Dago

Came across a intresting read from the Naval Institute up in Monterey. With a complete breakdown in Littoral Combat Ship man power requirments and augmented modules as well as Cost Analysis and legacy comparison.

Link - http://www.nps.edu/Research/HCS/Docs...ong_thesis.pdf

Abstract

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The Littoral Combat Ship’s (LCS) minimally manned core crew goal is 15 to 50 manpower requirements and the threshold, for both core and mission-package crews, is 75 to 110. This dramatically smaller crew size will require more than current technologies and past lessons learned from reduced manning initiatives. Its feasibility depends upon changes in policy and operations, leveraging of future technologies and increased Workload Transfer from sea to shore along with an increased acceptance of risk.

A manpower requirements analysis yielded a large baseline (~200) requirement to support a notional LCS configuration. Combining the common systems from the General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin designs with other assumed equipments (i.e. the combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) engineering plant) produce the notional LCS configuration used as the manpower requirements basis. The baseline requirement was reduced through
the compounded effect of manpower savings from Smart Ship and OME and suggested paradigm shifts. A Battle Bill was then created to support the notional LCS during Conditions of
Readiness I and III.

An efficient force deployment regime was adopted to reduce the overall LCS class manpower requirement. The efficiency gained enables the LCS force to “flex” and satisfy deployment requirements with 25% to 30% fewer manpower requirements over the “one-forone” crewing concept. An annual manpower savings of $80M to $110M if each requirement costs $60K.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................1
II. BACKGROUND ..............................................5
III. PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVE ..................................13
A. PROBLEM ...........................................13
B. OBJECTIVE .........................................13
IV. ASSUMPTIONS ............................................15
A. NOTIONAL LCS SEAFRAME .............................15
B. BATTLE BILL .......................................19
1. Ship Control .................................25
2. Operations Control ...........................26
3. Communication Control ........................27
4. Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control ..28
5. Weapons Control ..............................28
6. Engineering Control ..........................29
7. Damage Control ...............................30
8. Support Control ..............................32
C. AVIATION DETACHMENT ...............................32
D. FOCUSED MISSION PACKAGES ..........................34
E. MAINTENANCE .......................................37
V. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS ..................................39
VI. METHODOLOGY ............................................41
VII. FORMULATION AND DATA ...................................45
A. FORMULATION .......................................45
1. Indices ......................................45
2. Parameters ...................................45
3. Decision Variable ............................45
4. Objective Function ...........................46
5. Constraints ..................................47
B. DATA ..............................................47
VIII. ANALYSIS ..............................................49
A. “BUSINESS AS USUAL” ANALYSIS ......................49
B. REDUCED MANNING INITIATIVES .......................52
1. Smart Ship ...................................53
2. Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment (OME) .......54
C. PARADIGM SHIFTS ...................................56
1. Composite Sailor .............................57
2. Technology Leverage ..........................58
3. Workload Transfer (Ship to Shore) ............58
D. CORE CREW ANALYSIS ................................59
E. MISSION PACKAGE CREW ANALYSIS .....................61
v iii
F. LCS MODULE FORCE ANALYSIS .........................65
IX. SUMMARY .................................................7 1
X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..........................75
A. CONCLUSIONS .......................................75
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................75
XI. FUTURE STUDY ...........................................81
A. FATIGUE STUDY ON LCS FLIGHT “0” ...................81
B. TASK ANALYSIS ON LCS FLIGHT “0” ...................84
C. LCS MANPOWER COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS ................85
APPENDIX A. NOTIONAL PROJECTED OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......87
APPENDIX B. NOTIONAL REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY ........89
APPENDIX C. LCS DESIGNS ....................................137
APPENDIX D. FORMULATION INDICES ............................139
APPENDIX E. LEGACY SHIP MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS ..............141
APPENDIX F. LEGACY CONDITION I CONTROL STATION SUMMARY .....143
APPENDIX G. LEGACY CONDITION III CONTROL STATION SUMMARY ...145
APPENDIX H. CG (NS) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...............147
APPENDIX I. CG (SS) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...............149
APPENDIX J. DDG BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...................151
APPENDIX K. DDG (OME) BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS .............153
APPENDIX L. FFG BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...................155
APPENDIX M. MCM BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...................157
APPENDIX N. MHC BATTLE BILL REQUIREMENTS ...................159
APPENDIX O. NAVY ENLISTED RATE DESCRIPTION .................161
APPENDIX P. SEAFRAME BASELINE BATTLE BILL ..................167
APPENDIX Q. SEAFRAME BASELINE RQMTS ........................169
APPENDIX R. SEAFRAME RQMTS ANALYSIS ........................171
APPENDIX S. SEAFRAME REDUCED RQMTS .........................175
APPENDIX T. SEAFRAME REDUCED BATTLE BILL ...................177
APPENDIX U. MODULE PRE-PACKAGED RQMTS ......................179
APPENDIX V. MODULE FLEXED RQMTS COMPUTATION ................181
APPENDIX W. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....................183
LIST OF REFERENCES .........................................187
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................191

Manpower requirments are mainly determined by - Operational Capacity; Mission Enviroment and Requriments; Work Load Analysis; And Specified Readiness, IE. underway replenishment, logistical operations).

Figure 1 - Shows legacy manning by various augmented modules. Without significant change to current manning concepts. (see - Ship Manning Document (SMD) Note that the core crew is 120, with various module packages from 70-80. Greatly exceeding the thershold of 75-110 manpower goal.

Based on pervious legacy ships, and functions, the LCS seaframe would be organized into 5 departments - Executive, Operations, Combat Systems, Engineering, and Supply. Breakdown shown in Figure-2 (Table 11. PG.52)

Figure 3 - Smart Ship and Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment (OME) reduced manning concepts.

Figure 4 - Is even more radical and reduces manning requirments through various initiatives such as workload transfer (outsourching shorebased), "composite sailor' (multiple jobs), and further by technology means.


