Thread: Anatomy of A Tribal Revolt

S-2,

It would have been interesting if the article had presented us some trends about tribal affiliations and identity pre-invasion. A number of people observing Iraq have recorded that Iraqi society was lot less religious than its neighbors back then, but has become more religious following the invasion. I would like to know if similar retrogression (from the stated US objective of a stable, progressive Iraq) occurred in matters of tribal idenitity. People revert back to primitive forms of social and political networks during chaos (the "me and my brother against my cousin, me and my cousins against the world" attitude sets in). So if the goal is simply to get any al Queda you can, it is a splendid strategy; but if the ambition extends to creating a modern state capable of destroying al Queda systematically, it may be a bit short-sighted in its after-effects, don't you think?

"I would like to know if similar retrogression (from the stated US objective of a stable, progressive Iraq) occurred in matters of tribal idenitity."

Cactus, could you expand here a bit? I don't think I understand unless you're suggesting that American policy-makers held a broad mis-conception about the roles of tribes within the Iraqi polity. If so, that sounds more than fair.

"So if the goal is simply to get any al Queda you can, it is a splendid strategy; but if the ambition extends to creating a modern state capable of destroying al Queda systematically, it may be a bit short-sighted in its after-effects, don't you think?"

A singular focus on AQI may be "a bit short-sighted" as well with no guarantee of success. Kilcullen points to the failure of the "surge" to create it's intended effect- a top-down national reconciliation. While it may yet happen, we've been the beneficiaries of an unanticipated process that's emerging at the grass-roots level. I say "unanticipated" while fully recognizing that our troops down on the deck are now creating their own synergistic swirl stemming from our growing and culturally attuned COIN acumen.

I've noticed it. So have many others. Two questions for me are, 1.) whether we can carry this momentum into the shia regions and tribes with the same/similar results and, 2.) whether, unintended or not, this "bottom-up" process can actually be successfully linked to the Iraqi national government and by what mechanisms?

I remain unconvinced that we can consolidate these gains in the sunni tribal regions. I remain unconvinced that we can successfully transfer these techniques into the shia tribal regions further south. Unlike the northern two-thirds of the nation, our forces are not positioned in the south. As such, innovation down in the shia village street won't be coming anytime soon at the hands of imaginative American company commanders (nor British, either). Until that changes we depend upon shias, with few examples or support and almost no political cover, reaching to the same middle-ground as their sunni cousins.

Perhaps success in the northern two-thirds of the nation will allow American forces to "infiltrate" the southern villages and replicate the success. After all, Kilcullen stresses the force multiplying effect of the anbari/sunni success. If so, hopefully our increasingly freed-up forces and the national government can begin encroaching on Moqtada's carved-out southern enclave.

"After-effects" are interesting. What after-effects do you imagine as a consequence of a modern Iraqi state capable of systematically destroying Al Qaeda? Perhaps you could expand a bit here as well?

Originally Posted by S-2

"I would like to know if similar retrogression (from the stated US objective of a stable, progressive Iraq) occurred in matters of tribal idenitity."

Cactus, could you expand here a bit? I don't think I understand unless you're suggesting that American policy-makers held a broad mis-conception about the roles of tribes within the Iraqi polity. If so, that sounds more than fair.

"So if the goal is simply to get any al Queda you can, it is a splendid strategy; but if the ambition extends to creating a modern state capable of destroying al Queda systematically, it may be a bit short-sighted in its after-effects, don't you think?"
...

"After-effects" are interesting. What after-effects do you imagine as a consequence of a modern Iraqi state capable of systematically destroying Al Qaeda? Perhaps you could expand a bit here as well?

US stated goal is a stable and progressive Iraq. To be a stable nation, a national identity must supercede religious, ethnic and tribal identities among the vast majority. To be progressive a people must adopt a broad mind to absorb positive values and ideas they cannot generate by themselves. To these ends, a revival of tribal identities is effectively retrogression (of Iraqis) for Americans.

Of course it may not be a tribal identity revival at all, but an existing state we just came to know about. In that case there is no retrogression for Americans. Its just how things were. They should be exploited now to what extent possible and discarded as progress occurs in other fields (especially national primary education infrastructure).
...

The "after-effects" I worry about is not of the establishment of a modern Iraqi state, but the "after-effects" of encouraging tribal forces: they may have long-term negative consequenes on nation-building efforts, even if the have short-term positive effect of killing a few local al Queda.

Could you link me to anything that states that our ongoing, continuing objective remains "progressive" governance, i.e. "democratic transformation" I'd presume? I'm certain that we've regressed back to a far more fundamental approach emphasizing stability at the expense of advancing democratic ideals as an absolute priority.

You said,

"The "after-effects" I worry about is... the "after-effects" of encouraging tribal forces: they may have long-term negative consequenes on nation-building efforts, even if the have short-term positive effect of killing a few local al Queda."

Kilcullen shares the same concern, as do others-

"Unless re-integration measures are formally established, some tribes may come to see their security forces as a permanent entitlement, which would make control over their areas more difficult for any future central government."

At this point, Kilcullen and others appear to realize that whatever may have initially been intended as American national objectives for Iraq are less salient than what is evolving on the ground. He fully acknowledges that the anbari opportunity is not of our making. Capitalizing upon it, however, is. To that extent, we shall see just how opportunistic and flexible our leadership is under these emerging realities.

Originally Posted by S-2

Kilcullen shares the same concern, as do others-

"Unless re-integration measures are formally established, some tribes may come to see their security forces as a permanent entitlement, which would make control over their areas more difficult for any future central government."

At this point, Kilcullen and others appear to realize that whatever may have initially been intended as American national objectives for Iraq are less salient than what is evolving on the ground. He fully acknowledges that the anbari opportunity is not of our making. Capitalizing upon it, however, is. To that extent, we shall see just how opportunistic and flexible our leadership is under these emerging realities.

Ah, this is exactly what I was looking for! If I understand it correctly he is calling for controlled exploitation of the situation. With plenty of disclaimers, safety clauses and whatnot. I agree with the general idea then.

Now what is your opinion about it? To capitalize, or to not capitalize? I realize it may ultimately be a decision you would want to make on the ground, on a case-by-case basis. But what would the starting point of your decision making be, based on your general understanding of human psychology, historic progress, nature of conflicts etc?

"Now what is your opinion about it? To capitalize, or to not capitalize? I realize it may ultimately be a decision you would want to make on the ground, on a case-by-case basis. But what would the starting point of your decision making be, based on your general understanding of human psychology, historic progress, nature of conflicts etc?"

Ummm...you can build it well, fast, and cheap. Choose any two at the exclusion of the third.

What do you think?

S-2,

the interesting thing about this strategy is that it plays two games at once. it kills AQ, which will reduce the number of sectarian attacks poisonous to reconciliation.

at the same time, though, it raises stronger sunni structures whom don't view the national government with any love.

basically, if the government doesn't reconciliate, this would be the medicine that could very well kill the patient. but by then we would have moved on to a strategy of just targeting AQ and other transnational terrorists anyway!