Thread: Russia says opposes use of force against Iran

Why should'nt Iran have a nuclear programme?

Here's the American position/policy towards Iran:

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http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/46528.htm

United States’ Policy Toward Iran

R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
May 19, 2005
As Prepared for Delivery

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Biden and distinguished Members of the Committee, for the opportunity to discuss with you today United States’ policy toward Iran.

Iran remains a serious foreign policy challenge for our country and the democratic world at large. For nearly a quarter century the United States and Iran have been without diplomatic relations. With the images of our Embassy hostages seared so deeply into our collective consciousness, it is easy to forget that our countries once enjoyed excellent relations and, only a generation ago, 200,000 Iranians were studying in the U.S. The United States is proud to be home to a large community of extremely talented Iranian immigrants who preserve a cultural and personal bridge to Iran where diplomatic contact long ago broke off.

It is not with the Iranian people, but with the Iranian regime’s threatening and often irresponsible behavior, that our concerns rest. We have repeatedly made clear our grave concerns regarding the Iranian government’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems; its sponsorship of terrorism including its direct support to Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups; its appalling human rights and democracy record; its support for violent opposition to efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East; and its interference in the affairs of its neighbors -- especially Afghanistan and Iraq.

Each of these issues is of vital concern to the United States and, in each and every case, Iran has a position inimical to that of the United States and the international community. At a time when countries across the region are moving towards greater openness, political participation and economic freedom, Iran stands in stark contrast.

Our concerns with Iran are not merely historical; they do not simply reflect the pain felt, real as that pain is, over the storming of our Embassy more than two and a half decades ago. It is Iran’s actions and policies today that drive our policy. Iranian government policies, loosely grouped into three broad categories that I will discuss briefly today, directly threaten U.S. interests in the region and beyond.

In each of these three areas, Iran has a demonstrated track record of moving backwards against the tide of world events. I will start with Iran’s freedom deficit, appropriate given the recent election of democratic governments in two of Iran’s neighbors and the upcoming June 17 Presidential elections in Iran.

IRAN’S DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD

Iran is a great country with a unique history and culture. The Iranian people have made extraordinary contributions in many fields for thousands of years. Modern Iran will undoubtedly remain a significant country in the future of the broader Middle East.

The United States believes the future of Iran should be democratic and pluralistic. We support those who wish to see Iran transformed from a rigid, intolerant theocracy to a modern state. A peaceful, democratic Iran would be a key feature in a reformed, more democratic Middle East. We believe Iran is a country in the process of change. Some two-thirds of its people are below the age of thirty-five. Many young Iranians support the need for a more positive relationship with the U.S. In fact, the U.S. may have a more positive public image in Iran than in other countries of the region. We sense that the sentiment among ordinary Iranians for change – for reform and democracy – is strong. But that sentiment is ignored by the ruling clique.

Iran suffers from a deficit of freedom. The regime’s human rights record remains abysmal and the government continues to commit numerous, serious abuses, including summary executions, disappearances, torture and other inhumane treatment. In the late 1990s, elements of Iran’s secret services murdered a number of intellectuals and oppositionists. In 2000, a courageous journalist named Akbar Ganji was imprisoned for uncovering the truth and reporting it in his newspaper. Since Ganji was imprisoned, many journalists and even webloggers have been taken into prison where they have been abused and threatened. The Iranian government’s actions have essentially eliminated the free press in Iran. In 2003, an Iranian–Canadian photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi, was beaten to death in detention. The investigation and trial have been a farce and the Canadian government has taken steps to scale back its relations with Iran.

During student protests in June 2003, 4,000 demonstrators were arrested; a few are still held. In December 2003, Parliamentarian Mohsen Mirdamadi was beaten by vigilantes as he started a speech in Yazd. Before the 2004 elections, when reformist members of parliament signed a petition to the Supreme leader asking for more democracy, they were threatened with arrest and arbitrarily stripped of their parliamentary immunity.

In fall 2004, for a second year in a row, the United States co-sponsored and actively supported a Canadian resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning the human rights situation in Iran. The Iran human rights resolution passed in the UN General Assembly’s 59th Plenary, sending an important signal to the Iranian people that the international community recognized their suffering and to the Iranian Government that dialogue on human rights was no substitute for concrete action to improve its record, and that the serious concern about Iran’s overall international behavior would not blunt the international community’s focus on the internal human rights situation.

On the surface, the Iranian government points to a picture of an active democracy in which Iranians participate regularly in national and local elections. But this is a veneer behind which lies a perverted process whose integrity is severely compromised by the oppressive oversight exercised by hard-line clerical bodies. One of the most egregious recent examples of this extraordinary system was the rigging of the February 2004 Majles elections, in which the Guardian Council disqualified thousands of reformist candidates, including more than 85 sitting members of the Majles. We commend the bravery and dedication of the many ordinary Iranians who put their livelihoods at risk to advance the principles of democracy, religious tolerance, and the accountability of the government to its own people.