A. PROBLEM

The seaframe and module manpower requirements (RQMTS) for LCS are highly constrained by the crew accommodation threshold. The LCS critical design parameter for manning is of particular interest. In the preliminary requirements
document, the combined (seaframe plus mission module) RQMTS is limited by the threshold of 75 [Ref 2]. Since the release of the critical design document
(CDD) in May 2004, the crew accommodation threshold has been increased to 110, reflecting the difficulty of the manning problem. This increase added 35 additional bunks, and has eased the constraint for the combined manpower
requirements considerably. However, this relaxed threshold remains much lower than legacy RQMTS, and is still a significant challenge. Addressing this challenge is the problem at hand.

B. OBJECTIVE

This study has two objectives. The first objective is to determine the aggressiveness of the different approaches to achieve the specified manning levels. The baseline, or “business as usual”, estimates were derived using a methodology similar to the NMRS used to determine new construction RQMTS. This approach is not as aggressive in looking for ways to reduce the RQMTS or to efficiently manage the personnel. Because of this, we looked carefully at reduced manning initiatives, as well as to evaluate some “paradigm shifts” that would cause the Navy to significantly change its manning practices.

B. BATTLE BILL
The most demanding manpower requirements are during Conditions I and III for 24-hours and 60 days respectively. The Operational Manning is the requirement driver for supporting these conditions of readiness. The battle bill delineates the watch stations required to support the different control stations to satisfy the requirements of the Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operational Environment (ROC/POE) documents. There are eight control stations common to all legacy ships:

1. ship control,
2. communication control,
3. operations control,
4. combat system casualty control,
5. weapons control,
6. engineering control,
7. damage control, and
8. support control.

The composition concept was also used frequently to change the watch standing philosophies during the reduced manning experiments. For example, the DDG had two RQMTS for a NIXIE Operator and a NIXIE Repairman before the experiment. After OME, the DDG required only one NIXIE operator/Repairman. The concept assumes that the workload for both the NIXIE Operator and Repairman was able to be reduced by 50%. Table 4 lists some of the legacy compositions from the DDG OME. The LCS composition
concept, based upon the DDG NIXIE RQMTS, will also assume the workload of two RQMTS can be reduced by 50%. For example, the LCS EN who has been trained to do the GSM function will be required to support only 50% of both the EN and GSM workload. Furthermore, the composition of the operator and
repairman has enabled greater flexibility of operational personnel. The operator has the skills required to adjust the system to operational requirements without minimal outside assistance. However, the system operator will be the system maintainer while the operator is not standing
watch. The further necessitates the requirement to reduce the administrative workload for the operator/repairman or offload any additional responsibilities.



The Composite Sailor concept is both a policy and operational change item. This concept not only allows the combination of watch stations, it also allows the combination of the rates and functions. For example, a diesel mechanic (engineman or EN rate) who is assigned to the LCS will also be trained to work on gas turbine engines similar to the gas turbine mechanical (GSM) rate. Rates with similar job descriptions onboard the LCS were considered for composition. These rates include, but are not limited to these ratings: BM, CTT, DC, EN, ET, GS, HT, MM, MR, OS, QM, STG and TM. See Appendix O for rate descriptions and Table 5 below for proposed rate combinations.



The LCS Boatswain’s Mate (BM) rate will consist of KSAs from the Engineman (EN), Machinist’s Mate (MM) and Quartermaster (QM) rates. Small boat coxswains have traditionally been the BMs. When a small boat is deployed,
it is required to have an EN rate onboard. Since BMs are capable of maintaining deck machinery, it is assumed that BMs can also maintain the small boat engines of which they are the coxswain. Similarly, the EN rate should also be able to perform duties as the small boat coxswain. On the
bridge, BMs have traditionally stood the watch as the Boatswain’s Mate of the watch (BMOW). Today, they are standing watch as the Officer of the Deck (OOD) and Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) during Condition III operations. It is assumed that they are now capable of carrying out the
duties as the navigator as well when on the bridge, thus removing the requirement for the QM.
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Cotrol Stations

1. Ship Control - With respect to ship control, it is assumed that the
Smart Ship Integrated Bridge System (IBS) and Voyage Management System (VMS) will have matured enough to reduce the LCS piloting control stations to just the OOD and JOOD watches. Both the IBS and VMS systems would be integrated into the notional Integrated Command Centers (ICC). Furthermore, it is also assumed that the chart coverage provided by the VMS and electronic Chart Display Information System (ECDIS) will be sufficient to require only minimal paper charts onboard the LCS. If not, the Operations Specialist (OS) is assumed to be capable of preparing and managing the paper charts without the Quartermasters (QM). Operations Specialists (OS) have consistently been the secondary navigation team supporting the Quartermasters (QM). These skills combined with the VMS and IBS can be used to conduct all the LCS seaframe’s voyage planning requirements. The LCS bridge watchstanders will be the primary watchstanders responsible for the safe navigation of the ship. Using the IBS, VMS and ECDIS systems, the Officerof-the-Deck (OOD) and Junior OOD will be able to receive real-time ship’s position and other pertinent navigation data to support their decision-making abilities. It is assumed that the LCS pilot house will give the
bridge watchstanders the ability to see all around the ship. On the bridge with a 360-degree viewing capability, the LCS OOD and JOOD are able to safely navigate and handle the ship without additional lookouts. These Ship Control assumptions will allow the bridge watch stations to be reduced to just two. The Officer of the Deck (OOD) and the Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD) is
assumed capable of safe ship operations with the IBS, VMS and an all-around viewing capability.

