Thread: How could Israel strike Iran?

Originally Posted by highsea

They have 3 modern Dolphin SSK's (modified German 212's) Supposedly the rotation goes: one is always in the Red Sea, one is in the Persian Gulf, and one is at home.

I expect they are quite capable of taking out an Iranian warship or two and getting away.

Agreed.

A few other fun facts:

The range of the submarine is 8,000 miles at a surface speed of eight knots and over 400 miles at an economical speed of 8 knots dived.

The endurance of the submarine is 30 days

Source

With rendezvous at sea with re-supply...it can be done.

It SHOULD be done.

Originally Posted by Bluesman

There is no need to 'lure' them to the table: they're ready and eager to negotiate until they have a deliverable nuclear weapon. TIME is their enemy more than any Western power, and they are trying to string this along until it is a FACT that cannot be undone. Negotiations will be gladly carried on for as long as it takes. In bad faith, you may be sure, and if you were but willing to see it, as has been amply demonstrated up to this point. Refer to that farcical Euro-kibuki dance that flopped so spectacularly

Hi Bluesman,

All I see in the efforts of Washington and the EU3 up to this point is a failure to deliver the goods which does not neccessarily mean that the goods are undeliverable in general.

There are really only a half a dozen definable outcomes to this whole mess and two of them such as Iran being nuclear armed and Iran having control of the nuclear fuel process are, I am sure you will agree, unacceptable (I will return to this thought below). This leaves four outcomes that might be workable.

The U.S., the EU3 and Tehran have paralell interests with regards to some fairly substantial issues. Under these conditions, one would think that progress might be made if one or more of the negotiators were competent.

There are sticks and there are carrots and they are not being arranged and offered in the right combinations. Also, some of the sticks double quite nicely as levers which is pretty handy. The U.S. is not in a bad position to negoiate all things considered.

NOW you're talkin'! Seriously, direct action need not be B-52s or Marines or TLAMs. I like the direction you're thinking now, but note: all of those steps are a de facto war, carried on at a level below declared general hostilities.

The Iranians have been sponsoring terrorists, running guns, etc. so let them make the rules. We can sponsor dissidents, give aid and supplies, etc. just as well as they can.

I believe the Iranians are rational enough to realize that we have the weapons with which to destroy them and the means to deliver them and would not be to keen to ratchet up too far (though I could be wrong in which case we end up bombing them anyway).

But it is what i advocate: FORCIBLY removing their nuclear program from their grip, now and forever more, until they are a rational, accountable democratically-ruled secular state.

Here is where we are in a bit of disagreement on general principles:

1. I am not convinced that the cost v. benefit analysis favors the theoretical risks entailed by military action against Iran (but am willing to entertain more speculation);

2. I was raised to beleive that self determination was a good thing and given the track record of installing political systems at gunpoint I am going to have to remain firm pending evidence to the contrary.

Let the Iranians oust their own regime and remake their political landscape in the manner they see fit (yes, we might be able to help them and as long as the current regime is blowing up things in South America and meddling in the Levant and Iraq I think it would be "fair"...like I said, they are making the rules and I doubt they can articulate a single one that is beyond our ability to play by).

Getting back to the "unacceptable" outcome of having the Iranians get the bomb. "Unacceptable" does not mean "impossible" or "untennable".

Like it or not, it is quite possible that the Iranians may build a bomb sometime at the end of the decade or a little beyond so we are going to have to have a plan to deter, contain, ENGAGE and see to their disarmament anyway so why not try to engage them now and see if we can make something happen?

Sure, it might not work but this is a paralell track and we reserve the right to continue efforts by other means to find a suitable outcome.

An engaged Iran would easily be worth the effort of trying. In a policy relevant time frame, it is quite possible the Iranians are going to be among the best partners we could have which sounds outright crazy at this point I know but look at the stakes and the players involved and it does make sense.

But the Iranians will see it for exactly what it is: a mortal threat to their regime. It would be WAR, and the only thing to decide would be what level of intensity it's carried out on. If they want to go all the way, we'd better be prepared for that.

Brinksmanship may be the order of the day and it can be a ***** true.

However, the whole thing might be avoided or moderated with a little effort and ingenuity.

If they want to go all the way than it will be a very bad day for Iran and not a particularly good one for the United States.

Hope you have a pleasant evening,

William

William, you of all people need to read this, and really internalize it. It is by the greatest 'orientalist' (as they used to be known) of all time: Bernard Lewis. He knows more than anybody else about this subject. his credentials are unimpeachable, and there simply exists no greater voice anywhere in the world.

So, please read and understand what he has to say on this subject, the rationality of Iran's leader (and leader he is, however much we would all wish him to be checked and controlled by all thos oh-so-reasonable ayatollahs).

AT WAR

August 22
Does Iran have something in store?

BY BERNARD LEWIS
Tuesday, August 8, 2006 4:30 p.m.

