elements of all of the above naval groups. For either surface strike or fire support missions, surface combatants will be tasked to coordinate with and/or respond to naval and joint force fires agencies.

4.3.1 Notional External Command and Control Organization

Figure 4-2 depicts the notional command and control structure for surface combatants in the execution of NSS or NSFS missions. The JFMCC has operational control of one or more naval elements [CSG, surface action group (SAG), or ESG] that include individual surface combatants.



Naval fires coordination agencies, such as the supporting arms coordination center (SACC), force fires coordination center (FFCC), fire support coordination center (FSCC), Tomahawk strike coordinator (TSC), Tomahawk launch area coordinator (LAC), and others exist within the framework of the Navy’s traditional command and control structure. The command elements have operational control over the surface combatants, but the fires from the surface combatants, both NSS and NSFS, are controlled through the naval fires coordination agencies. Strike agencies, the TSC and the LAC, coordinate with fire support agencies, SACC, FFCC/FSCC, etc., to prevent conflict and to enhance the mission effectiveness.

The naval fires coordinator (NFC)4 as proposed in this document would have overall responsibility for coordinating both NSFS and NSS missions.

Footnote 4: NFC is more fully defined in Chapter 6.

4.3.2 Internal Shipboard Organization

On Aegis equipped surface combatants there is currently no requirement to integrate the existing Aegis weapon system and the new naval fires capabilities.5 Additionally, although the same operator working at the same console will conduct strike and naval gunfire support functions, these functions will be performed independently.

The notional naval fires command and control structure presented in figure 4-2 may require adjusting the duties and responsibilities that currently exist within the combat information center (CIC) in order to support evolving NSS and NSFS capabilities. To optimize transparency of fires, the future combat system functions must be integrated, interoperable, and collaborative, facilitating control and awareness of all shipboard fires functions by systems operators, supervisors, and battle watch staff. The ship’s commanding officer must be able to maintain situational awareness over the multi-warfare tactical picture, resolve resource conflicts, manage weapons and fire control, and ensure compliance with commander’s guidance and ROE.

Footnote 5: Desirability of integrating [AEGIS and naval fires] is recognized by OPNAV, but has not been funded due to fiscal constraints.



4.4 COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

The naval component commander exercises operational control through the numbered fleet commanders or other subordinate task forces. These forces are task organized as battle forces, task forces, task groups, task units, and task elements composed of individual units necessary to accomplish specific operational missions. The officer in command of any of the task organizations is designated as the officer in tactical command (OTC) and has primary responsibility for executing that may create as many task groupings as necessary, assigning OTC responsibilities as deemed appropriate. The naval component commander retains critical theater level perspective on naval operations. To facilitate execution and establish combat responsibilities the Navy uses a C2 arrangement referred to as the composite warfare commander (CWC) concept integrating ships, submarines, aircraft, and land based forces.

The Navy employs the CWC concept as the doctrinal cornerstone of its task force operational and tactical C2 system. The CWC concept enables the OTC of a naval force to conduct combat operations in functional areas against air, surface, subsurface, and land threats while contributing to the overall campaign of the JFC. The CWC uses OPGENs6 to set actual at-sea arrangements for operational control, tactical control, supported, and/or supporting relationships.

Footnote 6: Stands for operational general matters and is a message format within the maritime tactical messages system, a standardization of Navy general operating instructions, NWP 5.

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INSET BOX:

Overview of Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) Doctrine and Organization (NWP-3-56 (Rev. A), Chapter 2) CWC Doctrine

The CWC doctrine embodies a basic organizational structure that is responsive to the demands of modern Naval warfare and provides a body of operational principles with associated supporting procedures. Use of this doctrine enables the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to wage offensive and defensive combat operations aggressively against air, surface, undersea, and land-based threats while carrying out the primary mission of the force. The OTC may implement CWC procedures whenever and to whatever extent required depending upon the composition and mission of the force and the nature and severity of the threat. Flexibility of implementation, reinforced by clear guidance to subordinates, is the key element of this doctrine.

The CWC doctrine offers a methodology for effective decentralized C2 by recognizing that the magnitude of some threat scenarios requires dividing up the C2 work among several commanders to achieve effective spans of control.

The CWC doctrine also recognizes that timing or communication limitations may not allow commanders and units to seek and obtain clearance from their seniors before responding to certain threats. A negative aspect of decentralized C2, however, is the risk of improper execution of policies and misinterpretation of guidance from higher authority.