2. Operations Control - It is assumed that the LCS seaframe Combat Information Center (CIC) will incorporate the use of multi-modal consoles (MMC) along with an integrated Weapons Control Console (WCC). The MMC is an emerging system that, in the interim, may require the use of legacy sensor and weapon consoles. It is also assumed that the MMC will make available all the sensor inputs (e.g., Search RADAR, EO/IR, SLQ-32, etc.) to the watchstanders. Decoy controls are assume to be integrated into either the WCC or IBS console. CIC watchstanders will have primary decoy (air, surface and underwater) controls with the secondary controls located in the pilot house’s IBS. Traditional CIC watches required watchstanders to operate stations predominantly dedicated to a single sensor or weapon system. These Operations Control assumptions will consolidate most of the sensor inputs and weapon controls into a few consoles. This will greatly reduce the number of watchstanders down to perhaps only two or threewatchstanders using the MMC and WCC.

3. Communication Control - It is assumed that the LCS Battle Bill Communication Control stations are similar to legacy Communication Control stations. These watchstanders will maintain communication, tactical and LAN systems. The communication systems of legacy ships involved the use of many different circuits. Most of these circuits had dedicated handsets which resulted in some difficulty in differentiation. Onboard the LCS, it is assumed that these different circuits are patched into a common system where the executives and watchstanders will be able to access the different circuits with a visual aid to identify the status of the different circuits. Moreover, the LCS will leverage remote monitoring and sensing systems to reduce the manpower requirements for monitors. The systems are assumed to replace legacy monitoring personnel (i.e., missile launcher monitors) thus allowing the system operators and casualty control personnel the ability to remote monitor all systems and respond as they are needed. Communications systems are greatly improved through advances in computing technology and commercial off the shelf (COTS) systems. These improvements combined with the Smart Ship fiber optics LAN system, have greatly reduced the need for human monitors to check system performance and security. With the ability to remotely monitor machinery and conditions, a dedicated monitor will not be required. Thus communication systems have the potential to be unmanned.

4. Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control - It is assumed that the LCS Battle Bill Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control stations are similar to legacy Combat Systems/Electronics Casualty Control stations where the RQMTS respond to combat system casualties as well as electronic system casualties. However, the assumed LCS will have personnel capable of operating and maintaining their systems. This will greatly reduce the requirement for a separate operator and maintainer. For example, the NIXIE system demonstrated that the requirements for a NIXIE Operator and NIXIE
Repairman can be consolidated into a single NIXIE Operator/Maintainer.

5. Weapons Control - The 57MM, RAM, CIWS and decoy controls are assumed integrated into a single Weapons Control Console (WCC) console located in CIC with several back-up consoles located nearby. Additionally, each weapon system will have the local control capability (i.e., CIWS will have an operator at the Local Control Panel). During Condition I, .50-caliber machine guns on the port and starboard sides will be manned and ready. Each
mount will require one operator and one ammo loader. These personnel will also act as decoy loaders in support of the CIC watchstanders who are controlling the decoy launchers. The other two mounts will be augmented by standing down other watchstanders, and the ammo loader will support both
mounts on their respective sides. These assumptions will reduce the requirement for dedicated watch stations and systems. By integrating more than one system into a console, the potential exists to reduce the watch-stander requirements. The seaframe crew is responsible for the safe
launching and recovery of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles. The assumed launch and recovery system is based upon an enlarged variant of the Swedish Visby corvette’s UV launch and recovery system. The current U.S. Navy boat launching and recovery systems like the gravity davits found on legacy ships are manpower intensive. The system proposed for LCS is the overhead rail system assisted with electrical winches and controls that spot the UVs to the launch/recovery station and then back its storage station.
This system requires only one winch operator assisted by the personnel responsible for the UVs as tenders and assistants. Thus, the boat launching and recovery apparatus onboard LCS may require only one operator. UAVs will be the responsibility of the aviation detachment personnel. Aviation detachment personnel are responsible for the UAVs spot to the flight deck and then back to the hangar. The seaframe crew will be responsible
for the launch and recovery flight operations.

6. Engineering Control - The engineering plant is assumed to be of the combined diesel and gas turbine (CODAG) configuration. The fuel efficiency of the diesel engine at slow speed and the power of the gas turbine engine at high speed make this propulsion system ideal for the LCS. The engineers assigned onboard LCS will not be watchstanders. Their primary function is the maintenance and safe operation of the engineering plant and associated machinery. Engineers will assist the bridge watchstanders in the start-up and shut-down of engineering systems. Bridge and CIC watchstanders will have the ability to remote start the main engines as well as auxiliary equipment from the bridge or CIC through the Machinery Control System accessible on
the fiber optics LAN system. This will allow the bridge and CIC watchstanders to control vital engineering equipments required to safely operate and fight the ship without degradation. During Condition III steaming, watchstanders are not required in the engineering spaces. All engineers are maintainers during Condition III. The EOOW and their assistant will be the watchstanders during Condition I with a monitor in the main engineroom. This could reduce the LCS engineering watchstanders by 25% to 50% over the legacy engineering watches. The position of the JP5 Pump Room Operator is not
required if it is able to be remotely operated from Central Control Station (CCS). JP5 nozzleman will also have the redundant ability, from CCS, to start and stop the pumps from the flight deck area.

7. Damage Control - It is assumed that primary Damage Control Central
(DCC) will be located in the Central Control Station (CCS), and secondary DCC will be remotely located on the bridge. The damage control function relies on the extensive use of the Smart Ship Damage Control System (DCS) and installed shipboard firefighting technology that is available today. For example, the installed AFFF and CO2 systems inside critical spaces such as the main engineering and ordnance spaces. The Damage Control Officer (DCO) and Damage Control Assistant (DCA) will monitor and control damages from CCS while coordinating damage control efforts with the Engineering Officer of the Watch (EOOW). To facilitate ease of communication and efficiency, the DCO, DCA and the damage control party will be co-located in the same pace.
The damage control party will be reduced commensurate with the acceptable risk level and technology leverage. In general, the damage control party will consist of a scene leader, investigators, nozzleman and hoseman. These will
be the positions on the Rapid Response Team (RRT). The damage control philosophy is to engage the RRT to the scene immediately after the casualty. The RRT will estimate the damage and augmentation required. If the damage is beyond their capability, then the decision must be made whether or not to use the automation and installed firefighting system to isolate the damage. This is important especially if the affected space is a critical space. If the damage is too large for the RRT and the decision is made not to use the installed firefighting system, then additional personnel will be required by
standing down watch stations that are deemed non essential to the operation at hand. If the damage is excessively large for the augmented damage control party, then the decision must be made to either continue the operation until it is time to abandon or disengage from the operation. By changing the Damage Control philosophy, the legacy Damage Controls of 80 personnel can be reduced by 50% to 75%.