We are similarly very concerned that the upcoming June 17 Presidential elections will represent another setback for the democratic hopes of the Iranian people. Candidate registration started Tuesday, May 10 in Iran and ended May 15. At the end of the registration period, the names of the Presidential candidates will be forwarded to the 12-member Guardian Council, which then has up to 10 days to assess the eligibility of the candidates. There is every indication the June election will not result in a meaningful expression of the popular will, because the political process and the media are controlled and manipulated by an unelected few – the clerical elite and their associates. These unelected leaders dominate Iran’s political system, have the power to intimidate and disqualify candidates, and through the exercise of that power have stymied popular demands for freedom. Of the over 1,000 Iranians who have registered to run in the upcoming elections, the Guardian Council is likely to approve less than a dozen candidates. Indeed, in 2001, only 10 of the 814 registered candidates were allowed to run. The diminished role of women in Iranian political life since the February 2004 Majles elections is another clear indicator of the regime’s effectiveness in stymieing free popular will and of its anti-democratic beliefs.

In November 2003 at the National Endowment for Democracy, President Bush outlined a forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East. He said that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.” In his 2005 Inaugural Address, the President reiterated America’s support for the people of the broader Middle East and North Africa in their fight for freedom. “We will persistently clarify the choice before every ruler in every nation: The moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right.” President Bush spoke directly to the Iranian people in his February 2, 2005, State of the Union Address, saying: “As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.”

The Administration is deeply appreciative of Congress’ and this Committee’s support for the resources that enable us to implement the President’s Freedom agenda and reach out to the Iranian people. A few examples:

-- Since May 2003 we have funded a Persian language website that serves as a “virtual embassy” by providing the only channel for both U.S. policy statements in Persian as well as a range of information about democracy, American society and values, and consular information.

-- We are also funding political discussion in Persian on television and radio broadcasts into Iran under the auspices of the Voice of America. Recently VOA announced that it was increasing the duration of these broadcasts. The U.S. government also funds news and music broadcasts into Iran on Radio Farda. This service is specifically targeted at the large population of younger people in Iran.

-- The FY2005 Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act doubled to three million dollars the funds available to our Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau to support the advancement of human rights and democracy in Iran. We are currently reviewing applications for FY2005; in 2004 we provided one million dollars to document human rights abuses inside Iran and $500,000 for National Endowment for Democracy programming.

-- We have also recently established, with European and Canadian allies, a Human Rights Working Group that will convene quarterly to share information and coordinate our approach to the issue.

These initiatives and programs require resources. Our commitment of funds to support freedom in Iran is tangible evidence of the United States’ support for a better future for the Iranian people, and we appreciate Congressional support for our programs and efforts.

The freedom deficit and the severe restriction on free expression and fair elections is the first of our concerns with Iranian government policy.

COUNTERING IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

A second and critical U.S. concern is our strong and resolute opposition to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s desire to acquire a nuclear weapon threatens the peace and security of the United States, our friends and allies, and the stability of the entire region. Iran’s demonstrated track record of nuclear deception and denial is troubling, including an 18-year history of trying to hide from the world a clandestine enrichment program, undeclared plutonium separation experiments, and other suspicious activities, as reported by IAEA Director General El Baradei. Iran failed to report the irradiation of uranium targets and subsequent processing of those targets to separate plutonium. Iran failed to report the use of imported natural UF6 for the testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric company. Iran failed to declare the pilot enrichment facility at Kalaye Electric, the laser enrichment plant at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, and the pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at Lashkar Ab'ad. The list of Iran’s failures goes on and on and represents – not mere administrative failures – but, in our view, the foundation pillars of a clandestine nuclear weapons development program.

We see no sign Iran has made the necessary strategic decision to abandon what we conclude is an active nuclear weapons program. Iran’s repeated brinksmanship in its negotiations with the “European Union Three” or EU3, of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, is part of Iran’s continuing effort to divide the international community, weaken our resolve and avoid adhering to its international obligations.

On this issue, though, let there be no misunderstanding in Tehran. The international community stands united: Iran must not be permitted to develop the capacity to build or deliver a nuclear weapon. Many in the United States were skeptical of the chances of success for the EU3 diplomatic effort, given Iran’s track record. But President Bush, on his recent visits to Europe and Moscow, heard a clear commitment from our friends and Allies: we share the goal of denying Iran a nuclear weapon and recognize that there must be consequences should Tehran fail to adhere to its international commitments. Our partners made clear that Iran must provide objective guarantees to demonstrate that it is not pursuing a clandestine weapons program under the cover of a civilian nuclear energy program. On this point, the bar for Iran must be set high: its history of deception of the IAEA and the world has undermined the international community’s trust. To paraphrase a great American President: if we don’t trust, then we really must verify.