CWC Command Organization

The OTC will always be responsible for accomplishing the mission of the forces assigned. He may delegate authority for the execution of various activities in some or all warfare areas to designated subordinate warfare commanders. The OTC is normally the CWC. However, the CWC concept allows an OTC to delegate tactical command (TACOM) to the CWC. The CWC would exercise TACOM of the Principal Warfare Commanders who include Air Defense Commander (ADC), Antisubmarine Commander (ASWC), Information Warfare Commander (IWC), Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) and Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC). The CWC is also over the Functional Warfare Commanders such as the Mine Warfare Commander (MIWC) and Screen Commander (SC) as well as asset and resource Coordinators such as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), Launch Area Coordinator and TLAM Strike Coordinator (TSC). The warfare commanders are responsible for collecting and disseminating information and, in certain situations, are delegated the authority to respond to threats with assigned assets. The CWC command structure is highly flexible with the OTC assigning forces and authority based on the specific requirements of the situation.
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4.4.1 Operational Control (OPCON)

OPCON is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing forces assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command.7 OPCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon below the level of combatant commander, however, it would be more frequently exercised at echelons higher than the individual surface combatant.

Footnote 7: JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), dated 10 July 2001, pp. III-7, 8.

4.4.2 Tactical Control (TACON)

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.8 TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of the theater commander. TACON is the most likely command relationship for the surface combatant NSFS controlling unit or the NSS multi-unit commander role.

Footnote 8: Ibid, p. III-8.

4.4.3 Support 9

Support is a command authority appropriate when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command relationship is especially relevant to amphibious operations. For example, the establishing authority in an amphibious operation defines a support relationship between commanders within the amphibious force as well as other designated commanders as appropriate. The support relationships are intentionally flexible. The establishing authority will specify the purpose of the support, the desired effect, and the scope of action to be taken.

Footnote 9: Ibid, pp. III-9, 10.

4.4.3.1 Supported Commander

The supported commander has the authority to exercise the general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, the timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency. A supported commander may be designated for the entire operation, a particular function, or a combination of phases, functions, or events. If the operation is relatively short, the establishing authority may select one supported commander for the entire operation.

4.4.3.2 Supporting Commander

The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications that will be used to provide the support. He will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on the employment and limitations of support, assist with planning, and ensure the supporting units are fully aware of the supported commander’s needs and intent.

4.4.3.3 Supporting and Supported Relationships in Joint Environments

The land and naval force commanders are the supported commanders within their areas of operations (AOs) designated by the JFC. Within these AOs, the supported commanders have the authority to designate target priorities, munitions effects, and the timing of weapons delivery to best synchronize maneuver and fires. The JFC also has the authority to establish priorities that will be executed throughout the theater or joint operations area (JOA), including within the land and naval force commanders’ AOs. Commanders designated by the JFC have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations and attack targets within land and naval AOs, but they must be coordinated with the land and naval force commanders.

4.4.4 Transfer of Command and Control

Surface combatants must be able to smoothly transition from one role10 to another. In response to a developing crisis, first on the scene surface combatants can operate independently until follow-on forces can be dispatched to the operating area. Operating in the NSS single unit role, the ship must be able to provide for the ship’s self defense and employ its land attack capability. If the conflict widens and additional surface combatants arrive on scene, the senior commanding officer may be assigned as the NSS multi-unit commander to commence attacks against the enemy.

During amphibious operations, a surface combatant normally begins in a NSFS supporting unit role and receives orders to fire from the SACC. As the operation progresses, the surface combatant may assume the NSFS controlling unit role if the SACC transfers authority for tactical fire direction over other surface combatants.

The surface combatant must be interoperable with joint forces when they arrive on scene. Upon arrival of a more senior commander, the combatant will transfer command and control functions as directed. Joint interoperability and connectivity of command and control systems must be achieved for surface combatants to operate effectively in the land attack roles.

Footnote 10: See Chapter 1 for definitions of the five roles.

4.4.5 Liaison Elements for Land Attack

With the evolution of the surface combatant’s land attack mission area, NSFS and NSS missions will be conducted in support of operations that have not historically included fires from surface combatants as key elements of the associated fire plans. Therefore, the need for effective liaison between the supported and supporting forces becomes more important as the capability of naval fires increases.

For NSFS, the traditional Navy and Marine Corps doctrine, procedures, and organization for naval gunfire support provide for liaison between surface combatants and the supported units. Key to effective liaison is the staffing of doctrinal billets 11 and the training of surface warfare officers in land attack warfare.