8. Support Control - LCS seaframe Support Control is assumed to be the same in all respects as the legacy Support Control stations and their functions. The assumed LCS Supply Department is assumed to use advanced inventory systems like the scanners and commercial inventory management programs. These technologies can reduce the amount of personnel required to locate and issue as well as the time required. Another assumption is that
the self-service food line function is capable of reducing the CS requirement by about 25% to 50%.

Appendix O

Cryptologic Technician, Technical (CTTs) are “advanced [Electronic Technicians (ETs)] who do wiring, circuit testing and repair. They determine performance levels of electronic equipment, install new components, modify
existing equipment and test, adjust and repair equipment cooling systems [Ref 6]”. Under the assumption that ETs are able to perform these advanced functions, the ETs will replace the CTT RQMTS. The engineering rates of Damage Controlman (DC), Hull Maintenance Technician (HT) and Machinery Repairman (MR) are very similar. Thus, the LCS DC rate will possess the KSAs from the HT and MR rate. The DC knowledge of damage control can be greatly advanced with the skills of the HT and MR.

In general, The Operations Specialist (OS) rate is responsible for managing secondary charts and performing radar navigation in support of the QM who performs the visual navigation. These two rates are similar, using GPS data to update their positions. The voyage management system (VMS) is capable of updating positions as well as voyage planning using GPS and radar inputs and steering the ship along the planned tracks. Thus, it is assumed the QM rating can be replaced by the VMS and watchstanders in the piloting control stations and supported by the OS in CIC. This also assumes digital charts and permanent electronic recording of ship’s movement are acceptable in lieu of hardcopy charts, and the VMS along with the ECDIS are authorized for unrestricted use.

The LCS SONAR Technician (Surface) (STG) rate will possess the KSAs of both the STG and the Torpedoman’s Mate (TM). For LCS, the TMs are equired for torpedo countermeasures. By extending the ordnance capability to the STG rate, the torpedo countermeasures can be covered by
the STG.


Boatswain’s Mate (BMs) train and supervise personnel in all activities relating to marlinspike, deck and boat seamanship, and the maintenance of the ship’s external structure and deck equipment. They act as petty officers in charge of small craft and may perform duties as master-atarms, serve in or take charge of gun crews and damage control parties.

Cryptologic Technicians Technical (CTTs) control the flow of messages and information. Their work depends on technical communications by means other than Morse code and electronic countermeasures.

Electronics Warfare Technician (EWs) operate and maintain electronic equipment used in navigation, target detection and location and for preventing electronic spying by enemies. They interpret incoming electronic signals to determine their source. EWs are advanced electronic technicians who do wiring, circuit testing and repair. They
determine performance levels of electronic equipment, install new components, modify existing equipment and test, adjust and repair equipment cooling systems. The CTT and EW rates have been combined into the CTT
rate.

Damage Controlmen (DCs) perform the work necessary for damage control, ship stability, fire-fighting and chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) warfare defense. They instruct personnel in damage control and CBR defense and repair damage-control equipment and systems.

Electrician’s Mates (EMs) operate and repair the ship’s or station’s electrical power plant and electrical equipment. They also maintain and repair power and lighting circuits, distribution switchboards, generators, motors and other electrical equipment.

Enginemen (ENs) keep internal combustion engines, diesel or gasoline in good order. They also maintain refrigeration, air-conditioning, distilling-plant engines and compressors.

Electronics Technicians (ETs) are responsible for electronic equipment used to send and receive messages, detect enemy planes and ships, and determine target distances. They must maintain, repair, calibrate, tune and adjust all electronic equipment used for communications, detection and tracking, recognition and identification, navigation and electronic countermeasures.

Fire Controlmen (FCs) maintain the control mechanism used in weapons systems on combat ships. Complex electronic, electrical and hydraulic equipment is required to ensure the accuracy of Navy guided missile and surface gunfire-control systems. FCs are responsible for the operation, routine care and repair of this equipment, which includes radars, computers, weapons direction equipment, target designation systems, gyroscopes and range finders. It is in the advanced electronics field and requires a sixyear
enlistment.

Navy Gunner’s Mates (GMs) operate, maintain and repair all gunnery equipment, guided-missile launching systems, rocket launchers, guns, gun mounts, turrets, projectors and associated equipment. They make detailed casualty analyses and repairs of electrical, electronic, hydraulic and mechanical systems. They also test and inspect ammunition, missiles and their ordnance components. GMs train and supervise personnel in the handling and stowage of ammunition, missiles and assigned ordnance equipment.
Gas Turbine System Technicians (GSs) operate, repair and maintain gas turbine engines; main propulsion machinery, including gears; shafting and controllable pitch propellers; assigned auxiliary equipment propulsion control
systems; electrical and electronic circuitry up to the printed circuit module; and alarm and warning circuitry. They also perform administrative tasks related to gas turbine propulsion system operation and maintenance, (GSE:
Electrical) (GSM: Mechanical)

Hull Maintenance Technicians (HTs) are responsible for maintaining ships’ hulls, fittings, piping systems and machinery. They install and maintain shipboard and shore based plumbing and piping systems. They also look after a vessel’s safety and survival equipment and perform many tasks related to damage control.

