Thread: Iran's threats

"To these facts add that an Arab newspaper published in London and Beirut reported that an Iranian intelligence unit has established a center called "The Brigades of the Shahids of the Global Islamic Awakening," controlled by a Revolutionary Guards intelligence officer, Hassan Abbasi. The newspaper has a tape recording of Abbasi when he spoke of Iran's secret plans, which include "a strategy drawn up for the destruction of Anglo-Saxon civilization."

Ridiculous, almost comic - "destruction of the Anglo-Saxon Civilization" -- this sounds as absurd as the Jihadist's tripe.

"These are facts. Now let's consider the information coming in from Iraq where, day after day, our troops are being killed.

Most of the killing is now being done by Muslim militia -- Shi'ite Muslims -- in the cities of Fallujah, Mosul and Najaf. This militia appears to have some loyalty -- but not much -- to the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but he is equally obviously not their paymaster"

Oh boy, "facts" are these? Sistani a commander of the militias?? Shi'ah militia in Falluja, and not Sunni Militia directed by Al-Zaqawi and ex-Iraqi army intelligence officers?? The article is weak on "facts" and weighted on the side of fantasy and maliciousness, witness (more "facts"):

"one last fact: The 9/11 commission in its report poses a question, "September 11 was a day of unprecedented shock. The nation was unprepared. How can we avoid such a tragedy again?"

The answer has to be obvious. Ensure that Iran does not have the opportunity to make a first-strike against the U.S. and that Iran stops attempting to make Iraq a colony"

The fact that the Iranian is not "Arab" apparently is meaningless, presumably the 8 years of war between Iran and Iraq was conducted without the participation of "Shi'ah"?? But then consider the logic of inevitablity of pre-emption: "How can we avoid such a tragedy again?" and the "obvious answer : "Ensure that Iran does not have the opportunity to make a first strike against the U/S.." -- much like arguing that because we have been in a accident before, lets "ensure" that such a possibility does not arise - how? either by not driving or being the only driver around, ofcourse there is always the choice of not having cars at all.

Nuclear weapons in Iran are a problem, but then they are a probelm whereever they are and in whgich ever country they are in -- perhaps a more rational approach may be to recognize that such weapons are reflections of insecurity, that perhaps we may attenuate that insecurity or transform it, just a thought, anyways, whatever the demerits of this thinking, it does not suffer from arrogance, a narrow of selection of "facts" recalled and suicidal impulses.

Originally Posted by mostlymad

how reliable are these statements and information, guys

Nothing is 100%, ever. This appears to be a propaganda piece, but it still tells alot about the thinking involved, no matter how much is true or false.

Najaf 1 - Qom 0
Schism within contemporary Shi'ism
Iqbal Latif

The lingering conflict in Iraq, more than a year after the end of the year, demonstrates the subtle dynamics of Iraqi Shi'ism and the extent to which it affects power brokering in the Iraqi state. By handing over the keys to the Imam Ali mosque, Iraq's holiest Shi'ite shrine, Sadr was transferring the ideological legitimacy to the authentic victor of the Najaf uprising, Grand Ayatollah Sistani.

To create the waves of Shi'ite sympathy necessary for the success of his revolt Sadr's strategy was to dare the Iraqi government to violate the Shrine: in effect dare them to be barbarians. In the face of that challenge, Iraqi government on one hand had to convince Sadr that they were prepared to cross that line if it meant saving the integrity of Iraq or having Sistani intervene on their behalf.

The big question was will Sistani throw his weight behind beleaguered Allawi regime? Or would he call for the mass uprising that could have change the course of Iraq to exist as a unified entity. The stakes were high and so were the repercussions.

Sadr overestimated the degree of protection the mosque and its proximity to the shrine afforded him, since it could be easily trespassed. His militias were not protected by any physical boundary but by a sacred one from within the sanctuary, which civilized men hesitate to cross. Mortars were fired from the courtyard of the Imam Ali Shrine by men who didn"t even fortify their positions, secure in the knowledge that they could slay men too decent to fire back.