During his visit to Europe in February, the President heard from our friends of the importance of United States’ support for the EU3 diplomatic process, in order to reinforce to the world that the ball lies squarely in Iran’s court to adhere to its agreements. On March 11, Secretary Rice announced that the U.S. was prepared to take tangible, practical steps in support of the EU3 diplomatic track, and would no longer block Iran’s application to join the WTO and would consider licensing the export of spare parts for civilian passenger aircraft to Iran. Since that time, we have maintained a near constant dialogue with the EU3. For example, the Secretary saw UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on Tuesday, and I speak on a daily basis with my UK, French and German counterparts to reinforce our utmost support for their leadership on this incredibly vital issue to our shared security interests.

The EU3 deserves our appreciation for its efforts to resolve Iran’s nuclear challenge through patient, principled diplomacy. Iran appears to have maintained its suspension pledge since November 22, 2004 but has asserted several times in recent weeks that it intends to resume uranium conversion activities at Isfahan which are covered by its November 2004 agreement with the EU3, and would require the breaking of IAEA seals in place to monitor that suspension. The Europeans have made plain their deep concern with this possibility and reaffirmed that these activities would constitute an Iranian breach of the agreement, ending the negotiation process and requiring action by the international community. We support the EU3 in their commitment to the Paris Agreement signed in November and believe that, if it is breached, the United States and the EU3 must support a resolution in the IAEA Board of Governors reporting Iran to the UN Security Council.

President Bush and Secretary Rice have made clear publicly that we support a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Iranian nuclear problem. That is why we support the EU3 process. Our message to Tehran today is: adhere to the Paris Agreement, maintain suspension of all nuclear-related activities, and negotiate in good faith the eventual cessation and dismantling of all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities.

The spotlight must remain on the Iranian government and on the requirement that the Iranian government adhere to its international commitments. Unfortunately, we see no sign of a strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons efforts, and, particularly in the light of recent threats by Tehran to resume enrichment, we remain deeply skeptical of Iran’s intentions. U.S. policy toward Iran on this urgent issue is resolute. As President Bush noted on September 27, 2004: “We’ve made it clear, our position is that they won’t have a nuclear weapon.”

IRAN’S DESTABILIZING IMPACT ON THE REGION AND BEYOND

Iran has already used another unconventional weapon – terrorism – against innocent Americans, Europeans, Arabs, Israelis and others. Iran remains the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world. The State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Terrorism notes that “its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals.” Iran’s extensive involvement in supporting terrorism truly puts it in a class by itself.

We are deeply concerned about Iran's connections to numerous terrorist groups, including those that violently object to the right of Israel to exist or to any negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians. For example, Iran provides money, weapons, and training to HAMAS, Hizballah, and Palestinian rejectionist groups. These are some of the world’s most deadly terrorist organizations, responsible for the killing of thousands of innocents, including Americans. Hizballah, for example, has been responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization in the world apart from al-Qaida. Furthermore, Iran’s support for these groups fuels terrorist violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories, seeking to undermine the prospects for Middle East peace at this moment of historic opportunity.

Iran continues to hold senior al-Qaida leaders who are wanted for murdering Americans and others in the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings and for plotting to kill countless others. Iran has refused to identify those individuals in its custody.

We have sanctioned Iran as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and called for the regime to abide by the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or commit terrorist acts and to affirmatively take steps to prevent terrorist acts by providing early warning to other states by exchange of information. Iran should immediately turn over to face justice all al-Qaida related terrorists in its custody or on Iranian soil to appropriate jurisdictions.

We are also working closely with the UN and our key allies, particularly France, to fully implement UNSCR 1559, which calls for the dismantling of all armed militias in Lebanon, including Lebanese Hizballah. Iran has provided Lebanese Hizballah with funding, safe haven, training and weapons. We all remember that Lebanese Hizballah was responsible for the death of hundreds of Americans in Beirut in the 1980s.

As we meet with our allies from around the world, we take every opportunity to express our concerns about Iran’s support for terrorism and our concerns about Iranian interference in the efforts to secure a lasting, just peace between the Israelis and Palestinians. We actively seek the involvement of the international community to reflect those concerns in their dealings with the regime, diplomatically as well as commercially.

Iran must also live up to its commitments to develop productive relationships with its neighbors, support the new Iraqi government, and renounce in word and deed any relationship to individuals or groups that support instability and engage in terrorism.