Interior Communications Electricians (ICs) operate and repair electronic devices used in the ship’s interior communications systems, SITE TV systems, public address systems, electronic megaphones and other announcing equipment. They are also responsible for the gyrocompass systems.
Machinist’s Mates (MMs) are responsible for the continuous operation of the many engines, compressors and gears, refrigeration, air-conditioning, gas-operated equipment and other types of machinery afloat and ashore. They are also responsible for the ship’s steam propulsion and auxiliary equipment and the outside (deck) machinery. MMs also may perform duties involving some industrial gases.

Minemen (MNs) test, maintain, repair and overhaul mines and their components. They are responsible for assembling, testing, handling, issuing and delivering mines to the planting agent and for maintaining mine-handling and mine-laying equipment.

Machinery Repairmen (MRs) are skilled machine tool operators. They make replacement parts and repair or overhaul a ship’s engine auxiliary equipment, such as evaporators, air compressors and pumps. They repair deck equipment, including winches and hoists, condensers and heat exchange devices. Shipboard MRs frequently operate main propulsion machinery, besides performing machine shop and repair duties.

Operations Specialists (OS) operate radar, navigation and communications equipment in shipboard combat information centers (CICs) or bridges. They detect and track ships, planes and missiles. They also operate and maintain identification friend or foe (IFF) systems, electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment and radiotelephones.

Quartermasters (QMs) assist the navigator and officer of the deck (OOD), steer the ship, take radar bearings and ranges, make depth soundings and celestial observations, plot courses and command small craft. Additionally, they maintain charts, navigational aids and oceanographic publications and records for the ship’s log.

Signalmen (SMs) send and receive various visual messages, handle and route message traffic, operate voice radio and repair visual signaling devices. They also render honors to ships and boats and serve as navigators. The QM and SM rates have been combined to be called bridge specialists. No acronyms exist to represent this consolidation. The QM rate is still in effect and will be
used to fill bridge specialist requirements. Torpedoman’s Mates (TMs) maintain underwater explosive missiles, such as torpedoes and rockets, which are launched from surface ships, submarines and aircraft. They also maintain launching systems for underwater explosives, and are responsible for shipping and storage of torpedoes and rockets.

Dago

BASELINE RQMTS, RQMTS ANALYSIS, and Battle Bill comparison. Legacy Vs Reduced.

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1. Smart Ship - For the CG, Smart Ship savings were realized throughout several rates. The affected rates are summarized in Table 12. When the effects were applied to the LCS seaframe baseline RQMTS, the 4% Smart Ship savings removed the RQMTS 54 for an EM, DC and three GSs. The overall LCS manning level of 120 was thus reduced to 115 – not nearly enough of a reduction to accommodate required additional module personnel.

2. Fleet Optimal Manning Experiment (OME) - For the DDG, OME also affected every facet of theship’s organization. Most reductions were accomplished by policy and procedural changes supported with minimal technology leveraging. The overall OME savings for the DDG was 12.9%. [Refs 8 and 9] Compared to the Smart Ship effects, OME definitely had a bigger effect. Table 13 summarized the effects of OME across the different rates including officers (i.e., 1110, 6120 and 7120).




When the OME effects were compounded with the Smart Ship effects, it reduced the post-Smart Ship LCS seaframe RQMTS from 115 to 96. See Appendix R. OME produced andditional 16.5% reduction of the baseline RQMTS.

Knowing that the modules will require in excess of 30- 34 additional personnel, the seaframe RQMTS must be reduced even more. This required some “out of the box” paradigm shifts to further reduce the RQMTS. The paradigm shifts
considered were the Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and Workload Transfer concepts.

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C. PARADIGM SHIFTS
“[OME] accomplished [the manpower] reductions by combining watch stations underway, by creating and relying on shore detachments to handle routine preventive maintenance and administrative requirements, and by developing and taking advantage of other efficiencies such as selfservice laundry and food lines [Ref 9]”.

Changes from “business as usual” can accelerate the advances supporting the minimal manning concept. The OME manpower reduction methods can be grouped into three categories of Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and
Workload Transfer. Composite Sailor capitalizes on the watch station combinations and extends that to rates that are similar in function and responsibility. Technology Leverage aggressively uses the Smart Ship technologies to further reduce the RQMTS. Similarly, Workload Transfer
builds upon the supporting precepts of the PAPA detachment and ERM. Workload Transfer seeks to reduce the administrative and routine workload onboard the LCS. This concept also supports the Composite Sailor to allow the ship’s commanding officer more control of the crew’s time.

---1. Composite Sailor - The seaframe’s post-reduction manning initiatives RQMTS was then analyzed for the effects of the Composite Sailor concept. The Composite Sailor RQMTS reductions are:
OPS: QM (2)
CS: GUN/ORD OFF, STG (3)
ENG: MPA, AUXO, EN (4), HT (2), MR
and GS (3)
(See Appendix R for the detail listing of RQMTS affected
by the Composite Sailor concept.)

The Composite Sailor reduced the RQMTS from 96 to 78. Part of the reduction includes the GUN/ORD, MPA and AUXILIARY officer positions. These are assumed covered by the senior FC, GM, GS and EN onboard respectively.

---2. Technology Leverage - From the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) to the selfservice food lines, technology that supports manpower reductions already exists as evidenced by USS Yorktown’s and USS Milius’ successful completion of their experiments and the subsequent deployments.

Key technologies used in this study include:
1) Smart Ship technologies
2) Multi-modal consoles (an emerging technology)
3) Automated damage control devices including the automated mechanical and electrical isolation systems as well as the installed firefighting systems such as the CO2, AFFF and HALON firefighting systems.