The exemplary self restraint by the forces encircling the shrine discredited Sadr's strategy to use the shrine as a shield to promote his delicate agenda of ideological grandiosity. It was a rebuke to his strategy that Shiites refused to descend on the shrine despite of his repetitive calls; a solitary call by Ali Sistani was answered by thousands of weeping Iraqis. It was significant that Grand Ayatollah Sistani, said to be under treatment in London, remained largely silent on the fighting which had engulfed his religious capital, almost as if the Pope had no comment on fighting raging through St. Peter's square.

Sistani's timely stroke helped broker a deal that on surface looks a face saver for Sadr, as he and his forces were being decimated, the deal allows Sadr to be a free man despite his indictment for the murder of Khoei, for this concession he had agree to surrender the mausoleum of Imam Ali, disarmament of his militia and promise to join the mainstream Iraqi politics.

Scratching the wounds a little deeper it was actually Sistani and Sadr who were fighting for the heart and soul of Shiite mainstream sympathies; it is Sistani who has emerged as winner and has emerged as the grandest of the Ayatollahs that has the power to incite popular resistance.

Sadr was perfectly aware that with impending denunciation his future role in Iraqi politics was restricted, one collateral benefit from this peace deal brokered by Ali Sistani is that he has been declared a free man. The individual victory of escaping from a damning indictment aside his ideological power base has been dented and exposed.

The origin of the bloody feud is ensconced in ideological and individual vendetta. Inspired by the religious leader Kazim al-Husseini al-Hairi of Qom, calling for an Islamic government in Iraq some clerics, most notably the young Muqtada al-Sadr of Najaf and Muhammad al-Fartusi in Baghdad, issued bold statements. They moved to extend their influence in some Shi'ite cities in the south and in the slum area of Baghdad known before the war as Saddam City (now renamed Sadr City, after the religious leader Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was gunned down in Najaf in 1999).

The fierce struggle within Shi'ite religious circles took an ominous turn with the murder of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei, son of Abu al-Qasim, who had been brought to Najaf by American forces in the hopes that he would be able to exert his influence in the city. The killing of Abd al-Majid, a man who exemplified the sober and moderate face of Iraqi Shi'ism, has underscored the role of violence in Iraqi politics as well as the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Sadr. Sadr was accused of collusion in murder of Majid al-Khoei by an Iraqi judge.

This was the final effort by Sadr to control of mainstream Shi'ism, the end game between Sistani of Najaf and the Ayatollahs of Qum who were backing Sadr was an effective coup d'état to bury "quietism" practiced by the al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah in Najaf. Qum was playing the game of ultimate ideological supremacy through their proxy Sadr. Iraqi and Iranian Shi'ite strains have little love lost for one another the differences borne out during the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 and the 1991 Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq.

During the war with Iran, Iraqi Shi'ites, who formed the rank and file of the Iraqi infantry, fought against their Iranian coreligionists, demonstrating that their loyalty to the Iraqi state overrode sectarian allegiance and their discontent with the Sunni-dominated Baath regime. Iraqi Shiites are known historically for their "Iraqi nationalism" whereas Iraqi Sunnis have looked towards "Arab nationalism" as the clarion call.

To understand the background of this schism between Qum and Najaf, one needs to look profoundly at contemporary centers of Shi'ites learning's. Four senior Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Religious Institution (al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah) in Najaf, the preeminent seminary center for the training of Shiite clergymen. Before the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, Najaf was the most important center of study for Shia religious leaders.

However, Saddam Hussein ordered mass arrests and the expulsion of senior clerics, giving the Iranian seminary in the city of Qom the opportunity to take over the religious leadership of the Shias. Qom became the pre-eminent religious center for Shia Muslims since the Iranian revolution, however, Najaf has a history of more than a millennium of leadership, and the Iranian clerics who run the holy city of Qum, are facing a revived rival.

