Newsweek
November 7, 2005

'Failure Is Not An Option'

Washington's envoy to Iraq speaks out about the new Constitution, and his strategy for containing the insurgency.


Zalmay Khalilzad has been America's troubleshooter on the most important challenges facing the country. He recently finished a stint as the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, and now he's ambassador to Iraq. He spoke last week to NEWSWEEK's Michael Hirsh in Washington. Excerpts:

HIRSH: Let's start with the vote on the Constitution. What's your reading?

KHALILZAD: The Constitution won by a landslide in terms of popular vote—78 percent. For the Constitution to be rejected, three provinces had to vote it down by two thirds. Two did. So it was therefore close in electoral terms. I think there are additional opportunities for amendments to be made.

Some observers were concerned that this would only exacerbate the sectarian tendencies in the country.

The majority of Sunnis voted against it. That's a fact. But I am hopeful that it will not lead to exacerbation because of the last-minute agreement we made before the vote. It allows for a one-time package of [constitutional] amendments during the first six months of the next Assembly. And I think that will [motivate] Sunnis to participate in the Assembly.

Are you drawing on your experience in Afghanistan, where a unifying leader had prestige and presence? It seems as if it's been impossible to find someone similar in Iraq.

The fact that Afghanistan had a charismatic leader, broadly accepted in Hamid Karzai, was a huge asset. The fact that such a figure was not identified [in Iraq] has been a problem. I think a Hamid Karzai-type figure could have been identified early on, because when there is a role, usually a person can be found to fill it. But in Afghan-istan we immediately went to an Afghan interim-government formation. Here we had a period of the CPA.

You think that was done wrong.

No, I'm not saying that. I wasn't responsible for Iraq at that time and the complexity of the situation may not be entirely clear to me.

One of the people some in the Pentagon thought should have been head of the government was Ahmad Chalabi. Interestingly enough, Chalabi is now one of the leading contenders heading into the December election. When you talk about finding a Hamid Karzai-like figure, is that who you have in mind?

Well, Mr. Chalabi is one of several candidates who are running for office.

Let's talk about the Sunni insurgency. It seems as if the strategy of trying to divide extremists from those Iraqi Sunnis with whom we can negotiate has been central to your approach.

Absolutely.

Could you talk about which Sunni insurgent groups you are hopeful about winning away?

My philosophy is that we need to isolate two groups from the rest. The first is [Abu Musab] Zarqawi and the jihadists, some foreign and some Iraqis. And the second is the Saddamists, those who want Saddamism to come back. As far as the rest are concerned, our effort has been to win them away. I have been very active with Sunni Arabs, reaching out to them.

On the tribal level?

Across the board. Tribes, yes. Nontribal political leaders, yes. Academics, professionals, yes. Some former government officials who were not criminals, yes. You name it.

What particular successes can you point to?

One is we've got some key Sunnis supporting the Constitution. Second, many more are supporting the political proc-ess. Now we have some tribes coming forward, like the Albu Mahal, that are saying they will fight against Zarqawi. So what's happening for maybe the first time since the liberation is a real struggle going on in the Sunni community between those who want to participate in the process and those who want a protracted insurgency.

Some observers say your strategy is exactly right—the only problem is that you're at least a year too late in coming in.

Well, I don't want to look back. But it's very important in my view to engage politically. And to communicate our goals. Our goal is not to rule Iraq. Our goal is not to have permanent bases in Iraq. Our goal is not to take over Iraqi oil or other Iraqi patrimony... It's very important that there is a balance between our various instruments—military, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural. If you have a hammer, pretty soon everything looks like a nail. I believe if I could say one thing, we're rebalancing the instruments.

What do you say to the mother and father of a soldier who has died in Iraq about why?

I have participated in a lot of ceremonies for dead Americans. The price has been extremely high for the United States. I believe that given that, we have to be extremely careful about the use of military force. [But] whatever you think of the circumstances that led us into Iraq, now that we are there, the struggle has been joined, and it is a struggle not only for Iraq but for the entire region. Failure is not an option.