The remaining RQMTS were analyzed for reductions
effects from each of the technologies listed above. The
Technology Leverage reductions are:

OPS: QM, OS (5), BM (2), CTT and IT
CS: STG (3), FC (4)
ENG: DCA OFF, EN (2), DC (2), GS (2)
SUPPLY: SK (2), CS (2)

---3. Workload Transfer (Ship to Shore) - Routine workload or routine maintenance was moved ashore to the shore infrastructure co-located with the LCS module personnel. By conducting the routine items ashore, more time was recapitalized by the crew, saving time and RQMTS onboard the LCS. Some of the routine items included those conducted by the EM, EN, FC, GM, and SK rates. The seaframe crew had the ability to “reach-back” to homeport
or other technical supporting sites for assistance, thereby reducing the number of specialties RQMTS onboard the LCS. Each RQMTS, after the Technology Leverage, was then analyzed for the effects of transferring workload ashore. The Workload Transfer concept reduced the following
RQMTS:
CS: GM, FC
ENG: EM, EN
SUPPLY: SK.

Dago

The baseline sum of the individual MIW systems was 93 RQMTS. The biggest RQMTS driver was the aviation component at 57 RQMTS which is over half of the entire module RQMTS. When this sum of 93 was added to the seaframe RQMTS of 45, the MIW focused LCS has 138 RQMTS which was more than the threshold allows. Hence, further reduction must occur. Of the three approaches (Business As Usual, Reduced Manning Initiative and three Paradigm Shifts), only one was applicable here. That was the Composite Sailor paradigm shift. The Composite Sailor allowed the combination of the Operator and Maintainer RQMTS as well as the suggested rate combinations suggested earlier in Table 5 (Suggested Rate
Combination). Table 16 below summarized the suggested rate combinations for the modules.


Once all the RQMTS were analyzed for the effects of the Composite Sailor, the resulting reduced MIW module had 53 RQMTS. When added to the seaframe’s reduced RQMTS, the MIW focused LCS has 98 RQMTS which was within the threshold of 110.


The same methodology was applied to the littoral antisubmarine (ASW) and surface warfare (SUW) modules. The principal differences between these modules and the MIW module are the manned helicopter, which is the MH-60R, and the two USVs. The modules baseline and reduced RQMTS are
summarized in Figure 6 and 7.






The Navy plans to procure 56 LCS seaframes, 47 MIW, 34 ASW and 30 SUW FMPs (total of 111 FMPs). The FMPs do not include the 8 FMPs procured during the development phase. It is assumed that these 8 additional FMPs are 3 MIW, 3 ASW and 2 SUW FMPs. When these eight additional FMPs are added
with the 111, the sum is 119 FMPs (50 MIW, 37 ASW and 32 SUW). However, not all of the seaframes and FMPs will be deployable at any given time. To assign RQMTS to each FMP, even while not deployed, would be an inefficient use of critical human capital. A better way to assign manpower is by skills vice an entire module. This will allow greater flexibility in manpower assignment and reduce the overall LCS force RQMTS. Under the “Business As Usual” approach, the LCS force would be a relatively large “pre-packaged” force. “Prepackaged” means the traditional one-crew one-ship (or in
this case, one-module) assignment. The converse is the “flexed” concept where the crew is deployed as needed regardless of the module. Looking ahead to where 56 seaframes and 119 FMP modules are planned, the estimated LCS manpower force size, under the “pre-packaged” approach would be:

------------------------------------------------
56 seaframes *45 RQMTS = 2520 RQMTS
50 MIW Modules *53 RQMTS = 2650 RQMTS
37 ASW Modules *51 RQMTS = 1887 RQMTS
37 SUW Modules *45 RQMTS = 1440 RQMTs

LCS Force RQMTS = 2520 + 2650 + 1887 + = 8497 Total


8497 RQMTS was a relatively large force size, and this large LCS force size could potentially under-utilize talented human capital. Therefore, more efficient force utilization was assumed under the “flexed” concept. Lessons learned from Smart Ship and OME include changes in watchstanding philosophies to reduce the workload and, ultimately, reduce manning. Smart Ship’s innovative core/flex watchstanding philosophies permitted the ship to meet the spirit of the ROC/POE requirements while improving quality of life and better personnel management. The core/flex watch concept was again used
onboard the USS Milius for OME. Similarly, the LCS module force will be organized and “flexed” to meet operational requirements. The module personnel are organized into twelve (12) different detachments of generalists and specialists. Table 17 summarized the different detachments.


The detachments were similar to the Smart Ship “flexed” watchstanders who were called upon when they were needed. When the detachments were needed to conduct a particular littoral warfare operation, they were deployed
with the modules to the seaframe or theater. However, the number of deployable modules was much less than 119. Only 25% of the 56 seaframes will be deployable at any given time. Suppose there are 15 deployable seaframe, which is approximately 25% of the 56 seaframes planned, then the number of modules required will also be about 25% of the 119 planned. To properly determine the number of MIW, ASW and SUW modules required, first calculate the ratio of each module against the total modules planned.

MIW modules:
50 - 42%
119
ASW modules:
37 - 31%
119
SUW modules:
32 - 27%
119

Next, multiply each ratio by the number of deployable seaframes (in this case 15) to determine the number of FMP modules required.

MIW modules:42%*15 Seaframes = 13.4 ≈13 MIWModules
ASW modules: 31%*15 Seaframes = 9.9 ≈ 10 ASWModules
SUW modules: 27%*15 Seaframes = 8.6 ≈ 9 SUWModules

Therefore, 32 modules are required to support 15 deployable seaframes. The “pre-packaged” deployable LCS force for the 15 seaframes and 32 modules would have 2279 RQMTS, of which 1604 would be required for the FMPs.

15 seafram + *45 = 675
13 MIW + *53 = 689
10 ASW + *51 = 510
9 SUW + *45 = 405

Total - 675 + 689 + 510 + 405 = 2279

The “flexed” deployable LCS module force would only consist of module personnel. The seaframe RQMTS must be “pre-packaged” with the seaframe, but the module RQMTS are more flexible because they are shore-based until needed. Ashore, the module force is organized into the 12 detachments seen earlier in Table 17. Appendix V summarizes the “flexed” detachments, supported warfare and the quantity of each rate within the detachment. If a particular rate supports at least two warfare areas, thenit is considered a generalist. Otherwise, it is a specialist. To calculate the total “flexed” RQMTS, the optimization equation 11 was used.