As of mid-2003 the seminary in Qom hosted between 40,000 and 50,000 clergy, while the number in Najaf stood at about 2,000, down from about 10,000 before the Ba'ath regime took. The first exodus from Qom to Najaf is expected to be by exiled Iraqi clerics, estimated to number between 3,000, and 5,000.

At the heart of schism lies reluctance of seminary of Najaf to get involved in worldly affairs -- in essence al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah in Najaf wants to shield the highest Shi'ite religious leadership, the marjaiyya, from politics - this is an old tension within Shi'ite Islam between two conflicting tendencies, quietism and activism.

Whether clerics should confine their activities to religious affairs or also seek a role in politics has been a matter of fierce debate among Shi'ites for well over a century. Sunnis, who in theory are expected to obey their rulers and even tolerate a tyrant in order to avoid civil strife and preserve the cohesion of the Muslim community, observant Shi'ites recognize no authority on earth except that of the imam.

The twelfth imam is believed to be hidden from view and is expected to return one day as a messianic figure, the Mahdi. In his absence, there can be no human sovereign who is fully legitimate. This ambivalence toward worldly power has resulted in different interpretations within Shi'ite Islam regarding government accountability and the role of the clerics in state affairs. Imam Khomeini's concept of the rule of the jurist is only one among several competing views.

Qom is worried to face a challenge over the concept of the Velayat-e-Faqih - the God-given authority for a top religious leader to oversee secular in the absence of the Prophet Mohammad and infallible imams. The Najaf seminary's view of the Velayat-e-Faqih is that of a supervisor and adviser. The Qom school believes the opposite, with Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, officially considered as the highest religious authority of the world's Shias. Qom sees the direct involvement of clerics in state ruling and executive affairs as their legitimate right and moral obligation.

The battle of wills in present altercation was undoubtedly won by the elder grand Ayatollah Sistani and his favored doctrine of "quietism" won over calls of "activism." From designed chaos aimed at popular uprising of the South to peaceful withdrawal Sistani political maneuverings helped defuse the crisis, in the process he has emerged as a new force to reckon with. Iranian born Sistani plan to have higher goals his ambitions of Shiite heart and soul stems from his desire to shift the thrust of Shiite theocracy from Qum to Najaf and Karbela.

The recent upspring of the Sadr rebels was a blatant attempt to rob Sistani of its hardcore support, by showing Sistani soft on resistance Sadr purpose was to build a momentum that would lead to popular mass uprising those intentions did not materialize. Sistani call to "mass popular uprising for peace" was a de-facto call for Sadr withdrawal, that Sistani achieved very ingeniously, someone who is not even a born Iraqi to accomplish this ideological following in Iraq is matchless.

This is major victory of the al-Hawzah al-'Ilmiyyah and the marjaiyya in Najaf over that of Ayatollahs of Qom, this may not be the last one too, in political pragmatism it is clear that Sistani keeps his cards very close his chest, when he decides to play he plays them well too.

I would really like to know why we don't bomb their reactor and their ballistic missiles right now. An overthrow of their Government can wait, but not destroying a nuclear threat CAN NOT wait.

Cuz there's deal to be made - Iran have offered to be helpful in Iraq and elsewhere - and attacking them would have the result of unifying them, what is desirable, I think, is to divide them, divide the people from the govt and the aspirations of the people from those of the ruling elite -- word is that property values have sky rocketed in Najaf, that it's those iranians who fear they would be accountable if they did not get themselves a ticket to Najaf and the sanctuary it offers.

There should be no deals with bad guys, ever.

Let me just make sure i got this right...

IRAN has threatened us?

Holy crap, there is no way I could have possibly concieved this.

In a ideal world - but circumspection is itself power, it is not as if only the Us has power to influence events and personalities, we must be cognizant of this - let Iranians free Iran, the business of foreign policy imperatives always seems to turn out "tainted"

http://www.grandforks.com/mld/grandf...on/9762923.htm

Posted on Sun, Sep. 26, 2004

COLUMNIST GEORGE WILL : A nuclear Iran seems inevitable


WASHINGTON - Iran is not a mere dystopia. It is perhaps the biggest problem on the horizon of the next U.S. president because it is moving toward development of nuclear weapons, concerning which the Bush administration has two factions. One favors regime change, the other favors negotiations. There is no plausible path to achieving the former and no reason to expect the latter to be productive.