Iran is not meeting these commitments with regard to Iraq. Iran made commitments to Iraq and the international community at the November 2004 Ministerial Conference in Sharm El Sheikh to assist Iraq in its security (including border control), to support the political process, and to practice non-interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Unfortunately, we see little evidence of Iranian assistance, and continuing troubling indications of Iranian interference in Iraqi internal affairs.

We will continue to work closely with the new Iraqi government to address all issues related to Iraq's stability and security. In our dealings throughout the region we continue to stress the importance of protecting Iraqi sovereignty.

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the success of the worst regime elements in reasserting control over parliament, Iranian society is moving in its own positive direction. Iranians are unhappy about the Guardian Council’s heavy-handed exclusion of reformist candidates from elections, the government’s curtailment of press freedoms, and the deteriorating human rights situation. In addition, they are frustrated by the country’s chronic unemployment and their government’s failure to provide jobs for the thousands of young Iranians entering the work force each year. Structural flaws in the economy can be papered over with extraordinarily high oil revenues, but they don’t go away. Iran is a great nation which has given the entire world a powerful cultural legacy and the Iranians have much yet to offer in the years ahead.

It is our hope that U.S. relations with Iran will change for the better; but that cannot happen without a change in Iran’s policies in the areas I have discussed. The pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems makes Iran less secure and the region more unstable. The regime must end its sponsorship of terrorism, including its direct support to Hizballah and Palestinian rejectionist groups and begin to help build a better life for all parties involved. American citizens hear about Iranians who have gone to jail or have been murdered. How can we be silent when we see individual Iranians risking everything to achieve the democratic freedoms we ourselves treasure? How can we turn our backs when the Iranian regime attempts to subvert the newborn democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan?

We have had no diplomatic relations with Tehran for more than 25 years, through five Presidential administrations from both political parties. While we are optimistic about Iran’s future, the onus to improve its relationship with the rest of the world is squarely on Tehran and will be found in concrete actions in the three broad areas I discussed briefly today. For all the lack of diplomatic contact, there is no lack of communication about what is necessary to transform this relationship. The government in Tehran knows what is expected of it, and must act if it wishes to rejoin the community of civilized nations.



Released on May 19, 2005

I'm pulling some articles from think tanks to provide a better technical picture of the issues:

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http://www.isis-online.org/publicati...iranoffer.html

Iran Proposal to the EU Falls Far Short of an Acceptable Agreement
Institute for Science and International Security

May 3, 2005

The agreement tabled by Iran in its negotiations with the European Union (EU) falls far short of a permanent suspension of the gas centrifuge program, and would allow Iran to move significantly closer to a large uranium enrichment capability.

In their proposal, Iran offers a deal that involves installing 3,000 gas centrifuges at Natanz, which would give Iran a significant uranium enrichment capability. Because the installation of 3,000 centrifuges is far too large for the pilot plant, it would likely involve installing gas centrifuges in the large underground cascade halls for the first time. Subsequent phases of the proposed deal would involve the commissioning of the 3,000 centrifuges and the installation and commissioning of thousands more centrifuges at the underground site. For a newly annotated image of the Natanz site showing the location of the underground cascade halls, click here.

Iran has pledged that the installed centrifuges would be solely dedicated to making low enriched uranium (LEU) for nuclear reactor fuel. The 3,000 centrifuges would be sufficient to produce about 2-3 tonnes of LEU per year, but this is far less than the 25 tonnes of LEU that will be required annually for the nuclear power reactor under construction at Bushehr.

LEU cannot be used directly to make nuclear weapons, however Iran could decide in the future to use these same centrifuges to quickly make highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. As long as international safeguards are in place, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would know if such an increase in enrichment level occurs but would not be able to prevent it. The 3,000 centrifuges would be able to produce enough HEU for about 2-3 nuclear weapons per year.

The 3,000 proposed centrifuges are identical to the number of machines in a "block" of the underground enrichment plant designed to hold 50,000 centrifuges. A block is a predetermined module which is designed to be the basic unit of the full-scale fuel enrichment plant. If Iran is able to operate one complete block of centrifuges, they would gain the expertise in centrifuge installation and operation that they have not yet been able to acquire, and which is a necessary hurdle to overcome in order to operate the complete, 50,000 machine uranium enrichment plant that Iran plans to complete.

This offer from Iran would also mean that Iran would have to resume operations at the uranium conversion facility to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed material that flows through the centrifuges in the enrichment process.

The deal proposed by Iran is not adequate to end the threat posed by the Iranian uranium enrichment program. The fundamental goal of the negotiations between the EU and Iran remains the permanent suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment program, while facilitating Iran's access to nuclear power and a guaranteed fuel supply. Iran must understand that the likely alternative to reaching agreement is for the issue to be referred to the UN Security Council. Given Iran's past violations of its IAEA safeguards agreements, and strong suspicions that it seeks nuclear weapons, the European Union negotiators are right to pursue a better deal than the one offered by Iran.