“Flexed” option has 453 fewer RQMTS than the 1604 “pre-packaged” RQMTS. In the end, the savings is approximately $27.2M per deployment cycle. This estimate used the conservative personnel cost of $60K per RQMT. By multiplying the savings and the deployment rotational factor of 3 to 4, the potential savings range from $80M to $110M.





A. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis supported the minimally manned concept for the LCS seaframe and FMP modules. The top down manpower analysis used SMDs for legacy ships with “business as usual” approach and yielded a focus mission LCS with an
average manning of approximately 207. This estimate, though large, was used as the RQMTS baseline estimate. When reducing the RQMTS baseline, previous manning reduction initiatives like Smart Ship and OME are not enough. The Navy can have minimally manned LCS seaframes and FMP modules if, and only if, the suggested paradigm shifts of Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage and Workload Transfer are pursued. The pursuit could yield an LCS seaframe with 45 RQMTS and the mission-package RQMTS of
45 to 53. The result is a focused mission LCS that meets the threshold limit.
However, the means to reduce the total RQMTS for a focused mission LCS to 75 or less was not readily identifiable. Additionally, this study has also demonstrated that a “flexed” concept of module personnel management could
potentially yield manpower annual cost savings of 25% to 30% or roughly $80M to $110M over the one-crew per module or “pre-packaged” concept.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The minimally manned LCS seaframe and modules can be realized if, and only if, the assumed paradigm shifts with 76 the supporting technologies are pursued. The Smart Ship technologies have proven they can advance changes in policy and operations especially in the areas of ship operation,
training, maintenance and administrative support. Recommendation: Pursue the Composite Sailor, Technology Leverage, and Workload Transfer paradigm shifts as well as advancing the technologies assumed in this study. The technologies appear readily available to support the minimal manning concept intended for LCS. Recommendation: The Composite Sailor paradigm shift
requires the synergy of the BM, CTT, DC, EN, ET, GS, HT, MM, MR, OS, QM, STG and TM rates. Examine the KSAs of these rates to determine the Composite Sailor’s actual requirements for the BM (combination of BM, EN, MM and QM), ET (combination of CTT and ET), DC (combination of DC, HT and MR), EN/GS and STG/TM rates that have been suggested for the LCS.
Recommendation: Conduct a study to determine the optimal training curriculum for the above rates. A series of schools training time and KSA requirements data will support an optimized training pipeline to train these
personnel effectively and efficiently to support the minimal manning concept. Minimal manning onboard LCS will require the ability of this training path to respond to manning shortfalls.

Recommendation: Combine watch-station requirements of Operator and Maintainer into a single Operator/Maintainer requirement to facilitate increased personnel flexibility. This will greatly support flexed organizations like the 77 Smart Ship Core/Flex watch philosophy as well as the “flexed” module force concept. Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Bridge System
(IBS) and Voyage Management System (VMS). Increased digital chart coverage could add to the feasibility of the IBS/VMS system. Use the Integrated Bridge System (IBS) along with the Voyage Management System (VMS) more liberally. Supporting this is the recommendation to increase the coverage provided by digital/electronic charts to reduce the time consuming task of chart preparations and management. When combined with other technologies such as bow thrusters, the IBS/VMS could reduce the ship control requirements down to just a few personnel unlike the crowded legacy ship control requirements.

Recommendation: Pursue the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) and Machinery Control System (MCS) with the improved On-Board Trainer (OBT). Change philosophy to allow ship control and/or operations control personnel to operate and configure ship machinery as required to support operations and changing tactical requirements. Recommendation: Advance the integrated sensor and communications multi-modal consoles (MMC) and the integrated weapons and decoy Weapons Control Consoles (WCC). The MMC assumes all communication and sensors are integrated into a single station for greater effectiveness. The WCC assumes the control functions of the 57MM, CIWS, RAM, Torpedo Decoy Launcher, Air Decoy Launcher and TACTAS combat systems can be integrated into a single location. These systems can significantly add to the watch station reductions, and manpower reduction, in the Combat Information Center (CIC). More importantly it gives the78 decision-maker the ability to access all of the ship’s assets to make timely and informed decisions.

Recommendation: Pursue a UV launch and recovery system that is similar to an overhead rail system with automated winches and controls operable by only one person. Use Visby Swedish Corvette as a model.

Recommendation: Pursue automation technology. The SONAR can only be supported by two Operator/Maintainers if the log-keeping is automated. Similar to the flight data recorders onboard commercial aircrafts, the log-keeping of the SONAR equipment can be automated. This will allow a more accurate data storage and facilitate data for followon analysis. Recommend pursuing this technology.

Recommendation: Operate with unmanned engineering spaces during Condition III steaming. This will leverage the technology to allow the engineers more control of their time. Personnel will only be required for start-ups, shutdowns and condition-based maintenance requirements. The spaces do not have to be manned after start-up and shut-down evolutions. During Condition I, engineering spaces will only require a monitor in the critical
engineering spaces (i.e., main engineroom and electrical generation rooms) to respond and stabilize from casualties. Operating in this manner will also permit bridge and CIC watchstanders to operate the engineering plant in direct support of mission readiness without delay.

Recommendation: Operate with reduced Damage Control party requirements and increase reliance on technology/automation. The Rapid Response Team (RRT), or minimum fire party, requires a scene leader, investigators, 79 nozzleman and hoseman. Employ the RRT initially and augment as required. Primary DCC should be located near machinery controls which is assumed to be in CCS, and secondary should be located near the decision makers either in the pilot house or CIC. In this case, recommend secondary CCS in the pilot house to facilitate greater control and less workload increase in CIC. Recommendation: Organize the shore infrastructure to support the reduced maintenance onboard the LCS using concepts similar to a “pit stop.” Reduce the workload onboard the seaframe. Determine the workload of 45 personnel, and remove the remainder if possible. Conduct as much routine and large maintenance requirements ashore as possible. Both critical and routine spares and parts need to be readily available to sustain the LCS operational availability and reliability.