The current liaison structure and training for naval gunfire support may not be sufficient to respond to the expanded capabilities of both NSFS and NSS. New land attack weapons systems (e.g., ERGM and TACTOM) have flight profiles significantly different than traditional naval gunfire and require more extensive coordination than has been performed in the past by the naval gunfire liaison officer. This coordination could be effected through the establishment of a new coordination detachment within the JFACC.

This document recommends the establishment of a naval coordination detachment (NCD)12 as identified above and described in Appendix C. The NCD would provide on-site representation within the JFACC regarding surface combatant land attack matters.

Footnote 11: Naval gunfire officers and naval gunfire liaison officers. (Note: these titles should be changed to reflect the broader function of naval surface fires; e.g., NSF officer and NSFLnO.)

Footnote 12 The NCD expands on the responsibility of the naval and amphibious liaison element (NALE) as described in draft NWP 3-09.1 and could be included within or replace the NALE.

The presence of Army and coalition forces involved in land attack warfare presents additional challenges. The elimination of the air and naval gunfire liaison companies (ANGLICOs) from the active Marine Corps force structure reduced the liaison support capability naval forces can provide to the U.S. Army and coalition forces.13 Recognizing the value that ANGLICO added to the joint force, the Marine Corps has decided to re-activate ANGLICO in both I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). These active component liaison companies will become operational in 2003.

The range and precision of new land attack weapons makes them also relevant to Army operations. The Army may find it necessary to develop a liaison structure that will enhance its ability to operate with supporting surface combatants. For example, the Army could embark a liaison team onboard a surface combatant in a controlling unit role, with the necessary equipment to support an Army operation.

Special operations forces (SOF) interoperability with supporting surface combatants may require a SOF liaison detachment14 on the ship. The two main functions of the SOF detachment would be: (1) to provide or advise on communications with supported SOF units, and (2) to advise the ship’s commanding officer regarding any special considerations for the employment of land attack weapons in support of SOF units.

Footnote 13: Two ANGLICOs were maintained in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Footnote 14: The SOF liaison detachment could consist of a single liaison officer with appropriate communications. requires the surface combatant to perform specific functions and assume certain responsibilities.

4.4.6 Inherent Responsibilities for Surface Combatants

Surface combatants operate in one of the five roles described in detail in Chapter 1. Each role Shipboard command and control responsibilities must be clearly defined. The surface combatant and the agency or unit being supported must have the same understanding of those functions and responsibilities. To prevent confusion, minimize excessive voice communications, and increase mission responsiveness, a set of common practices or inherent responsibilities specifies a surface combatant’s functions and relationships with higher headquarters and supported units. These responsibilities will vary, depending on the surface combatant’s role.

Table 4-1 is based on an artillery model15 and summarizes the inherent responsibilities for surface combatants in a matrix format. It addresses several issues unique to surface combatants that:
-- operate in firing areas vice a specific geographic location,
-- have multi-warfare ship self-defense responsibilities,
-- have multi-warfare sensor capabilities,
-- are responsible to the battlegroup commander for other mission areas, and
-- have different command relationships.



The inherent responsibilities define standard tactical support responsibilities for each role to facilitate task organization, improve communications, and reduce the need for detailed coordination. The matrix defines these responsibilities regarding priority of fires, zones or areas of responsibility, targeting sources, communications, fire planning, and sensor allocation.

Footnote 15: Joint Pub 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Appendix B, Fire Support Missions, dated 12 May 1998.


The following situation illustrates the importance of standard inherent responsibilities: Several surface combatants are assigned the Supporting Unit role to a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB).

Based on table 4-1 the ships would:

1. Answer fires tasking in priority from the MEB (supported unit) and also answer any tasking from higher HQ.

2. Have its zone of fire determined by the MEB.

3. Receive targeting from the supported unit (FFCC/SACC (ashore/afloat)). Targeting may also be provided directly by forward observers assigned to MEB maneuver units.

4. Establish communications with the supported unit (FFCC/SACC) or as assigned.

5. Have fires planned by MEB (FFCC/SACC). This means pre-planned fires will be provided to the ships for scheduling and execution as directed by the supported unit. For example, the FFCC/SACC sends informationto the ships that includes target data, weapons/munitions data, and timing data for schedules of fire. The ships would process and prepare the schedule of execution on the pre-arranged timeline.