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/index.html

Iran: Countdown to showdown

By David Albright and Corey Hinderstein
November/December 2004 pp. 67-72 (vol. 60, no. 6) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

The United States wanted the Security Council to sanction Iran, but the European Union preferred to make a deal. Now Iran appears to have backed out of their agreement . . .

The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, reported to the board of governors on September 1, 2004, that Iran intended to convert 37 metric tons of yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride, the "feed" material that is enriched in gas centrifuges. It was a surprising revelation--37 metric tons is a small quantity for a civilian nuclear power program. But it would be a large amount for a fledgling nuclear weapons program--enough material to make roughly five crude nuclear weapons.

Iran's processing of yellowcake represents another step in its abandonment of a short-lived agreement with the European Union (EU), signed in October 2003, that offered Iran a range of benefits in exchange for suspending its uranium enrichment program. Iran formally broke the deal when it announced that it was once again starting to assemble centrifuges. Iranian officials reportedly added they would likely start enriching uranium in fall 2004.

The breakdown of the agreement alarmed members of the European Union and the United States. Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister and a leader of the EU's effort in Iran, said on September 13: "There is a risk Iran is making a huge error. I hope they understand that. If not, we will end up in a very serious situation."

The suspension issue dominated the IAEA's board of governors meeting, held September 13-18. During the contentious debate over a resolution on the matter, the United States argued that Iran should be referred to the U.N. Security Council and tried to add language to a draft resolution requiring Iran to remedy "all failures identified to date" no later than October 31. The EU refused to accept such a rigid trigger, preferring to give Iran one last chance for a negotiated solution, with language included in the resolution requiring the board to make a "definitive determination on whether or not further steps are required."

Members of the non-aligned movement, led by South Africa and Brazil, were alarmed that the resolution would deny Iran the right to peaceful nuclear activities, namely the right to process uranium for nuclear fuel.

In the end, the board adopted a consensus resolution that was somewhat weaker than the original EU proposal, but considerably stronger than that called for by the non-aligned. It called on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities immediately and as a matter of necessity reconsider its decision to construct a heavy-water research reactor. The resolution created a trigger for action, stating that the board "will decide whether or not further steps are appropriate" in November. The European Union and the United States left little doubt that failure on Iran's part could lead to a referral to the Security Council.

The board meeting and resolution also focused on the IAEA's two-year effort to verify that Iran's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes. The IAEA began an intensive investigation in 2002 after learning that Iran was building nuclear sites in secret. Complicating the process, Iran provided a series of incomplete and changing declarations and delayed inspectors' access to key sites.

The new resolution requires the IAEA to produce a comprehensive report before the November meeting that recapitulates its findings since September 2002 and analyzes in detail the implications of those findings with regard to Iran's implementation of its IAEA safeguards agreement. The resolution states that the board will also consider this report in deciding about future steps.

After the meeting, Fischer issued a statement expressing the EU's keen interest in resuming negotiations that might persuade Iran to permanently suspend uranium enrichment activities in return for more immediate benefits. Other countries, such as Japan, Russia, and perhaps the United States, could also engage Iran directly.

Iran sent a mixed signal in response to the board's resolution. Many Iranian officials called the resolution illegal or unjust and vowed to persist in developing the entire fuel cycle. Iranian Vice President Reza Aghazadeh said to reporters soon after the meeting that Iran continues to produce uranium hexafluoride gas. Hassan Rowhani, secretary of the powerful Supreme National Security Council and the EU's counterpart in negotiations, criticized the resolution but stopped short of rejecting it outright or foreclosing negotiations.



Getting Iran to suspend
The suspension of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities lies at the heart of any potential solution to the conflict with Iran. Iran's original agreement to suspend dates to October 2003, when the British, French, and German foreign ministers and Rowhani reached an agreement requiring Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to address and resolve outstanding issues, voluntarily suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, and sign and start the ratification process of the IAEA's advanced safeguards protocol. [1]

In return, the EU foreign ministers promised that their governments would recognize Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expressed their willingness to help resolve the situation with the IAEA board of governors and promote security and stability in the region. They also committed their governments to providing Iran easier access to modern technology and supplies once international concerns were fully resolved. The latter was conditioned, according to a participant in the meeting, on an indefinite continuance of the suspension of enrichment activities.

At first, Iranian cooperation with the IAEA appeared to improve. Iran signed the advanced protocol and announced it would act as if it were in force pending ratification by its parliament. It also started to implement the suspension itself.

Earlier this year, some EU countries wanted to start to deliver some incentives to Iran, concerned that Iran needed some immediate benefits to build domestic support for the October agreement, which powerful factions within Iran were known to oppose.