Recommendation: Assign future LCS personnel to an operational LCS seaframe for indoctrination. With a limited indoctrination period, every LCS sailor must be afforded the opportunity to get familiar with an LCS for a short period of time prior to assignment to either the LCS or the modules. With the largest combined manpower RQMT of 98, a focused LCS can accommodate additional personnel onboard for training and indoctrination with minimal impact on the core crew accommodations. A trainer would be required to manage the training curriculum. In conclusion, personnel assigned to LCS must be trained and qualified to the fullest extent possible. There is very limited flexibility in the LCS force 80 structure to support gaps beyond a reasonable length of time. If a sailor is unable to fulfill their function onboard LCS, a replacement must be ready and available for immediate relief. Otherwise, mission readiness will quickly become an adverse factor.

-------------------------------------------------------------



1. The LCS XX Class ship’s mission is to operate offensively in a high-density multi-threat environment as an integral member of a Carrier Strike Group, Surface Action Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. In addition it provides its own limited Air Defense (AD), limited Surface Warfare (SUW) and Undersea Warfare (USW) self-defense and can effectively provide some local area protection to the Force, Group or other military shipping against subsurface
and surface threats. Accordingly, the following primary and secondary warfare mission areas are assigned:

P = Primary
PF = Primary with FMP
S = Secondary


2. The LCS XX is not capable of providing facilities for an embarked warfare commander and staff.

3. Required Operational Capabilities (ROCs) are reported under readiness conditions having major significance in determining the unit's total manpower
requirements. The following summarizes conditions covered: Condition I: Battle Readiness While in Condition I (Battle Readiness), the ship shall be
capable of meeting the following criteria: able to perform all offensive and defensive functions simultaneously; able to keep all installed systems manned and operating for maximum effectiveness; required to accomplish only minimal maintenance - that routinely associated with watch standing and urgent
repairs. For the LCS XX, this condition means self-defense measures are being performed. Evolutions such asreplenishment, law enforcement or helo operations are not appropriate unless the evolution stations are co-manned by personnel from other battle stations. The maximum expected continuous crew endurance for Condition I is 24 hours.



REQUIRED OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES (Page 93') - AAW, AMW, ASW, MIW, and AUS warfare. (http://www.nps.edu/Research/HCS/Docs...ong_thesis.pdf)


Comparison with other legacy departments.

HKDan

Dago,
In this document it makes mention of CWIS on future LCS. This is the first i have heard of it. Do you know where it would be mounted? Is there a real plan to mount CIWS on later flights of LCS? Just wondering.

Dago

To be perfectly honest, this was the first time i've also heard of the CWIS emplacement on the LCS. As to where it would be mounted? I have no clue. Possibly above the hanger near the weapons stations near the Ram's. Also, you would have to consider potential manpower requirments and associated costs.

Personally, a CWIS is a must in todays enviroment of Ashm's. I just don't see it happening on baseline LCS's due to lean manpower requirments.



As you can see, with the reduced manning, combat systems department have been reduced to 9-10 while manpower requirments (according to baseline) would be around 6 - RCP Oper FC, LCP Oper FC, POIC/Reloader SHIP, Ammo Passer SHIP, Ammo Passer. Which could probably be reduced by 50% due to integrated control consoles and other reduced manning concepts.

HKDan

I agree that CWIS would be nice. I had for some reason been thinking that CWIS had been losing popularity over the past years, Im not seeing them on new DDG IIAs, up until today I hadnt heard of it on LCS either. I always thought of it as being a very useful system. Given that LCS will be operating in areas where it will be relatively easy for someone to get up pretty close, I think a block II CWIS would be a great idea. But thats just my amateur opinion.

RustyBattleship

Close In Weapons Systems (CIWS) of either the 20 mm Vulcan/Phalanx or the 30 mm Goal Keeper is a good back up to longer range anti-missile (or anti-aircraft) weapons such as Sea Sparrow and the British Sea Dart.

Those missiles are the long range riflemen and the CIWS is the short range "Quick Draw" fighters.

And don't worry about finding a place to put them on the ship. Naval ship designers (like me) are always good at packing 12 pounds of potatoes in a 10 pound sack.

PubFather

They fell out of favour as well (in the USN at least) because of the comparatively short-range (2km tops) and because at that range, blast damage from the missile might still damage sensor arrays on the warships. RAM was brought in to ensure a kill far enough away to avoid damage (Its still a CIWS though). The Aster 15 is really a point-defence missile (at least on the Type 45) just that the point is much further away than it used to be. (And doubles as a handy short-mid range weapon on other platforms).

Ironically, they have come back into favour (at least with some, like the RN) because of the effectiveness of the Block B phalanx against small surface targets. RAM can kill a small boat - but guns do it much more cheaply...

Personally, I'd rather have all of them... Standard (Aster 30), ESSM(Aster 15), RAM and Phalanx

__________________
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit - Scottish Motto

"They that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that dislike it, heresy; and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion” Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan

Anon

I always thought the USN should've worked out an improved Goalkeeper type system.

Who builds a gun based CIWS and doesnt use the most powerful rotary cannon ever designed(which is an indigenous design to boot)?

I can see the 20mm phalanx for smaller vessels, but for DDGs and CGs and CVs, i definitely would opt for a 30mm based system instead.

Hell that goofy millenium thingy is like 35mm or something.

PubFather

It's not goofy... its cool although not American. Oerlinkon-Contraves designed it, and LockMart have US distribution contract. Nice piece of kit..

Anon

I think i'd rather stick with the 4200rpm 30x173mm Goalkeeper system.