During the Cold War, both sides possessed weapons of mass destruction, but neither side used them, deterred by what was known as MAD, mutual assured destruction. Similar constraints have no doubt prevented their use in the confrontation between India and Pakistan. In our own day a new such confrontation seems to be looming between a nuclear-armed Iran and its favorite enemies, named by the late Ayatollah Khomeini as the Great Satan and the Little Satan, i.e., the United States and Israel. Against the U.S. the bombs might be delivered by terrorists, a method having the advantage of bearing no return address. Against Israel, the target is small enough to attempt obliteration by direct bombardment.
It seems increasingly likely that the Iranians either have or very soon will have nuclear weapons at their disposal, thanks to their own researches (which began some 15 years ago), to some of their obliging neighbors, and to the ever-helpful rulers of North Korea. The language used by Iranian President Ahmadinejad would seem to indicate the reality and indeed the imminence of this threat.

Would the same constraints, the same fear of mutual assured destruction, restrain a nuclear-armed Iran from using such weapons against the U.S. or against Israel?





There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran's present rulers. This worldview and expectation, vividly expressed in speeches, articles and even schoolbooks, clearly shape the perception and therefore the policies of Ahmadinejad and his disciples.
Even in the past it was clear that terrorists claiming to act in the name of Islam had no compunction in slaughtering large numbers of fellow Muslims. A notable example was the blowing up of the American embassies in East Africa in 1998, killing a few American diplomats and a much larger number of uninvolved local passersby, many of them Muslims. There were numerous other Muslim victims in the various terrorist attacks of the last 15 years.

The phrase "Allah will know his own" is usually used to explain such apparently callous unconcern; it means that while infidel, i.e., non-Muslim, victims will go to a well-deserved punishment in hell, Muslims will be sent straight to heaven. According to this view, the bombers are in fact doing their Muslim victims a favor by giving them a quick pass to heaven and its delights--the rewards without the struggles of martyrdom. School textbooks tell young Iranians to be ready for a final global struggle against an evil enemy, named as the U.S., and to prepare themselves for the privileges of martyrdom.

A direct attack on the U.S., though possible, is less likely in the immediate future. Israel is a nearer and easier target, and Mr. Ahmadinejad has given indication of thinking along these lines. The Western observer would immediately think of two possible deterrents. The first is that an attack that wipes out Israel would almost certainly wipe out the Palestinians too. The second is that such an attack would evoke a devastating reprisal from Israel against Iran, since one may surely assume that the Israelis have made the necessary arrangements for a counterstrike even after a nuclear holocaust in Israel.

The first of these possible deterrents might well be of concern to the Palestinians--but not apparently to their fanatical champions in the Iranian government. The second deterrent--the threat of direct retaliation on Iran--is, as noted, already weakened by the suicide or martyrdom complex that plagues parts of the Islamic world today, without parallel in other religions, or for that matter in the Islamic past. This complex has become even more important at the present day, because of this new apocalyptic vision.





In Islam, as in Judaism and Christianity, there are certain beliefs concerning the cosmic struggle at the end of time--Gog and Magog, anti-Christ, Armageddon, and for Shiite Muslims, the long awaited return of the Hidden Imam, ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil, however these may be defined. Mr. Ahmadinejad and his followers clearly believe that this time is now, and that the terminal struggle has already begun and is indeed well advanced. It may even have a date, indicated by several references by the Iranian president to giving his final answer to the U.S. about nuclear development by Aug. 22. This was at first reported as "by the end of August," but Mr. Ahmadinejad's statement was more precise.
What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (c.f., Koran XVII.1). This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.

A passage from the Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted in an 11th-grade Iranian schoolbook, is revealing. "I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [i.e., the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against their whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another's hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours."

In this context, mutual assured destruction, the deterrent that worked so well during the Cold War, would have no meaning. At the end of time, there will be general destruction anyway. What will matter will be the final destination of the dead--hell for the infidels, and heaven for the believers. For people with this mindset, MAD is not a constraint; it is an inducement.

How then can one confront such an enemy, with such a view of life and death? Some immediate precautions are obviously possible and necessary. In the long term, it would seem that the best, perhaps the only hope is to appeal to those Muslims, Iranians, Arabs and others who do not share these apocalyptic perceptions and aspirations, and feel as much threatened, indeed even more threatened, than we are. There must be many such, probably even a majority in the lands of Islam. Now is the time for them to save their countries, their societies and their religion from the madness of MAD.

Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton, is the author, most recently, of "From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East" (Oxford University Press, 2004).


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Originally Posted by Swift Sword

I believe the Iranians are rational enough

Are you talking about the people or the regime?

Because when talking about any theocracy, betting on their rationality is... irrational?

The Soviet Union was a communist regime, yes, but dare I say a cynical, 'mature' one, which wasn't so committed to ideology not to look out for its own survival.

I personally wouldn't like to apply Cold War deterrence logic to Iran, or North Korea for that matter, because MAD requires cynical instincts for survival. (NK isn't religious... but its leader is certainly outthere.)

I don't know about the people, but these are far more nihilistic regimes than the USSR and we should recognise them as such. Just read Bluesman's posting from the unswervingly expert Bernard Lewis.