But problems in implementing the agreement had developed, leading to pressure on the European Union not to provide benefits. Additional undeclared Iranian nuclear activities were revealed, including its secret acquisition of advanced "P2" centrifuge designs and components from Pakistan. Iran was also slow in suspending its centrifuge operations, deciding that some components would continue to be made under contracts with private companies that, it said, could not be broken.

Iran also asserted in a May 18 letter to the IAEA that it was not committed to ending its production of uranium hexafluoride. The EU believed that to be a reinterpretation of the October 2003 agreement. Also contrary to the EU's understanding was Iran's intention to build a heavy-water research reactor.

Then, on June 23, Iran told the IAEA that it would resume manufacturing centrifuge components and assembling and testing centrifuges. But, Iranian officials said, it would not restart enriching uranium, and it would conduct all its activities under IAEA supervision.

On June 27, Iran cut the IAEA seals on its existing centrifuge components and started assembling centrifuges from its existing stock of components. Manufacturing of certain key components was delayed because Iran had dismantled its centrifuge manufacturing capabilities at military sites, partly as a way to avoid IAEA inspections at these facilities.



Remaining safeguards issues
During the summer, the IAEA managed to clear up some outstanding safeguards issues, including Iran's experimental laser enrichment activities. Also, no additional undeclared Iranian nuclear activities emerged. But other safeguards issues remained. According to ElBaradei, the two principal outstanding issues involved the origin of uranium contamination found at various locations in Iran, and the completeness of Iran's declaration about the P2 gas centrifuges.

The IAEA was able to at least plausibly assess that Iran had not produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) at its two major declared research and development sites, Kalaye and Natanz. However, the IAEA needs to do more work to establish that undeclared enrichment has not taken place at other locations and that no undeclared enriched uranium has been imported from abroad.

The IAEA is still investigating Iran's P2 gas centrifuge program. An important outstanding issue is whether Iran conducted any P2 work between 1995--when Iran first received the P2 designs from overseas--and 2002, which is when, Iranian officials say, work on the P2 started.

The inspectors need more cooperation from Pakistan. Although it is providing information and sampling data, it still refuses to allow the IAEA to question A. Q. Khan or take its own samples in Pakistan. Without this type of access, the IAEA might not be able to finish its assessments of Iran's nuclear program and declaration.



Weaponization
Questions remain about whether Iran has conducted activities to research, test, and produce a nuclear weapon itself, a process called nuclear weaponization. Although the U.S. government and Israel have stated for years that Iran has a nuclear weapons program, they have not provided the IAEA or the public with the location of any nuclear weaponization sites or any direct evidence of such activities. They have largely arrived at their conclusion that Iran has a nuclear weapons program through indirect assessments.

One theory is that the Khan network, which supplied both Libya's and Iran's gas centrifuge program, supplied Iran with a weapon design. Libya received detailed nuclear weapon design and fabrication documents from the Khan network, leading to suspicions that Iran also received them, something Iran and Pakistan deny.

The design supplied to Libya appears to be for a Chinese warhead that was tested on a missile in the mid-1960s and provided to Pakistan in the early 1980s. The warhead has a mass of about 500 kilograms, and measures less than a meter in diameter, small enough for the Iranian Shahab 3 missile. If Iran received this information, it would have been able to short-circuit the difficult process of developing a deliverable nuclear warhead. If it received the designs several years ago, Iran could have already finished all the necessary research and development for a nuclear warhead, and perhaps even stockpiled key components.

The IAEA is evaluating Iranian sites that could have been or potentially could be used for nuclear weaponization activities, although no unambiguous sites have been identified. Nonetheless, the IAEA has sought to visit several sites to check out suspicions of nuclear weaponization work:

Lavizan-Shian. In early June 2004, ABC News received information about Lavizan, in the northeastern section of Tehran. ABC asked the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) for help in assessing the information. The initial information suggested the site was involved in some type of nuclear weaponization.

An August 2003 overhead image of the site obtained by ISIS shows large buildings inside a secure perimeter. In a second image, from March 2004, the buildings have been removed and the earth scraped. Even the roads and walkways have been removed or covered.

The site's destruction raised concerns because it is the type of measure Iran would take if it were trying to defeat the powerful environmental sampling capabilities of IAEA inspectors. When Iran deployed less extensive deception measures at other sites, inspectors discovered evidence that forced Iran to amend its previous statements.

The Lavizan site was also known to house radiation-detection devices called whole-body counters, which Iran procured overseas in the early 1990s under false pretenses. The equipment itself is not direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program, but it could be out of place at a site that has no nuclear activity.

The IAEA became aware of the Lavizan-Shian site in 2003. Its suspicions apparently increased in early 2004 when commercial satellite imagery showed that dismantling had begun.