The regime-changers have their hands full with the unfinished project next door to Iran. Negotiations cannot succeed without one of two things. One is a credible threat of force, which America's Iraq preoccupation makes unlikely. The second, which is also unlikely, is a mix of incentives, positive and negative, that can overcome this fact: Iran's regime is mad as a hatter, but its desire for nuclear weapons is not irrational.

Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, near four nuclear powers - Russia, India, Pakistan and almost certainly Israel - and the large military presence of another, the infidel United States. Iran has seen how the pursuit of nuclear weapons allows the ramshackle regime of a tin-pot country like North Korea to rivet the world's attention. Iran knows that if Saddam Hussein had acquired such weapons, he would still be in power - and in Kuwait. And even if the major powers could devise security guarantees sufficient to assuage Iran's geopolitical worries, there remains the regime's religious mania:

Until 1994, Nafisi says, Iran's chief film censor, who previously had been theater censor, was nearly blind. He would sit in a theater with an assistant who explained what was transpiring on stage and took notes on the cuts the censor required. The showing on television of "Billy Budd" was condemned because it supposedly promoted homosexuality - although the television programmers chose it because it had no female characters. After the 1979 revolution, the regime lowered the marriageable age of women from 18 to 9. Since 2002 - this is Iranian moderation - a court's permission is required to marry younger than 13.

President Kennedy could not have imagined that such a backward-facing regime would be among those that would acquire the most modern of weapons. In the 1960 presidential campaign, he cited "indications" that by 1964 there would be "10, 15 or 20" nuclear powers. As president, he said that by 1975 there might be 20 nuclear powers. Today it is unclear whether North Korea has become the ninth by weaponizing its fissile material.

It is in America's interest - indeed, the interest of all members of the nuclear club - to keep new members out. But a mere aspiration is not a policy. The club will expand over time. U.S. policy can vigorously discourage this, but must discriminate among, and against, nations. It is unlikely, but possible, that China's weight, properly applied in the context of North Korea's desperate material needs, can prevent North Korea from crossing the threshold. However, Iran is almost certainly going to cross it.

Iran can negotiate in bad faith while it continues its progress toward development of such weapons, as North Korea has done while increasing its supply of plutonium. When that tactic has been exhausted, Iran can come to agreements that it then more or less stealthily disregards, as North Korea has done.

On Tuesday, four days after a U.N. agency told Iran not do it, Iran announced that it has begun processing 37 tons of yellow cake (milled uranium) into a gas as part of a process to produce a compound that can be used in nuclear power plants, but also can be a precursor of highly enriched uranium for weapons. U.S. policy is that the "international community," whatever that is, "cannot allow the Iranians to develop a nuclear weapon" (Condoleezza Rice, Aug. 8). It is surreal to cast this as a question of what anyone will "allow" Iran to do.

So, Iran is dangerous because it wants to go nukilla? -- The real problem in Iran is not it's nukilla program but the fact that it is a fountainhead of Islamist radicalism

Originally Posted by tarek

The real problem in Iran is not it's nukilla program but the fact that it is a fountainhead of Islamist radicalism

Yeah, it's scarry to think suicide preachers could have nukes.

Originally Posted by tarek

So, Iran is dangerous because it wants to go nukilla? -- The real problem in Iran is not it's nukilla program but the fact that it is a fountainhead of Islamist radicalism

Tarek,

#1 and & #2 fountainhead of Islamists radicalism are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Iran is a theocracy but its society is far less radicalised than Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

In Iran there is a progressive movement which wants to modernise the country.

Whereas Saudis are the most retrograde regime on the planet sponsering and practicism 7th century Wahabism.

Pakistan on the other hand is a jihadist factory capable of churning them out by millions.

If the world has to eradicate Islamist radicalism then the first two countries which need work are Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.