6. Allocate assigned sensor resources in response to MEB targeting priorities.



4.5 COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) WITHIN THE ROLES

The section sets forth a specific situation for each of the five roles (note: section 4.5.4 includes two roles) and uses narrative and associated operational sequence diagrams (foldout figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, 4-10) to describe how a fire support or strike mission could be prosecuted in that situation. Symbols used in figures 4-3 through 4-10 are taken from FM 101-51/MCRP 5-2A, Operational Term and Graphics which is in compliance with MILSTD-2525A.


4.5.1. Naval Surface Fire Support Supporting Unit Role:
Amphibious Operation, Call for Fire

4.5.1.1 Special Situation (see figure 4-3)

An amphibious task force (ATF) has been deployed to Country ORANGE to conduct an amphibious assault. The mission of the ATF is to prevent enemy occupation of the vital port and industrial complex in Country ORANGE to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces in theater. A lead battalion of an enemy motorized rifle regiment is located 16 km east of RED Beach. Enemy forces are consolidating their positions and displacing logistics forward. Indications are that the enemy will move to occupy the port and industrial complex (10 km west of RED Beach) within the next several days.



Battalion landing team, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines (BLT 2 / 1) is an assault battalion of the landing force. Its mission is to attack across RED Beach 1 at 0600, D-Day, to seize Division Objective 1 and establish a blocking position to prevent the movement of enemy forces along Route 15, into the port and industrial complex. The BLT 2 / 1 commander’s intent is to conduct a surface assault across RED Beach 1 with two companies abreast, avoid decisive engagement on or near the beach, and move swiftly inland to seize the high ground, in zone, which dominates Route 15.

At 0530, thirty minutes before H-Hour, a reconnaissance team on Hill 300 observes an estimated platoon sized enemy mechanized unit (with two ZSU-23 / 2 twin towed AA systems) in the vicinity of Hill 84 on the left flank of BLT 2 / 1’s axis of advance. Informed of this development, the BLT 2 / 1 commander decides not to alter his scheme of maneuver, but to try to neutralize the enemy unit by fire and bypass. If that fails, he would have his left flank company (Echo Company) block the enemy advance while his right flank company (Fox Company), and reserve company (Golf Company) move swiftly to seize the objective.

The BLT 2 / 1 commander notifies the Echo Company commander of the threat. He reminds the Echo Company commander that attack helicopters are on station and available to attack the enemy mechanized forces, but that the ZSU-23s need to be suppressed before the helos go in.

The Echo Company commander immediately briefs his platoon commanders, his forward air controller, and his NSFS Spot Team of the situation. He directs the NSFS Spot Team, which is equipped with a target location designation and handoff system (TLDHS), to strive for first round accuracy in the suppression mission not only to prevent effective employment of the weapons, but also to hinder their displacement to new firing positions before the attack helicopters can complete their attack on the enemy mechanized forces.

4.5.1.2 Assumptions

-- The amphibious force is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade / Amphibious Ready Group (MEB / ARG).
-- Command is afloat and the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is the supported commander.
-- An amphibious objective area (AOA) has been established and is bounded by a ceiling altitude as delineated by the air control plan.
-- The tactical air control center (TACC), which is automated and co-located with the SACC, exercises airspace control within the AOA.
-- The airspace control authority (ACA) is the JFACC for the overall joint operations area.
-- The SACC has been equipped with an automated fire support and mission planning system, the core of which is the advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS).
-- The primary mission of the surface combatants is fire support.

4.5.1.3 Sequence of OSD Events

(See operational sequence diagram (OSD), figure 4-7, at the end of this chapter; time sequence indicators below (Tn) correspond to the time sequence numbers on the OSD)

T0

The NSFS Spot Team with Echo Company, equipped with a TLDHS, accurately locates and designates the target and generates a fire request (FR). The data communication path is via SINCGARS radio, which interfaces with the DACT component of the TLDHS, via relay to the automated fire support system terminal located in the SACC. The FR data is also provided, via internal LAN, to the AFATDS also located in the SACC. The AFATDS updates the databases of all AFATDS ashore once they are able to receive data transmissions.

T1

The AFATDS in the SACC processes the FR by performing the following functions: target processing, target filtering, attack analysis, and mission execution. A summary of the functions of the automated fire support system in the SACC is described below:

During target processing, the FR is received and a verification of sufficient target data is performed. If required data is missing from the FR, the AFATDS operator may manually insert the