The ABC News report about the site and the parallel publication of an ISIS report caused considerable public and government discussion. The IAEA asked for and received permission to visit. Iran told the IAEA that the site had no nuclear material requiring a declaration, and that no fuel cycle activities were conducted there.

The Iranians described Lavizan as owned by the Military Industrialization Organization (MIO). Until 1998, it was a physics institute; afterward, a biotechnology institute. The body counters arrived after 1998. Later, the counters were moved again. One went to an MIO university in Esfahan, the other to a private clinic in Tehran. Iran provided a basic description of activities at the site, but was unwilling to provide detailed explanations about its activities or equipment, citing security concerns. The September 2004 IAEA director general's report to the board of governors says that Iran had declared the site as a place to study "preparedness to combat and neutralization of casualties due to nuclear attacks and accidents (nuclear defense) and also support and provide scientific advice and services to the Ministry of Defense."

Iran said the site was razed because the land was being returned to the city of Tehran after a dispute between the municipality and the ministry. Iran provided the IAEA with supporting documents, including yellowed local newspapers discussing the transfer of property. The IAEA is analyzing these documents to determine their authenticity.

The IAEA took environmental samples at Lavizan. As of late September, the results of preliminary environmental sampling showed no evidence of undeclared plutonium or HEU. In addition, Iran allowed IAEA access to the two whole-body counters that had been located there.

Iranian statements about Lavizan's purpose and fate have raised additional questions. Given the power of the Iranian military, how could it lose a dispute with municipal authorities, particularly given the large size of the adjacent park and the considerable investment already made at the site? Or had the military decided that the site was compromised, and moved to improve its cover story by transferring the site to municipal authorities? No direct evidence points to the site being involved in nuclear weaponization, centrifuge activities, or other banned activities such as biological weapons work, but the IAEA investigation remains incomplete and further Iranian cooperation and information are required.

Parchin. Information obtained by ABC News led ISIS to acquire satellite images of the Parchin military complex, located about 30 kilometers southeast of Tehran. This huge complex is dedicated to research, development, and production of ammunition, rockets, and high explosives. The site, owned by Iran's military industry, has hundreds of buildings and test sites.

Within the larger complex, there is an isolated, separately secured site that is a logical candidate for nuclear weapons-related activities. But evidence of nuclear weapons work is ambiguous.

The IAEA has known about this site for some time and has independently assessed its potential for nuclear weapons work. Several weeks before the September board of governors meeting, the IAEA asked Iran about visiting the location, but Iran expressed willingness to allow a visit only after ABC News and ISIS revealed their findings during the September board meeting. Although the timing of the ABC News report was not intentional, the reports caused considerable controversy at the board meeting, intensifying pressure on Iran to permit an IAEA visit, which could take place in October.

High-explosive testing facilities at Parchin could be useful to a nuclear weapons effort, particularly by providing the capability to research and develop high-explosive components for an implosion-type nuclear weapon. Buildings in one area appear to have flash X-rays and fast cameras for recording explosions. Arguing against the area being solely dedicated to high-explosive work is another building that appears to have a pad oriented for testing small rocket motors, not high explosives.

Nearby, but more isolated, is what appears to be a high-explosive testing bunker, perhaps still under construction. Such a bunker, which is partly buried, would allow the study of large explosions for a variety of purposes, including the development of nuclear weapons. The presence of this structure has increased suspicion that the site might be involved in researching nuclear weapons.

This bunker could be where Iran would test a full-scale mock-up of a nuclear explosive using natural or depleted uranium as a surrogate for a highly enriched uranium core. Such tests can provide key confirmation that a nuclear weapon will work adequately. Iraq had constructed a high-explosive testing bunker at Al Atheer before the 1991 Persian Gulf War partly for such a purpose. The bunker at Parchin has some similar characteristics, such as being partly buried. However, the imagery of the bunker at Parchin is not sufficient to draw detailed comparisons.



The timetable
One Israeli intelligence report, a portion of which was leaked to the media, claims that Iran could get enough HEU for a first nuclear weapon by early 2007. [2] The U.S. intelligence community assessment is reportedly that Iran could have a nuclear weapon in three to five years. But more recent estimates of the timeline for Iran to build its first nuclear weapon have moved the date back. Reasons for the change probably include Iran's suspension of its enrichment program and greater appreciation outside Iran of problems in Iran's centrifuge program as a result of the inspection effort.

The key to predicting the timetable is understanding the pace and scope of Iran's gas centrifuge program, such as the schedule for establishing a centrifuge plant that would hold about 1,500-2,000 centrifuges. Such a facility could produce enough HEU for about one nuclear weapon a year.

