Rusky is wrong once again.
The following is from
www.gao.gov
GAO-01-636T Report-
In September 2001, DOD informed Congress that the F-22 production program would exceed the congressional cost limit by $5.4 billion and the Air Force would purchase a minimum of 303 aircraft, a reduction of 36 aircraft.21 The Air Force proposed an acquisition plan that extends initial low-rate production two additional years and begins high-rate production in fiscal year 2006 rather than 2004. The proposed plan is designed to provide funds for cost reduction initiatives by funding fewer aircraft in the early production years of the proposed plan. Table 5 shows the planned aircraft purchases under the prior and the proposed acquisition plans and the quantity reductions through 2005.
21The Air Force still intends to try to procure these 36 aircraft if cost savings are realized through ongoing cost savings projects.
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The fiscal year 2002 Defense Appropriations Act provided funds to increase initial low-rate production to 13 F-22 aircraft.22 The act also provided advance procurement funds for F-22s in fiscal year 2003. The Air Force proposes to continue low-rate initial production through 2005 and begin high-rate production of 40 aircraft in fiscal year 2006.
In several reports over the last 7 years, we concluded that DOD should minimize commitments to F-22 production until completion of operational testing. In our March 2001 report, we concluded that limiting production to no more than 10 aircraft a year (the fiscal year 2001 quantity) was a prudent way to mitigate risks until the Air Force completes operational testing.
The Air Force’s current plan would reduce the annual buy of low-rate production aircraft, but it would increase the total commitment of production aircraft before the projected completion of operational testing in December 2003. Specifically, the Air Force had planned to buy 47 aircraft at about $9.8 billion prior to the completion of operational testing in February 2003. However, under the current acquisition plan, it plans to buy 71 aircraft at about $14.9 billion prior to the completion of operational testing, now scheduled for December 2003. Moreover, should the schedule for operational testing slip further, as indicated earlier in this report, the Air Force’s commitment to a greater number of aircraft before the end of operational testing could increase significantly. Buying production articles before they can be adequately tested can result in buying systems that require significant, and sometimes costly, modifications to achieve satisfactory performance; accepting less capable systems than planned; and deploying substandard systems to combat forces. Conversely, lower
22P.L. 107-117, Jan.10, 2002.
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production rates could increase average procurement cost over the life of the program.
GAO-02-298 Report-
The F-22 is an air superiority aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges.8 It has integrated avionics to greatly improve pilots’ awareness of the situation surrounding them. The objectives of the F-22 development program are to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F-22 development test aircraft, 2 non-flying structural test aircraft, 6 production representative test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the support and training systems. The F-22 is being developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin Corporation (for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine).
Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the development phase of the F-22 program, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation of $18.688 billion for F-22 development and a limitation of $43.4 billion for production.9 The act instructed the secretary of the air force to adjust the cost limitation for the amounts of increases or decreases in costs attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 1997, and for compliance with changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30, 1997. Congressional direction in fiscal year 2000 legislation added six production representative test aircraft to the development program, which helped increase the cost limitation to $20.443 billion.
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 required that before the secretary of the air force awards a contract for F-22 low-rate initial production,10 the secretary of defense had to certify that the (1) test plan in the program’s development phase is adequate for determining the
8Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy.
9P.L. 105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.
10P.L. 106-65, Oct. 5, 1999.
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operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22 aircraft and (2) development phase and the production phase for the F-22 program could be executed within the congressionally mandated cost limitations.11 If the Secretary of Defense was unable to make either of these certifications, he would be required to submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes (1) the reasons the certifications could not be made, (2) a revised acquisition plan if the decision to proceed with low-rate initial production is made, and (3) revised cost estimates for the remainder of the development phase and the production phase if the decision is made to proceed with low-rate initial production.
On September 13, 2001, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics notified the congressional defense committees that DOD had approved the F-22 program for low-rate initial production. The under secretary certified that the development test plan is adequate to determine the operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22 aircraft. The under secretary said DOD could not certify that the F-22 development phase or the production phase could be completed within the existing congressional cost limitations. In his letter, he stated that both the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense estimates of the cost to complete the development phase exceeded the cost limitation. He indicated that the development phase would cost an additional $557 million. However, instead of requesting an increase in the cost limitation amount, he asked that the development cost limitation be removed. The under secretary also developed a revised acquisition plan and requested that Congress remove the production cost limitation, estimating that the production phase could cost $5.4 billion more than the $37.6 billion production cost limitation.
In December 2001, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 eliminated the development cost limitation.12 The production cost limitation remains in effect.
11The limitation on production cost does not specify a quantity of F-22 aircraft. 12P.L. 107-107, Dec. 28, 2001.
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