By spring 2004, Iran had assembled 1,140 centrifuge rotors, a reasonable indicator of the number of centrifuges it possessed. [3] However, only about 500 rotors were good enough to operate.

According to the September IAEA safeguards report, after resuming centrifuge manufacturing in June, Iran had assembled and tested about 70 centrifuge rotors by mid-August.

With this information, the intelligence estimates can be understood. Assuming that Iran does not suspend its activities again, and that it makes and tests about 70-100 centrifuges per month, it could have roughly 800-1,000 good centrifuges by the end of 2004. It could then build another 800-1,200 good centrifuges in 2005, resulting in about 1,600-2,200 centrifuges. Given another year to make enough HEU for a nuclear weapon and a few more months to convert the uranium into weapon components, Iran could have its first nuclear weapon by early 2007.

However, this scenario must be viewed as Iran's best case under prevailing conditions. Iran might not be able to meet such a schedule for bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. The suspension of manufacturing and operating centrifuges could be reestablished, or Iran might have trouble making so many centrifuges. In addition, Iran does not appear to have accumulated enough experience to operate a cascade of centrifuges reliably. Iran had assembled 164 centrifuges into a cascade just before the suspension, but it did not acquire sufficient experience in operating the cascade to be certain it would perform adequately. Centrifuges can crash during operation, causing other centrifuges in the cascade to fail--in essence, destroying the entire cascade. Thus, Iran might need a year or more of additional experience in operating test cascades before building and operating a plant able to make HEU for nuclear weapons.



What needs to be done
Iran does not appear to have nuclear weapons and seems unlikely to be able to make them for at least several years. Nonetheless, the IAEA board of governors is correct to view the Iranian situation as urgent and to issue a firm demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. Two years have passed since secret Iranian nuclear sites were first brought to public attention, and Iran appears unwilling to abandon its fissile material production programs. Iran has too often dictated the pace of diplomatic progress, giving the impression that it is playing for time. In the next one or two years, Iran could build up unstoppable institutional and public momentum to finish and operate its enrichment plant or a heavy-water reactor and outlast the current international diplomatic effort.

An ultimatum is the best way to require Iran to come clean and suspend its fissile material production programs or be perceived widely as pursuing a nuclear weapons program. If Iran chooses to stonewall the IAEA on safeguards issues or refuses to suspend its programs, it risks paying an enormous price for its choices.

But an ultimatum requires the international community to act in concert and develop a unified approach. So far, the United States and the European Union have been unable to agree on an approach. For months, the Bush administration has pushed for a rapid referral to the Security Council with little follow-up in mind. The EU has sought a negotiated solution to the crisis with referral to the Security Council a much more distant option.

If Iran chooses not to abide by the requests in the most recent board resolution, the United States, the EU, and other allies need to develop a common strategy to impose punitive actions against Iran while at the same time holding open a path for the Iranian regime to change its mind. If Iran complies, then their goal should be to create an agreement with an optimal combination of carrots and sticks that could lead to a more durable solution.

For any diplomatic solution to last, the United States needs to open a dialogue with Iran. If the United States remains outside an agreement between Iran and the EU, Iran is unlikely to view the agreement as sufficient, particularly as long as the U.S. economic embargo on Iran remains intact and forces within the U.S. government work to make Iranian regime change the official U.S. policy. In addition, without U.S. involvement, there is little opportunity to convince U.S. decision makers and the public that the agreement is acceptable.

Whatever happens, the United States should persuade Iran that if it renounces its fissile material production capability and accepts intrusive IAEA investigations, the United States will move to significantly improve relations.



1. "Agreed Statement at the End of a Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, and Germany," October 31, 2003.

2. Dan Williams, "Israel: No Bomb Capability Until 2007," Reuters, July 22, 2004.

3. Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, June 1, 2004, GOV/2004/34, Annex 1, p. 11.


David Albright is president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). Corey Hinderstein is deputy director.

November/December 2004 pp. 67-72 (vol. 60, no. 6) © 2004 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

An older document, but it provides a in-depth historical background.
http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/...ar02072000.PDF

If America attacks Iran it wont be like Afghanistan or Iraq they will be facing an organized army willing and able to fight.

Originally Posted by Alamgir

If America attacks Iran it wont be like Afghanistan or Iraq they will be facing an organized army willing and able to fight.

An army that is only slightly better than Saddam's was, judging by the Iran-Iraq war. Plus they would be down whatever amount of manpower the Iranian mullah's have sent into Iraq already. Especially the scores of Iranian commando's that were killed or captured in both battles for Fallujah, and possibly even the scuffle with Muqtada Al-Sadr which made the US Forces postpone taking Fallujah.

Originally Posted by lemontree

Why should'nt Iran have a nuclear programme?

A better question is why should the US allow them to have a nuclear program?